APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Jonathan Howell, the Defendant, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal
Court’s denial of probation following his plea of guilty to theft of property valued at
$60,000 or more. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying an
alternative sentence and by basing its denial solely on deterrence. Following our review,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The City of Orlinda filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate the Robertson County Planning Commission’s rezoning of property from “Agricultural Residential” to “Neighborhood Commercial,” alleging the rezoning was “illegal spot zoning” and was also procedurally deficient. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

A landlord appeals from the grant of summary judgment to a commercial tenant in the landlord’s breach of contract action. The lease contained a provision requiring the tenant to obtain fire insurance on the “Premises.” The trial court concluded that the lease failed to define the term “Premises” and that such failure rendered the fire insurance provision unenforceable. We reverse because we find the term “Premises” as used in the fire insurance provision to unambiguously refer to the space within the commercial building that the tenant rented and occupied during the lease. We further conclude that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact regarding whether it was possible for the tenant to obtain fire insurance on only the portion of the building which it rented and occupied. Consequently, we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In these related appeals, two law firms seek an order to recuse a judge. Finding that they
waited too long to seek relief under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the
petition as to the four related probate cases. As to the interpleader action, we vacate the
orders entered since the Rule 10B motion was filed and order the judge to respond to the
Rule 10B motion.

The defendants in this action failed to timely answer the plaintiff’s complaint.  Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court entered judgment by default against the defendants.  The defendants moved to set aside the default judgment.  The trial court denied the motion to set aside.  Because the trial court’s order lacked findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.

The Petitioner, Edwin Orlando Millan, appeals from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his filing a false police report and
tampering with evidence convictions. The post-conviction court granted relief in
connection with the filing a fraudulent insurance claim conviction after determining that
the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, the Petitioner
contends that the court erred by denying relief on his remaining convictions because (1) he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the State elicited false trial testimony in
violation of his due process rights, (3) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 376 U.S. 83 (1986), and (4) he is entitled to relief pursuant
to the cumulative error doctrine. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This action involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their child.
Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to
establish the following statutory grounds of termination for each parent: (1) abandonment;
(2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (3) the persistence of conditions
which led to removal; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the
child. The court also found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest
of the child. We affirm the trial court’s ultimate termination decision.

The Defendant, Melvin Summerville, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court
of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life in confinement. On
appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) allowing testimony about a
previous domestic assault against the victim in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence
404(b); (2) allowing cellular telephone records into evidence when the State did not
establish relevance for the records; and (3) failing to suppress the testimony of a material
witness when the State did not reveal the name of the witness and turn over police body
camera video involving the witness until the “eve” of trial. Based on our review, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on the ground of severe
child abuse. Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her
rights was in the best interest of the child. Concluding that clear and convincing evidence
was presented of both the ground for termination and that termination was in the child’s
best interest, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeffrey Michael Davis, of one count of
attempted aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court
sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly allowed irrelevant
testimony; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted
aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault; and (3) the trial court improperly
instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated assault. After review, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Justine Welch, of first degree premeditated
murder, attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury, attempted first
degree murder, vehicular homicide, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and two counts of
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant
received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus
sixty-two years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree
murder; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress witnesses' out-of-court
and in-court identifications of him due to an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup;
and (3) the trial court erred in declining to issue a special jury instruction on identification.
After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The Petitioner, Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions for nine counts
of rape of a child, two counts of rape, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, and three
counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and his 121-year sentence at 100% service. The
Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The owners of a restaurant in downtown Clarksville sued the City of Clarksville for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, interference with business relationship, diminution of value of land, and a takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the City’s failure to construct an alleyway on property Plaintiffs sold the City. Plaintiffs also filed a claim for inverse condemnation alleging that the City’s construction of a sewer line encroached on their land. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract, interference with business relationship, diminution of value of land, and section 1983 claim for failure to state a claim under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) and dismissed Plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel claim on summary judgment. After a jury trial on the inverse condemnation claim, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $8,335 for the value of land on which the sewer was built, and the trial court awarded Plaintiffs $30,000 in attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees. Plaintiffs appeal each of the dismissals, the measure of damages from the jury trial, and the award of attorneys’ and paralegals’ fees, among other things. We affirm the decisions of the trial court and decline to award Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees on appeal.

