APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Perley Winkler, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 Monroe County Criminal Court convictions of two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of attempted aggravated arson, claiming that the State withheld material evidence at trial, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and that the post-conviction court erred by refusing to allow the petitioner to treat his trial counsel as an adverse party. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant, Johnny L. McGowen, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and received an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion to reduce his sentence to probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jamaal L. Byrd, appeals from his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction of voluntary manslaughter, claiming error in the jury instructions provided by the trial court and in the trial court’s failure to admit certain evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and awards of transitional alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido in this divorce action. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm. Husband also appeals the trial court’s judgment holding him in contempt for failing to comply with the trial court’s order to pay to Wife one-half of a health savings account. We affirm on this issue. Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is granted.

Following a retrial, the defendant, Elgie Sykes, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Edward Fritts, appeals his conviction for first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life without parole. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce expert testimony regarding Fritts’s gang affiliation, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Appellants, Grico Clark, Jordan Curry, and Deangelo White, were each indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of evading arrest. Deangelo White was also indicted for one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with the intent to sell and one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. After a jury trial, Clark, Curry, and White were found guilty of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. Clark and Curry were found guilty of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. White was found not guilty of the firearm charge and convicted of the lesser included offenses of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Clark and Curry each to effective sentences of forty-four years and White to an effective sentence of forty years. The trial court denied motions for new trial. In this consolidated appeal, we are asked to determine whether under the holding of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), the evidence supported convictions for both especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Additionally, we must determine whether the State was required to make an election of offenses and whether the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentencing. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the trial court properly instructed the jury as mandated in White and that the evidence supported convictions for both especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Further, we determine that the State was not required to elect offenses. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing White to an effective sentence of forty years and Clark and Curry each to an effective sentence of forty-four years. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff Lessee in this action for breach of contract and promissory fraud.  It also awarded Plaintiff punitive damages and prejudgment interest at the rate of eight percent per annum.  We affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order, affirming the decision of the Designee of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that Appellant/Employee was not qualified for unemployment benefits. Because there is substantial and material evidence in the record, and a reasonable basis in law, to support the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision, we affirm the order of the trial court. Affirmed and remanded.

Petitioner’s third habeas corpus petition attacking his conviction for first degree murder, with a sentence of life without parole, was dismissed by the trial court without an evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner argues on appeal that he is entitled to relief because (1) the trial court failed to require the State to make an appropriate election of offenses; (2) the indictment was erroneously amended; (3) Petitioner was never given notice of the offense he was charged with; and (4) a final ground that can only be accurately described by a direct quote from Petitioner’s brief: “whether the unanimity of the verdict was decided upon imparcially [sic] due to multiple offenses that have never been recognized by the Grand Jury that has always been a Constitutional right of any citizen born in the United States that have alleged to have committed an offense.”  We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal 20.

Petitioner, Mathis L. Vaughn, was convicted in 1993 of first degree murder during the perpetration of a robbery.  His conviction was affirmed on appeal.  See State v. Mathis T. Vaughn, No. 01C01-0312-CR-00425, 1994 WL 256993, at *1 (Tenn., June 9, 1994).  Subsequently, Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Mathis T. Vaughn v. State, No. M2007-00755-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 WL 303034, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 29, 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2001).  Petitioner first sought habeas corpus relief in 2006; it was denied.  See Mathis T. Vaughn v. James Worthington, Warden, No. E2007-00808-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 58956, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 4, 2008).  Petitioner again seeks habeas relief, arguing that his judgment is void because it lists his conviction offense as first degree murder when the jury actually convicted him of first degree felony murder.  The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition.  Petitioner appeals.  After a review, we determine that the habeas corpur court properly dismissed the petition where Petitioner failed to establish that the judgment was void or that his sentence had expired.  Consequently, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

This case is before us upon mandate from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of our previous opinion, Johnson v. Floyd, No. W2012-00207-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2500900 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Rajvongs v. Wright, --- S.W.3d ----, 2013 WL 6504425 (Tenn. 2013). Based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant, John Nolan Sunde, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and domestic assault.  After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of both charges.  The trial court merged the convictions into a single conviction for aggravated assault and sentenced Appellant to three years in incarceration.  The trial court suspended the sentence “on time served” and ordered Appellant to attend an anger management class and ordered him to have no contact with the victim.  Appellant’s motion for new trial was denied, and he initiated this appeal.  On appeal, he argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove serious bodily injury; (2) the trial court erred in admitting multiple photographs of the victim; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to anger management class.  After a review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the victim suffered serious bodily injury to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim’s injuries at trial; and the trial court properly ordered anger management classes as a condition of probation.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The Petitioner, Michael Ricardo Martin, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition was erroneously transferred to the Criminal Court for Davidson County without a judgment entered, and, thus, the Petitioner was deprived of his right to object to the transfer.  Upon a review of the record, we agree that the lower court was correct that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.  This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of divorce entered on March 19, 2007. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until December 2, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the final judgment to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Petitioner, Jeremie Alan Thomas, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner sought relief from his convictions for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated robbery.  Petitioner pled guilty to these charges as a result of a negotiated plea agreement, and he received all concurrent sentencing with an effective sentence of 20 years of incarceration.  On appeal Petitioner asserts that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  After a thorough review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In case number 6994, the Defendant, Daniel Antonio Payne, who was on bond pending the resolution of his charges, pled guilty to one count of driving while license suspended, one count of felony evading arrest, and two counts of theft over $1000.00. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of ten years for each of the theft convictions, six years for the felony evading arrest conviction, and six months for the driving while license suspended conviction. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s bond in case number 6994. As the Defendant was being taken into custody, he was found in possession of marijuana, which resulted in the charges in case number 7515. Subsequently, in case number 7515, the Defendant pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years, to be served concurrently with his sentence in case number 6994. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in not imposing mandatory consecutive sentences for case numbers 6994 and 7515. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that consecutive sentencing was mandatory. We reverse the trial court’s judgment in case number 7515 and remand for sentencing consistent with this opinion.

This case arises from a dispute between family members over the proper distribution of assets from two separate trusts. Appellant contends that the grantor of one of the trusts revoked a modification of the trust prior to her death pursuant to a settlement agreement with Appellant. The trial court declined to give effect to a settlement agreement because it was never signed by the parties prior to the grantor’s death. Additionally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of various provisions in each of the trusts. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Patrick Stanton, was convicted of one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years for his felony conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he had the requisite intent to commit a theft prior to entering a habitation or that he actually committed a theft. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm appellant’s convictions.

The Petitioner, James R. Lening, appeals the Circuit Court for Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Curtis Moore, of attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction with the attempted second degree murder conviction and ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder and that the trial court erred when it found him statutorily ineligible for probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. We further conclude, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred when it found the Defendant statutorily ineligible for probation. As such, we reverse the case for the trial court to consider the Defendant’s suitability for probation on the eight-year sentence for attempted second degree murder.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for return of personal property. Because the order does not resolve all the claims between the parties we dismiss for lack of a final judgment.

This case is before this court on a delayed appeal of appellant’s 2004 convictions for second degree murder and arson. Appellant received an effective sentence of twenty-four years. Appellant now argues that the trial court erred by (1) allowing a witness to testify about appellant’s propensity for violence during the State’s case-in-chief; (2) allowing the testimony of a witness when appellant did not have notice of her testimony until two days before the trial; (3) incorrectly instructing the jury on self-defense; and (4) ruling that a defense witness’s testimony was irrelevant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Brandon L. Brawner, pleaded guilty to one count of vandalism of property valued at $10,000 or more and received a six-year sentence, to be served in a community-based alternative to incarceration (community corrections). A violation of probation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that appellant perpetrated a domestic aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and vandalism of $1,000 or more while using a knife and that appellant owed $9,438.50 in fines, costs, and restitution. The trial court revoked his probation, and this appeal follows. Appellant now alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A person whose property was seized, and subsequently forfeited, pursuant to a drug arrest challenges the actions of the Department of Safety. In light of the nine-year delay in the filing of a petition for review, we find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of the action.