APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant in this will contest. We affirm.

An employee sustained a work-related injury after a mechanical loading dock malfunctioned and a dock plate struck him in the knee. His employer denied the claim, contending that the event could not have occurred in the manner described by the employee. The trial court ruled in favor of the employer and dismissed the employee’s complaint. The trial court also entered alternative findings if causation were proven, limiting the employee’s recovery to 1.5% vocational disability. The employee has appealed. We reverse and remand the case for entry of a judgment consistent with the trial court’s alternative findings.

Appellant, Cheryl A. King, entered a no contest plea to arson, a Class C felony, and applied for judicial diversion. The trial court denied diversion and sentenced her to three years, suspended to probation. Appellant now appeals from the denial of judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Johnathan R. Johnson (“the Defendant”) was convicted on two counts of driving on a suspended driver’s license, one count of possession of .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of contraband in a penal institution, and one count of simple possession of marijuana. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motions to suppress certain evidence; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) lab report which the Defendant alleges was not provided in discovery; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine with intent to sell or deliver; and (4) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgements of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Marvin Green, appeals the dismissal of two petitions for habeas corpus relief. He was sentenced to fifteen years under the Drug Free School Zone Act. He argues that he is a standard offender and should be released after service of thirty percent of the sentence, and he alleges errors in his indictment. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Williams, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, three counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-five years for each of the attempted murder convictions and as a Range III offender to fifteen years for the firearm conviction, with each of the sentences to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the life sentence. However, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court overturned and dismissed the firearm conviction, leaving the defendant with an effective sentence of life plus seventyfive years in the Department of Correction for the murder and attempted murder convictions. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his murder and attempted murder convictions and argues that the trial court erred in admitting prior bad act evidence and in ordering consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Charles Franklin Smith, appeals as of right from the judgments of the Knox County Criminal Court convicting the appellant of two counts of burglary. The appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the motion is well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22(F), affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Lawrence Ralph, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging that counsel provided ineffective assistance by not requesting the transcript of voir dire, and that the trial court erred by merging two convictions. Finding that the trial court properly denied post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeremy Jarvis, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance by counsel. Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was unaware of the law concerning self-defense until trial and was ineffective by asserting the defense of self-defense with regard to the death of an innocent third person; and was ineffective by failing to attempt to negotiate a settlement of the case short of trial. Finding that the court properly denied post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Frederick Leon Tucker, sought a writ of error coram nobis. The hearing court found there were no due process concerns which would entitle petitioner to relief and dismissed the petition as not being filed within the applicable statute of limitations. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andrew Quinn, appeals a certified question of law pertaining to the stop of his vehicle and the denial of a motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, carjacking, aggravated assault, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, and felony evading arrest. After the defendant was determined to be competent to stand trial, counsel filed a motion asking that the defendant be allowed to present expert proof of a mental disease or defect to show that he could not form the requisite state of premeditation. The State objected to the introduction of this evidence, and the defendant responded by asserting that, while the expert witness could not state unequivocally that he could not form the requisite intent, the testimony was admissible as bearing on the defendant’s intent. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the State’s motion to bar this testimony. The State then requested, and the trial court granted, the filing of a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 appeal, which this court granted. Following our review, we agree with the State that the proferred evidence is inadmissible, reverse the order of the trial court, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Father of one child appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by wilful failure to support and visit and the finding that termination of his parental rights would be in the child’s best interest. Finding no error we affirm.
 

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Arthur Crutcher, of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred by ruling that the State could use a prior conviction to impeach the appellant without giving proper notice. The State contends that the appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the appeal should be dismissed. We agree with the State and conclude that the interests of justice do not require waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A doctor employed by a state mental health facility lost his job in a reduction in force. He claims this action was the result of complaints he made about the facility. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because the doctor failed to present evidence to establish an issue of material fact (after the defendants shifted the burden to the doctor), we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Appellant, Larry Baltimore, was acting as a bail bondsman in Dyer County at the time this Court decided in In re: The Application of Tony Cox (Seeking to Qualify as Agent for Memphis Bonding), 389 S.W.3d 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012), that a convicted felon could not act as a bail bondsman under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-128. After Cox was decided, the trial court determined that Appellant could not be a bail bondsman because of a previous conviction for felony assault. Appellant appeals from this order and asks this Court to reverse its decision in Cox. After a thorough review of Appellant’s arguments, we find no reason to reverse our earlier determination. Therefore, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

The defendant, Joshua Ethen Doyle, appeals a certified question of law pertaining to the stop of his vehicle, and the denial of a motion to suppress the breath alcohol test. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This appeal involves termination of parental rights. While she was pregnant, the mother of the child at issue made threats to harm herself and the unborn child. Both of the parents are mentally impaired. The mother has other serious disorders as well, and the father is a registered sex offender. The state took the child into protective custody four days after the child was born. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents on grounds of mental incompetence and persistent conditions. After a trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Children’s Services had established grounds for termination and that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Craig Beene, appeals the summary dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner alleges he did not enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. The habeas court found he had litigated this issue in his post-conviction hearing, and it was not a proper subject for habeas corpus relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ronald Lee West, Jr., appeals from his jury convictions for initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, Count 1, and possession of drug paraphernalia, Count 2. In this appeal, he alleges (1) that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction in Count 1; (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request for a mistrial after improper character evidence was admitted by a witness at trial; and (3) that the trial court also erred in declining to apply any mitigating factors, resulting in a longer sentence. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Stormy Condry (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of attempt to commit aggravated assault and reserved a certified question of law concerning the retroactivity of an amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-107 (Supp. 2011). The Defendant contends that the amendment should be applied retroactively so as to render her conduct non-criminal. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reject the Defendant’s argument and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Michael Anthony Lewis (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for a writ habeas corpus regarding his conviction for attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s division of the marital property as modified by the majority. I believe the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s property division, even as modified by the majority, as being an equitable division of the marital property.

Appellant, Brian G. Wallace, pled guilty to five counts of attempted especially aggravated exploitation of a minor and one count of attempted sexual battery. The plea was an open guilty plea, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eighteen years which included consecutive sentencing. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The divorce in this case brought to an end the thirteen-year marriage of David Ray Hoggatt (“Husband”) and Lori Ann Hoggatt (“Wife”). The trial court classified, valued, and distributed the parties’ property. On this appeal, Husband challenges aspects of the division of marital property. We modify the amount that the trial court ordered Wife to pay Husband in the property division. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.