APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This action involves the proper adjudication of the parties’ interests in certain marital retirement assets post divorce. The sole issue raised is whether the trial court properly retained jurisdiction over the retirement assets pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”). Based on prior precedent, we find that the trial court did properly retain jurisdiction, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s decision in this case.

The defendant was found by the trial court to be in violation of the terms of his community corrections sentence and ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to incarceration rather than to rehabilitation. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we discern no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Tamika Michelle Claybourne, challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.  After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we discern no error in the trial court’s determinations and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ronnie Peter Wilson, III, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-103, -12-107, -13-402. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twenty-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a property boundary dispute. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and found that Defendant did not acquire disputed property bordering the western edge of Plaintiff’s property and the eastern edge of Defendant’s property by adverse possession. The trial court also found that Defendant did not demonstrate laches. We affirm.

A bail bondsman filed suit against an attorney over title to several pieces of land.  The suit went to trial before a jury, but the parties settled before a verdict was announced.  The attorney subsequently sued the bail bondsman’s attorneys for malicious prosecution and other torts.  The defendant attorneys filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that the parties’ agreement to settle the underlying case negated one of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim, “a final and favorable termination” of the underlying suit in favor of the defendant.  The motion also argued that the complaint did not sufficiently allege the elements of the other causes of action.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff attorney had failed to state a claim for relief under any of the causes of action.  We affirm the trial court.

Earlene Gregory brought this action against Michael Melhorn and his wife, Cynthia Melhorn, sellers of a house and real estate, alleging that the defendants falsely stated in their Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure statement that they were unaware of any defects in the exterior walls or basement or any flooding or drainage problems. The contract for sale of the property, executed and signed by plaintiff and defendants, provided that the warranty deed was to be made in the name of Earlene Singleton Gregory. During discovery, the parties discovered that the deed actually listed the plaintiff’s three sons as grantees. After defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing because she did not own the property, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to include a claim for reformation of the deed to reflect her intention at the time of sale, i.e., to retain a life estate in the property with a remainder interest in her sons. Plaintiff also filed a motion to allow her sons to intervene as plaintiffs on the ground that they held legal title to the property. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motions and granted defendants summary judgment, holding that plaintiff lacked standing because she did not own the property. The court further held that the proposed intervening plaintiffs, even if allowed to intervene, would lack standing because they were not parties to the contract. We vacate the trial court’s summary judgment. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.01, and by refusing to allow the plaintiff’s sons to intervene, as was their right under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01.

The Petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his guilty-pleaded conviction for burglary and resulting eight-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing principally by failing to discover or challenge several errors in the presentence investigation report regarding his criminal history. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Cassie Chapman, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for two counts of theft over $1,000 and one count of aggravated burglary. She pled guilty to the charges and agreed to a three-year sentence for one count of theft, a two-year sentence for the second count of theft, and a three-year sentence for aggravated burglary. The plea agreement specified that one two-year sentence for theft and the sentence for aggravated burglary would run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the three-year sentence for aggravated burglary would run consecutively to the theft sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing on the theft sentences. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to incarceration. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a post-divorce case. Jimmy Glenn Fields (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s order (1) denying his motion for a reduction in alimony and (2) granting the counter-motion of Rene Annette Fields (“Wife”) for an increase in alimony. Following a bench trial, the court held that Husband had failed to demonstrate his inability to return to work as a material change in circumstances justifying a decrease in his court-ordered alimony obligation of $1,100 a month. Rather, the court found that the proof demonstrated that Husband had the ability to pay, and that Wife had a need for, increased support. The court increased Husband’s obligation to $2,000 per month. We affirm.

I do not take issue with any of the law as set forth in the majority’s opinion. I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the Appellant’s request to reduce the amount of the alimony. I do, however, respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the Trial Court’s decision to increase the amount of the alimony.

Winston Payne brought this action against his former employer, CSX Transportation, Inc., under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), alleging that CSX negligently exposed him to asbestos, diesel fumes, and radioactive materials in the workplace causing his injuries. The jury returned a verdict finding (1) that CSX negligently caused Payne’s injuries; (2) that CSX violated the Locomotive Inspection Act or safety regulations regarding exposure to asbestos, diesel fumes, and radioactive materials; and (3) that Payne’s contributory negligence caused 62% of the harm he suffered. The jury found that “adequate compensation” for Payne’s injuries was $8.6 million. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court, sua sponte, instructed the jury, for the first time, that, under FELA, its finding that CSX violated a statute or regulation enacted for the safety of its employees meant that plaintiff would recover 100% of the damages found by the jury. The court sent the jury back for further deliberations. It shortly returned with an amended verdict of “$3.2 million @ 100%.” Six months after the court entered judgment on the $3.2 million verdict, it granted CSX’s motion for a new trial, citing “instructional and evidentiary errors.” The case was then assigned to another trial judge, who thereafter granted CSX’s motion for summary judgment as to the entirety of the plaintiff’s complaint. The second judge ruled that the causation testimony of all of plaintiff’s expert witnesses was inadmissible. We hold that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, sua sponte, on a purely legal issue, i.e., that the jury’s finding of negligence per se under FELA precluded apportionment of any fault to the plaintiff based upon contributory negligence, an instruction given after the jury had returned a verdict that was complete, consistent, and based on the instructions earlier provided to it by the trial court. We further hold that, contrary to the trial court’s statements, the court did not make any prejudicial evidentiary rulings in conducting the trial, and that its jury instructions, read as a whole, were clear, correct, and complete. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting a new trial. We remand to the trial court. We direct the first trial judge to review the evidence as thirteenth juror and determine whether the jury verdict in the amount of $8.6 million is against the clear weight of the evidence. If it is not, the trial judge is directed to enter judgment on that verdict. If, on the other hand, the trial judge finds that the larger verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, the court is directed to enter a final judgment on the jury’s verdict of $3.2 million. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is rendered moot by our judgment. However, in the event the Supreme Court determines that our judgment is in error, we hold that the grant of summary judgment was not appropriate.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, James Johnson a.k.a. Guy Bonner, charging him with aggravated burglary, theft of property more than $500 but less than $1,000, and resisting arrest. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, theft of property less than $500, and resisting arrest. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months, 29 days each for the theft conviction and the resisting arrest conviction and fifteen years as a persistent offender for aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentences in unrelated cases. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the State failed to give proper notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm defendant’s convictions for aggravated burglary, theft over $500, and resisting arrest. However, we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment showing a sentence of six months, concurrent with the sentences for aggravated burglary and theft over $500, for the Class B misdemeanor of resisting arrest.

