APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Christopher David McIntosh, appeals his effective 10-year sentence
imposed by the Union County Criminal Court as a result of his guilty-pleaded convictions
of six counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and two counts of theft of property
valued at $1,000 or less. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in
imposing partially consecutive sentences and in ordering him to serve nine months of his
sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal stems from a lengthy and acrimonious divorce, wherein the trial court, inter
alia, divided the parties’ marital assets and debts, established a permanent parenting plan
and child support obligations, and declined to award alimony to the husband. Entry of
the trial court’s divorce decree did not occur for approximately twenty-two months
following the trial, however, which the husband argues on appeal constituted a due
process violation. Husband also appeals the trial court’s valuation of certain assets, its
division of the marital estate, its imputation of income to him for child support purposes,
and its failure to join his mother as a necessary and indispensable party. Following our
review, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the parties’ marital residence as
marital property. We also affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the husband’s contempt
petition, its denial of the husband’s motion to join his mother as a party, and its
imputation of income to the husband due to his voluntary unemployment. We vacate the
trial court’s valuation of the parties’ retirement accounts and its division of marital
property, and we remand those issues to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

Article II of Tennessee’s Constitution vests legislative authority in the General Assembly. We have held, however, that the General Assembly may “grant an administrative agency the power to promulgate rules and regulations which have the effect of law in the agency’s area of operation.” Bean v. McWherter, 953 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tenn. 1997). The General Assembly frequently has done so. But it also established important guardrails for administrative agencies by enacting the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. One of those guardrails is the requirement that agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking: a process that gives the public and other affected parties an opportunity to weigh in. Here, we consider whether a reimbursement cap imposed by TennCare is a “rule” within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act that should have been promulgated through the notice-and-comment process. We hold that it is and reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision.

Defendant/Appellant appealed a speeding ticket from Benton City Municipal Court to the Circuit Court for Polk County, Tennessee (the “circuit court”). The City of Benton (the “City”) filed a motion for summary judgment which the circuit court granted on May 18, 2022. Defendant appeals and, discerning no error, we affirm.

Steven Craig Griffin, Petitioner, claims the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his
petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Discerning no error we affirm.

Defendant, Latrice Rogers, appeals the trial court's order denying her motion to withdraw
her guilty plea. Defendant pled guilty to multiple charges as indicted with sentencing to
be determined. One week after the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years'
imprisonrnent, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea. Before the trial court ruled
on the motion, Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment. The trial court
later denied the motion to withdraw the plea. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of
her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. After a thorough review of the record and the
parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se plaintiff appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of his legal
malpractice action against his attorney and the attorney’s law firm. The trial court found
that the action was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Because the
plaintiff’s action accrued more than one year before he filed the lawsuit, we affirm.

This is an action for malicious prosecution of an attorney’s fee claim. The plaintiffs contend
that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the defendant under the one-year
statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(1). The court held
that the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when the allegedly-malicious prosecution
terminated, and it held that the prosecution terminated when the first court denied the
defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 59.04. The plaintiffs contend that this is wrong because the defendant was a
party to and participated in the appeal of those proceedings. They assert that the defendant’s
action did not terminate until he exhausted his appellate remedies. We agree and hold that
the defendant’s cause of action did not terminate until his time for filing an appellate brief
expired. Thus, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions to
reinstate the complaint and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from an employment termination case in which an employee of the Division of Fire Services for the City of Memphis was terminated for a second positive drug test.  After receiving notice of his termination, the employee requested an appeal hearing with the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission.  Following the hearing, the Civil Service Commission issued a decision affirming the termination of his employment.  The employee filed a petition for the trial court to review the decision of the Civil Service Commission.  The trial court found that substantial and material evidence did not support the decision and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.  Accordingly, the trial court granted the employee’s petition and remanded the matter to the Civil Service Commission.  The City of Memphis appeals.  We vacate the decision of the trial court and remand to the trial court for entry of an order to remand to the Civil Service Commission with instructions to issue a decision addressing certain deficiencies.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. Father also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellants, Mother and stepfather, filed a
petition to terminate Appellee Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by
failure to support and failure to visit. Father asserted the absence of willfulness as an
affirmative defense. At the close of proof on grounds, the trial court orally found that
abandonment by failure to support was not shown, but abandonment by failure to visit was
proven. At the close of all proof, the trial court reconsidered its oral ruling on grounds and
determined that Father’s failure to visit was not willful. In its written order, the trial court
found that grounds for termination had not been proven and that, even if grounds existed,
termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interest. Discerning no
error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a provision in a marital dissolution agreement obligating the father to pay for his son’s “college tuition, expenses, room and board.”  The mother filed a petition for contempt and for breach of contract, seeking a judgment for over $15,000 in expenses that the father refused to pay, as he believed that they were not covered by the language of the MDA.  The father filed a motion for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration of his obligations.  He asked the trial court to interpret the language of the MDA and also declare that he had fulfilled his obligations under the MDA in light of his son’s struggles in college thus far.  After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a series of orders interpreting the language of the MDA and defining the categories of expenses that the father was obligated to pay.  However, none of the trial court’s orders mention or resolve his request for termination of his obligation.  As a result, we vacate the trial court’s orders and remand for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding this issue pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

The Appellee, Joseph Lester Haven, Jr., was originally convicted of rape of a child and two
counts of aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against his stepchildren, for
which he received an effective forty-year sentence. After his convictions were affirmed,
State v. Joseph Lester Haven, No. W2018-01204-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 3410242, at *1-
2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020), the Appellee filed a petition seeking post-conviction
relief based on trial counsel’s failure to challenge the State’s compliance with the
Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123, the statute which authorizes a video
recording of a child to a forensic interviewer to be introduced as evidence at trial, but only
when certain requirements are met. The Obion County post-conviction court granted relief,
and the State now appeals. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the postconviction
court, reinstate the Appellee’s convictions, and remand for execution of
judgments consistent with this opinion.

