APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this State appeal, the State challenged the Knox County Criminal Court’s setting aside the jury verdicts of guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony and ordering dismissal of the charges. This court reversed the judgment of the trial court setting aside the verdicts and dismissing the charges of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary, reinstated the verdicts, and remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing. We also determined that although the trial court erred by dismissing the firearms charge on the grounds named in its order, error in the indictment for that offense nevertheless required a dismissal of those charges. Finally, we affirmed the defendants’ convictions of aggravated robbery. Upon the defendant’s application for permission to appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the case to this court for consideration in light of State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013). Having reconsidered the case in light of the ruling in Cecil, we confirm our earlier holdings. The jury verdicts of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary are reinstated, and those convictions are remanded to
the trial court for sentencing. The trial court’s dismissal of the firearms charge is affirmed on grounds other than those relied on by the trial court, and the convictions of aggravated robbery are affirmed.

Chiropractic clinic which provided services to party injured in an automobile accident brought action against the injured party, who had assigned the proceeds of his claim against tortfeaser to the clinic in payment of the services, and the tortfeasor’s liability insurer, which did not honor the assignment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer holding that: the victim did not have any rights relative to the insurance provider; the insurance policy required written consent for an assignment and there was no evidence of such consent; there was no privity between the clinic and the insurance provider; the clinic was not a beneficiary of the insurance policy; and the suit was a direct action against an insurance company which is prohibited by Tennessee law. The clinic appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

The trial court prohibited the use of taped testimony from a prior trial when a doctor exercised his statutory right not to appear at trial, ordering that the doctor “needs to testify live or not at all.” Efforts of the defendants’ counsel to secure the doctor’s live testimony were successful,only to have the plaintiffs’ counsel argue that counsel was being ambushed. The trial court finally determined not to allow the doctor to testify. The issues relating to prohibiting the doctor’s taped testimony and then prohibiting the doctor’s live testimony were appealed, along with other issues that arose during the trial. We find these two testimonial issues dispositive. We reverse the trial court on both issues and remand for a new trial.

This appeal involves the modification of a parenting arrangement. After many years without parenting time, the mother asked the juvenile courtto designate her as the primaryresidential parent for the parties’ daughter. The juvenile court held domestic violence in the father’s home constituted a materialchange in circumstances. However,the juvenile courtconcluded that, despite the incidents of domestic violence, it was in the daughter’s best interest for the father to remain as the primary residential parent. The juvenile court awarded the mother alternate residential parenting time. The mother appeals, raising numerous issues. We affirm.

Appellant, David Earl Freeman, pled guilty to three counts of theft of property and three counts of misapplication of funds in Hamilton County. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of sixteen years and placed on probation. He was also ordered to pay restitution to the victims. Subsequently, Appellant pled guilty to one count of theft of property and one count of passing a worthless check. A four-year sentence was imposed and ordered to run consecutively to the sixteen-year sentence. The new sentence was to be served on probation, and Appellant was ordered to pay restitution to the victims. A probation violation warrant was filed based in part on Appellant’s failure to pay restitution payments and the fact that he was convicted of several new charges in North Carolina. The trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remaining fourteen years of his sentence in incarceration. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Mother’s parental rights to her daughter were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to pay support, and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals, asserting that the evidence in support of the grounds is not clear and convincing and that the record does not show that termination of her rights would be in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Damien O. Armstrong, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eight years, with one year of confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his home because the search warrant was defective. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found that Defendants were liable to Plaintiff bank for losses stemming from a scheme wherein Defendants defrauded Plaintiff bank into making automobile loans to unqualified borrowers who were customers of a defendant. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

Roger Joseph (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting, among other claims, that, due to mental illness, he could not have formed the requisite intent for first degree murder. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment dismissing the Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition.

The Petitioner, Timothy Christopher Pillow, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. The motion was based upon allegations of bias against the party, who is also a licensed attorney representing herself in this matter. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

Conservator for injured bus passenger challenges the trial court’s dismissal of her action after the defendant’s filing of a confession of judgment for the full amount of damages requested in the general sessions warrant. In light of the plaintiff’s failure to amend the complaint after transferring the case to circuit court to increase the amount of damages sought, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

This appeal challenges the effectiveness of a QDRO which requires Wife to pay taxes on a $115,000.00 divorce settlement. The trial court held that the amount should not be reduced by taxes. We conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Wife’s $115,000.00 divorce settlement was not subject to reduction for taxes, and we reverse its holding in that regard. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Landlords filed suit against a tenant for breach of the rental contract. The trial court held the tenant breached the contract and awarded the landlords damages for the breach. Tenant appeals asserting that the landlords failed to mitigate their damages, that his counsel was ineffective, and that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Tenant’s arguments are without merit. We affirm the trial court.

