Mathews Partners, LLC, d/b/a NAI Nashville v. Lucianna Lemme
Commercial real estate broker brought action against seller of property seeking commission following the sale of the property to buyers allegedly introduced to the seller by the broker during the term of the listing agreement. Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the seller finding the listing agreement was unenforceable because there was no meeting of the minds and a lack of mutual assent to the terms of the agreement. Broker appeals and finding error, we reverse and remand. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Randloph Deakins v. Lynn Lampton Deakins - Concurring
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Randloph Deakins vs. Lynn Lampton Deakins
In this divorce case, the trial court granted Nancy Randolph Deakins (“Wife”) a divorce from Lynn Lampton Deakins (“Husband”) thereby ending the parties’ 24-year marriage. Upon dissolving the marriage, the court valued and divided the marital estate, declined Husband’s request for alimony, and awarded Wife discretionary costs, her attorney’s fees and court costs. Husband challenges each of these determinations as well as an evidentiary ruling and the court’s finding that Husband dissipated assets. We reverse the awards to Wife of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Elizabeth Plunkett v. Bradley-Polk, OB/GYN Services, P.C.
This is a medical malpractice action filed by Sarah Elizabeth Plunkett and her husband Robert Plunkett (“the Plaintiffs”) as the natural parents and next of kin of their stillborn child. The complaint alleges that Michelle Perry, M.D., and Bradley-Polk OB/GYN Services, P.C. (collectively “the Bradley-Polk Defendants”), negligently failed to diagnose, manage and treat complications during Sarah’s pregnancy and that those failures resulted in the stillbirth delivery of the Plaintiffs’ infant. The Plaintiffs secured only one medical expert, Michael A. Ross, M.D., to present testimony that the Bradley-Polk Defendants violated the standard of care applicable in Bradley County at the time of treatment in early 2004. Doctor Ross was licensed in Virginia and practiced primarily in Fairfax, Virginia, and the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C. To satisfy the “locality rule” followed in Tennessee, Dr. Ross testified that Bradley County was similar to two communities where he practiced in Virginia, both of which are within the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C., but both of which are distinct communities situated about 40 to 50 miles from Washington, D.C. The Bradley-Polk Defendants first challenged Dr. Ross’s qualifications to testify with a motion in limine, and the trial court denied the motion approximately one month before trial. The Bradley-Polk Defendants renewed their challenge to Dr. Ross’s qualifications on the first day of trial. The trial court allowed a voir dire of Dr. Ross out of the presence of the jury and held that Dr. Ross was not qualified because the large metropolitan area where he practiced was not similar to Bradley County. Upon a stipulation of the parties that there was no proof available other than through Dr. Ross to establish a violation of the standard of care in Bradley County, the trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ oral motion for continuance and granted the Bradley-Polk Defendants’ motion for directed verdict. The Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Julia Fisher v. Ashley Revell - Concurring
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Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Julia Fisher v. Ashley Revell - Concurring
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Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Julia Fisher, et al. v. Ashley Revell, et al.
This is a summary judgment case, arising from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs/Appellants, the two injured parties, filed suit and served a copy of the summons on their insurance provider, the Appellee herein. In interpreting the policy, the trial court concluded that the policy limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence limited Plaintiffs/Appellants’ coverage to $200,000 (or $100,000 per person). Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal, asserting that they are entitled to recover the policy limit of $300,000 per occurrence. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Bass Collins v. Stephen Butler Collins
This case involves a divorce ending a one year marriage. Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation of marital property, its decision not to include the increase in wife’s separate property in the distribution of marital property and the award of temporary support to the wife during the pendency of the divorce. Because the trial court failed to properly determine the marital value on some items of property we reverse the trial court’s decision as to those items and remand for further consideration. We affirm the trial court’s decision as to the value of the remaining items of property and its award of temporary support. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis S. Person v. The Board of Commissioners of Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.