I am pleased to concur in Justice Campbell’s separate concurring opinion, concurring in the result of the majority opinion but not the reasoning. I write separately on particular problems with the majority’s reasoning, as well as far-reaching unintended consequences of this ill-defined new common-law privilege.

I agree with the Court’s decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. But my agreement with the majority ends there. I would not adopt a new evidentiary privilege for expert witnesses because that privilege is not grounded in the Constitution, Tennessee’s statutes, the common law, or this Court’s Rules—the only permissible sources of a privilege under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 501. Although the trial court erred by excluding the expert opinions at issue in this case, that error was harmless and did not warrant reversal of the judgment below or a new trial. For that reason, I join in the Court’s judgment.

I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately to highlight the flawed and impractical analysis in the concurring in judgment opinion, authored by Justice Campbell and joined by Justice Kirby.

This appeal primarily concerns the compulsion of a physician’s deposition testimony in a health care liability action. In 2014, a child was born via cesarean section and suffered permanent brain damage and severely debilitating injuries. By and through her next friend and mother Brittany Borngne (“Plaintiff”), the child sued the doctor who delivered her and the certified nurse midwife who was initially in charge of the birthing process, among other defendants. The trial court dismissed all claims of direct negligence against the defendant physician but allowed the plaintiff to proceed against the physician on a vicarious liability theory as the midwife’s supervising physician. However, during his deposition prior to trial, the physician refused to opine on the midwife’s performance outside of his presence. The trial court declined to require the physician to do so, and after a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, partially reversed the judgment. The intermediate court concluded, among other things, that the trial court committed reversible error in declining to order the physician to answer the questions at issue in his deposition and remanded for a new trial. After review, we hold that a defendant healthcare provider cannot be compelled to provide expert opinion testimony about another defendant provider’s standard of care or deviation from that standard. We therefore conclude that the trial court here properly declined to compel the defendant physician’s testimony. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this appeal, we address the standards for severe child abuse as a ground for termination of parental rights. The statute defining severe child abuse includes “knowing” failure to protect a child from abuse or neglect likely to cause serious injury or death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) (Supp. 2016). The statutes do not define “knowing.” We hold that, for severe child abuse, a person’s conduct is considered “knowing,” and a person is deemed to “knowingly” act or fail to act, when he actually knows of relevant facts, circumstances or information, or when he is either in deliberate ignorance of or in reckless disregard of such facts, circumstances, or information presented to him. Under this standard, the relevant facts, circumstances, or information would alert a reasonable parent to take affirmative action to protect the child. For deliberate ignorance, a parent can be found to have acted knowingly when he has specific reason to know the relevant facts, circumstances, or information but deliberately ignores them. For reckless disregard, if the parent has been presented with the relevant facts, circumstances, or information and recklessly disregards them, the parent’s failure to protect can be considered knowing. Here, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the parents of an infant who suffered over twenty rib fractures, in part for knowing failure to protect the child. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse, holding under the particular circumstances of this case that the proof in the record does not clearly and convincingly show that the parents’ failure to protect the child was “knowing.”

I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing the termination of parental rights as to both Mother and Father, and I join nearly all of Justice Kirby’s opinion for the majority. In particular, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this case presents circumstances that call strongly for application of the prior-construction canon. I would hesitate to apply the canon if only one or two intermediate appellate courts had interpreted the language at issue. Here, however, the Court of Appeals had issued at least eight opinions interpreting “knowing” in a uniform manner before the General Assembly’s reenactment of that language. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (finding “the uniformity of . . . judicial precedent construing the [statutory] definition significant”); Kentucky v. Biden, 57 F.4th 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2023) (noting that the force of the prior-construction canon is “stronger when the lower courts uniformly adopt a particular interpretation of an oft-invoked statute”); cf. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (declining to apply canon where “widespread disagreement exist[ed] among the lower courts”).

A Maury County jury convicted Stacy Matthews, Defendant, of two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school zone and one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the trial court struck the school zone sentencing aggravator for two of the convictions and entered judgments on three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. The trial court imposed three concurrent sentences of twelve years, as a Range I, standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: he was prejudiced by the language of Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment; that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to § 2.02 of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.

At issue is the validity of an amendment to a revocable trust. The specific issue is whether the Settlor’s attorney-in-fact was authorized to execute an amendment to the Robert McKeel Bone Living Trust. The trial court held that the amendment was valid. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm.

A patient brought a health care liability action against a hospital after she developed a pressure wound during her hospital stay. The hospital moved for summary judgment on the ground that the patient’s standard of care expert was not competent to testify under the Health Care Liability Act. Alternatively, it sought to narrow the remaining claims through a partial summary judgment. The trial court disqualified the expert witness and granted the hospital summary judgment on all claims. The court’s decision was based, in part, on grounds not raised in the hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the expert was competent to testify and the trial court erred in ruling on additional grounds not raised by the movant, we vacate the judgment in part.

Defendant, Charles Randolph Johnson, was convicted by an Anderson County Jury of one
count of possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin within 1,000 feet of a drug free
school zone; possession of more than 14.175 grams of marijuana with intent to sell or
deliver; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective thirtyyear
sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant appears to argue that (1)
the length of time between his trial and the hearing on his motion for new trial violated his
right to due process; (2) the search warrant was invalid; (3) the untimely “constructive
amendment” of the indictment rendered it invalid; (4) the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gregory Hickman, of rape of a child, and
the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to forty years in prison. On
appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
and that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to submit a rebuttal closing argument.
After our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.