The sole issue in this putative class action is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under the common law substantial benefit doctrine. Plaintiffs, shareholders of O’Charley’s Inc., filed this action against several parties to enjoin the imminent merger with and acquisition by Fidelity National Financial, Inc.; no monetary relief was sought. The gravamen of the complaint was breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs requested additional disclosures but did not seek to enjoin the merger. After the merger was completed, Defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; Plaintiffs contemporaneously filed a motion to recover attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs did not oppose the motions to dismiss and an agreed order was entered by which the complaint was dismissed but, by agreement, the issue of attorneys’ fees was reserved for hearing. Plaintiffs acknowledged this was not a shareholder derivative action and that they were not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-17-401; however, Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to attorneys’ fees under the common law substantial benefit doctrine. The chancellor disagreed and denied Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees. We affirm.

The Defendant, Terrell B. Johnson, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417, -432 (2010). The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years at 100% service. See id. § 39-17-432 (2010) (enhanced penalties for offenses committed in drug-free zones). On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred (1) by allowing evidence at the trial that was not included in the State’s discovery package and (2) by limiting his closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, George Anthony Braddock, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was in error because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to investigate the petitioner’s psychological, mental, and physical health history and to present proof of such at trial in an attempt to negate the petitioner’s culpable mental state; (2) failing to file a motion to suppress the petitioner’s statement to law enforcement; and (3) failing to fulfill his duty of loyalty and to zealously advocate on behalf of the petitioner because of a familial relationship with the district attorney general. Following review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In September of 2006 in exchange for an eight-year sentence, Appellant, Jeremy Bo Eaker, pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. Appellant was released to probation with credit for time served. Subsequently, Appellant was arrested for possession of cocaine and hallucinogenic mushrooms. A violation of probation warrant was filed. Appellant pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine and received a sentence of nine years, to be served concurrently to the eight-year sentence for which he was already on probation. Appellant’s probation was revoked, and Appellant was ordered to serve twelve months in incarceration with the trial court reserving the right to suspend the balance of the sentence upon Appellant’s entry into a drug treatment program. Following Appellant’s release from incarceration and reinstatement to probation, numerous probation violation warrants were filed against Appellant on the basis of among other things new criminal charges and positive drug screens. As a result of these various probation violations, Appellant’s probation was partially revoked, he was ordered to enter into and complete a drug treatment program, and he was ordered to community corrections. This appeal arises following a violation of probation warrant filed in response to Appellant’s January 17, 2013 arrest for possession of methamphetamine and failure to report the arrest to his probation officer. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his effective nine-year sentence in incarceration. Appellant appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. After a review of the record, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Heather Widner, Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Edward Smith (“Plaintiff”) sued Chattanooga Entertainment, Inc. d/b/a Electric Cowboy (“Electric Cowboy”) and Ashley Langworthy with regard to the tragic death of Glenn Edward Smith (“Deceased”). Electric Cowboy filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Electric Cowboy summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that on the relevant night there had been no sale of alcoholic beverages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102 by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting Electric Cowboy summary judgment and whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow Plaintiff additional time for discovery. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that no sale of alcoholic beverages by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy occurred on the relevant night, and that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further discovery. We, therefore, affirm.

This is an appeal from an Order of Protection entered on July 2, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until August 19, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the order to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This is an easement case in which the Appellant, the servient estate owner, appeals the trial court’s grant of injunctive relief in favor of the Appellee, the dominant estate owner. Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant had interfered with Appellee’s use of the easement by erecting a gate across it. The trial judge ordered the Appellant to remove the gate, and enjoined her from further interference with the Appellee’s use of the easement. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This appeal involves the termination of a biological father’s parental rights with regard to his son. The child at issue was removed from the custody of the mother as a result of the mother’s drug use and neglect. The child, now five years of age, did not have a significant relationship with the father, if any. Following a hearing, the juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights for failure to substantially comply with the responsibilities of the permanency plan. The father appeals. We affirm.

Appellant, Teddy Russell Robbins, Jr., was indicted by the Scott County Grand Jury for domestic assault, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape based on acts committed against his wife. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of all the offenses as charged in the indictment. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifty years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and rape; and (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial. After our review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial where the juror in question was dismissed from the jury pool and the trial court issued a curative instruction. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

In this retaliatory discharge action brought by a former city administrator of the City of LaFollette, Tennessee (“LaFollette”), the trial court, following a bench hearing, denied LaFollette’s motion to strike the city administrator’s demand for a jury trial. The trial court, however, granted LaFollette permission for interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the city administrator’s request for a jury trial properly may be granted pursuant to the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2013), despite the non-jury provision of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-307 (Supp. 2013). We conclude that the non-jury requirement of the GTLA applies to this TPPA claim. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of LaFollette’s motion to strike the city administrator’s jury demand, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings without a jury.

Charged by the Hamilton County Criminal Court grand jury with aggravated robbery, the defendant, Tavaruus Montrel Moss, pleaded guilty to facilitation of aggravated robbery and agreed to a three-year sentence of split confinement consisting of 11 months and 29 days in jail with credit for time served and the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. The trial court entered the judgment on August 9, 2012, but on January 17, 2013, the State obtained a probation revocation warrant that alleged that the defendant had incurred new criminal charges, that he had failed to report his arrest to his probation officer, that he had failed to provide proof of lawful employment, that he had failed to report for probation, that his whereabouts were unknown, and that he had failed to pay his probation fees. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. In his timely appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him into confinement. Because the record supports the trial court’s order, we affirm.