APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court granted a divorce to a husband and wife after a marriage of nineteen years. The court named the husband as the primary residential parent of the parties’ children, divided the marital property between the parties, and awarded the wife transitional alimony of $3,000 per month for five years. The husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in including his separate property in the marital estate subject to division. The wife argues that the alimony award was insufficient in light of the length of the parties’ marriage and the disparity in income between them, and that the court erred in failing to award her attorney’s fees. We agree that husband’s separate property should not be included in the marital estate, but that the division of property is still equitable. We hold that the wife is entitled to alimony in futuro. We also find that she should be awarded one-half of the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Marvin Davis, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years at 100%. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting the videotaped forensic interview of the victim; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, Margaret Renee Wright, has appealed from the dismissal of her action for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Upon review of the record, this court determined that neither Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion nor her notice of appeal were timely filed. We thus ordered Ms. Wright to show cause why her appeal should not be dismissed. Ms. Wright’s trial counsel has filed a response asserting that both Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion and her notice of appeal were in fact timely filed. 2 It appears fromMs. Wright’s response that certain documents were omitted from the record. Nevertheless, we still conclude that Ms. Wright’s Tenn. R. Civ. P.59 motion was untimely and thus dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Gary Allen Jordan, appeals the denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to sell, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, felony evading arrest, and two counts of aggravated assault. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the denial of the petitions.

Fourmen who worked forTennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction (TRICOR)while incarcerated in the Department of Corrections filed a grievance with the Department, contending that TRICOR had failed to pay them all the wages they had been promised. The Grievance Committee ruled in their favor, but TRICOR and the Department refused to authorize any additional pay. The men filed two different actions in the Davidson County Chancery Court. This appeal is from the denial of the trial court in Part III of a motion to reconsider. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

The principal issue is whether an association that governs and coordinates interscholastic athletic competition of substantially all public and private secondary schools in Tennessee is the functional equivalent of a government agency for purposes of the Tennessee Public Records Act. Two reporters and their newspaper filed this action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505 to obtain records from the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association regarding the enforcement of its bylaws on member schools. The chancery court held that the association was the functional equivalent of a government agency; therefore, it was subject to the Tennessee Public Records Act, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 et seq. The court also ordered it to produce the records at issue, subject to the redaction of students’ names. We affirm.

Father of two children appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and the finding that termination of his parental rights would be in the best interest of the children. Finding no error we affirm.

Garnishor obtained a final judgment which held Garnishee liable for full amount of outstanding debt of the judgment-debtor. The trial court granted Garnishee’s motion to alter or amend and vacated the conditional judgment and the final judgment against the Garnishee; Garnishor appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

In 2000, the Petitioner, Frederick Parks, pled guilty to one count of escape. The trial court sentenced him to one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a prior six-year sentence as well as any other prior sentences. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on appeal. State v. Frederick Parks, No. W1999-01357-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1672341, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 27, 2000), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. In 2012, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which was dismissed. This Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition on appeal. Frederick Parks v. Cherry Lindamood, No. W2013-00361-CCA-R3-HC, 2013 WL 6529307, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 10, 2013), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. In 2013, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he presented multiple claims, including that his guilty plea to the escape charge had been illegally induced by the prosecutor. After a hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition, contending that the newly discovered evidence warrants a waiver of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

Mother appealed the trial court’s determination that several grounds for terminating her parental rights had been met and that termination was in the best interest of her children. She failed to appeal or argue one of the grounds for termination, so the trial court’s finding regarding that ground is final. Because only one ground need be found, we decline to examine the other grounds. We agree with the trial court’s determination that clear and convincing evidence existed to conclude that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

The petitioner, David Allen Brimmer, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief challenging the validity of his 1999 aggravated kidnapping conviction and resulting sentence of 60 years as a violent offender. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

