APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Saidrick Tiwon Pewitte, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell; possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver; possession of a Schedule III controlled substance (dihydrocodeinone) with the intent to sell; possession of dihydrocodeinone with the intent to deliver; and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, -1324 (2011). He received a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Angela K. Pendergrass, appeals her Hamilton County Criminal Court bench trial conviction of driving under the influence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Adonta Lasha Griggs, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence because there was not “sufficient evidence” for the trial court to conclude a violation occurred and (2) that even if a violation occurred, the trial court abused its discretion by placing his original sentence into effect, instead of ordering a sentence of split confinement. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence.

The Defendant-Appellant, Danny Owens, was indicted by a Lawrence County Grand Jury for the first degree premeditated murder of his wife. At trial, Owens was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Owens as a Range I, standard offender to a sentence of twenty years at one hundred percent release eligibility. On appeal, Owens argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he had threatened to kill the victim shortly before her death; (2) the trial court erred in admitting statements from the victim; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to exceed the scope of redirect examination in its questioning of a witness; (4) the trial court erred in admitting witnesses’ observations of the victim’s bruises; (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (6) he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error; and (7) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Leonard Giles, Jr., appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, Giles argues (1) the special condition of his probation prohibiting him from driving or possessing a vehicle is invalid; (2) the trial court erred in failing to consider the invalidity of this special condition during his revocation hearing; (3) the admission of witness statements at the revocation hearing violated his right of confrontation; and (4) the cumulative effect of the aforementioned errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Dwayne Wright, was convicted of one count of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises five issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion for the jury to visit the crime scene; (3) whether the trial court properly allowed the victim to testify regarding prior sexual abuse; (4) whether the trial court properly ruled that the victim’s statements were admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception; and (5) whether the sentence imposed is proper. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment and sentence as imposed.

The defendant, Alvin “A.J.” Waller, Jr., was convicted after a jury trial of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced the defendant to ten years as a multiple offender on that count. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty years as a multiple offender at one hundred percent for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and ordered the two sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals, challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Timothy Neal Stiles, was convicted by a jury of theft of property valued over $1,000 but under $10,000, a Class D felony. After trial, defense counsel investigated the ownership of the stolen vehicle, along with other discrepancies at trial, and introduced this evidence at the sentencing hearing and the hearing on the motion for a new trial. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial, and the defendant appeals. He asserts as error that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict; (2) a variance exists between the crime charged in the indictment and the proof at trial; (3) the State knowingly presented false testimony or withheld exculpatory material; and (4) the trial court refused to authorize the court reporter to transcribe the sentencing hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude there was no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and he was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The defendant appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress and admitting an incriminating statement he made to police; (2) refusing to allow him to introduce the contents of a learned treatise during the cross-examination of a witness; (3) limiting closing argument; (4) excluding  character evidence; (5) denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence; and (6) improperly applying the enhancing and mitigating factors during sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no error, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Johnson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition as having been untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A taxpayer sued for a tax refund based on two issues. In response to the commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, the taxpayer conceded one issue, which constituted about 70% of the amount contested, and moved for summary judgment on the other issue. The trial court ruled for the commissioner on the conceded issue and for the taxpayer on the other issue. Both sides sought attorney fees and expenses. The trial court determined that the taxpayer was the prevailing party. The commissioner appealed. Finding that there is no prevailing party, we reverse the trial court.

I write separately to emphasize the point that trial courts should not automatically impose the maximum sentence when consecutive sentencing is available; this is due in part to the recognition that “not every contemptuous act, or combination of contemptuous acts, justifies the imposition of a maximum sentence, particularly when consecutive sentencing is in play.” Simpkins v. Simpkins, 374 S.W.3d 413, 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). Imposition of the maximum sentence to be served consecutively is merely an option if the facts of the case justify the absolute maximum sentence. Further, there is a presumption in favor of concurrent sentencing as distinguished from consecutive sentencing. Id. at 424 (citing State v. Taylor, 739 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that consecutive sentences should not routinely be imposed in criminal cases and the aggregate maximum of consecutive terms must be reasonably related to the severity of the offenses involved)).

Husband and wife in dependent and neglect proceeding who were each held in criminal contempt for violating an order that they have no contact with other parties to the proceeding appeal their convictions, the sentences imposed, and other rulings of the trial court. We affirm the holding that the husband was in contempt, vacate the sentence imposed and remand the case for resentencing. We affirm the holding that the wife was in indirect contempt and the sentence imposed; we reverse the holding that wife was in direct contempt. In all other respects we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The divorced father of an seven year old child filed a petition to transfer custody of the child from the mother to himself. The trial court heard expert proof that the child suffered from a rare genetic disorder that can cause grave neurological consequences if the child’s diet is not strictly controlled. The mother’s testimony indicated that she was unconvinced that the child had a disorder and that she was unwilling to adjust the child’s diet to meet his medical needs. The court found that there had been a material change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the child that custody be transferred to the father, with the mother’s visitation limited to fifty days per year. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court’s order should be reversed because it committed a number of procedural errors in the course of the custody proceedings. We affirm the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Michael Goodrum, of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a park, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a public school, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, -432 (2008). The trial court merged the two counts into one conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly excused a prospective juror; (3) the trial court erred in submitting his case to the jury for deliberation; and (4) application of the Drug-Free School Zone Act violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from the dismissal of the Appellant’s lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Shelby County for failure to timely perfect her appeal from General Sessions Court. Appellant filed her notice of appeal with the 24-hour General Sessions Criminal Clerk’s Office, but did not pay costs or bond because the 24-hour clerk’s office does not accept any payments for civil matters. As a result, Appellant’s bond was not paid until the eleventh day after the General Sessions Court’s judgment was entered, and was therefore outside the ten-day filing period. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108. Consequently, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

