APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the majority’s holdings affirming the trial court’s jurisdiction and vacating the mandamus. However, I do not agree with the decision to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the declaratory judgment claim.

An attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility brought suit against the Board asserting violations of the Open Meetings Act and the Public Records Act. We have concluded that the trial court properly determined that the Open Meetings Act does not apply to the Board. Furthermore, we find no error in the trial court’s determination regarding the attorney’s right to records from certain Board meetings.

The Maury County grand jury indicted appellant, Jonathan Carl Davidson, for driving under the influence, second offense, and violation of the open container law. Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence, appellant entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence, second offense. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State dismissed the violation of the open container law charge, and the trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail, with forty-five days to serve. As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant reserved the right to certify a question of law challenging the legality of the initial traffic stop. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Michael Webster, challenges his bench trial conviction for theft of property, over $500, a Class E felony, contending that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove his knowing commission of the offense and that the value of the property exceeded $500. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the property at issue exceeded $500, modify the conviction to theft of property, $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

The petitioner, Timothy Chatman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary and that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Terry Fossett, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and statutory rape by an authority figure, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years at 100% on the rape of a child conviction and three years as a Range I offender on the statutory rape conviction, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the State should have obtained a psychological examination of the victim. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted appellant, Andre Harris, of first degree murder in the perpetration of a theft, first degree premeditated murder, and theft of property valued under $500. The trial court merged the murder convictions. Appellant was sentenced to life for first degree murder and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for theft, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant submits the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting a video taped portion of appellant’s interrogation from “The First 48”; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photographs; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for premeditated murder and murder in the perpetration of theft. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Chad Medford, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court convictions of felony murder, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to police and by denying admission of his unedited statement at trial, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by admitting certain witness testimony. The defendant also challenges his sentence alignment. Discerning no reversible error, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant, Gregory Bryan Austin, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated statutory rape with an agreed sentence of two years for each count to be served concurrently, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the effective sentence. The trial court ordered that Defendant serve six months of his effective two-year sentence in confinement with the balance served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him full probation. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Conservator filed suit to rescind a pre-conservatorship conveyance of real property by ward to her niece. The jury found in favor of niece and the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict. Conservator appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of her expert witness. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case presents a question of first impression regarding the scope of the term “lender” as used within the Tennessee Home Loan Protection Act. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment: Plaintiff claiming that the Defendants were “lenders” subject to the Act and Defendants claiming that they were not “lenders” subject to the Act. The trial court concluded that Defendants were not “lenders,” and therefore it granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants, we grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

The petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he was denied the right to a speedy trial and he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Gwendolyn Hagerman, was found guilty by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of five counts of rape of a child. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (1997). She was sentenced as a Range I offender to twenty years for each conviction, to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, for an effective sixtyyear sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) there was a material variance between the presentment, the bill of particulars, the election of offenses, and the proof; (3) the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the charges due to pre-accusation delay; (4) the trial court erred in declining to conduct an in camera review of Department of Children’s Services records; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves an appeal from juvenile court to circuit court. The maternal grandmother of the child at issue filed a petition in juvenile court against her daughter, seeking court-ordered visitation with her grandson. The respondent mother of the child filed an answer denying all of the grandmother’s allegations and also filed a counter-petition for injunctive relief against the grandmother. The juvenile court granted the grandmother’s petition for court-ordered visitation but did not adjudicate the mother’s petition for injunctive relief. The mother then appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The mother now appeals. We affirm the decision of the circuit court, vacate the orders of the juvenile court based on subject-matter jurisdiction, and remand to the juvenile court, with specific instructions, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Robert Aaron White, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Both counts of aggravated assault and the firearm offense were dismissed prior to trial. Defendant was convicted by a petit jury of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to serve 23 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by refusing to allow Defendant to cover his facial tattoos during trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Travis Nipper, was indicted for the Class D felony of Theft of $1,000 or more by the McMinn County Grand Jury. After a trial by jury, he was convicted of the Class E felony of Theft over $500 and was sentenced to one year in the Department of Correction. The appellant appeals his conviction and sentence, stating that his due process rights were violated when the trial court excluded defense evidence during trial that allegedly had been ruled admissible in a pretrial hearing, and that he had been improperly denied an alternative sentence to incarceration. We affirm the appellant's conviction and sentence.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Raynella Dossett Leath, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life, with the possibility of parole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that she was retried in violation of her state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy; (2) that the trial court erred by declining to exclude test results from analysis of the victim’s blood and urine; (3) that the trial court erred by admitting “certain estate planning documents” into evidence at trial; (4) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial after a witness testified that she had previously stated that she was “scared” of the Defendant; (5) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (6) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the State’s duty to preserve evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (7) that the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the defense of alibi improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the Defendant; (8) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the Defendant’s “theory of defense”; (9) that the trial court used an improper method to select the alternate juror; (10) that members of the jury committed misconduct by deliberating prematurely and reviewing extraneous prejudicial information; (11) that the State withheld evidence favorable to the Defendant in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny; (12) that the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence; (13) that the trial court, by accepting the jury’s guilty verdict, “abdicated” its role as the thirteenth juror; and (14) that the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, John T. Freeland, Jr., appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court convictions of first degree premeditated murder, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1); first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an especially aggravated kidnapping, see id. § 39-13-202(a)(2); especially aggravated kidnapping, see id. § 39-13-305; and tampering with evidence, see id. § 39-16-503(a)(1). Following a bench trial regarding both guilt and punishment, see id. § 39-13-205, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each first degree murder conviction based upon its findings that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involve the use of violence, see id. § 39-13-204(i)(2); the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant, see id. § 39-13-204(i)(6); the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, an aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-204(i)(7); and that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court also imposed consecutive sentences of 20 years’ incarceration for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and five years’ incarceration for the tampering with evidence conviction. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements and the imposition of the death penalty. Because we determine that the trial court failed to merge the first degree murder convictions at sentencing, we remand the case for correction of the judgments to effectuate proper merger. In all other respects, however, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial in the Madison County Circuit Court, Defendant Timothy James Coley was convicted of the Class B felony offense of initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine, and also of the Class A misdemeanor offenses of possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and evading arrest. For each of the Class A misdemeanors, he was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days, with a 75% service by incarceration prior to eligibility for work release, furlough, trusty status and/or rehabilitation programs. Defendant was sentenced to serve 12 years as a Range I standard offender for the felony conviction, with service in the Community Corrections Program, consecutive to, and following service of the sentence for the misdemeanor convictions. Typed under “Special Conditions” of each judgment for a misdemeanor conviction is a requirement that the incarceration must be served in the Madison County Jail and not at the Madison County penal farm. Also typed in the Special Conditions section is the provision that Defendant was not eligible for work release or “any other special jail credits.” Handwritten on the judgment for possession of methamphetamine is the addition “(other than [g]ood [b]ehavior credits).” Defendant presents one very narrow issue in this appeal. He argues that the trial court had no authority to place any restrictions on “the earning of credits and the manner in which the credits are earned.” Specifically, he asserts he should be entitled to sentence credits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-2-147. The state filed a brief with a detailed argument section, but failed to address the precise issue raised by Defendant. Following a thorough review of the record and Defendant’s brief, we reverse the judgments of the trial court as to the sentencing credit restrictions in the misdemeanor judgments and remand for entry of amended judgments that do not include the restriction on earning sentencing credits.

The Defendant, Mansour Bin El Amin, appeals from his conviction by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury for theft of property valued at more than $1000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-103 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years, six months’ confinement. The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Tina K. (“Mother”) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Courtney N. (“the Child”), now age 12. The Child and her older sister, Tiffany N. (“Sister”) (collectively “the Children”) were placed in the protective custody of petitioners, Raymond and Charlene W., (“Uncle and Aunt”). They were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected in Mother’s care. In January 2012, Uncle and Aunt, together with Janie Lindamood, the Child’s court-appointed guardian ad litem, (collectively “Petitioners”), filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the Child’s best interest. The court stated that it made both findings by clear and convincing evidence. Mother appeals each of these determinations. We vacate the finding of abandonment based on conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare as such ground is not implicated by the facts of this case. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

This appeal involves two letters of credit issued by First State to Commerce Bank for the benefit of Debtor, who subsequently defaulted on two loans that were secured by the letters. Commerce Bank issued a sight draft requesting full payment, but First State submitted partial payment. Commerce Bank filed suit. Following a hearing, the trial court held that First State was obligated to fulfill each letter of credit in its entirety. The court granted Commerce Bank’s request for attorney fees but denied the request for pre-judgment interest. First State and Commerce Bank appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jonathan Pulley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his Wayne County Circuit Court convictions of aggravated sexual battery and assault, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the Circuit Court.
 

Keith Allen Powell (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of property over $1,000, Class D felonies, and one count of simple possession of Lortab and Soma pills, a Class A misdemeanor. The plea agreement provided that the Defendant would serve concurrent sentences for the two theft convictions but otherwise left sentencing for all the convictions open to the trial court. At the time of sentencing, the Defendant also had a community corrections violation for an additional conviction of theft of property over $1,000. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of four years’ incarceration. The Defendant has appealed the trial court’s sentence, asserting that the trial court erred in requiring the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
 

The issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court that had granted the divorce lost subject matter jurisdiction to hear a later petition for change of custody. James Franklin Holley, III (“Father”) and Paula Jean Holley (“Mother”) were divorced in the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Mother was given primary custody of the parties’ two minor children (“the Children”), with Father having co-parenting time. Later, Father filed a petition (“the Petition”) to change custody based on Mother’s alleged neglect of the Children’s psychological and educational issues. The Trial Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Petition as juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear petitions alleging dependency and neglect. Father appeals. We hold that the Petition did not allege under the relevant statutes that the Children were dependent and neglected and, therefore, the Trial Court did have jurisdiction to hear the Petition. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.