APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We accepted this appeal to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to seek post-conviction relief from a judgment in a civil case finding her in criminal contempt and imposing sanctions, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 (2012). We hold that a criminal contempt adjudication under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 does not amount to a criminal conviction under the general criminal laws for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the dismissal of the petition.

This appeal involves the trial court’s disposition of Wife’s post-judgment motions and redivision of marital property. Following the trial court’s entry of the final decree of divorce, Wife filed several post-judgment motions seeking relief from the final decree based on Husband’s misrepresentation and concealment of assets prior to the trial court’s division of the marital estate. After an extensive period of discovery, the trial court agreed with Wife and concluded that she was entitled to a new division of marital property and relief from the final decree under either Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court further ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees and expert fees. Husband appeals. We affirm.

Appellant, Marques D. Wheeler, entered a guilty plea to aggravated burglary and received a four-year suspended sentence to be served in community corrections. Following several violations, the trial court revoked appellant from community corrections and resentenced him to six years. Appellant contends that the trial court’s resentencing was improper because the trial court failed to follow the statutory procedure of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Correl Marcellus Baker, was convicted by a Coffee County jury of aggravated robbery and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction and merged the reckless endangerment conviction into the aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting that the reckless endangerment conviction was merged into the aggravated robbery conviction.

The Defendant, Eric Dates, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, all suspended but 48 hours. See T.C.A. 55-10-401 (2012). On appeal, he contends that (1) the traffic stop was an unconstitutional search and seizure, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction, and (3) the verdicts were inconsistent. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Tony Thomas, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Husband and Wife were divorced in 2000 and Wife was awarded one-half of the retirement benefits Husband earned from the military during the parties’ ten-year marriage. Wife has been unable to collect her portion of these benefits because the language of the court’s decree does not satisfy the requirements of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §1408, et seq. Shortly after the divorce was granted, Wife filed a Rule 60 motion to amend the court’s Final Decree of Divorce to comply with the Act, which the trial court granted. Husband appealed because the trial court made substantive changes to Wife’s award beyond what was necessary to comply with the Act. The Court of Appeals agreed with Husband on appeal and issued a mandate directing the trial court to amend its Final Decree using language meant to comply with the Act’s requirements to enable Wife to receive her portion of Husband’s retirement benefits directly from the military.  Wife still has not been able to collect her portion of Husband’s retirement benefits and filed another Rule 60 motion seeking to amend the Final Decree again to comply with the Act’s requirements. The trial court denied Wife’s motion and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. Wife presents extraordinary circumstances entitling her to relief pursuant to Rule 60.02(5).

Appellee/Buyer purchased certain telecommunications equipment from Appellant/Seller. Upon inspection, Appellee discovered the equipment was defective and rejected the goods. Appellant contends that the returned goods were never delivered and that Appellee bears the risk of loss under the Tennessee Uniform Commercial Code. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Appellee/Buyer, finding that, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 47-2-510, the risk of loss remained with Appellant/Seller. Appellant appeals this finding, as well as the award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees in favor of Appellee. We reverse the award of attorney fees. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

This case involves a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed by a pro se inmate. The Defendants/Appellees filed motions to dismiss the Petition, arguing that the Petition was untimely and that it lacked the required verification pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-8-104. The trial court dismissed the Petition without ruling on the inmate’s motion for an enlargement of time to respond to the motion to dismiss. The inmate appealed. On appeal, the Appellees argue that the inmate’s Notice of Appeal was untimely. We conclude that the inmate’s Notice of Appeal was timely filed. In addition, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to rule on the inmate’s pending motion was harmless, as the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction to consider the petition by the inmate’s failure to verify the truth of the petition. Affirmed and remanded.

The Defendant-Appellant, Susan Deshon Winters, was indicted by a Coffee County Grand Jury for bribery of a public servant (count 1), possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver (count 2), possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver (count 3), and possession of drug paraphernalia (count 4). See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-102; 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1); 39-17-417(a)(4), (g)(1); 39-17-425. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Winters entered guilty pleas to the charged offenses, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. The trial court subsequently sentenced Winters as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Winters argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her a sentence of split confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments for bribery of a public servant, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. However, because the record indicates that Winters entered a guilty plea to the indicted offense of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, rather than the offense of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony, we reverse the judgment in count 2 and remand the case for resentencing on that conviction.

The appellant, James Dennis Lamb, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to two counts of theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more and two counts of writing worthless checks valued $500 or less and received an effective four-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered that he serve the balance of his effective sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that he serve the sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issues in this case are (1) whether the evidence supports an award of 8% to the body as a whole for an injury covered by the Workers’ Compensation statutes of this state, and (2) whether the trial judge erred in multiplying that award by a factor of six in the final judgment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the medical proof supports the trial court’s finding of an 8% anatomical impairment and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the employee is entitled to receive permanent partial disability benefits of six times the anatomical impairment rating. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment awarding the employee permanent partial disability benefits of 48% to the body as a whole.

