APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Tolbert Cates Kail, was convicted by a Crockett County jury of two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony, sexual exploitation of a minor with fifty images or less, a Class D felony, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, and assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Kail as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of twelve years at 100%. On appeal, Kail argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of his complaint against the prison’s medical staff for failure to properly diagnose and treat him. The trial court determined that Appellant prisoner’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which was not tolled by operation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s findings concerning his status as an indigent person. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm and remand.

Petitioner pro se appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus. The petitioner contends that his conviction for first degree (felony) murder is void because of a defect in his indictment. This issue was previously adjudicated in one of the petitioner’s prior petitions for habeas corpus, and this court is bound by the result reached in the prior case. The judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Appellant, Jackie Ray Elkins, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver not less than one-half of an ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana in a drug-free zone. This charge was the result of a traffic stop in Shelby Bottoms in Nashville, Tennessee and the subsequent search of the vehicle in which Appellant was travelling. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the proceeds of the search. The trial court denied the motion. A jury convicted Appellant as charged. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion and asks this Court to review his complaint under the plain error rule. In addition, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that plain error review is not necessary to do substantial justice and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and received a life sentence. In his appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, he alleged that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that a discharged alternate juror improperly communicated with the jury foreman; and that the trial court erred by failing to exclude from the evidence certain photographs and recordings and by failing to provide a special jury instruction on diminished capacity. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. This Court granted permission to appeal to address whether the communication by the alternate juror to the foreman entitled the defendant to a new trial. Because the State successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice that accompanies an improper communication with a juror, we find no error and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
 

Mother appeals the trial court’s order naming Father primary residential parent and setting child support. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Plaintiffs, former part-time Shelby County employees, claim they were wrongfully excluded from Shelby County’s retirement plan. The trial court dismissed all claims based on the six year limitations period applicable to contract actions. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The petitioner, Anthony Leroy Harris, appeals the summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner is currently serving an effective ninety-year sentence in the Department of Correction following convictions for aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery. In his petition, he alleges he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because his sentences are disproportionate to the severity of the offenses he committed. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in its denial because proportionality of a sentence has been recognized as a habeas corpus claim in the United State Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Following review of the record, we conclude no viable habeas corpus claim was presented and affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Terry Wayne Robinson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of one count of theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to interview witnesses and by failing to insist that the petitioner testify at trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Collier Smith, pled guilty to statutory rape, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year, suspended to two years probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, John Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective sentence of 161 years following his convictions for five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and three counts of aggravated robbery. In this appeal, he contends that his petition for relief was erroneously denied because his right to a public trial was violated and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing object to or raise that violation. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition.

The homeowners’ association of a residential subdivision in Brentwood,Tennessee seeks just compensation from the City of Brentwood for loss of property rights in a portion of the subdivision’s open space. The City acquired the property by purchasing it from the developers of the subdivision without the Association’s knowledge. The Declaration of Protection Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of the subdivision, which the developers drafted and of which the City was on notice, states that the developers “will deed the completed Open Space on the subject Properties to the Association free and clear of any encumbrances before the first Lot is conveyed to a Lot Owner.” Although they sold the first individual lot in 2001, the developers did not convey any of the open space to the homeowners’ association until after the sale to the City. This action by the homeowners’ association ensued. The trial court summarily dismissed the action on the City’s motion, finding the homeowners’ association did not own a compensable property right in the Open Space when it was sold to the City. We have determined the homeowner’s association had an equitable interest in the Open Space pursuant to the Declaration of Protective Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions when it was sold to the City; therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s enrollment of a foreign judgment acquired by the petitioners against the respondent in Idaho, and the case was remanded for enforcement proceedings. On remand the respondent refused to comply with the Idaho judgment, so the petitioners filed a motion for contempt and for an order to compel compliance with the judgment. The respondent did not attend the hearing. The trial court found the respondent to be in contempt of court for refusing to comply with the Idaho judgment. The respondent now appeals. We dismiss the appeal, because the issues raised on appeal were not first raised in the trial court, and the respondent did not comply with either Rule 24(c) or Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
 

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this action asserting claims for fraudulent misrepresentation; civil conspiracy; negligence, breach of contract; and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff appeals; we affirm.

The Appellant, James William Taylor, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion for correction of clerical errors on the face of his first degree murder judgment. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 36 motion. Upon review, we reverse the Appellant’s first degree murder judgment in case number 188-108 and remand the case to the Williamson County Circuit Court for entry of a corrected judgment showing that the Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and his conviction offense was a Class X felony pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-202 (Supp. 1987), that he was sentenced to a life sentence with release eligibility on that life sentence after service of thirty years pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(f) (Supp. 1987), and that the trial court imposed consecutive sentencing for the first degree murder, burglary, and robbery convictions.
 

