APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant. Likewise, I agree with the conclusion that State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn. 2012), provides the current double jeopardy analysis and that the analysis announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), applies retroactively. I respectfully disagree, though, with the majority opinion’s conclusion that a separate due process analysis is unnecessary in the present case, and I believe the separate convictions should be merged.

In this post-divorce modification of alimony case,Husband contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his alimony obligation was not subject to modification. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and conclude that Husband’s alimony obligation constitutes transitional alimony that is subject to modification pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-121(g)(2). Reversed and remanded.
 

Appellant, Terrence Justin Feaster, stands convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, for which he received consecutive sentences of twelve years as a career offender, fourteen years as a persistent offender, and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial Defendant, Ronald Bernard Anderson, II, was found guilty as charged of four counts of the Class C felony offense of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court imposed a sentence of thee years for each conviction. A combination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing resulted in an effective sentence of six years. As to the manner of service of the sentences, the trial court ordered split confinement: three months incarceration and the balance of the six-year sentence suspended, with supervised probation for twelve years. In this appeal Defendant presents two issues for review. He claims the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend each of the four counts of the indictment over Defendant’s objection because the indictment was defective, and he asserts the evidence was legally insufficient to support the convictions. After review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

In this divorce action, the trial court granted Wife a divorce, divided the marital assets, and awarded Wife alimony of $700 per month for 48 months. Wife appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect an award of periodic alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for judicial review of a decision of the Tennessee Civil Service Commission. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Thomas Paul Gagne, Jr., appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1998 convictions for two counts of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less and his effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The circuit court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected on the ground of severe child abuse by her father. The father appeals contending the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding of severe child abuse. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm.

In January of 2002, Guadalupe Arroyo (the “Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide. The trial court imposed two twelve-year sentences to be served consecutively—an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The Petitioner successfully appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals on the basis that the trial court had imposed consecutive sentencing based upon the “dangerous offender” classification in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(4) (2010) without first addressing the requisite factors set forth in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). A second appeal on the same issue also resulted in a second remand to the trial court. In a third sentencing order, the trial court held that the sentences were reasonably related to the severity of the offenses and were necessary to protect the public, grounds essential for the imposition of consecutive sentences based upon the “dangerous offender” classification. Id. at 938; see also State v. Pollard, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 6732667, at *9-10 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013). The reasons cited were as follows: [One,] during the prior sentencing hearing the [Petitioner] admitted to underage drinking on a daily basis, confirmed in the pre-sentence report; Two, the [Petitioner] admitted to driving without a license daily; and Three, the [Petitioner] has been illegally within this country since his arrival.

In this termination of parental rights proceeding, both Mother and Father maintain that the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that they willfully abandoned the child by failure to visit within the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. Mother additionally claims that the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s findings that both parents abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of both parents.

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two consecutive twelve-year terms for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The defendant twice appealed the sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which twice remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Each time, the trial court imposed a twenty-four-year sentence. The defendant did not appeal the third sentencing order. Later, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to appeal the third sentencing order. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he and the defendant discussed the futility of a third appeal and the defendant agreed that no appeal would be filed. The defendant denied that he and his trial counsel discussed a third appeal. Trial counsel did not file a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(d)(2) waiver of appeal. The post-conviction court found trial counsel to be more credible than the defendant. Based on that finding, the trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the defendant knew of his right to appeal and waived that right. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We hold that the defendant had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know of his right to appeal or that he otherwise did not waive that right. His trial counsel’s failure to file a written waiver of appeal was not per se deficient performance, but was a fact properly considered by the trial court on the issue of whether trial counsel rendered effective representation. Based on the credibility determinations made by the post-conviction court, we hold that the defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence his allegations of ineffective
representation. The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are
affirmed.

The defendant, Sandra L. Perez, appeals a jury verdict of guilty of Tenn Care fraud, asserting insufficient evidence upon which to base a verdict of guilty. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which sets aside the order of restitution and remands for another hearing. I disagree that this is an appropriate case to observe “plain error” and would accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jimmy R. Griffin, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court conviction of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, challenging the sentence imposed by the trial court. We affirm the denial of alternative sentencing but remand the case for a determination of the proper amount of restitution.

The defendant, Cordell Bufford, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to enforce a plea agreement with the State, by denying his request for funds to hire an expert witness, by denying his motions to exclude certain evidence, by prohibiting cross-examination of the victim’s mother about the victim’s previous sexual abuse pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412, and by denying his request for a special jury instruction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Donquarius Person, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, aggravated assault, and two counts of attempted first degree murder, challenging the admission of certain hearsay testimony that was admitted pursuant to the excited utterance exception and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant seeks to appeal was entered on December 13, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the December 13, 2013 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (February 28, 2014). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Former revenue enforcement officer challenges her termination from the Tennessee Department of Revenue. Because substantial and material evidence supports the Civil Service Commission’s decision, we affirm the chancery court’s judgment.
 

Defendants in a health care liability action appeal the denial of their motions to strike the allegations of comparative fault raised in the amended answer of other defendants and their motions to dismiss the amended complaint. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Former revenue enforcement officer challenges her termination from the Tennessee Department of Revenue. Because substantial and material evidence supports the Civil Service Commission’s decision, we affirm the chancery court’s judgment.
 

The Petitioner, James Frederick Hegel, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for rape of a child and incest. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

A Carter County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Leslie Dean Ritchie, Jr., of two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-529(a) (Supp. 2009). The trial court sentenced Ritchie as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of ten years in confinement. Ritchie’s sole issue on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his two convictions. Upon review, we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in count two to reflect that the jury convicted Ritchie of the offense of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor rather than that Ritchie entered a guilty plea to this offense and to reflect that the sentence in count two is concurrent with the sentence in count one. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The order appealed is not a final judgment and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the payment for Defendant’s wedding reception. Plaintiff filed suit when Defendant failed to pay for the reception as agreed. At trial, Plaintiff presented theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The jury found for Plaintiff and returned a verdict against Defendant in the amount of $10,787.18. On appeal, Defendant requests reversal of the judgment entered against her because she believes that the jury verdict form erroneously allowed for recovery pursuant to both theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. We affirm.

John Jackson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated sexual battery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of facilitation of theft over $500. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of twenty years’ incarceration, to be served at 100%. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress; erred in failing to determine whether the Defendant’s prior convictions were admissible; erred in failing to grant a continuance after finding error in the State’s notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment; erred in failing to instruct the jury on theft as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery; that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction of aggravated sexual battery; that the trial court failed to act as thirteenth juror; and that he should not have been sentenced as a Range III offender. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.