APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State filed a petition seeking to transfer seventeen-year-old Defendant-Appellant, Malique Nicolas Gray, for prosecution as an adult in criminal court. Prior to the transfer hearing, the Bradley County Juvenile Court Judge signed an order appointing the juvenile magistrate judge to hear the matter. The juvenile magistrate judge presided over the Defendant’s transfer hearing and found probable cause to transfer the Defendant to the Bradley County Criminal Court to be tried as an adult. At the close of the transfer hearing, the juvenile magistrate judge advised defense counsel that she was sitting as a “substitute judge.” Following a trial, the Defendant was convicted by a Bradley County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, felony theft of property, misdemeanor theft of property, and burglary of an automobile. The Defendant received a concurrent term of eleven years for the aggravated robbery and three years for the felony theft of property, which was aligned consecutively to a concurrent term of two years for burglary of an automobile and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor theft of property, for an effective sentence of thirteen years’ imprisonment. The Defendant’s principal complaint on appeal is that the juvenile transfer hearing was “marred by procedural defects” because (1) the order by the juvenile court judge appointing the juvenile magistrate judge was “silent regarding any necessity or good cause [for the juvenile judge] to be absent;” and (2) the transfer hearing was conducted by a judge who did not identify herself as a “substitute judge” until the end of the hearing, depriving the Defendant of an opportunity to object and appeal to the elected juvenile court judge The Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-35- 122, which prohibits continuous confinement for non-violent property offenses, and in imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm.

Defendant, Joseph Anthony Szostak, III, claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for alternative sentencing and ordering him to serve his sentence of three years and six months in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Daniel J. Jamison, entered an open plea of guilty to aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at less than $1,000, aggravated criminal trespass, and public intoxication. The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction, followed by a consecutive sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but ninety days to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence was excessive. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy L. Jefferson, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief from his conviction for second degree murder, for which he received an effective sentence of forty years in prison. On appeal, the Petitioner argues he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was illegally restrained as a result of a procedurally defective juvenile petition. After review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

This appeal requires interpretation of a clause in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. The final decree, entered in January 2018, incorporated the parties’ agreement awarding the wife $130,000 from the husband’s 401(k). After several rounds of qualified domestic relation orders and other court orders, the trial court ultimately held that the wife was entitled to $130,000 plus approximately four months of statutory interest. The wife appealed, seeking earnings on the $130,000 in addition to interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a controversy surrounding certain real property located in Memphis. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on most claims, and after a jury trial and verdict in favor of the Defendant, the remaining claim was also dismissed. Although the homeowner of the property raises a number of issues in this appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, James Berg, entered guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery and two counts of rape of a child. The Defendant agreed to a concurrent term of twenty-five years for the rape of a child convictions and a term of fifteen years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, with the alignment of these terms of imprisonment to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the terms to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty years’ imprisonment. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm.

The trial court granted the defendant medical providers summary judgment on the basis of the plaintiff s failure to comply with the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act's pre-suit notice and good faith certificate requirements. On appeal, the plaintiff, an employee of the defendants, argues that her claim does not relate to the provision of health care services and that she was therefore not required to give pre-suit notice or file a good faith certificate. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the claim is related to the provision of health care services, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Grainger County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Pamela C. (“Mother”) to her minor children Cayson S.-C. and Chaston C. (“the Children,” collectively). After a hearing on the termination petition, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. Mother appeals. We vacate the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody because the Juvenile Court failed to make specific findings regarding the second prong of that ground. We find that all other grounds found by the Juvenile Court were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm as modified.

The Defendant, Jason Steven Molthan, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of one count of stalking and one count of harassment. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent service. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court should have merged his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to file a consecutive sentencing order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c). Upon our review, we conclude that the Defendant has failed to provide this Court with an adequate appellate record and has not prepared a sufficient brief. Because we cannot conduct a meaningful appellate review of his issues, we conclude that the issues are waived. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Martigous Malone, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel and entered a voluntary guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of the petition.

A Hardeman County jury convicted the defendant, Betty Sparks, of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault with serious bodily injury, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which she received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. She also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms in counts one and two

The pro se petitioner, Roddarous Marcus Bond, appeals the summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because his sentence is illegal. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Courtney Watkins, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict holding a real estate agent liable for common law negligence, intentional misrepresentation and fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act for his failure to disclose flooding and water intrusion issues at a home he had listed for sale. The jury awarded the plaintiff, a first-time home buyer, compensatory and punitive damages. The real estate agent appeals the jury’s verdict holding him liable for intentional misrepresentation and fraud, the admission of certain expert testimony, the admission of opposing counsel’s alleged prejudicial statements during closing argument, the amount of compensatory damages, and the award of and amount of punitive damages. Finding that the trial court failed to follow the appropriate procedures in reviewing the jury’s award of punitive damages, we vacate the award of punitive damages and remand the case for further proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her daughter based on severe child abuse and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court granted the petition, finding that the two statutory grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. We affirm.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her son based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment by an incarcerated parent, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, failure to remedy persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court granted the petition, finding that the five statutory grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. We affirm.

The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Tony Dale Crass, Defendant, with driving
under the influence (DUI), DUI per se, and possession of a firearm while under the
influence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the State did not have
probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and that video evidence of
Defendant’s driving was erased and deleted as a result of a malfunctioning recording
system in Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) Trooper Joey Story’s patrol car. The trial court
concluded that the loss of video evidence constituted a violation of the State’s duty to
preserve potentially exculpatory evidence recognized in State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912
(Tenn. 1999), and deprived Defendant of the right to a fair trial. The trial court granted the
motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment, and the State appealed. We conclude (1)
that the video was not lost or destroyed by the State, (2) that a Ferguson violation is not
applicable to a suppression hearing based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a
traffic stop, (3) that the trial court misapplied the “degree of negligence” Ferguson factor
by equating perceived public policy decisions on the part of the State to negligence, and
(4) that Defendant’s right to a fair trial can be protected without dismissal of the indictment.
We reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further
proceedings.

Larry Dale Pitts, Defendant, was convicted of aggravated assault after a jury trial. The trial court denied his request for judicial diversion and sentenced him to split confinement, with one year of incarceration, and the remainder on supervised probation. He now appeals the sentencing determinations of the trial court, arguing that it abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion, denying full probation, and sentencing him to the maximum within-range sentence of six years. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a case about fitting new technology into a not-so-new statutory scheme. Exercising our power to answer questions certified to us by federal courts, we consider whether two video streaming services—Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC—provide “video service” within the meaning of a Tennessee law that requires such providers to obtain a franchise and pay franchise fees to localities. Netflix and Hulu say they do not provide “video service” and therefore do not owe franchise fees; the City of Knoxville says they do. We agree with Netflix and Hulu.

Plaintiff Randolyn Laferney filed a tort action against several defendants, alleging causes of action for, inter alia, libel, civil conspiracy, and malicious prosecution. The allegations arose primarily out of social media comments and posts made by the defendants regarding Ms. Laferney. On December 10, 2020, the trial court dismissed the legal action as to some, but not all, of the defendants pursuant to Tennessee’s anti-SLAPP statute, the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“the TPPA” or “the Act”). Several months later, after the trial court awarded the dismissed defendants their attorney’s fees, Ms. Laferney appealed to this Court. Because we conclude that the notice of appeal was untimely pursuant to the TPPA, the appeal is dismissed.