APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Ernest H. Pyle, was charged by presentment with two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of resisting arrest. The trial court dismissed at the request of the State the two counts of aggravated kidnapping. A petit jury convicted Defendant of the remaining counts. The trial court properly merged Defendant’s two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and sentenced Defendant to 25 years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that trial court erred by not granting a mistrial after allowing evidence of a prior bad act. Having carefully reviewed the record before us and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terry D. Sanders, appeals the Houston County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of the sale of less than 0.5 gram of cocaine and his effective thirty-year sentence.  The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial when the State’s confidential informant testified that the Petitioner was on community corrections, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that he was denied a fair trial due to cumulative errors in the conviction proceedings.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiffs presented Defendants with an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to Defendants’ acceptance, Plaintiffs attempted to rescind the offer. Defendants nevertheless accepted the offer within the time allowed by Rule 68 and attempted to enforce the offer of judgment. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs were not entitled to revoke the offer of judgment and entered an order granting the motion to enforce the judgment. We affirm and remand.

Calvin Reid Quarles, Defendant, was convicted by a Williamson County Jury for theft of property valued over $500.  After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant perfected this appeal.  The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in giving the jury charge partially before and partially after closing arguments; and (2) whether the trial court erred by issuing a supplemental jury instruction.  After a review of the applicable authorities and the record, we conclude that Defendant waived any challenge to the trial court’s completing the jury instructions after closing argument by acquiescing and by failing to raise the issue in a motion for new trial.  Further, we conclude that the trial court did not commit error in answering a question posed by the jury during deliberations.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Jermaine Carlton Jordan, pled guilty to one count of attempted first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping in April 2007.  Six years later, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that he should be granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  The coram nobis court summarily dismissed his petition as time-barred.  Petitioner appealed, arguing that due process considerations require tolling the statute of limitations.  Upon thorough review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has neither alleged the nature of the evidence nor when it was discovered sufficiently for us to determine whether it qualifies as a later-arising ground for relief.  Therefore, we hold that due process does not require tolling the statute of limitations.  We affirm the decision of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Conley R. Fair, appeals the Unicoi County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1997 convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and his life-plus-thirty-five-years sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by (1) denying him relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding his claim that he was denied his right to confront witnesses. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On July 26, 2012, this court affirmed judgments regarding the petitioner, Kevin Womack, for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm with intent to employ in the commission of a dangerous felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, theft of property over $500, and tampering with evidence, reducing the theft conviction from a Class E felony to a Class A misdemeanor. State v. Kevin Womack, No. W2011-01827-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3055773, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 26, 2012). No application for permission to appeal was filed. On August 8, 2013, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he did not file a Rule 11 application because his trial counsel had filed a motion to withdraw, “informing the petitioner his application [for permission to appeal] must [be] filed by September 24, 2012.” He argued that his post-conviction petition was timely because it was filed within one year of this date. The State responded that the petition was untimely, and the post-conviction court agreed, dismissing the petition for this reason. On October 15, 2013, the petitioner filed his notice of appeal regarding that dismissal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Charles Hall, was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced, as a repeat violent offender, to life imprisonment without parole. This court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied his application for permission to appeal. State v. Charles Hall, No. W2009-02569-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5271082, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 12, 2011). Subsequently, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that trial counsel was deficient in pursuing pretrial motions and making erroneous trial decisions. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court determined both that the petitioner had failed to establish that trial counsel had been ineffective or that he had been prejudiced by counsel’s alleged misdeeds. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Petitioner, Reginald Maurice Adkins, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for first degree murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery and his life-plus-twelve-years sentence.  The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Lance Thomas Sandifer, was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape.  He was sentenced to an effective sentence of one-hundred and eight years in confinement.   Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence, and this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court.  State v. Lance Sandifer, et al., No. M2008-02849-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Dec. 21, 2010) perm. app. denied (Tenn., May 26, 2011).  A detailed summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions can be found in that opinion.  Petitioner now appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

The Petitioner, William L. Green, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-three-year sentence.  The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from the termination of Robert Koscinski (“Koscinski”) from his employment as a corrections officer with the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office. Koscinski had been found to be unfit for duty based upon a psychological evaluation. Koscinski appealed his termination to the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Civil Service Board “the Board”). The Board upheld Koscinski’s termination. Koscinski filed an application for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). After hearing arguments, the Trial Court entered an order denying Koscinski’s writ of certiorari. Koscinski timely appealed to this Court. We find and hold that the Board applied the correct legal standard, and that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial and material evidence. We affirm the Trial Court.

Parents and minor child brought this action against a licensed clinical social worker, alleging that the social worker provided counseling to the minor child in violation of a court order. The social worker moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act’s procedural requirements. The trial court found that the complaint sounded in health care liability and accordingly dismissed it in its entirety. We conclude that the trialcourtapplied an improper standard in dismissing the complaint,vacate the judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

Mother and Father were divorced in 2009 and Mother was named the primary residential parent of their two children. Father later filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, and the court changed the primary residential parent designation to Father. Mother filed one petition to modify in 2012 and another petition in 2014 in an effort to become the primary residential parent again. The court entered orders denying each petition, and Mother appealed both orders. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all respects.

