APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child. Jordan H.
(“Father”) and his wife Johnaysja S. (“Stepmother”) (“Petitioners,” collectively) filed a
petition in the Juvenile Court for Washington County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to
terminate the parental rights of Cynthia B. (“Mother”) to her minor son Genesis B. (“the
Child”). Mother has a history of criminal conduct involving the sale of illegal drugs. After
a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the
Child. The Juvenile Court found that the following grounds were proven against Mother
by clear and convincing evidence: abandonment by wanton disregard, persistent
conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The
Juvenile Court found further, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of
Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing in part that
despite her continued criminal conduct she has demonstrated a genuine desire to maintain
a relationship with the Child as evidenced by, for example, her filing a petition for visitation
and engaging in some visitation. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its
entirety.

The Defendant, Darrin Jeremiah Baker, appeals from his guilty pleaded convictions for
possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 gram of methamphetamine, a
Class B felony; attempted possession with the intent to sell or deliver less than fifteen
grams of heroin, a Class C felony; possession with the intent to sell or deliver less than
fifteen grams of fentanyl, a Class C felony; and driving under the influence, a Class A
misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (possession of heroin and fentanyl) (Supp.
2022), -17-434 (possession of methamphetamine) (2018), 55-10-401 (driving under the
influence) (2020), 39-12-101 (attempt) (2018). The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range
I offender and agreed to an effective ten-year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the
trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing.
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Spencer L. Phillips, Defendant, claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
probation or an alternative sentence and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement.
Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In April of 2013, Defendant, Yvette Adele Slee, was convicted of aggravated child abuse and attempted first degree murder for suffocating the victim, Defendant’s eight-month-old child. She was sentenced to an effective sentence of 22 years in incarceration. Subsequently, in May of 2018, the victim died as a result of complications from injuries originally sustained by the aggravated child abuse. Defendant was then indicted for first degree felony murder, the subject offense of this direct appeal. After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty as indicted. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether her conviction for first degree felony murder violates double jeopardy. After a review of the record, the briefs, and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises out of a vehicular accident between Ciera Besses (“Plaintiff”) and James
Killian (“Defendant”). Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages, seeking compensation for
past and future medical expenses, loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and loss of
enjoyment of life. Defendant admitted fault but challenged the reasonableness and
necessity of certain medical, hospital, and doctor bills itemized by Plaintiff. Defendant also
contended that some of Plaintiff’s claimed injuries were not causally related to the accident.
The jury awarded $16,720 to Plaintiff in damages, which represented $12,720 for medical
expenses; $3,000 for past physical pain and mental suffering; $1,000 for past loss of
enjoyment of life, and $0.00 for future physical pain and suffering and future loss of
enjoyment of life. Plaintiff filed a motion for additur and/or new trial, which the trial court
denied. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a
new trial. We have determined it did not. Thus, we affirm.

This is an appeal from the entry of an order of protection for stalking. The respondent
asserts that he did not receive the statutorily required notice of hearing and that the evidence
did not support a finding of stalking. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. We
affirm.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. The
juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of five statutory
grounds for termination. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing
evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. On appeal, we determine that
some grounds do not support termination of parental rights. Still, clear and convincing
evidence supports at least one statutory ground for termination and the best interest
determination. So we affirm.

Petitioner, Nemon Winton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request specific jury instructions and for utilizing an improper trial strategy.  After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Shannon Leigh Smith, appeals her Union County Circuit Court jury
conviction of second degree murder, arguing that the State improperly withheld favorable
and material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Because the
withheld evidence was not material to the outcome of the case, we affirm.

The appellant, an insurance provider, sought a declaratory judgment against the policy
holder, his wife, and his grandson, relieving the insurance company of the duty to defend
and indemnify the policy holder, his wife, and his grandson against a complaint brought by
the conservator of the grandson’s girlfriend for varying claims of negligence. The
insurance provider filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the grandson
constituted a “covered person” under the grandfather’s policy as an authorized driver and
that the grandson’s girlfriend constituted a “person residing in the same household as a
covered person,” triggering the policy’s household exclusion. Pursuant to the household
exclusion, which excluded liability coverage for bodily injury to “any covered person or
any person residing in the same household as a covered person,” the insurance provider
claimed that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the policy holder, his wife, and his
grandson. The trial court granted the insurance provider’s motion for summary judgment
in part and denied it in part.