This case involves litigation between two business entities: Dominion Enterprises, f/k/a Trader Publishing Company (“Dominion”), the former employer of six of the seven individual defendants, and Dataium, LLC (“Dataium”), a company subsequently formed by those defendants. Dominion filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging numerous causes of action, including breach of covenants not to compete, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty, breach of a non-solicitation agreement, and civil conspiracy. The trial court found that Dataium and two of the individual defendants were liable for breach of contract but dismissed Dominion’s other claims.  Dominion appeals.  We affirm.

Jimmy Yarbro (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to theft of property of $10,000 or more and burglary. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of eight years, with restitution and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the Petitioner serve his sentence in confinement. The court also ordered restitution of $17,000 in increments of $200 per month beginning sixty days after the Petitioner’s release. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his plea. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Benjamin Gunn (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of possession of cocaine, one count of possession with intent to sell 14.175 grams or more of marijuana, one count of possession with intent to deliver 14.175 grams or more of marijuana, and one count of tampering with evidence. The trial court merged the two convictions for possession of cocaine. The trial court also merged the conviction for possession with intent to deliver 14.175 grams or more of marijuana into the conviction for possession with intent to sell 14.175 grams or more of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eight years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for possession with intent to sell and deliver 14.175 grams or more of marijuana. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Alejandro Guana, appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for first degree murder which resulted in a life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief alleging ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel and trial court errors. Specifically, he submits that trial counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) failing to investigate and interview the State’s witnesses, leaving him unprepared for cross-examination; (2) conceding that the Petitioner’s actions were intentional, abandoning any viable defense; (3) failing to call an expert witness on his intoxication at the time of the shooting and failing to present a defense of diminished capacity; (4) failing to preserve his request for a mistrial and offer proof regarding a memorial service for the victim which took place during the sentencing phase of the Petitioner’s trial; and (5) failing to ask for individual voir dire of any particular juror. As for appellate counsel, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance by counsel’s failure to pursue the memorial service issue and the omission of a jury instruction on accomplice testimony on appeal. Finally, he alleges trial court error regarding the trial court’s failure to give the instruction on accomplice testimony and the failure to declare a mistrial based upon the memorial service. Following our review, we affirm the denial of relief.

Gregory Tyrone Greer (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of reckless aggravated assault by a Madison County jury. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Larry Wayne Webb, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for forgery and identity theft, for which he is serving an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range III, career offender.  The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child A.W. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found A.W. to be an unruly child. A.W. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding A.W. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. A.W. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. A.W. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that A.W.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. A.W. appeals. We affirm.

This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child B.R. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found B.R. to be an unruly child. B.R. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding B.R. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. B.R. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. B.R. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that B.R.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. B.R. appeals. We affirm.

This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child T.W. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found T.W. to be an unruly child. T.W. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding T.W. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. T.W. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. T.W. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that T.W.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. T.W. appeals. We affirm.

This case is before us once again after remand to the Trial Court for specific findings relative to the Trial Court’s termination of the parental rights of Christopher M. (“Father”) to the minor child Eimile A.M. (“the Child”). Upon remand the Trial Court entered its findings of fact. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to the Child. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was not proven of grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 for willful failure to visit or willful failure to support. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child.

This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the minor child M.R. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found M.R. to be an unruly child. M.R. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding M.R. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. M.R. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. M.R. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that M.R.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. M.R. appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Charles Martin, Jr., pled guilty to one count of kidnapping, as a Range II, multiple offender, with an agreed upon eight-year sentence.  The trial court determined the manner of service, and the Defendant was placed in the Community Corrections Program and ordered to serve 180 days in confinement.  A violation warrant was filed.  Thereafter, the trial court revoked the sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement based upon the Defendant’s commission of new crimes and his consumption of alcohol while at a local grocery store.  The Defendant appeals the order of total incarceration.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.