APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

At issue is whether Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(2) extends the statute of
limitations for a personal injury action to two years when a traffic citation for the violation
of Memphis City Code Ordinance § 11-16-3 for Failure to Maintain Safe Lookout is issued
to the driver alleged to be at fault. Stated another way, is an exception created to the oneyear
statute of limitations for personal injuries if a person involved in an automobile
accident receives a ticket for the violation of a municipal ordinance from that accident?
The trial court ruled in the negative. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jasmine Lashay Bland, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court
jury of leaving the scene of an accident, assault, and burglary of a vehicle. She was
sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of two years
for the felony burglary of a vehicle conviction, six months for the assault conviction, and
thirty days for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction, with the sentences suspended
after thirty days of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court
committed reversible error by not allowing her to cross-examine the victim about a
potential source of bias related to the victim’s alleged insurance claim for personal injuries.
Based on our review, we conclude that this issue is waived because it was not raised in the
trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shaquil Murphy, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of
attempted first degree premeditated murder, attempted second degree murder, unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, two counts of aggravated assault, and two
counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal,
the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the attempted murder and
employing a firearm convictions and argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the
employing a firearm counts of the indictment and by including duty to retreat language in
the jury instruction on self-defense. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

The defendant, Joel Michael Guy, Jr., appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury
convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony
murder, and two counts of abuse of a corpse, challenging the denial of various motions to
suppress evidence, the admission of certain evidence, the constitutionality of the statute
prohibiting abuse of a corpse, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions of abuse of a corpse and arguing that the cumulative effect of the errors entitles
him to a new trial. Because the defendant did not have standing to challenge the
warrantless entry into the house where the murders occurred, we affirm the denial of the
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the crime scene on grounds different
than those upon which the trial court relied. Even if the defendant had standing to challenge
the entry into the house, the entry was supported by probable cause and exigent
circumstances, and the evidence was in the officers’ plain view. The trial court correctly
concluded that the search of the backpack was an appropriately-conducted inventory
search. The trial court did not err by refusing to suppress surveillance video obtained using
the receipts discovered from the unlawful search of the defendant’s Louisiana residence
because the trial court correctly concluded that the police would have inevitably discovered
the surveillance video during the course of the investigation. The trial court did not err by
admitting evidence that the victims intended to stop providing financial support to the
defendant. The proscriptive statute criminalizing the abuse of a corpse is not void for
vagueness, and the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s
convictions of these offenses. Finally, because we conclude that the trial court did not
commit any error, no error obtains to accumulate. We affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

A father appealed an order requiring his children to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.  While the appeal was pending, both children received the vaccine.  Because we determine that the appeal is moot, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Rickey Haymer, appeals his convictions of crimes involving the attempted unlawful purchase or possession of a firearm. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because his actions in seeking to purchase a firearm did not constitute a “substantial step” toward the completed crimes. He also argues that the trial court committed plain error in admitting various text messages showing his contact with the putative seller. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her child on the ground of
severe child abuse. She concedes the ground for termination, but challenges the trial
court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We
affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports the
aforementioned ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

All of the claims asserted in this action arise from a prior healthcare liability action in which Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”) sued Dr. John Rosdeutscher and his medical group for damages resulting from breast reduction surgery. In the action now on appeal, the complaint asserts claims for invasion of privacy, abuse of process, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract against Dr. Rosdeutscher, his medical group, and the attorneys who represented them in the prior healthcare liability action. All of Plaintiff’s claims pertain to the fact that the defendants filed Plaintiff’s medical records in the healthcare liability action, which included nude photographs of Plaintiff and details about her sexual and mental health history—information that Plaintiff contends had “nothing to do” with her healthcare liability claims. The defendants responded to the complaint by serving a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 notice on Plaintiff’s counsel. Shortly thereafter, the defendants filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion to dismiss all claims on various grounds. The trial court granted the Rule 12 motion, dismissed all claims, and assessed $10,000 in damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119 against Plaintiff. The trial court also assessed Rule 11 sanctions against Afsoon Hagh, Plaintiff’s attorney, in the additional amount of $32,151.67. Plaintiff appealed; her attorney did not. Finding no error, we affirm. We also find this appeal to be frivolous and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by the defendants in defending this appeal and entry of judgment thereon.

This health care liability action was brought against a hospital and a physician. The
plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to three1 potential defendants prior to initiating the action. The
trial court found, however, that the plaintiff failed to include as part of the pre-suit notice
a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization because one of the six core elements was
incorrect on the authorization. Following a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 12.02(6), the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action against the
defendant hospital due to noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121. The plaintiff
argues, among other things, that he should have been allowed to conduct limited discovery
in order to determine whether the defendant hospital had been prejudiced by his failure to
provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. We vacate the trial court’s grant of the
motion to dismiss and hold that the plaintiff should have been permitted to conduct limited
discovery regarding whether prejudice existed for the trial court to consider in its
determination of whether the plaintiff substantially complied with the pre-suit notice
requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121.