In 1967, the General Assembly passed a Private act consolidating the juvenile courts of Memphis and Shelby County by establishing a new court. The Act also provided for a second division, with the judgeship of that division to remain vacant until the County Commission determined the need for it. Almost forty years later, the Commission adopted a resolution approving the appointment of a judge to the second division of the court. The current judge of the Juvenile Court of Shelby County challenged the attempted creation of a second judgeship, arguing that the relevant portion of the Private Act constituted an unconstitutional delegation of the authority to ordain and establish courts, which power is reserved to the General Assembly by the Tennessee Constitution. Because a judge is a necessary component of a court, in order to “ordain and establish” a court under Art. VI, § 1, the legislation creating or establishing the court must make provision for a judge. The legislature cannot establish a court without also establishing a judgeship. Since Section 20 of the Private Act does not create or establish a judgeship for division 2, it did not effectively create or establish that division or court. Additionally, because in Section 20 of the Private Act the legislature delegated to the Commission the power to decide whether a judge for division 2 was needed, which is the equivalent of delegating to the Commission the authority to establish or create division 2 of the juvenile court, we conclude that Section 20 is an unconstitutional delegation of power reserved to the General Assembly by Art. VI, § 1 of the Tennessee Constitution and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s holding on that issue. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on Open Meeting Act claims based on a prior resolution that was promptly rescinded by the Commission. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wireless Properties, LLC vs. The Board of Appeals for the City of Chattanooga, et al
The plaintiff filed a petition challenging the grant of a building permit to Verizon Wireless. The decision of the City was affirmed by the Board. After the trial court conducted a hearing, it affirmed and dismissed the petition. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Clarence E. Johnson v. Tanner-Peck, LLC,
This is a summary judgment case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellee against his former employer, the Appellant herein. Finding that the Appellee presented sufficient proof to shift the burden of production to the Appellant pursuant to Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), and that the Appellant failed to satisfy this burden, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. Because the trial court’s order denying the Appellants’ motion to revise the grant of partial summary judgment does not include the trial court’s reasons, we cannot determine whether analysis under Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2000) was necessary, or whether the trial court otherwise abused its discretion. Consequently, we vacate the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to revise the grant of partial summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Macon v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board and Shelby County Sheriff's Department
This is an appeal from an administrative hearing on a termination. The plaintiff was a deputy jailer with the sheriff’s department. He was arrested and charged with, inter alia, driving under the influence. The subsequent internal investigation by the sheriff’s department revealed that, prior to his hire, the deputy jailer had pled guilty to a felony drug charge. The conviction was expunged. On the plaintiff’s later application for employment with the sheriff’s department and on the background check form, the plaintiff was asked whether he had had any arrests or convictions, including any that had been expunged. The plaintiff answered that he had none. After the internal investigation, the deputy jailer was terminated for violating sheriff’s department regulations governing personal conduct, adherence to law, and truthfulness. The deputy jailer appealed his termination to the civil service merit review board which upheld the termination based on violation of the truthfulness regulation. This was appealed to the trial court, which ultimately upheld the termination as well. From this order, the deputy jailer now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence before the board and arguing that the board’s failure to include conclusions of law precludes adequate judicial review. We affirm, finding that the evidence is substantial and material; that the sheriff’s department and the civil service board properly considered the expunged conviction; and that the board’s failure to include conclusions of law in its decision does not preclude adequate judicial review in this case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Madden Phillips Construction, Inc. v. GGAT Development Corporation
This appeal arises out of a dispute between a contractor and landowner over the parties’ duties under a construction contract. Plaintiff/Appellee Madden Phillips Construction, Inc. (“Madden Phillips”) filed suit to enforce a mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien and to recover damages in breach of contract against Defendant/Appellant GGAT Development Corporation (“GGAT”).1 Madden Phillips’ complaint included a claim for damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 66-34-101 to -703, also known as the Prompt Pay Act of 1991 (“Prompt Pay Act”). GGAT counterclaimed and asserted, inter alia, that Madden Phillips failed to perform its contractual obligations in a “workmanlike and expeditious fashion to coincide with the completion schedule of [GGAT].” |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carol J. Cataldo v. Larry B. Stanley, Sr., Executor of The Estate of James Alton Julian, Deceased
This case arises from the denial of Appellant’s claim against the Appellee Estate of James Alton Julian. Because Appellant held and exercised a power-of-attorney, a confidential relationship existed. The trial court determined that Appellant failed to overcome the presumption of undue influence, that the claim was satisfied by a specific bequest in the decedent’s will, and denied Appellant’s alternate theory of quantum meruit. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville v. James E. Brown, et al.