The Petitioner, Alexander Jackson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions for two counts of rape and
his resulting sentence of nine years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that
he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the
judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Darryl Robinson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his
post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery and
convicted felon in possession of a handgun and his resulting effective sentence of sixteen
years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

Defendant, Charles Bradford Lampley, was convicted by a Maury County jury of first
degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault resulting in death, for which he
received an effective sentence of life. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial
court erred in not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the evidence is
insufficient as it relates to his conviction for first degree premediated murder; (3) the trial
court failed to exercise its mandatory function as the thirteenth juror as to his conviction
for first degree premeditated murder; (4) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
on the issue of voluntary intoxication; (5) the prosecutor made numerous improper
references to his decision not to testify, shifted the burden of proof, and improperly offered
his opinion on the truth or falsity of evidence and on Defendant’s guilt during closing
argument; and (7) he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a
thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

Defendant, Ambrus Gay, was charged in a five-count indictment with two counts of
aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of robbery. The case
proceeded to a jury trial. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court partially granted
Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, reducing the robbery charge to the lesserincluded
charge of theft. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged on all counts, and
the trial court imposed an effective 10-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, Defendant
contends: 1) the trial court should have suppressed his confession based on a violation of
his Miranda rights; 2) the trial court should have suppressed his confession because it was
not voluntarily made; 3) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to sever the
offenses; and 4) the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated robbery
convictions because he had completed the thefts prior to producing a weapon. Discerning
no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children. Two years after the
children were removed and found to be dependent and neglected, the Department of
Children’s Services petitioned for the termination of her parental rights. The trial court
found the existence of four grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to provide a
suitable home, abandonment by an incarcerated parent/wanton disregard, persistence of
conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody with
custody posing a risk of substantial harm to the children. Finding it also to be in the best
interest of the children, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights. Mother contends
these findings were in error. Finding no error, we affirm.

Following his indictment for first degree murder, a Benton County jury convicted the Defendant, George E. Burns, III, of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of 17 years. The trial court subsequently granted the Defendant’s motion for new trial. The Defendant later entered a best-interest plea to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, where the agreed sentence would be eight-andone-half years at 60 percent, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arose from a termination of parental rights proceeding where a mother’s
parental rights were terminated on several statutory grounds. The original adoption petition
contained no grounds for termination of the parents’ rights, and therefore, the Trial Court
used the four months prior to the amended petition, which included grounds for
termination, for purposes of the abandonment grounds. We affirm the trial court’s use of
this time period before the amended petition. We hold that the record is insufficient for us
to conduct a meaningful appellate review in this case and that the trial court failed to make
sufficient findings of fact on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment
by failure to financially support, and mental incompetence based on the statutory authority
in effect at the time of the filing of the amended petition alleging grounds for termination.
These grounds are vacated and remanded to the trial court to allow the trial court to develop
a proper record from which this Court can conduct a meaningful appellate review and to
make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-
1-113(k). The amended petition seeking termination of parental rights was filed prior to
the 2018 statutory amendments of the relevant termination statutes. Because the Child was
never adjudicated as dependent and neglected, we reverse the ground of persistent
conditions under the statute in effect when the amended petition was filed. Additionally,
the statutory ground located at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) was not pled in the
termination petition and was not tried by express or implied consent; therefore, we reverse
this ground as to the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

In 1998, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Derwin V. Thomas, of two counts
of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and two
counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of
life without the possibility of parole. The Defendant unsuccessfully sought review on
multiple occasions, by direct appeal, post-conviction petition, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Most recently, the Defendant filed a
“Motion for Life Imprisonment,” alleging that the State failed to give him proper notice of
its intention to seek life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and a Motion for
Rule 36.1 relief1, alleging that the trial court failed to charge the jury with relevant lesserincluded
offenses. The trial court summarily dismissed both the Defendant’s motions, and
the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it
dismissed his motions. After review, because the notice of appeal in this case was untimely
filed and because the Defendant has offered no facts supporting a waiver of this untimely
filing in the interests of justice, the appeal is hereby dismissed

In 1998, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Derwin V. Thomas, of two counts
of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and two
counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of
life without the possibility of parole. The Defendant unsuccessfully sought review on
multiple occasions, by direct appeal, post-conviction petition, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Most recently, the Defendant filed a
“Motion for Life Imprisonment,” alleging that the State failed to give him proper notice of
its intention to seek life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and a Motion for
Rule 36.1 relief1, alleging that the trial court failed to charge the jury with relevant lesser included
offenses. The trial court summarily dismissed both the Defendant’s motions, and
the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it
dismissed his motions. After review, because the notice of appeal in this case was untimely
filed and because the Defendant has offered no facts supporting a waiver of this untimely
filing in the interests of justice, the appeal is hereby dismissed

The Defendant, Sidney Eugene Watkins, was convicted by a jury of alternative counts of
possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of a firearm during
the commission of those dangerous felonies, as well as simple possession of
methamphetamine, simple possession of alprazolam, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Following the jury verdict, the trial court granted the Defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal on the firearm counts (counts 7 and 8). The State appealed, and we reversed,
concluding that the trial judge applied the wrong standard in ruling on the Defendant's
motion for judgment of aquittal. On remand, the trial court affirmed the jury's verdict in
its role as thirteenth juror and found the evidence sufficient to support the firearm counts.
The Defendant now appeals challenging the trial court's ruling. Following our review, we
affirm. We remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in count 8 due to clerical
errors.

Tony R. Hearon ("Employee') allegedly developed an occupational disease during the
course and scope of his employment with the State of Tennessee ("Employer"). Employee
gave notice of his injury to Employer but his claim was denied. The denial letter advised
Employee that he must file a petition for benefit determination within ninety days or risk
dismissal of his claim. Employee filed his petition several months after the expiration of
the ninety-day period. Upon receiving a dispute certification notice dismissing his claim,
Employee filed a workers' compensation complaint in the Claims Commission, which is
the agency responsible for handling disputed claims of state workers. Employer moved for
summary judgment, asserting Employee failed to meet the ninety-day statutory deadline.
The Commissioner granted summary judgment concluding that Employee failed to timely
file his petition for benefit determination and therefore failed to exhaust the benefit review
process as required by statute. Employee appealed. The appeal was referred to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel ("Panel") for a hearing and a report of findings of
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the
judgment of the Commissioner.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee from the chancery court’s denial of a motion to recuse.
A new chancellor, during the course of a judicial election and shortly after the election was
held, made extremely critical comments regarding the personal and professional character
of his opponent, the incumbent chancellor. The challenger won the election, and the former
chancellor, who has returned to practice, is now representing a party before the new
chancellor. The former chancellor moved for the new chancellor’s recusal in cases in
which the former chancellor is appearing as counsel as well as recusal from cases involving
the law firm which the former chancellor joined after losing the judicial election. The new
chancellor denied the motion. On appeal, we conclude that, even in the absence of actual
bias, based upon concern about the appearance of bias toward the former chancellor,
recusal is warranted. This concern does not extend to the law firm the former chancellor
has joined. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the former
chancellor but affirm the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the law firm.

In a previous appeal, this Court affirmed the probate court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants on two separate grounds – res judicata and the statute of limitations.  On remand, the appellant filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to set aside the same order granting summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that a recent order from a circuit court necessitated that the probate court’s summary judgment order be “voided and set aside.”  The probate court denied the motion.  The appellant appeals.  We affirm and remand.

The Petitioner, Joe G. Manley, appeals from the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty-pleaded convictions for
aggravated domestic assault, domestic assault, and false imprisonment. The Petitioner
contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that he received effective
assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered.
Specifically, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective based upon trial
counsel’s failing to (1) communicate and maintain contact with the Petitioner; (2)
thoroughly investigate the case and speak with the victims prior to entry of the Petitioner’s
plea; (3) request a remand to general sessions court for a preliminary hearing; and (4)
explain that Corrections Management Corporation would supervise the Petitioner’s release.
Following our review, we affirm the judgment of post-conviction court denying relief.

In February of 2021, Defendant, Clinton D. Braden, pleaded guilty to burglary and
identity theft. In exchange, he received a total effective sentence of 16 years suspended
to community corrections. On May 4, 2022, Defendant admitted he again violated the
terms of his community corrections program and offered no proof for the trial court to
make findings of what consequences to apply. Defendant now appeals, and we affirm,
the trial court’s judgment to impose his original sentence to serve in full.