APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Michael D. Green, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of multiple crimes, including first degree felony murder, and received a sentence of life plus twenty-four years. That sentence was ordered to be served concurrently to a federal sentence of life plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to request sequestration of the jury; (2) failing to utilize all available preemptory challenges or to challenge potential jurors for cause; and (3) failing to limit testimony concerning the prior federal trial. Following review of the record, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Raymond Denton, was convicted of aggravated rape, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-502; aggravated burglary, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-403; and physical abuse of an impaired person, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-6-119. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender for each conviction to sixty (60) years for aggravated rape, fifteen (15) years for aggravated burglary, and fifteen (15) years for physical abuse of an impaired person. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to each other for an effective sentence of ninety (90) years. In this appeal, Defendant does not challenge any of the sentences imposed, and does not challenge the convictions for aggravated burglary and physical abuse of an impaired person. Defendant’s sole issue is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of aggravate rape, limited to the argument that there was insufficient proof establishing the element of penetration. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee worked as a skidder operator for the employer’s logging company. The employee’s face and eyelid were lacerated when the chainsaw that he was operating “kicked back.” The employee briefly returned to work within a few weeks after his accident, but he was unable to continue working due to eye pain. The employee subsequently underwent eight surgeries on his face and eye. Although the employer admitted that the employee’s injury was compensable, it argued that his award should be capped at one and one-half times his impairment rating and that the medical testimony concerning his impairment was not credible. The trial court found that the employee was permanently and totally disabled. The employer appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. The employee, however, contends that the employer’s appeal is frivolous and seeks liquidated damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(h). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Keeanna Luellan, guilty of forgery over $500 and fraudulent use of a credit card over $500. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to six years for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other bad acts or crimes and that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Frederick Parks, appeals from the trial court’s order summarily dismissing Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Kimberly Wilson Wentzel, of six counts of prescription fraud and two counts of identity theft.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender and imposed concurrent eleven-year sentences for each of the Defendant’s eight felony convictions.  The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied her request for alternative sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing.

I join the majority in all respects with the exception of sentencing.  While I agree that the effective 225-year sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive, I disagree that an effective fifty-year sentence complies with the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.    
 

The Defendant, Tavaria Merritt, pleaded guilty to nine counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010).  He was sentenced to nine consecutive terms of twenty-five years for an effective 225-year sentence to be served at 100%.  The Defendant was seventeen years old when the offenses were committed and nineteen years old when he pleaded guilty.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that his effective sentence is the equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and is cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  Although Graham does not apply to the Defendant’s effective 225-year sentence, we conclude that the sentence is excessive, reverse the judgments of the trial court, and remand for entry of judgments reflecting an effective fifty-year sentence.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dearaysun Wright, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert Lee Polk, appeals the Circuit Court for Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the question of whether the trial court properly limited a medical expert’s testimony at trial regarding the standard of care in an informed consent health care liability action. In the case at bar, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to limit the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert at trial regarding risks that should have been disclosed to the plaintiff to only those risks that actually resulted in injury. The trial court granted the motion. A jury trial was held, and the jury found in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appeals, asserting that the trial court committed reversible error when it restricted the ability of the plaintiff’s medical expert to testify about other known risks. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority to affirm the Trial Court. I believe the Trial Court did commit reversible error when it limited Plaintiff’s medical expert’s testimony at trial regarding the standard of care in this health care liability informed consent action. Specifically, I do not believe that the Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony on what risks should have been disclosed to the Plaintiff to meet the acceptable standard of care for informed consent should have been limited to disclosure of only those risks that actually came to pass.

An employee was injured when she fell from a stack of soft drinks while attempting to climb a wall to rescue and remove a feral cat from her employer’s premises. Her employer denied the claim, contending that she was on a private mission at the time of her injury and also that she had violated a safety rule by failing to use a ladder. The employee filed this action seeking workers’ compensation benefits. The trial was bifurcated. After the initial hearing, the trial court found that the employee’s action was related in part to her employment and, therefore, compensable. After a subsequent hearing, the court awarded benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on compensability and, in the alternative, that the claim is barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-110(a) (2008). The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to further address the causation aspect of the trial court’s rationale in excluding portions of Dr. Law’s testimony.

The petitioner, Ira Ishmael Muhammad, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which challenged his 11-year-old Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and felony reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Reba Nell Woods, of three counts of selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class A felony, and two counts of selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a park, a Class B felony.  The trial court sentenced her as a Range III, career offender to an effective sentence of ninety years.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to sever the offenses, that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court committed numerous reversible errors regarding the admissibility of evidence.  Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to sever the offenses and that the error was not harmless as to the appellant’s convictions in counts 3, 4, and 5.  Therefore, those convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for new trials on those charges.  We also conclude that although the evidence is sufficient to show that the appellant sold twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in counts 1 and 2, the evidence is insufficient to show that she did so within 1,000 feet of a park.  Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of those judgments.  Finding no errors that warrant reversal of the appellant’s convictions for selling twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in counts 1 and 2, those convictions are affirmed.  However, upon remand, the trial court is to consider whether the appellant’s mandatory thirty-year sentences should be served consecutively.
 

Petitioner, Bert Newby, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction petition after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts his trial counsel at the trial where Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated assault rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Charles Pennington, charging him with first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm in the commission of a felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was found not guilty of employing a firearm in the commission of a felony. Defendant was sentenced to life for the murder conviction, and by agreement with the State, to a concurrent sentence of twelve years for attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Everett Russ, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to consecutive terms of nine years for each conviction. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2010). On appeal, he contends that (1) the State’s failure to respond properly to his request for a bill of particulars should have resulted in a mistrial and (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but because of inappropriate sentencing, we reverse the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting concurrent sentences.

This appeal involves the enforceability of an arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court found the agreement was not unconscionable, but that the defendant had waived its right to enforce the agreement. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and we remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Terrance Antonio Cecil, No. M2011-01210-SC-R3-CD, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013).   See State v. Glenn Lydell McCray, No. M2011-02411-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2013), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013).  Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that although the jury was not properly instructed pursuant to State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), regarding the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the judgments of the trial court.  Upon further review, we conclude that the omission of the White instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.  The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Gregory Eidson, appeals as of right from the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that his trial counsel was ineffective.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Justin B. Conrad (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and theft of property of $1,000 or more.  The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction and sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions.  See State v. Justin Brian Conrad, No. M2008-01342-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3103776, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

The parents of six children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on two grounds, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions, and the determination that termination of both parents rights was in the best interests of the children. We affirm.

Petitioner, Jonathan Tears, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.  On appeal, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the petition because the State violated his constitutional rights by withholding material exculpatory information, and trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  More specifically, Petitioner contends that the State (1) failed to disclose a statement made by the victim; (2) failed to disclose the statement of Ashton Davis; (3) failed to disclose the statement of Felice O’Neal; (4) failed to disclose the statement of Tangelia Alexander; and (5) failed to disclose payment from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund.  Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) failing to “investigate, interview, subpoena, and call to the stand” Shelby Harris, Darron Little, Alexander Harris, Jarrod Robinson, Zeldra Swaggerty, and Adriana Cross; (2) failing to request Jenck’s material and cross-examine the victim concerning his statement to Detective Oliver; (3) failing to request a ballistics expert to testify at trial; and (4) failing to investigate and assert the defense of self-defense.  Petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise Brady issues.  Following our review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief and remand this cause for a new trial.