After the appellant, Danny Wayne Carpenter, pled guilty in the Hamblen County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary and theft of property worth more than $10,000, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and ordered the appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $15,250. On appeal, the appellant challenges the amount of restitution imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second extraordinary interlocutory appeal in this divorce case and custody dispute. In the first appeal, this Court held that the father did not automatically waive the psychologist-client privilege as to his mental health records by seeking custody or by defending against the mother’s claims that he was mentally unfit. While the first appeal was pending, the mother filed a motion asking the trial court to require the father to undergo a second mental health evaluation pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 35; the trial court granted the motion. The Rule 35 evaluating psychologist concluded that the father did not pose a danger to his children. Dissatisfied with this conclusion, the mother again asked the trial court to compel the father to produce all of the mental health records from his treating psychologists. After this Court rendered its decision in the first appeal, the trial court granted the mother’s request and again ordered the father to produce all of the mental health records from his treating psychologists. The trial court reasoned that the father waived the psychologist-client privilege as to all of his mental health records by allowing the evaluating psychologists to speak to his treating psychologists, by providing mental health records to the evaluating psychologists, and by testifying that he had a history of depression and had undergone treatment for it. It also ordered the father to produce all of his mental health records because the mother needed them to prepare her case. The father filed a request for a second extraordinary appeal, which this Court granted. We vacate the trial court’s order as inconsistent with this Court’s holding in the first appeal; we hold that there was at most a limited waiver of the psychologist-client privilege, only as to the privileged mental health information that the father voluntarily disclosed to the two evaluating psychologists involved in this case. As for mental health records not subject to a limited waiver of the privilege, we hold that the standard for the trial court to compel disclosure of the records is not met in this case. We remand the case for factual findings on any privileged mental health records the father voluntarily disclosed and other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves the compensability of an alleged aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative back condition. After the employee began experiencing increased and more severe pain in his back, he filed a workers’ compensation claim in the Chancery Court for Marshall County against his employer, its insurer, and the Second Injury Fund. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the employee temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits. The employer’s appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce case, Jeannie Antoinette Worgan (“wife”) filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to alter or amend the final judgment, which had been entered over eleven months earlier. The final judgment had incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). Wife’s Rule 60.02 motion alleges that the MDA “failed to mention the division of the former husband’s pension” and that “[t]his oversight certainly must have resulted from a mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that wife was aware of the pension of Kenneth James Worgan (“husband”) when she signed the MDA and that she had ample time and opportunity to review the MDA before signing it. We agree with the trial court’s ruling that wife has presented no ground for Rule 60.02 relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Appellants Ronald L. Carroll and John Boyde Collett stand convicted of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Appellant Carroll to serve fifteen years as a violent offender and sentenced Appellant Collett to serve seventeen years as a violent offender. On appeal, the appellants argue that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for especially aggravated robbery; (2) the victim’s coaching of an essential witness should have resulted in a mistrial; and (3) the prosecutor violated the appellants’ right to remain silent during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the defendant property buyer upon remand from this Court. The sellers initiated the original action for specific performance and breach of contract after the buyer refused to close on the purchase of real property. The buyer filed a counterclaim requesting attorney’s fees. The buyer subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that the sellers had been the first to breach the contract by failing to fulfill a condition precedent. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the buyer, and the seller appealed. Upon that original appeal, while this Court affirmed summary judgment, the issue of attorney’s fees was not raised. Following this Court’s remand to the trial court, the buyer moved for an award of attorney’s fees, pursuant to a default provision of the parties’ agreement. After conducting a post-remand hearing, the trial court awarded the buyer attorney’s fees in the amount of $106,485. The seller appeals. We conclude: (1) that the buyer abandoned its counterclaim for attorney’s fees by failing to question the finality of the summary judgment and by failing to raise the issue during the first appeal and (2) that the trial court exceeded its authority by considering the buyer’s post-remand motion. We therefore vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees.

The Petitioner, Reuben Hickok Fairfield, pled guilty to second degree murder and tampering with evidence, and he agreed to concurrent sentences of thirty-five years, at 100 percent, for the second degree murder conviction and to six years, at 30 percent, for the tampering with evidence conviction. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his counsel was ineffective and his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err when it dismissed the petition. The post-conviction court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

The Petitioner, Tommy Joe Owens, appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect and resulting effective twenty-five year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves post-divorce parental relocation. The parties were divorced in Tennessee, and the mother was designated as the primary residential parent for the parties’ minor child. After the divorce, the mother graduated from a nurse practitioner program and obtained a job offer in Mississippi. She notified the father of her intent to relocate with the parties’ child. The father objected and filed a petition opposing her relocation. At trial, the father argued that the proposed relocation did not have a reasonable purpose under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d)(1), in that the mother failed to apply for nurse practitioner jobs in Tennessee. The trial court agreed with the father and denied the mother permission to relocate with the child. The mother appeals. We hold that, by failing to submit proof of comparable jobs in Tennessee for which the mother was qualified, the father did not meet his burden of proving that the mother’s proposed relocation did not have a reasonable purpose. Therefore, we reverse.

The Petitioner, Cameron Winselle, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. However, this court is without jurisdiction in this case because the Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Lorenzo Spencer, was convicted of aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 34-14-403. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

A commercial truck driver was injured while sitting in the passenger seat with another person driving. The question presented is whether the passenger qualified as an employee and was, therefore, excluded from benefits under the trucking company’s liability insurance policy. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the passenger was an employee when the accident occurred.

This is a medical malpractice action brought against the State of Tennessee and others. The issue as to the appealing State is whether the plaintiffs complied with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (2012 & Supp. 2013). The State argues that the plaintiffs were required to send the pre-suit notice applicable to their claim against the State to either (1) the Attorney General of Tennessee or an Assistant Attorney General, or (2) the Division of Claims Administration of the State. The Tennessee Claims commission denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding (1) no statutory authority requiring that pre-suit notice as to the State be served upon one of the parties alluded to by the State, and (2) that the State received adequate pre-suit notice in this case. We affirm and hold that the plaintiffs complied with Section 121’s pre-suit notice requirements by providing notice to the University of Tennessee Graduate School of Medicine, a health care provider, which entity is a division of an agency of the State of Tennessee and also a named defendant in this case.

A mother and father divorced and the trial court ordered the father to pay the mother $50 a week as support for their two children. The children subsequently came into the legal custody of their maternal grandfather, but the court did not order support. Ten years later, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to set child support against the father. After a hearing which the father did not attend, the trial court increased his child support obligation to $333 a month and declared that he owed back support of $31,635, which he was ordered to pay in monthly installments. Four years later, the father, acting pro se, filed a petition to modify the support order. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition, declaring only that its previous order was a valid one. Because there was an existing support order for the two children, the appropriate proceeding would have been one to modify that order. The requirements for modification were not met, and the trial court exceeded its authority by assessing an arrearage based upon an amount different from the amount set in the existing order. We accordingly hold that the father was entitled to Relief from a Final Order under Tenn. R. App. P. 60.02(5), and reverse the trial court’s denial of that relief. We also vacate the trial court’s earlier order imposing on the father a duty to pay a modified amount of support and retroactive child support.