The Defendant-Appellant, Justin Darnay Graves, was convicted as charged by a Madison
County jury of simple possession of cocaine, felon in possession of a firearm, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he received an effective sentence of six years’
plus eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to
several unrelated convictions including case numbers 20-330 (sale and delivery of heroin),
20-331 (sale and delivery of heroin and sale and delivery of methamphetamine), 20-332
(sale and delivery of heroin and sale and delivery of methamphetamine),1 20-334
(possession of drugs; traffic offense; introduction of contraband into a penal facility;
driving without a license; tampering with evidence), 2 and 20-335 (leaving the scene of
accident resulting in death), two of which were committed while the Appellant was
released on bond. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-111(b). Prior to trial, the Appellant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop which formed the basis of
his convictions. As grounds for the motion to suppress, the Appellant argued that “the
amount of time between the initial traffic stop and the arrival of the [canine] unit [was]
unreasonable” and in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and article I, section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee. Following a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion to suppress. In this appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress and the trial court’s imposition of partially consecutive sentencing. Because the State failed to establish that the otherwise lawful traffic stop was
not unreasonably prolonged in time and scope, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court,
vacate the judgments, and dismiss the case.

The Appellant, Christopher M. Black, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

Appellant appeals the decision of the probate court to name other parties as the conservators of her daughter on the basis that the trial court improperly placed time limitations on the presentation of proof at the final hearing. Because Appellant has failed to show any reversible error in the trial court’s decision, we affirm.

The trial court clerk notified this Court that a final judgment has not been entered. This
Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed.
Appellant failed to respond to our show cause order. As no final judgment has been
entered, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Two law firms seek accelerated interlocutory review of the denial of their motion to
disqualify the trial judge. Because there is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s
impartiality, we reverse and remand for reassignment.

This case involves a dispute over a parcel of real property. Because of the profound
deficiencies with Appellants’ brief, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial
court for a determination of damages under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

This appeal arises from a divorce case. The wife filed a complaint for divorce alleging
irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted a
divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, divided the marital
estate, awarded alimony, and entered a judgment for unpaid child support. The husband
appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

A mother relocated less than fifty radial miles, but more than fifty driving miles, from the father. The trial court held that the parental relocation statute applied because the mother relocated more than fifty miles away and, even if she had not, she moved close enough to fifty miles that application of the relocation statute was appropriate. We find that the radial distance should be used to determine whether the relocation statute is triggered. By that standard, the mother did not move more than fifty miles away, and the relocation statute does not apply. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision.

A mother appeals an order setting aside a default judgment. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

After the trial court issued a temporary injunction affirming a trust’s appointment of a new
trustee, the former trustee’s attorney in other matters sent a letter to financial institutions
holding trust assets. The letter stated that the attorney represented the trust, construed the
trial court’s order as being without factual basis or legal authority, and requested the
institutions freeze the trust’s assets. Trust beneficiaries and the new trustee brought a
motion to hold the former trustee and the attorney in civil contempt. Finding that the former
trustee was unaware of the letter, but that the attorney meant the letter to thwart the efforts
of the new trustee in violation of the trial court’s order, the trial court granted the motion
only as to the attorney, who was ordered to pay attorney’s fees related to remedying the
effects of the letter. Discerning no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, we affirm.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found multiple grounds
for termination, including abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, failure to manifest a
willingness and ability to assume custody, and mental incompetence. The trial court also
found that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Father’s parental rights. We
conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports each of the grounds for termination
found by the juvenile court and the juvenile court’s determination that termination is in the
best interest of the child. Accordingly, we affirm.

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction
to consider this appeal.

A railroad worker developed cancer after working for thirty years in a railroad yard. The
worker sued the railroad, alleging violations of federal law. She proffered two experts to
prove elements of her claim. The railroad moved to exclude the expert testimony as
unreliable. The railroad also moved for summary judgment, arguing that the worker could
not prove her claim without the testimony of both experts. The trial court excluded the
expert testimony and granted summary judgment. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her two children on the grounds of abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113-(g)(1); substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans under section 36-1-113(g)(2); persistence of conditions under section 36-1-113(g)(3); and the failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody under section 36-1- 113(g)(14). The trial court also determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a breach of contract action brought by a nontenured teacher against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) for nonrenewal of her teaching contract for the 2018–2019 school year. The teacher alleges that the nonrenewal of her yearly teaching contract was ineffective because the decision to nonrenew was improperly delegated by the Director of Schools to the principal. The school district contends that the decision to nonrenew is delegable and that the teacher lacks a private cause of action because the school district provided her with timely notice of her nonrenewal. The trial court summarily ruled in favor of the teacher, awarding her damages for breach of contract. The school district appeals, reiterating its same arguments. For the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher to be effective, the proper authority must make the decision to nonrenew, and the school district must provide timely notice to the teacher. Because the decision to nonrenew requires the Director of Schools to exercise his or her independent judgment and discretion, the Director of Schools may not delegate this authority. In this case, the Director of Schools did not exercise his independent judgment and discretion in the decision to not renew the teacher’s contract; thus, the purported nonrenewal was ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm.

Plaintiff initiated this action related to the alleged misconduct of sheriff’s deputies in
general sessions court. After voluntarily dismissing the general sessions court action, the
plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court found that the plaintiff could not
appeal a nonsuit from general sessions court and dismissed the action as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. We affirm.