Mother and Father were divorced in 2009 and Mother was named the primary residential parent of their two children. Father later filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, and the court changed the primary residential parent designation to Father. Mother filed one petition to modify in 2012 and another petition in 2014 in an effort to become the primary residential parent again. The court entered orders denying each petition, and Mother appealed both orders. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all respects.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.06, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

The father and step-mother of the child at issue commenced this action to terminate the parental rights of the child’s mother and for step-parent adoption. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and by willful failure to visit the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), and upon the determination that termination of Mother’s rights was in the best interest of the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(c)(2) and (i). The trial court further determined that step-parent adoption was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm the determination that Mother abandoned her child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1113(g)(1) by willfully failing to visit her child and by willfully failing to support her child during the four-month period preceding the filing of this petition. However, because the trial court failed to provide written findings of fact as mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k), we reverse the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Accordingly, we remand the issue of the child’s best interest to the trial court with instructions to provide written findings of fact on the issue of the child’s best interest and to enter judgment consistent with its findings.

Defendant, Dandarius Woods, was charged with one count of aggravated rape and one count of rape.  He filed a motion to suppress a statement that he made to police, alleging that his statements were coerced by implied promises of leniency.  After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, finding that Defendant’s statements were not voluntary.  The State sought an interlocutory appeal.  Upon thorough review of the record, we find that the detective did not imply that Defendant would be released or that Defendant would receive treatment in lieu of a jail sentence if he confessed to rape.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Defendant, Robert Allen Lester, Jr., was indicted by the Dekalb County Grand Jury in fourteen separate cases for thirteen counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, one count of aggravated burglary, four counts of burglary, eleven counts of theft of property valued under $500, one count of theft of property valued over $500, and six counts of theft of property valued over $1,000.  Subsequently, Defendant entered into negotiated guilty pleas to eleven counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, one count of aggravated burglary, and two counts of burglary.  The plea agreement called for an effective sentence of eight years, the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court at a sentencing hearing.  At the hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve the sentence in incarceration.  He appeals, challenging the denial of an alternative sentence.  After our review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the judgment form in Case Number 2013-CR-127 should be corrected to reflect a conviction and sentence for burglary rather than auto burglary.  Further, the matter is remanded to the trial court to resolve inconsistencies between the plea provisions and the corresponding judgments in order to yield an effective eight-year sentence and to correct any other clerical errors which may exist.  We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence to Defendant due to his extensive criminal history, because measures less restrictive had been applied to Defendant in the past, and in order to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offenses.  Accordingly, the matter is affirmed in part and remanded in part.

The judgment from which the pro se incarcerated appellant, Jackie D. Owens, seeks to appeal was entered on December 17, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the December 17, 2013 judgment, even considering the date upon which it appears the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (August 26, 2014). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). The appellee, Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss.

The Defendant, Dana Crumley, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s order denying her motion for a reduced sentence.  The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case concerns a boundary line dispute. Walter Allen Gault (“Plaintiff”) sued Jano Janoyan and Pinnacle Bank (“Defendants”) seeking a declaratory judgment 1 that, by way of adverse possession, he is the rightful owner of a triangle-shaped piece of land, 41.59 feet at its base and approximately 302 feet on each of its two sides. The disputed area is within the deed boundaries of the property owned by Janoyan, the Plaintiff’s next door neighbor. (See attached exhibit.) The parties’ properties are in Forest View, a residential subdivision in Knoxville. Defendants filed an answer and a counterclaim for ejectment and quiet title to the property. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Carol Payne McKinnis (“Seller”) brought suit against Sandra Kim Hammons (“Purchaser”) to enforce an oral contract for the sale of real property. Seller sought a judgment for the amount allegedly due under the parties’ agreement. Purchaser moved for summary judgment based on her contention that the action was barred by the Statute of Frauds as codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101(2012). The trial court granted the motion. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The issue presented on this appeal is whether a plaintiff who brings a health care liability action against a governmental entity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”) is entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c)(Supp. 2014) under the current version of the Health Care Liability Act (“the HCLA”). This inquiry focuses on the effect of the 2011 amendment to the HCLA that expressly includes “claims against the state or a political subdivision thereof” within the definition of “health care liability action.” Applying the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013), we hold that the 2011 amendment demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to allow the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations to be extended by 120 days in cases where a plaintiff satisfies the requirements of the HCLA. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying defendant Bradley County’s motion to dismiss.

The petitioner, Theodore James Nugent, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his timely petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 guilty-pleaded convictions of domestic assault and aggravated stalking on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary.  Because the record supports the decision of the post-conviction court, we affirm that court’s order.