COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Vondell Richmond v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee
M2022-00974-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathryn Wall Olita

This case involves a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the plaintiff, then a member of the Clarksville City Council, was entitled to a declaration of rights concerning alleged communications between the Clarksville City Attorney and the local District Attorney General potentially pertaining to plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that the plaintiff was seeking an impermissible advisory opinion because there was no justiciable controversy. Having reviewed the record, we affirm.

Kristie M. Haun v. Jason B. Haun Et Al.
E2021-01012-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lawrence Howard Puckett

This is an appeal regarding the final decree of divorce for this couple. The husband’s inlaws
are included as intervening petitioners. The trial court granted the wife a divorce on
the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, $1250 per month alimony in futuro, and
payment of her attorney fees as alimony in solido.1 Further, the court awarded a judgment
to the intervening petitioners of $297,670, with a lien in their favor upon all the real
property to secure payment of the indebtedness. The husband appeals. We affirm.

Heidi Pendas v. Christopher J. Irizarry et al.
M2022-00603-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Laurence M. McMillan, Jr.

This case involves an intrafamily dispute over a home and the alleged indebtedness thereon. The trial court found that the son committed promissory fraud with regard to the conveyance of the home and awarded the mother $180,000.00 in damages as the value of the home at the time of the conveyance. The trial court further dismissed a claim against the daughter related to a loan on the property. Both the son and the mother appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

John Jahen v. Aer Express, Inc. Et Al.
E2022-00344-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Pamela A. Fleenor

An injured truck driver brought suit against his alleged employer seeking to recover worker’s compensation benefits. The alleged employer did not appear at trial, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Eight months later, the alleged employer moved the trial court to set aside the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, on the grounds that it did not receive notice of the trial date. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the alleged employer failed to notify the court and the plaintiff of its change of address and that plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if the court set aside the judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Michael R. Adams v. Edwin Brittenum ET AL.
W2023-00800-COA-T10B-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gina C. Higgins

A pro se petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review of an order denying a motion for
recusal. Because the filing does not comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we
dismiss the appeal.

Lyon Roofing, Inc. et al. v. James H. Griffith, Jr. et al.
E2022-00530-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge William E. Phillips, II

This appeal involves the denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion. In the original action,
the trial court granted summary judgment to the City of Mount Carmel, Tennessee (“the
City”), finding that it had negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim against it.
In the summary judgment pleadings, the City presented expert evidence concluding that
the retaining wall in question was failing due to lateral earth pressure and not a problem
with the foundation. In that report, the expert stated that the backfill of the retaining wall
was red clay but that regardless of whether the backfill consisted of red clay or crushed
stone, the wall would fail. The plaintiff presented no evidence to rebut this opinion. The
plaintiff filed a Rule 60.02 motion seeking to be relieved of the grant of summary judgment
after discovering that the backfill of the wall was crushed stone and not red clay as stated
in the expert’s report.1 The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion upon its determination
that even with a backfill of crushed stone, summary judgment still would have been
granted. Discerning no error, we affirm.

John Patton Et Al. v. Anita Pearson
M2022-00708-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda McClendon

After a fire at a rental home, suit was brought against the tenant.  During discovery, the tenant sought admissions related to the landlords’ insurance coverage and as to whether the suit was actually a subrogation action by the insurer brought in the names of the insured.  As a result of resistance to disclosure, the tenant moved to compel.  The trial court granted the motion.  Following admissions indicating that this suit is a subrogation action by the insurer brought in the names of the insured, the tenant moved for summary judgment asserting that under the Sutton Rule she is an implied co-insured under the landlords’ insurance policy.  Opposition to summary judgment was advanced based upon the purported inapplicability of the Sutton Rule and the purported applicability of the collateral source rule.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the tenant.  This appeal followed.  We affirm the trial court’s grant of the motion to compel and summary judgment in favor of the tenant.

Thomas Builders, Inc. v. CKF Excavating, LLC
M2021-00843-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

An arbitrator awarded a subcontractor damages against a general contractor. In chancery court, the general contractor moved to vacate the award on the basis that the arbitrator exceeded his powers. The chancery court denied the motion to vacate and, at the request of the subcontractor, confirmed the arbitration award. We affirm.

Thomas Builders, Inc. v. CKF Excavating, LLC
M2021-00843-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

I respectfully disagree with the majority's holding that the doctrine of prior suit pending is inapplicable here. The majority's discussion of prior suit pending is contained in footnote one of its opinion. Therein, the majority notes that the Rogers Group commenced an action (the "Cheatham County case") in Cheatham County against CKF Excavating and TBI. However, the majority omits the fact that TBI filed a cross-claim against CKF in the Cheatham County case. For the reasons discussed below, it is my opinion that TBI's cross-claim triggered the doctrine of prior suit pending and vested jurisdiction in the Cheatham County court. As such, the Davidson County court did not have authority to conduct a review of the arbitrator's decision.