The matters at issue arise from the demolition of a dilapidated residential structure by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. Following the demolition of the property, the Metropolitan Government filed this action to recover the cost of demolition. The homeowners, who purchased the property at a delinquent property tax sale after the Metropolitan Government had filed Notice of Violation with the Register of Deeds Office, but prior to the structure’s demolition, responded by filing a counter-claim for inverse condemnation. The homeowners contended that the Metropolitan Government had no right to demolish their property and was not entitled to recover its costs for demolition, due to the intervening delinquent property tax sale. They also asserted in the counterclaim that the Metropolitan Government intentionally destroyed their property without the right to do so and, as a consequence, they are entitled to recover the value of the structure demolished. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the homeowners on both motions by summarily dismissing the Metropolitan Government’s claim for reimbursement and granting summary judgment to the homeowners on their inverse condemnation claim. The trial court then awarded the homeowners damages for the value of the structure and attorney’s fees; however, the court denied their request for prejudgment interest. Both parties appeal. We affirm the summary dismissal of the Metropolitan Government’s claim and the grant of summary judgment to the homeowners on their inverse condemnation claim. We also affirm the award of damages for the value of the structure and the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the homeowners. We reverse on the issue of prejudgment interest, finding that the award of prejudgment interest in inverse condemnation cases is mandatory under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-17-813(a). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William & Rose Allgood v. Gateway Health Systems
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. The plaintiff patient filed a lawsuit against the defendant physician alleging medical negligence. The patient attempted personal service on the physician by leaving the summons and the complaint at the reception desk of the hospital at which the physician practiced. Eventually, the summons and the complaint were delivered to the physician. The summons stated that service would be made by the commissioner of insurance or the U.S. mail. In his answer to the complaint, the physician asserted insufficiency of service of process, and stated that the summons indicated that service was made by the commissioner of insurance through the U.S. mail. No new process was issued. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Bethany A. Adkins v. Robin Swensen
Driver of automobile which struck pedestrian appeals jury award of damages for future pain and suffering, asserting that there is no material evidence to support the award. Finding the verdict of the jury to be supported by the evidence we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Jeffrey Jackson v. Kristi Lyn Williams
This is a post-divorce petition for contempt and to modify a parenting plan. The parties divorced when their son was about three years old. They were awarded joint custody of their son and the mother was designated as the primary residential parent. Many disputes ensued. The father filed a contempt petition against the mother, claiming that she was in contempt for failing to schedule compensatory weekend parenting time for the father after the child spent one of his weekends with the mother, and for causing the father to miss six scheduled telephone calls with their son over an eight-month period. The father asserted that this and other conduct showed that the mother intended to alienate the child from him, and on this basis filed a petition to modify the parenting plan. After a hearing, the trial court denied the father’s petitions for contempt and for modification. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Marion Barker v. Angel Chandler
This post-divorce appeal challenges the “overnight paramour” provision in the parties’ parenting plan. By agreement, the parties sought to modify the parenting plan for their two teenage children, a son and a daughter. At the time, the father lived with his new wife, and the mother lived with her unmarried partner of nine years. The parties agreed that the father would be the primary residential parent of their son, and that the mother would be the primary residential parent of their daughter. The permanent parenting plan form completed by the parties included a “paramour provision,” in accordance with a local court rule mandating that parenting plans prohibit the non-spouse paramour of either parent from spending the night in the same residence as the minor child. The mother objected to the inclusion of this provision, arguing that the children’s best interest would be served by permitting them to stay in her home along with her partner. Despite finding that the children’s well-being would not be adversely impacted by the arrangement on which the parties had agreed, |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark VII Transportation Co., Inc. v. Responsive Trucking, Inc.
This action arises from an agreement between Appellant Mark VII Transportation Co. and Appellee Responsive Trucking, Inc. Appellant filed suit seeking to recover for breach of contract based on the Carmack Amendment standard of liability adopted by the parties in their agreement and for indemnification as allowed by their agreement. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for summary judgment and granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Finding material issues of fact in dispute, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Stone, individually and derivatively in her capacity as a director of Appalachian caverns Foundation vs. Scott Smile, et al
The plaintiff initiated this action on behalf of a foundation of which she was formerly a director. She sought to reinstate a deed of trust securing a note belonging to the foundation and to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of the property that was subject to the deed of trust. The trial court found that the release of the deed of trust was improper and that the conveyance was fraudulent and, thus, reinstated the deed of trust and set aside the conveyance of the property. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Renee L. Johnson v. Grayson Rowsell, et al
Jackson County- This is a summary judgment case arising from a personal injury lawsuit. Plaintiff/Appellant alleged liability on the part of Appellee delivery company arising from the negligent acts of its driver. Finding that the driver was an independent contractor, and that the exceptions to the general rule of non-liability on the part of the employer of an independent contractor do not apply in this case, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee delivery company. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith M. Farnham v. Donna M. Farnham
The plaintiff filed this action seeking to review the business records of the defendant, asserting under oath that she is a 25 percent shareholder of the defendant corporation. The defendant moved to dismiss. The trial court found that the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §48-26-104(a) – the corporate records statute – and ordered the defendant to comply with the request to inspect and/or copy corporate records. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Michael D. Reed vs. Darla Carden Steadham
The father left his salaried employment and began his own construction business, which resulted in a substantial decrease in his annual income. As a result the father reduced his child support payments to the mother, who then asked the Trial Court to find the father was voluntarily under employed and the Court should impute additional income, based upon his true earning capacity. After an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court found the father was not willfully unemployed and adjusted the child support amount in accordance with the guidelines based on his then income. The mother has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Alanna Christy Daniels Howe v. John Ashley Howe
In this divorce action, after a long and contentious trial, the Trial Court awarded the mother the divorce and awarded custody of the parties' minor child to the father. The sole issue on appeal by the mother is the award of custody to the father. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
