APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Dickie Ray Bain, pled guilty in the DeKalb County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years to be served at sixty percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by referring to the wrong offense during the sentencing hearing and that his sentence constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.” Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Fred Mogan, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. He pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery in 2008 and was sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In September 2012, the petitioner filed what appears to be his second petition for post-conviction relief in this case. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the court should have considered his petition because due process requires tolling the statute of limitation. Following review of the somewhat scant record before us, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for relief.

The petitioner, David Allen Lackey, appeals the determination of the post-conviction court that due process did not mandate a waiver of the statute of limitations. The petitioner is currently serving a life sentence in the Department of Correction following his conviction for first degree murder and theft of property valued under $500. Following a direct appeal, the petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief. After the petition was denied by the post-conviction court, this court remanded the case for a determination of whether the petitioner’s due process rights required that the statute of limitations be tolled. After a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that the petitioner had failed to carry his burden of establishing his right to a tolling of the statute of limitations and dismissed the petition. The petitioner contends that the court’s determination was error. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as untimely.

This is a negligence case in which the Grahams were severely injured when the top portion of a tree collapsed, hitting their car while they were driving in Cleveland, Tennessee. Plaintiffs filed suit against the County, alleging that the County’s failure to maintain and inspect its roadways caused the accident. The County alleged that it could not be held liable pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-10-101, et. seq. Following a trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The Grahams appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The appellant, Demetrius D. Walton, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to one count of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court and the trial court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence. Upon review, we affirm the length of the sentence imposed. However, we must remand to the trial court for a correction of the judgment to reflect that the appellant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender who was to serve a minimum of thirty-five percent of his sentence in confinement before being eligible for release.

The Petitioner, David G. Housler, Jr., filed petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, seeking relief from his convictions for four counts of felony murder and resulting consecutive sentences of life in confinement. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted the petitions. On appeal, the State contends that the court erred by finding that the Petitioner was entitled to any relief. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s granting the petition for post-conviction relief but conclude that the court erred by granting the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Nevertheless, because the Petitioner has shown that he is entitled to post-conviction relief based upon his receiving the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a slip and fall case. Plaintiff sued The Kroger Company after he fell in a puddle of water near a freezer at a local Kroger store. The trial court granted Kroger’s motion for summary judgment, but failed to include findings indicating the reason for its decision. We find that summary judgment was inappropriate and therefore reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal results from the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint on the basis of res judicata.  However, in his appellate brief, the Appellant fails to raise as an issue the trial court's application of the doctrine of res judicata, or the resulting dismissal. Because the Appellant’s brief fails to raise and argue the dispositive issue in this case and does not otherwise comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal.

Mother of six children appeals termination of her parental rights, contending that the evidence does not support the court’s holding that she abandoned the children within the meaning of the applicable statute, that she failed to comply with the requirements of permanency plans, that the conditions which led to the removal of the children from her custody persisted, and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest.  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a “Final Decree of Divorce.”  Because the decree does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

In this second appeal of a child custody decision, Father argues that the trial court erred in naming Mother primary residential parent and in fashioning the permanent parenting plan. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to either the custody or parenting time decisions, and therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court.  Affirmed and remanded.

A twenty-year veteran of the Memphis Police Department was terminated based upon his involvement with a private security company, in violation of departmental policies, and his untruthfulness during the department’s investigation. The officer filed a petition for review in chancery court, and the chancery court upheld his termination. The officer appeals, arguing that the chancery court should have allowed him to introduce evidence of another officer who was treated differently, in violation of his equal protection rights. He also argues that he was impermissibly punished twice for the same conduct. We affirm.

In this consolidated appeal, the pro se petitioner, Tyrone E. Montgomery, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court and the Morgan County Circuit Court’s orders denying his petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In case number E2011- 2629-CCA-R3-HC, the State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court. Because the petitions raise identical claims, we also affirm the judgment of the Morgan County Circuit Court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

This is a post-divorce appeal. In this second appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's ruling on his obligation as to certain expenses.  After a careful review of the record, we affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Defendant, Ladarius Devonte Maxwell, challenges his jury convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing. After a thorough examination of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kwane Morris, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of facilitation of first degree murder and received a twenty-two-year sentence for that conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police that was involuntary and coerced; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness for possible bias; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The trial court awarded partial summary judgment to both parties in this dispute over the division of attorney’s fees.  We affirm the trial court’s holding that Tennessee law, and not the “modern rule” is applicable to this case as a matter of law.  We reverse the trial court’s awards of summary judgment to both parties on the remaining issues, and remand for further proceedings. 
 

Petitioner, Daylon Demetric Roberts, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus regarding his convictions for first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions into one judgment and sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment. State v. Daylon Demetric Roberts, No. 03C01-9403-CR-00117, 1994 WL 540555, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 1994), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 6, 1995). Petitioner argues that the judgment of the trial court was void due to a defective indictment. The State filed a motion to dismiss asserting that petitioner’s indictment was legally sufficient. The habeas corpus court granted the State’s motion and dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Dusty Ross Binkley, pled guilty to manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of a weapon in the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an eight-year sentence to be served on community corrections. The Petitioner’s community corrections officer filed a violation warrant, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s community corrections sentence, finding that he had violated the terms of his sentence, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement, to run consecutively with his sentence in another county on an unrelated charge. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.
 

The employee, a sanitation worker, was struck in the groin area when he fell onto a bed frame. Within a few days, he developed swelling and infection of same. His treating physician testified that the condition was not caused by the work injury, and an evaluating physician testified that the employee’s condition was consistent with the injury. The trial court found that the swelling and infection were not related to the work injury and dismissed employee’s complaint. The employee appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Husband filed a petition pursuant to Rule 60.02 to set aside a provision of the parties’ divorce decree that required him to pay $80,000 to Wife in accordance with an antenuptial agreement. He sought relief under Rule 60.02(2) for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. The trial court denied Husband’s petition and “confirmed” the divorce decree. We find that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, and as a result, it did not properly exercise its discretion. We also find that Wife’s conduct constituted misrepresentation or other misconduct within the meaning of Rule 60.02(2). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Husband’s Rule 60 petition and we vacate the challenged portion of the divorce decree.

For the reasons discussed below, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the return of proof of service of process 412 days after issuance of a summons precludes a plaintiff from relying upon the original commencement of the lawsuit to toll the running of the statute of limitations. We hold that the plain language of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 4.03 does not condition the effectiveness of the original commencement to toll the statute of limitations upon the prompt return of proof of service. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s lawsuit. We remand this case to the trial court to determine whether service of process occurred within ninety days of issuance of the summons. If so, the plaintiff may rely upon the original commencement of the lawsuit to toll the statute of limitations.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that failure to return proof of service does not render commencement ineffective to toll the statute of limitations under Rule 3. I write separately, however, to address the majority’s failure to construe Rule 4.03(1), which states that a plaintiff “shall promptly make proof of service.” See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(1) (2012). Although the majority provides a brief historical perspective of companion Rules 3 and 4.03, including significant changes in the return of proof of service requirements of both rules, the majority relies almost entirely on Rule 3 to conclude that Ms. Fair’s failure to promptly return proof of service did not affect the commencement of her action.