APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is the second appeal of a post-divorce decision concerning child support. In the first appeal, we determined that the trial court erred in failing to make the required findings to justify an upward deviation in child support, thus we vacated the award of child support and remanded for a determination of the appropriate amount. Following the hearing on remand, the trial court set the appropriate amount of child support and determined that Father had overpaid child support. The court did not award Father a judgment or credit in the amount of his overpayment, and Father appeals. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award Father a credit or judgment in the amount of his overpayment.

Larry Scott Reynolds ("the Petitioner") was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court failed to make "sufficient findings of fact to allow meaningful review" and "erred in questioning the Petitioner and in making other comments" at the post-conviction hearing. The Petitioner also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds that Mother was incarcerated under a sentence of more than 10 years and her child was under the age of eight at time of sentencing, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that Mother was convicted of the intentional and wrongful death of the child's other parent, see Tenn. Code Ann.  36-1-113(g)(7). Mother appeals. We affirm.

Appellant, Michael Fields, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for two counts of first degree murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. The jury determined that the sentence for the first degree murder counts should be life without parole. The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions into the first degree felony murder convictions. The trial court imposed a twenty-five-year sentence for each especially aggravated robbery conviction. The twenty-five-year sentences were ordered to run concurrently to the life sentences. The two life sentences were ordered to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to a previously imposed sentence of life plus forty years. Appellant presents several arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to change venue; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for the trial judge to recuse himself; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial when there was juror contact with the prosecuting officer; (4) there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (5) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (6) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Appellant’s proffered expert witness, Dr. Charlton Stanley; (7) the trial court erred in allowing the use of a stun belt on Appellant during the trial; (8) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (9) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (10) the trial court erred in imposing the sentence for especially aggravated robbery and in ordering consecutive sentences. Appellant argues several smaller miscellaneous issues concerning evidentiary rulings, closing argument of the State, the denial of his request to have both of his attorneys present separate closing arguments, the denial of funds to pay an expert witness, and the failure to assure that Appellant received his prescribed medication in jail. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Sandra Beavers, pled guilty to sale or delivery of less than .5 gram of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II offender to ten years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. After her release from jail, the Petitioner violated a condition of her probation that required that she successfully complete the Next Door rehabilitation program, and the trial court revoked her probation. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to her attorney’s failure to communicate with her and failure to request a bond hearing. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights with respect to the six children at issue in this appeal. She concedes that grounds exist for termination, but she claims that termination is not in the children’s best interest. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendants, James L. Dowell, III, and Rivera L. Peoples, of five counts of aggravated robbery and five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced each defendant to an effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Dowell asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to dismiss for breach of an immunity "Cooperation" agreement with the State; (2) admitted into evidence a form in which Defendant Peoples disclosed Defendant Dowell’s phone number; (3) admitted into evidence items obtained from Defendant Peoples’s Chevrolet Impala; (4) allowed Agent Richard Littlehale to testify as an expert witness; (5) denied his motion for acquittal; (6) failed to define "substantial interference" for the jury; and (7) imposed a sentence of 100 years. Defendant Peoples asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient as to his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed Agent Richard Littlehale testify as an expert witness; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to define "substantial interference" for the jury; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This case involves the construction of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Father appeals the transfer of his case from circuit court to chancery court, the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a declaratory judgment, and the trial court’s ruling finding him in breach of the post-majority support provision of the marital dissolution agreement and awarding Mother attorney fees. We reverse as to the attorney fee award, but affirm as to the remainder.

At the time of the parties’ divorce, both parties lived in Tennessee, and Mother was named primary residential parent. Shortly thereafter, Mother was allowed to relocate to Georgia with the children, and Father’s requests that he be named primary residential parent were denied. Following the move, the parties were unable to agree to a parenting plan, and the circuit court resolved the remaining parenting issues and transferred future disputes to Georgia. On appeal, the pro se parties raise numerous issues related to various decisions of the trial court. We affirm in part and we reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings.

A law firm filed suit against a former partner and a former paralegal. Both former employees filed motions to compel arbitration. The trial court consolidated the cases and stayed discovery except as to the issue of whether the cases were subject to arbitration. Subsequently, the trial court ordered the parties to engage in mediation and to disclose “all necessary documents to conduct a meaningful attempt at resolution” despite the prior order limiting discovery. After the trial court denied their motion to vacate the order, the former partner and paralegal sought an extraordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which was denied. We granted extraordinary appeal. We hold that the trial court erred in ordering discovery without limiting the scope of discovery to the issue of arbitrability, in contravention of the unambiguous language of the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act, and erred in referring the parties to mediation in an effort to resolve all issues. We vacate the order of the trial court, and we remand the case to the trial court for a determination on the motions to compel arbitration.

The Petitioner, John Joseph Kratochvil, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his conviction for second degree murder, for which he is serving a Range II, thirty-five year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns an overcollection of child support by the State in a Title IV-D matter. Anthony Phillips (“Father”) and Suzanna R. Phillips (“Mother”) divorced, and Father was ordered to pay child support. Later, Father’s child support obligation was suspended on account of his disability status. The State of Tennessee (“the State”) garnished Father’s Social Security checks to satisfy an arrearage. The Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”) found that Father had paid his arrears and, in fact, had overpaid. The Trial Court ordered the State to reimburse Father the overpayment and to pursue Mother for the overpayment sum. The State appeals, arguing that the Trial Court lacked authority because of the State’s sovereign immunity to render such an order. We affirm as modified.