Following a jury trial, the Defendants, Gregory Mathis and Elza Evans, were each convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-305, -13-402, -14-403. The trial court sentenced Defendant Mathis to an effective sentence of 126 years and Defendant Evans to an effective sentence of two lifetimes without the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, the Defendants raise the following issues: (1) Defendant Evans contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from Defendant Mathis’s trial; (2) both Defendants contend that the especially aggravated kidnapping offenses were essentially incidental to the aggravated robbery offense; (3) both Defendants contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions; and (4) both Defendants contend that the trial court erred in imposing their sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case regarding Allison N.A., David M.B., and Raven H.B. (“the Children”), the minor children of Rebecca A.B. (“Mother”) and Jerry W.E.B. (“Father”). Mother and Father are divorced and reside in different states. Mother and the Children resided in Tennessee in a home with Mother’s then-boyfriend, Troy R. (“Boyfriend”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Children, then ages eight, four and three, respectively, from Mother’s care after Boyfriend was arrested for a physical assault against the youngest child. Relatives, with whom the Children were first placed, proved not to be able to care for them. DCS obtained custody and the Children entered foster care. Thereafter, they were adjudicated dependent and neglected. Father was located and he was notified of the Children’s situation. He did not seek custody. More than a year after the Children were placed in foster care, DCS filed a petition to terminate both parents’ rights. After a trial, the court granted the petition based on its finding that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Both findings were said to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.

This case involves the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of a Rule 60.02 Motion to Set Aside a Final Judgment. The trial court previously dismissed Mother’s Petition for Divorce, after finding that the marriage was void due to Mother’s preexisting marriage in Chile. Mother subsequently filed a Rule 60.02 Motion, with supporting documentation purporting to show that she was never legally married in Chile. The trial court refused to set a hearing and dismissed the Rule 60.02 Motion. We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Mother’s Rule 60.02 Motion. Reversed and remanded.

A Wayne County Jury convicted Defendant, Brent Rowden, of second-degree murder (County One), tampering with evidence (Count Two), and attempted initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine (Count Three). He received concurrent sentences of thirty-seven years as a Range II multiple offender for second-degree murder, thirteen years as a persistent offender for tampering with evidence, and thirteen years as a persistent offender for attempted initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine. The trial court ordered Defendant’s effective thirty-seven-year sentence to be served consecutively to an eight-year sentence in Lawrence County. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statements to police. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment in Count One to reflect Defendant’s offender status as Multiple rather than Career.

The Petitioner, Johnny L. Heitz, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated kidnapping conviction and resulting thirty-year sentence. He contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to two statements made by prosecutors during closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A patron at a sports bar shot and killed a man without threat or warning.  The widow of the murdered man and his daughter filed separate lawsuits which were later consolidated, naming the owner of the bar as defendant, and claiming that the victim’s death was the result of inadequate security on the premises. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment contending that he did not violate any duty owed to the plaintiffs, because the shooting that occurred was completely unforeseeable under the circumstances. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion. We affirm.

The defendant, Cleven Johnson, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for mistrial; (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the crime scene, and of a victim’s injuries and by admitting evidence of the defendant’s guilty plea to accompanying offenses; and (4) the sentence was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm and grant Appellees’ request for damages for a frivolous appeal.

The defendant, Daniel Ward, appeals his Campbell County Criminal Court jury convictions of 10 counts of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the bill of particulars was inadequate, that his pretrial statement to police was not voluntarily and knowingly given, and that the 54-year sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated sexual battery in count six, that conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed

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The petitioner, John Lowery, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. He asserts that newly discovered evidence, namely two witnesses’ recantation of their identification of the petitioner as the shooter and a previously unknown witness who said the petitioner was not at the scene of the crime, warranted a new trial on his convictions of premeditated first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the coram nobis court and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

A jury convicted the defendant, Brice Cook, of premeditated first degree murder after the defendant shot the victim, Shantell Lane. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing a witness to offer lay opinion testimony; (2) denying the defendant’s request for a copy of a witness’s prior statement to police; (3) allowing certain hearsay testimony; (4) refusing to grant a mistrial when a witness referred twice to the defendant’s previous trial; (5) giving limiting instructions to the jury over the defendant’s objection; (6) allowing prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and (7) refusing to excuse for cause potential jurors who exhibited a bias against a defendant’s exercise of his or her right to remain silent. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jerry A. Bell, was convicted in three separate trials of multiple felonies which resulted in three separate appeals. See State v. Jerry Bell, No. W2003-02870-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1105158 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 10, 2005); State v. Jerry Bell, No.W2004-01355-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2205849 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 12, 2005); State v. Jerry Bell, No. W2005-02812-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2872472 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 9, 2006). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief jointly attacking these convictions and arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled because the cases of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); and State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (“Gomez II”); established a new constitutional right requiring the tolling of the statute of limitations or in the alternative that his due process rights were violated such that the tolling of the statute of limitations is required. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals this dismissal. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that there is no basis upon which to toll the statute of limitations. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

Pro se Petitioner, Willie Andrew Cole, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition requesting DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-30-301. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition for DNA analysis without a response from the State or an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.