The defendant, Russell Victor McCollum, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to an effective term of twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of aggravated sexual battery and the trial court’s consolidating the aggravated sexual battery and failure to appear indictments for trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Timothy Davale Martin, of attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of thirteen years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court committed plain error in failing to merge the convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of confinement. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. However, the Defendant’s dual convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy protections. Accordingly, we vacate his aggravated assault conviction in count four and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment reflecting the merger of the Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction into his attempted aggravated robbery conviction in count two. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

Because the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 were clearly not met in this case, I concur fully in the result reached in this case. However, I write separately again to express my disagreement with this Court’s holding in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, L.L.C., No. W2012-00803-COA-R3, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013) namely, that the statutory requirement of giving “bond with good security” for “the cost of the cause on appeal” is not satisfied by paying an initial filing fee. I find the statute unambiguous, and therefore, there is no need to attempt to discern legislative intent based upon the less than compelling legislative history of various statutory schemes relied upon by the majority in Bernatsky.

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this action on February 17, 2009, to quiet title to property they own in Williamson County, Tennessee. At issue was a Deed of Trust that secured a 1997 promissory note, with an original maturity date in 1998, executed by a South Carolina limited liability company of which the plaintiff husband was a member. Plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that the statute of limitations for the 1997 note and deed of trust had lapsed; therefore, the deed of trust encumbering their property should be released. Defendant Beta, LLC, filed a counterclaim for judicial foreclosure asserting it was the assignee of an October 8, 1998 renewal note with a maturity date of October 1999, the maturity date of which was subsequently extended to October 2000 pursuant to a Change in Terms Agreement executed in October 1999. It is based on the Change in Terms Agreement that Beta insists the statute of limitations had not lapsed and it is entitled to enforce the deed of trust. Although Beta was unable to produce an original or photocopy of an October 1998 renewal promissory note or evidence that complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-8-101 to prove it was a lost negotiable instrument, the trial court held that a copy of the 1999 Change of Terms Agreement was sufficient to established the existence of the October 1998 renewal note and the extension of the maturity date to 2000; thus the statute of limitations had not run and Beta was vested with the right to enforce the deed of trust. Therefore, the court dismissed Plaintiffs complaint to quiet title and ruled in favor of Beta on the issue of foreclosure. On appeal Plaintiffs contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s rulings. Particularly, Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding that the Change in Terms Agreement dated October 8, 1999, was sufficient to establish Beta’s claims under an October 1998 promissory note of which there is no copy. We have determined the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy Beta’s burden of proof as the foreclosing party. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the specific relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled.

Homeowner sued Bank, alleging that it had settled her claim for damages to her house with Insurance Company without her consent. Bank served discovery on Homeowner, and when Homeowner did not comply with discovery requests to Bank’s satisfaction, Bank moved to dismiss Homeowner’s claims. Trial court granted Bank’s motion to dismiss, and Homeowner moved to set aside the dismissal pursuant to Rule 59. Trial court denied Homeowner’s motion to set aside, and Homeowner appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment denying Homeowner’s motion to set aside because (1) the scheduling order included a deadline for completing discovery that had not yet passed and (2) there was insufficient evidence of wrongdoing by Homeowner or her attorney.

This dispute arose at the end of two long-term commercial leases and a contract for the sale of two businesses and their assets, which businesses operated at the leased premises. The issues pertain to what assets were purchased, whether the tenant properly maintained the premises during the lease term, and whether the tenant returned the premises to the landlord in the same condition as at the commencement of the leases. The trial court ruled that the tenant had not purchased the assets in dispute, which the tenant removed at the end of the lease; thus, the tenant was liable for removing the assets. The court also found that the tenant breached both leases by failing to maintain the premises and failing to return the premises in the same condition as at the commencement of the leases. The tenant insists the court erred in finding that the landlord owned the assets in dispute; it also insists it did not breach any duties arising under the leases. The tenant also contends it is not liable for any of the numerous categories of damages awarded because the landlord failed to prove its damages. We affirm the trial court’s rulings as to the ownership of the disputed assets and the findings that the tenant breached numerous provisions of the leases. As for the various awards of damages, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Petitioner, Anton Mayhew, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his two jury convictions for aggravated robbery and resulting twelve-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a severance of the Petitioner’s trial from that of his co-defendant. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ramone Lawson, was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus six years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury about the possible sentences and release eligibility dates for first degree murder. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Antonio Hampton, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.