Brian Kerr ("the Defendant") was convicted after a jury trial of driving under the influence, reckless driving, and failure to maintain his lane of travel. The trial court also found that the Defendant had violated the implied consent law. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after service of ten days in confinement. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for each conviction. The Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the Defendant’s failure to submit to a blood alcohol test when the trial court had not yet ruled on whether the Defendant violated the implied consent law. Lastly, the Defendant contends that, if the trial court first rules that a defendant violated the implied consent law and then gives the jury instruction regarding the defendant’s failure to submit to a blood alcohol test, the trial court is indirectly commenting on the evidence in violation of Article VI, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for driving under the influence and failure to maintain his lane of travel. However, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant’s conviction for reckless driving.

This is an appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal of Appellant’s appeal from general sessions court. Upon filing the appeal, Appellant paid costs in the general sessions court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8–21–401(b)(1)(C)(i), but did not submit a surety bond under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-5-103. The circuit court held that failure to post the surety bond under Section 27-5-103 resulted in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court. Accordingly, the trial court granted Appellees’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Based upon this Court’s recent decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), we reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a commercial lease. The lease gave the plaintiff tenant two successive options to extend the term of the lease, provided the tenant gave timely notice of its intent to exercise the renewal option. The tenant exercised the first renewal option, but did not give timely notice of intent to exercise the second option. The lease also contained language giving the tenant a grace period to exercise the option if the lessor gave notice that the lessor had not received notice of renewal. The lessor did not give the written notice to the tenant. The tenant filed a lawsuit against the defendant lessor, seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff tenant asserted in the lawsuit that the tenant had the grace period to exercise the renewal option because the lease required the lessor to give written notice, and the lessor had failed to do so. Both parties filed dispositive motions based on their interpretations of the lease. Construing the lease, the trial court held that the grace period was never triggered so the tenant’s renewal option lapsed and granted a judgment in favor of the lessor. The tenant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is divorce case pertaining to the marriage of Carrie Mobley (“Mother”) and Mark Adam Mobley (“Father”). The parties were married for 15 years. They have three minor daughters (collectively “Children”). Following a two-day trial, the court divorced the parties, divided their marital property, and made decrees regarding the custody of the Children. With respect to the Children, the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent; it then ordered a 50/50 shared residential parenting arrangement. Following the divorce, the court found Mother to be in willful contempt of multiple provisions of its judgment. It sentenced her to ten days in jail on each of five counts. The court suspended the sentences on condition that there be no further violations. Mother appeals. She challenges the trial court’s judgment as to (1) the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, (2) portions of the residential parenting schedule, and (3) the inclusion of a “paramour provision” in the divorce judgment. In addition, she appeals the contempt findings, sentences, and award of fees to Father on the contempt proceedings. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Brandon Trae Wagster (“the Defendant”) was indicted for driving under the influence and violation of the implied consent law. He filed a motion to suppress, challenging the legality of the stop of his vehicle. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion and dismissed the charges against him. The State appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the Defendant’s charges.

In this condemnation action, the condemning authority appeals the jury’s valuation of property taken and award of compensation to landowner. Finding that the valuation of the property is within the range of opinions of fair market value testified to at trial, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the court’s conduct of the trial was proper, we affirm the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict.

I write separately to address two issues. The first pertains to jury instruction T.P.I. 11.15 and the failure to give a curative instruction when requested by the jury.

Purchaser of land brought action to recover damages for shortage in acreage and road frontage of property purchased; sellers contended that sale was in gross rather than by acre. Trial court determined that there was a discrepancy between the amount of land both parties thought was being sold and the amount determined by a survey to have been sold, and that sellers did not own land which would provide access to the property; accordingly, it granted purchaser judgment for the discrepancy in the amount of land conveyed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment.

Executrix of an estate filed a complaint against the officers of a corporation in an effort to pierce the corporate veil and recover a debt she alleges is due from the corporation to the estate of her late husband. The trial court granted her motion for summary judgment and awarded her a $52,000 judgment. The individuals appealed, asserting genuine issues of material fact should have precluded the trial court’s award. We conclude the trial court erred in awarding damages at the summary judgment stage because material facts are in dispute regarding whether a debt actually exists and regarding the amount of money that is at issue.
 

The trial court granted summary judgment to a judgment creditor of the decedent’s estate on a claim that the decedent fraudulently deeded an interest in real property to his wife so she would receive it free from the claims of his legitimate creditors after his death. The trial court’s judgment was based on circumstances surrounding the property transfer that satisfied the elements of fraudulent conveyance under both Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-305(a)(1) and (a)(2). The widow denies that there was any fraudulent intent behind the transfer of the disputed property to her, but insists that it arose naturally from the love and affection that existed between husband and wife. We affirm the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee suffered a compensable back injury. Surgery did not relieve his symptoms of severe pain. The trial court awarded 84% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer filed a motion to set aside the judgment based on the employee’s alleged failure to supplement his discovery responses. The trial court denied the motion. The employer has appealed, contending that the award is excessive and that the trial court erred by denying its post-trial motion. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kevin James Callahan, pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of Percocet and one count of delivery of Oxycodone, both Schedule II controlled substances, and the Williamson County Circuit Court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years’ imprisonment, suspended to probation following the service of six months’ incarceration in the county jail. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentence imposed was excessive in manner of service. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Sidney Cason, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of forty years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which resulted in his guilty pleas being unknowing and involuntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.