APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a divorce action. Wife appeals the trial court’s judgment naming Husband primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and classifying real property as Husband’s separate property. Wife also asserts the trial court erred in dividing the parties’ property notwithstanding classification of the real property. We affirm the trial court’s classification and division of property. We vacate the trial court’s judgment with respect to naming Husband primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding the parties equal parenting time, and remand the matter to the trial court to engage in a comparative fitness analysis as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106, and for findings as required by Rule 52 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of Appellants’ defamation lawsuit. The trial court granted Appellees’ motions to dismiss under both Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), and under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02, for violation of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 45. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the Rule 12.02 motion when the Appellants’ motion to amend their pleadings was still pending. We further conclude that the trial court’s stated reasons for granting the Rule 41.02 motion are not sufficient to justify the drastic sanction of dismissal. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. Vacated and remanded.

A school administrator filed the instant lawsuit,alleging that his employment was terminated in violation of both the Open Meetings Act and his contract of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant school board on the Open Meetings Act claims on the basis of laches, finding that the school administrator failed to bring his claim in a timely manner. The trial court also granted summary judgment as to the contract claim, finding that the school administrator could not prove damages. We reverse the trial court’s ruling with regard to the school administrator’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Open Meetings Act, but affirm as to the remainder of the trial court’s decision. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
 

Plaintiffs, eight Shelby County registered voters, filed an action for declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the 2012 Senate Reapportionment Act on the ground that it divides more counties than necessary in contravention of Article II, Section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and subsequently granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The facts are not disputed and we hold that, as a matter of law, the Act is not unconstitutional. We affirm judgment in favor of Defendants.

This appeal arises from the transfer of a child custody case to Texas. The lower court issued an order naming Mother primary residential parent of the parties’ child and granting Father certain visitation rights. According to Father, Mother did not allow Father visitation with the child despite the court’s order. Father filed a petition seeking to hold Mother in contempt. At a preliminary hearing on the matter, the lower court dismissed Father’s petition and ruled that all further proceedings in the matter be held in the court of appropriate jurisdiction in Texas, where Mother was supposedly living. Father appealed. After reviewing the record, we have determined that the lower court’s findings do not support its decision; we therefore vacate the order of the lower court.

Ernest Jackson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of sale and delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the Defendant’s conviction for delivery of cocaine into his conviction for sale of cocaine and sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for sale and delivery of cocaine. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Homeowner appeals the trial court's order dismissing her complaint against the Deputy Circuit Court Clerk of Crockett County. The complaint alleged that the Deputy Clerk failed to properly issue a writ of possession regarding the homeowner's real property. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Roderick Sammual Chadwick, was convicted by a jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault, for which he received concurrent sentences of twelve years and fifteen years, respectively, as a Range III, career offender.  Upon his guilty plea to another count in the indictment, being a felon in possession of a handgun, he received an additional six-year sentence to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-one years.  Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief.  The court denied relief after conducting an evidentiary hearing.  This appeal follows, in which petitioner claims multiple instances of ineffective assistance at trial and on direct appeal.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, appellant, Charles Edward Wagner, was found guilty of the following offenses: aggravated criminal trespass; two counts of aggravated assault; five counts of aggravated kidnapping; one count of especially aggravated kidnapping; one count of false imprisonment; and one count of kidnapping. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days each for aggravated criminal trespass, false imprisonment, and assault; four years each for both counts of aggravated assault; ten years each on the five counts of aggravated kidnapping; nineteen years for especially aggravated kidnapping; and four years for kidnapping. Appealing his convictions and effective nineteen-year sentence, appellant raises the following issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) sufficiency of the convicting evidence; and (3) errors with regard to sentencing. Following our careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant’s probation was revoked after a full evidentiary hearing, and he was ordered to serve his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment accordingly.

The defendant, Brian Alan Lambright, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of four counts of aggravated child abuse, Class A felonies, which the trial court merged into two convictions and sentenced the defendant to twenty-two years on each conviction, to be served consecutively, for an effective term of forty-four years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentences imposed by the trial court.  After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mario A. Reed, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Montgomery County.  He was convicted of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated rape, and theft under $500, and received an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  In this appeal, he claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sullivan County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant of one count of delivering psilocin, a Schedule I drug, within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class A felony; one count of delivering psilocin, a Class B felony; and two counts of casual exchange, a Class A misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged each casual exchange conviction into a conviction for delivering psilocin and sentenced the appellant to an effective fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the felony convictions; that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to cross-examine the confidential informant (CI) about her prior convictions; that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question the CI and her husband about their prior drug use; that the trial court should have instructed the jury on entrapment; that cumulative errors warrant a new trial; and that his effective fifteen-year sentence is disproportionate to the crimes. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error regarding the appellant’s cross-examination of the CI. Therefore, the appellant’s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Petitioner, Michael Small, was convicted of aggravated robbery and received a sentence of 20 years, to be served consecutively to his sentences for three prior aggravated robbery convictions. Petitioner appealed his sentence, and this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Michael Small, No. W2010-00470-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Mar. 28, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn., July 15, 2011). A summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions in this case can be found in that opinion. Petitioner now appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

A jury convicted Ricco R. Williams (“the Defendant”) of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Defendant appealed and contended, among other issues, that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. Upon our review, this Court reversed the Defendant’s two convictions of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and remanded those counts for a new trial; modified one of the Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions to a conviction of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault; reversed and dismissed the Defendant’s conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and affirmed the Defendant’s convictions of and sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and the remaining aggravated robbery. See State v. Ricco R. Williams, No. W2011-02365-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 167285, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2013) (“Williams I”). Upon the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court for consideration in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), and State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013). See State v. Ricco R. Williams, No. W2011-02365-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2013). Upon our consideration of the Defendant’s especially aggravated kidnapping convictions in light of White and Cecil, we affirm the Defendant’s three convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping as to the victims A.R., K.R., and M.R. We reverse the Defendant’s two convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping as to the victims Timothy Currie and Sherita Currie and remand those charges for a new trial. Our previous holdings regarding the Defendant’s remaining convictions are unaffected by the remand and, thus, remain valid.