Taylor M. (“Mother”) and Caleb G. (“Father”) are the biological parents of Isabella G. (the “Child”). Mother and her current husband, David M. (“Stepfather”) petitioned the Chancery Court for Giles County (the “trial court”) for termination of Father’s parental rights in April of 2021, and for Stepfather to adopt the Child. As grounds for termination, Mother and Stepfather alleged abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Mother and Stepfather failed to prove any statutory grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights. The trial court then concluded, however, that termination would have been in the Child’s best interests. Mother and Stepfather appealed to this Court. Because clear and convincing evidence establishes multiple grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights, and because clear and convincing evidence establishes that termination is in the Child’s best interests, we reverse.

Following the trial court’s revocation of his probation, Defendant, David Chad Moss, appeals arguing that the trial court failed to award him jail credit while incarcerated in Kentucky for an unrelated offense.  Upon our review, we conclude that Defendant has failed to prepare a sufficient brief in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) and Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b).  Accordingly, the issue is waived and the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal involves an interstate custody matter. The mother and child reside in
Massachusetts while the father resides in Tennessee. The father attempted to obtain
custody of the child by filing an emergency petition in the Knox County Juvenile Court.
The juvenile court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The father
appealed the juvenile court’s decision to the Knox County Circuit Court which, also finding
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismissed the appeal. We affirm.

The Defendant, Herandus Washington, pleaded guilty to reckless vehicular homicide, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(1), (b)(1) (2018) (subsequently amended).  At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant sought judicial diversion.  The trial court denied diversion and imposed a five-year sentence, to be served on probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Antwain D. Coleman, of aggravated
assault, domestic assault, and theft. The trial court imposed an effective seven-year
sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that
the evidence is insufficient to support his theft conviction and that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.

This is negligence and wrongful death action brought be the decedent's estate and the surviving spouse against the apartments complex owner and management company where the accident occurred. The decedent died from profound injuries he sustained when he fell while attempting to remove tree branches that blocked the only path his disabled stepson used for ingress and egress to his apartment. The complaint asserted claims for negligence based on premise liability, negligence per se, and wrongful death. Upon the motion of the defendants, the trial court summarily dismissed all claims based on the finding that the defendants did not owe the decedent a duty of care because the accident was not foreseeable. The court also dismissed the surviving spouse's independent claim for loss of consortium. Plaintiffs appealed. We find that sufficient facts exist from which a trier of fact could reach a different conclusion than that found by the trial judge on the issues of foreseeability and duty. Accordingly, we reserve the decision to dismiss the wrongful death claim. We nevertheless affirm the dismissal of the spouse's independent claim for loss of consortium because it does not represent a claim for damages separate from the wrongful death action. Rather, "a claim for consortium. . .embodies one component of the decedent's pecuniary value of life." Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 197, 207 (Tenn. 2002). Accordingly, the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

This appeal involves an interstate custody matter. The mother and child reside in
Massachusetts while the father resides in Tennessee. The father attempted to obtain
custody of the child by filing an emergency petition in the Knox County Juvenile Court.
The juvenile court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The father
appealed the juvenile court’s decision to the Knox County Circuit Court which, also finding
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismissed the appeal. We affirm.

In this divorce action, the parties have appealed the trial court’s classification of certain
assets as well as the court’s overall marital property distribution. The husband has also
appealed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the wife in conjunction with her
procurement and enforcement of an order of protection. Following review, we vacate the
trial court’s classification of certain real property assets as well as the court’s overall
marital property distribution. We remand this matter to the trial court for further
evidence to be presented concerning the values of one unimproved lot of real property
and the parties’ retirement assets and for the court to value and equitably distribute all of
the parties’ marital assets, including the two real properties in Alabama previously
classified as the husband’s separate property and the various retirement accounts. We
affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the wife related to her procurement and
enforcement of an order of protection against the husband.

This appeal arises from a father’s petition for modification of a parenting plan and modification of child support in a post-divorce action.  We have determined that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that there was not a material change of circumstances for purposes of modifying the residential parenting schedule under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C).  We affirm the trial court’s order in all other respects and remand for a determination of the children’s best interests under the applicable factors.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by
clear and convincing evidence that three grounds for termination were proven against the
father: (1) abandonment by incarcerated parent for failure to visit; (2) substantial
noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume custody. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the
best interests of the children. The father appeals. We affirm.

A husband and wife divorced after a short marriage. The trial court awarded a
disproportionate share of the marital property to the husband. The wife challenges the
court’s division and its denial of her request for attorney’s fees. Discerning no reversible
error, we affirm.

Plaintiff sues to enforce his perceived right to address the House of Representatives. Finding that the case is identical to a prior case in that it involves a court of competent jurisdiction, the same parties as a previous case, a prior final decision on the merits, and the same parties and cause of action, the trial court applied the doctrine of res judicata and dismissed the case. We affirm.