Leah Gilliam v. David Gerregano, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue Et Al.
M2022-00083-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Citizens of Tennessee may apply to the Tennessee Department of Revenue (the “Department”) for license plates featuring unique, personalized messages. Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-210(d)(2) provides that “[t]he commissioner shall refuse to issue any combination of letters, numbers or positions that may carry connotations offensive to good taste and decency or that are misleading.” After her personalized plate featuring the message “69PWNDU” was revoked by the Department, Leah Gilliam (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against David Gerregano (the “Commissioner”), commissioner of the Department, as well as the then-Attorney General and Reporter. Plaintiff alleged various constitutional violations including violations of her First Amendment right to Free Speech. The Department and the State of Tennessee (together, the “State”) responded, asserting, inter alia, that the First Amendment does not apply to personalized plate configurations because they are government speech. The lower court, a special three judge panel sitting in Davidson County, agreed with the State. Plaintiff appeals, and we reverse, holding that the personalized alphanumeric configurations on vanity license plates are private, not government, speech. We affirm, however, the panel’s decision not to assess discovery sanctions against the State. Plaintiff’s other constitutional claims are pretermitted and must be evaluated on remand because the panel did not consider any issues other than government speech. This case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Duane Dominy Et Al. v. Davidson County Election Commission
M2022-00427-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Plaintiffs brought an action against the Davidson County Election Commission, asserting that the Election Commission violated the Tennessee Open Meetings Act and Metro Code 2.68.020. The chancery court granted judgment on the pleadings to the Election Commission, concluding no violation occurred and that even if there had been a violation it was cured by a subsequent public meeting. Plaintiffs appealed. Defending the chancery court’s judgment, the Election Commission argues that the trial court’s ruling was correct on the merits and that the Plaintiffs are also not entitled to relief because they lack standing and because the matter has become moot. Because the Election Commission presented a well-developed and well-supported argument in favor of mootness and because the Plaintiffs have failed to respond to that argument, we conclude that opposition to the Election Commission’s mootness argument has been waived. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

In Re Noah B. Et Al.
E2022-00432-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy E. Irwin

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the
grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to support, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3)
failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial
responsibility of the children. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the
children. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

Aaron Solomon v. Angelia Solomon et al.
M2021-00958-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

Plaintiff sued several defendants over social media posts and the unauthorized use of his and his child’s name, image, and likeness. Plaintiff requested both damages and injunctive relief. In response, defendants petitioned to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. Plaintiff then filed notice of a voluntary nonsuit, which defendants opposed. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice. Because we conclude that nothing in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41 precludes the voluntary dismissal, we affirm.

Kristopher McMickens v. Vincent J. Perryman, as Administrator of the Estate of Alfred G. Farmer
W2022-00445-COA-R3-Cv
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jerry Stokes

The plaintiff filed this personal injury action following an automobile accident in which
the other driver died. The plaintiff originally named the defendant as “John Doe, as
Administrator of the Estate of [the deceased driver].” The trial court dismissed the action
on the basis that the plaintiff failed to timely commence the action against the personal
representative of the estate within the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm and
remand.

Wanda Denise Ware v. Metro Water Services, a Division/Agency of Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee
M2022-01114-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

Plaintiff sued for personal injuries under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging she had experienced a fall due to an unsecure water meter valve cover located in her sister’s yard. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered an order finding that Plaintiff had not met her burden of proof. Although Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her case, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Charles Youree, Jr. v. Recovery House of East Tennessee, LLC Et Al.
M2021-01504-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

A landlord leased property to company A. When company A breached the lease, the landlord filed suit against the company to recover monetary damages. A default judgment was entered against company A and, when company A failed to make any payments on that judgment, the landlord filed suit against company B and company C. The landlord alleged that the corporate veil should be pierced to hold company B and company C liable for company A’s debt because they were the alter egos of company A. After a default judgment was entered against company B and company C, they motioned to have the judgment set aside because the landlord’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for piercing the corporate veil. The trial court denied the motion to set aside, and the two companies appealed. Discerning that the complaint does not state sufficient factual allegations to articulate a claim for piercing the corporate veil, we reverse and remand.