I respectfully write separately to express departure from the majority with respect to the absence of the White instruction in the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions wherein M.R., K.R., and A.R. were respectively named victims. I emphasize that I do not disagree with the logic underlying the majority’s conclusion that due process principles do not impact these three convictions, the victims of which were not also named victims in accompanying felonies. Rather, I disagree with the implication emanating from Anthony that due process principles constrict the use of kidnapping convictions against victims even though those victims were not victims in any accompanying felony. This vestige of the Anthony regime should be specifically overruled, but I view that as a responsibility of our supreme court.

E. Ron Pickard and Linda Pickard have filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition requesting this Court to revisit its opinion filed in this case on December 17, 2013. This petition is premised on the Pickards’ erroneous conclusion that the focal point of the Court’s analysis was their April 6, 2009 petition for a declaratory order, to the exclusion of their January 16, 2009 petition for a declaratory order.

Defendant, Dwayne B. Harris, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking Defendant’s sentences of probation following a hearing in which violation of conditions of probation were admitted to by Defendant through his attorney. While acknowledging on appeal that violations of probation conditions had been admitted, Defendant asserts the trial court still erred by revoking probation and ordering him to serve his sentences in incarceration. The State argues the appeal should be dismissed because the notice of appeal was filed seven days late. Defendant admits the notice of appeal was late but requests this court to waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Under the circumstances, we decline to do so. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Samuel Blake Maness, was convicted of robbery, aggravated burglary, and assault and is currently serving an effective twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) consecutive sentences were improperly imposed. Following review of the argument and record, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

The defendant, Cortino A. Harris, stands convicted for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the registration law. He was sentenced to a term of six months in the county jail for the convictions, and the sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a term imposed in a separate case. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the convicting evidence with regard to the conviction for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license. Following review of the record and arguments, we affirm the convictions as imposed.

The defendant, Timothy Aaron Baxter, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of Class E felony failure to appear, see T.C.A. § 39-16-609, the result of which was a six-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of hearsay evidence, the use of prior convictions to impeach the defendant as a witness, and the failure to suppress his pretrial statements recorded in a transcript of an earlier court appearance. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the purchase of property at a tax sale. MERS filed suit against Purchaser to invalidate his purchase of property because it had not received notice of the sale even though it was listed as a beneficiary or nominee on the deed of trust. Purchaser claimed that MERS was not entitled to notice because MERS did not have an interest in the property. Purchaser also alleged that MERS failed to properly commence its lawsuit because it did not remit the proper funds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2504(c). The trial court refused to set aside the tax sale, holding that the applicable notice requirements were met and that Purchaser was the holder of legal title to the property. MERS appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A woman driving a passenger vehicle was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a tractor trailer. The woman and her husband filed a complaint alleging negligence and loss of consortium against the other driver and against the owner of the tractor trailer. The Plaintiffs did not comply with the deadlines set out in the Scheduling Order and, as a result, they were precluded from introducing medical testimony or records in support of their claims. On the day set for trial, the Plaintiffs told the court they were not prepared to try their case and wanted to go home. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice, with the option of filing a new complaint within a year, and the Plaintiffs appealed. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and, accordingly, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a neurosurgeon, negligently penetrated her spinal cord with a surgical instrument while performing a cervical fusion at two levels of her neck leading to partial paralysis and other neurological problems. She was ultimately diagnosed with a condition called Brown Sequard Syndrome. The issues were tried before a jury; however, several of the claims were dismissed on directed verdict. The remaining claims went to the jury which rendered a verdict on behalf of the defendant-neurosurgeon. The plaintiff raises numerous issues on appeal, the substance of which may be divided into three categories. First, she contends error associated with the directed verdict, the verdict form, and the jury instructions. In this regard she contends, inter alia, that the trial court erred in directing a verdict as to res ipsa loquitur because she presented the testimony of three expert witnesses of the defendant’s specific acts of negligence. The plaintiff also contends the court erred by dismissing all but three of her claims upon a directed verdict. Second, the plaintiff argues she was denied a fair trial due to inappropriate argument and misconduct. Third, she argues a host of errors secondary to evidentiary rulings. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

The defendant, convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, and sentenced to concurrent terms of ten and six years respectively, appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the evidence of identification was sufficient as to both convictions and, as to the aggravated burglary, holding that the victim had not given his “effective consent” to the entry of the residence. We granted the application for permission to appeal to determine whether the evidence, circumstantial or direct, was sufficient to establish both convictions. Because the jury had the prerogative to reject the alibi testimony offered by the defendant, the identification evidence was sufficient as to both offenses. The aggravated robbery conviction is, therefore, affirmed. As to the aggravated burglary, however, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction because there was no evidence that the Defendant engaged in an act of “deception,” as defined by statute, in the context of “effective consent.” The aggravated burglary conviction is, therefore, reversed and the charge dismissed. We remand for a new trial on the lesser included offenses of aggravated criminal trespass and criminal trespass.