In 1987, the Petitioner, James E. Williams, was convicted of armed robbery, assault with intent to commit first degree murder, and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life plus seventy-five years. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. James E. Williams, No. 88-172-III, 1988 WL 138843, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 30, 1988), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 3, 1989). During the next sixteen years, the Petitioner filed two petitions for post-conviction relief and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, all of which were denied by the post-conviction court. The Petitioner appealed each denial separately, and this Court affirmed the trial court each time. In 2012, the Petitioner filed a second petition for a writ of error coram nobis in which he presented multiple allegations. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis court erred when it dismissed his petition without a hearing, contending that he presented in his petition newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.
 

Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”) initially brought this action for foreclosure and damages against a borrower,TN Metro Holdings XII LLC (“TN Metro XII”) alleging default by failure to make scheduled principal and interest payments, by improperly allowing liens against the mortgaged property in violation of the loan agreements and by misapplication of rents collected from leasing the mortgaged property. FNMA subsequently filed an amended complaint seeking relief in the nature of personal liability against Defendant Selim Zherka under the loan. The trial court granted FNMA summary judgment and held both the borrower and “Key Principal” liable for the deficiency following a foreclosure sale and for damages. We vacate the summary judgment, holding that (1) FNMA failed to provide written notice and a thirty-day period to cure the alleged defaults as required by the parties’ agreement; and (2) there are genuine issues of material fact making summary judgment improper regarding FNMA’s claim for damages resulting from the alleged misapplication of rents.

Appellant, Samuel L. Giddens, seeks relief from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s “Motion Nunc Pro Tunc,” which sought amendment of a judgment to increase his pretrial jail credits. The trial court denied relief without having a hearing. We conclude that Appellant’s appeal must be dismissed because there is no appeal as of right from the denial of the motion filed by Appellant.
 

The Petitioner, Clayton Bezuidenhout, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 guilty plea to theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000. He contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the petition was untimely and that the one-year statute of limitations was not tolled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Gregory Justice, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his jury convictions for possession with the intent to sell or deliver one-half gram or more of a controlled substance, facilitation of the sale of less than one-half gram of a controlled substance, and felonious possession of marijuana, and his concurrent sentences of fourteen years, five years, and three years, respectively. The Petitioner contends that the convictions should be set aside and that he should be granted a new trial because (1) the count charging possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than one-half gram of a controlled substance was duplicitous, (2) he was denied his constitutional right to a trial by a jury and jury unanimity, and (3) trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Timothy P. Guilfoy (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child, four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of assault. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty years for each of the rapes, ten years for each of the aggravated sexual batteries, and six months for the assault. The trial court ordered partial consecutive service, resulting in an effective sentence of seventy years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends as follows: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask leading questions of one of the victims; (2) the trial court erred in admitting two expert opinions; (3) the trial court erred in admitting recordings of phone calls between the Defendant and the victims’ mother; (4) the trial court erred in admitting the videotaped forensic interviews of the victims as substantive evidence; (5) the State’s election of offenses was ineffective; (6) the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; (7) cumulative errors entitle him to a new trial; and (8) his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we merge the Defendant’s two convictions of aggravated sexual battery entered on Counts One and Two into a single conviction of aggravated sexual battery. We also merge the Defendant’s two convictions of rape of a child into a single conviction of rape of a child. Finally, we merge the Defendant’s conviction of assault into his conviction of aggravated sexual battery entered on Count Three. In light of our holdings, we remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing. The Defendant’s convictions are otherwise affirmed.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Kenneth Lewis, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury for second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was convicted as charged. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2006). The trial court sentenced Lewis as a Range II, multiple offender to a sentence of thirty-five years at one hundred percent release eligibility. On appeal, Lewis argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to question a witness about the witness’s failure to appear at two prior court proceedings in his case; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving a set of young twins, Mya E. and Kaleah E. (“the Children”). The Children were born out of wedlock to Jasmine E. (“Mother”) and Darius M. (“Father”) on June 1, 2008. The Children, found to be dependent and neglected by Juvenile Court Order entered January 28, 2011, were placed in the custody of their maternal grandmother, Olivia E. Olivia E. filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Father and Mother on March 30, 2012. The petition alleged as grounds statutory abandonment and persistence of conditions. Mother later joined in the petition to terminate her parental rights. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Children by willfully failing to visit and support them. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that the conditions leading to removal persisted and were unlikely to be remedied in the near future. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm.

The defendant, Demeko Gerard Duckworth, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during a dangerous offense, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever offenses, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by imposing partially consecutive sentences. Because we discern no reversible error, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

The petitioner, Jonathan Fortener, appeals the Monroe County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of one count of second degree murder and sentenced to a term of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because trial counsel was ineffective in that he had reason to know of mitigating factors, failed to investigate those mitigating factors, and failed to hire an expert to present evidence of the mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing. The petitioner also faults the post-conviction court for failing to allow testimony at the post-conviction hearing regarding traumatic brain injuries. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.