Katherine J. Hill v. James D. Hill
E2021-00399-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Tammy M. Harrington

This appeal stems from a lengthy and acrimonious divorce, wherein the trial court, inter
alia, divided the parties’ marital assets and debts, established a permanent parenting plan
and child support obligations, and declined to award alimony to the husband. Entry of
the trial court’s divorce decree did not occur for approximately twenty-two months
following the trial, however, which the husband argues on appeal constituted a due
process violation. Husband also appeals the trial court’s valuation of certain assets, its
division of the marital estate, its imputation of income to him for child support purposes,
and its failure to join his mother as a necessary and indispensable party. Following our
review, we affirm the trial court’s classification of the parties’ marital residence as
marital property. We also affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the husband’s contempt
petition, its denial of the husband’s motion to join his mother as a party, and its
imputation of income to the husband due to his voluntary unemployment. We vacate the
trial court’s valuation of the parties’ retirement accounts and its division of marital
property, and we remand those issues to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

Bradley Allen Garrett v. William Tyler Weiss, Et Al.
D2022-01373-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Pamela A. Fleenor

The pro se plaintiff appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of his legal
malpractice action against his attorney and the attorney’s law firm. The trial court found
that the action was barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Because the
plaintiff’s action accrued more than one year before he filed the lawsuit, we affirm.

City of Benton v. Glenn Austin Whiting
E2022-01382-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael E. Jenne

Defendant/Appellant appealed a speeding ticket from Benton City Municipal Court to the Circuit Court for Polk County, Tennessee (the “circuit court”). The City of Benton (the “City”) filed a motion for summary judgment which the circuit court granted on May 18, 2022. Defendant appeals and, discerning no error, we affirm.

Araceli Cordova et al. v. Robert J. Martin
M2021-01412-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge David D. Wolfe,

This is an action for malicious prosecution of an attorney’s fee claim. The plaintiffs contend
that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the defendant under the one-year
statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(1). The court held
that the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when the allegedly-malicious prosecution
terminated, and it held that the prosecution terminated when the first court denied the
defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 59.04. The plaintiffs contend that this is wrong because the defendant was a
party to and participated in the appeal of those proceedings. They assert that the defendant’s
action did not terminate until he exhausted his appellate remedies. We agree and hold that
the defendant’s cause of action did not terminate until his time for filing an appellate brief
expired. Thus, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions to
reinstate the complaint and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Karl S. Jackson v. City of Memphis, et al.
W2022-00362-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jim Kyle

This appeal arises from an employment termination case in which an employee of the Division of Fire Services for the City of Memphis was terminated for a second positive drug test.  After receiving notice of his termination, the employee requested an appeal hearing with the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission.  Following the hearing, the Civil Service Commission issued a decision affirming the termination of his employment.  The employee filed a petition for the trial court to review the decision of the Civil Service Commission.  The trial court found that substantial and material evidence did not support the decision and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.  Accordingly, the trial court granted the employee’s petition and remanded the matter to the Civil Service Commission.  The City of Memphis appeals.  We vacate the decision of the trial court and remand to the trial court for entry of an order to remand to the Civil Service Commission with instructions to issue a decision addressing certain deficiencies.

In Re: Mitchell B.
M2022-01285-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Thompson

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. Father also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In Re Emaire E.
E2022-01015-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gregory S. McMillan

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellants, Mother and stepfather, filed a
petition to terminate Appellee Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by
failure to support and failure to visit. Father asserted the absence of willfulness as an
affirmative defense. At the close of proof on grounds, the trial court orally found that
abandonment by failure to support was not shown, but abandonment by failure to visit was
proven. At the close of all proof, the trial court reconsidered its oral ruling on grounds and
determined that Father’s failure to visit was not willful. In its written order, the trial court
found that grounds for termination had not been proven and that, even if grounds existed,
termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the child’s best interest. Discerning no
error, we affirm.

Christopher George Pratt v. Tiffani Hearn Pratt, et al.
W2021-01333-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith

This appeal involves the interpretation of a provision in a marital dissolution agreement obligating the father to pay for his son’s “college tuition, expenses, room and board.”  The mother filed a petition for contempt and for breach of contract, seeking a judgment for over $15,000 in expenses that the father refused to pay, as he believed that they were not covered by the language of the MDA.  The father filed a motion for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration of his obligations.  He asked the trial court to interpret the language of the MDA and also declare that he had fulfilled his obligations under the MDA in light of his son’s struggles in college thus far.  After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a series of orders interpreting the language of the MDA and defining the categories of expenses that the father was obligated to pay.  However, none of the trial court’s orders mention or resolve his request for termination of his obligation.  As a result, we vacate the trial court’s orders and remand for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding this issue pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

In Re Estate of Robert McKeel Bone
M2022-00771-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Haylee Bradley-Maples

At issue is the validity of an amendment to a revocable trust. The specific issue is whether the Settlor’s attorney-in-fact was authorized to execute an amendment to the Robert McKeel Bone Living Trust. The trial court held that the amendment was valid. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm.