APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissal entered in favor of all defendants in a civil enforcement action involving violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and the Government Imposters and Deceptive Advertising Act. We vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The appellant is a property owner who sought review of a decision by the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the Historic Zoning Commission. The appellant property owner appeals. We affirm.

In this post-divorce action, the trial court modified the permanent parenting plan to provide the father with equal co-parenting time after the father and the mother had, by oral agreement, lived by an alternate plan for approximately sixteen months during the COVID19 pandemic in an effort to adapt to their child’s virtual education from home. The mother has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding a material change in circumstance affecting the child’s best interest and by determining that modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. Both parties have requested attorney’s fees on appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We decline to award attorney’s fees to either party.

In this case, we consider the appropriate discipline for Tennessee attorney James Ralph Hickman, Jr. The Board of Professional Responsibility filed a petition for discipline against Hickman alleging that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct while representing an estate in probate proceedings. A hearing panel of the Board adjudicated the petition and recommended a one-year suspension, with “at least” ninety days served as an active suspension and the rest on probation. Any violation of the conditions of probation would result in “reversion to active suspension.” The hearing panel also directed Hickman to obtain a practice monitor during the probationary period, complete fifteen additional hours of estate-management continuing legal education (“CLE”) and three additional hours of ethics CLE, and pay the costs of the matter. Neither Hickman nor the Board appealed. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the hearing panel’s judgment. Exercising our authority under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 15.4, we determined that the punishment imposed by the hearing panel appeared too lenient and proposed to increase it. After carefully considering the entire record, “with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case,” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b), we affirm the hearing panel’s one-year suspension but modify the judgment to impose six months of active suspension followed by six months on probation. We also clarify that the period of probation imposed should be fixed rather than indefinite and that violation of a condition of probation does not automatically result in reversion of the probationary period to active suspension. We affirm the decision of the hearing panel in all other respects.

This case began with the filing of a “Civil Warrant Restraining Order” in general sessions
court. The defendants then filed a petition to dismiss pursuant to the Tennessee Public
Participation Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-101, et seq. The plaintiffs filed a response,
asking the court to deny the TPPA petition to dismiss. After an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court entered an order denying the defendants’ TPPA petition for reasons set forth in
an attached transcript. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to
enter an order setting forth the reason for the trial court’s decision.

This is a dependency and neglect case predicated on an allegation of severe abuse. The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and found that one of the children had been subject to severe child abuse at the hands of the children’s father. The father appealed to circuit court. After a de novo hearing, the circuit court found the allegations of severe abuse were not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence and declined to find the children dependent and neglected. The Department of Children’s Services, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the children’s mother appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in concluding that the evidence of severe abuse was not clear and convincing. Based on our review of the entire record, we find there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of severe abuse. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.

In this appeal, we consider the interplay and applicability of two statutes that relate to suffrage rights of Tennessee residents previously convicted of infamous crimes in other states. Although the Tennessee Constitution recognizes the importance of the right of its residents to vote, the Constitution also allows the General Assembly to restrict the right of a person to vote “upon a conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 5. Ernest Falls, a resident of Tennessee since 2018, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia in 1986, an infamous crime under the laws of Tennessee. In 2020, Mr. Falls was granted clemency in Virginia by then-Governor Ralph Northam. The grant of clemency reinstated Mr. Falls’ rights of citizenship in Virginia, including his right to vote. Subsequently, Mr. Falls attempted to register to vote in Grainger County, Tennessee, in June of 2020. The Grainger County Election Commission denied his restoration of voting rights request and cited “Incomplete/Insufficient Document(s)” as the reasoning for the denial. Mr. Falls and a co-plaintiff, who was left off the voter rolls under similar circumstances, filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3) requires the state to re-enfranchise persons convicted of out-of-state infamous crimes as soon as said persons are “pardoned or restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor or other appropriate authority of such other state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) (2014). Respondents, three public employees sued in their official capacity, countered that Mr. Falls also is required to comply with requirements set forth in another statutory provision, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202, which requires that persons convicted of infamous crimes pay outstanding court costs, restitution, and child support obligations before they can be re-enfranchised. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202 (2018). The Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of the three state officials, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment with Mr. Falls acting as the sole remaining plaintiff. Like the Court of Appeals, we affirm the grant of summary judgment and conclude that, in order to regain the right of suffrage in Tennessee, Mr. Falls and other similarly situated individuals must comply with both section 2-19-143(3) and the additional requirements set forth in section 40-29-202.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child upon a petition filed by the child’s mother and stepfather, the trial court determined that five statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Following the father’s initial appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded for entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k). On remand, the trial court entered a judgment confirming its prior determinations with added specific findings and conclusions. The father has again appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Ernest Falls’ right to vote is guaranteed under the Tennessee Constitution. Tenn.
Const. art. I, § 5.1 In 1986, almost forty years ago, Mr. Falls was convicted of an infamous
crime in Virginia. He completed his sentence in 1987. In 2018, Mr. Falls moved to
Tennessee. In February 2020, the Governor of Virginia gave him an individualized grant
of clemency, fully restoring his rights to vote, hold public office, serve on a jury, and be a
notary public. With his voting rights fully restored, Mr. Falls tried to register to vote in
Tennessee; he disclosed his previous conviction and verified the restoration of his right to
vote. His application was denied because he provided no evidence that he did not owe
restitution or court costs in Virginia from his 1986 conviction and that he was current on
any child support obligations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202(b)–(c) (2018). Yet, under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-19-143(3), Mr. Falls was not prohibited from voting
because his right to vote had been restored by the grant of clemency. The requirement
regarding restitution, court costs, and child support under section 40-29-202 does not apply
to Mr. Falls because he had no need to have his voting rights restored.

For the second time, the Defendant, Bruce Antione Cole, appeals the trial court’s order of
restitution in the amount of $25,474.16 associated with his convictions for aggravated
assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Specifically, the Defendant argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating a restitution amount that was not
substantiated by evidence in the record and by failing to consider the Defendant’s financial
resources and future ability to pay. After review, we reverse the restitution order of the
trial court and remand for a new restitution hearing.

The Appellant challenges the circuit court’s grant of an order of protection, asserting that
the evidence preponderates against the finding that the Appellant stalked the Appellee.
Because the order of protection has expired by its own terms, we dismiss the appeal as
moot.

The Appellant challenges the circuit court’s grant of an order of protection, asserting that
the evidence preponderates against the finding that the Appellant stalked the Appellee.
Because the order of protection has expired by its own terms, we dismiss the appeal as
moot.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Courdarrius Perkins, of first-degree felony
murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a concurrent
sentence of life imprisonment for felony murder and five years for aggravated robbery. On
appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the underlying
felony on the felony murder charge and compounded the error by failing to require the
State to elect the facts for the underlying felony. He also contends the trial court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the felony murder charge because the
evidence is insufficient. After reviewing the record, the briefs and oral arguments of the
parties, and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dale Anthony Wilbourn, was convicted of the offenses of evading arrest
and making an improper turn. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective
term of six years to be served in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence
is insufficient to support his conviction for evading arrest and that the trial court erred in
not imposing an alternative sentence to incarceration.1 On our review, we respectfully
disagree with the Defendant and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Gregory Lavelle Lilly, appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for a reduction of sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35. Upon review of the motion filed by appointed counsel, and in light of the record on appeal, the Court hereby affirms the order of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ladon Antoine Doak, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Deshawn Eugene Williams, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his previously ordered probationary sentence of ten years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give him credit for time successfully served while on probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a bid awarded by a county finance department and upheld by the
county’s finance committee after a bid protest hearing. One of the service providers whose
bid was not selected filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in chancery court.
After reviewing the administrative record, the chancery court concluded that the finance
committee’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by material evidence
and remanded for the county to rebid the contract. We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.

Defendant, Michael E. Odom, was convicted by a Houston County jury of assault and elder abuse. The trial court imposed a two-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation after sixty days of incarceration. Defendant appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for a new trial. On appeal, Defendant argues that the jury instruction on elder abuse was incomplete and that the trial court improperly commented on matters of fact during trial testimony. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and oral argument, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the enforceability of a promissory note and a coguarantor’s right to seek contribution from another guarantor. The note and guaranties were assigned several times and, at one point, held by the coguarantor. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded on the undisputed facts that the promissory note had been discharged and that there was no right to contribution. We conclude that the promissory note was not discharged but agree that there was no right to contribution.

This appeal involves the termination of a tenured teacher for the cause of inefficiency.
After receiving a written charge recommending his dismissal, the teacher requested a
tenure hearing before a hearing officer, who found that there was substantial evidence to
support the charge of inefficiency and that there was just cause for termination. The teacher
appealed, the board of education voted to sustain the decision of the hearing officer, and
the teacher was terminated. The teacher petitioned for judicial review of the decision in
the chancery court. The chancery court reversed and reinstated the teacher with back pay.
The school system appeals. We reverse.

The pro se Petitioner, Charles Anderson Clark, Jr., appeals the denial of his motion to
correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Based
on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kyanedre Oshea-Malik Benson, was convicted in the Haywood County Circuit Court of one count of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class C felony; one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; ten counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony.  After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sentence of sixty-two years in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter and that the trial court erred by refusing to merge one of his convictions of reckless aggravated assault into his conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jerry W. Phillips, Petitioner, appeals from the summary dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he claimed his convictions were void because there was a fatal variance between the proof at trial and the indictment and that the proof at trial, which differed from the proof at the preliminary hearing, constructively amended the indictment. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

Appellant, a tenured teacher employed by Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, was involved in an altercation with students at an alternative high school. Subsequently, Appellee Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education (the “Board”) terminated Appellant’s employment. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Appellant filed an action with the trial court arguing that the Board exceeded its authority under the Teachers’ Tenure Act. The trial court vacated the Board’s decision on the ground that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act. We affirm the trial court’s decision on different grounds, i.e., that the Board committed a clear error of law when it conducted a third hearing concerning the termination of Appellant’s employment. We also conclude that Appellant is entitled to reinstatement and back pay. There is nothing further for the Board to do; accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order of remand.