Emily Christine Wimley v. Emily Annette Wimley and Jerry Lee Wilmley and The First National Bank of Manchester Tennessee
This case involves the validity of transfers of property and money from a mother to her daughter and son-in-law. The trial court determined that there was a confidential relationship between the mother and her daughter and that the defendants failed to overcome the presumption of undue influence. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Jerome Williams v. George Little, et al.
Petitioner sought to withdraw a waiver he had signed as a prisoner. On a summary judgment motion by defendants, the Trial Court held that if the waiver was withdrawn, petitioner would serve more time and granted the motion. On appeal, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas & Associates, Inc. v. Tennessee American Contractors, Inc.
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in imposing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to dismiss the counterclaim filed against the plaintiff. Prior to the trial of the case, the plaintiff filed a Rule 11 motion for sanctions contending the filing of defendant’s counterclaim violated Rule 11. Thereafter, the case went to trial on the plaintiff’s complaint and defendant’s counterclaim. At the close of the proof, the defendant voluntarily dismissed its counterclaims. After the trial was concluded, the trial court held that the defendant and its attorneys violated Rule 11 because the evidence presented at trial revealed that the counterclaim had no basis in fact or law and they failed to dismiss the counterclaim when the motion for sanctions was filed. We have determined the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by evaluating the issue with the wisdom of hindsight instead of examining the circumstances existing at the time the counterclaim was signed by the attorneys, and for imposing sanctions for failing to voluntarily dismiss the counterclaim, because Rule 11 does not impose a duty to review or reevaluate a pleading once filed or to take affirmative steps thereafter to dismiss a previously filed pleading. Therefore, we reverse the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: R.H. and J.H.
Parents of two children appeal the termination of their parental rights, asserting that the grounds for termination do not exist under the facts presented. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Barry Armistead v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al
Inmate filed a petition for certiorari, seeking a review of a decision of the prison disciplinary review board, affirmed by the Commissioner of Corrections, finding him in violation of Tennessee Department of Corrections policy. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding it was not filed within sixty days of the entry of the order for which review was sought. Finding no error, we affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bernard Hughes vs. Demar Hudgins
The plaintiff claimed that he suffered neck and back injuries after the automobile in which he was riding was rear-ended by the defendant’s automobile. The defendant admitted breach of the standard of care, but the jury found that the plaintiff had suffered no damages as the result of the accident, and he was not awarded any recovery. The trial court awarded the defendant $645.95 in discretionary costs to cover the court reporter fees he incurred for depositions. The plaintiff argues on appeal that there was no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict. For his part, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in declining to award him all of the discretionary costs he requested. We affirm the jury verdict, but we remand the issue of the award of discretionary costs. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bernard Hughes vs. Demar Hudgins - Dissenting
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Curtis Whitworth v. Patricia Gayle Whitworth
In this divorce action, the defendant, following the entry of the Divorce Decree, filed a Motion to Set Aside the Marital Property Settlement on the grounds that she did not agree to the same, and further was denied due process because she had no notice of a hearing resulting in the Divorce Decree. On appeal, we vacate and remand. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: J.G.H.,Jr., dob 11/04/05, A Child Under 18 Years of Age James And Teri Wolfe v. Jennifer Lynn Duckhorn - Dissenting
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: J.G.H.,Jr., dob 11/04/05, A Child Under 18 Years of Age James And Teri Wolfe v. Jennifer Lynn Duckhorn
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her son based on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit. Mother appeals, claiming that the trial court should have dismissed the termination petition because the petitioners lacked standing, or alternatively, because the petition failed to contain a notice provision required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9A. Mother also claims that the trial court looked to the wrong four-month period when determining whether she failed to visit and erred in finding that her failure to visit was willful. She also claims that termination was not in her son’s best interest. Finally, Mother claims that her due process rights were violated in various ways. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Entertainer 118 and Meroney Entertainment, Inc. dba Ken's Gold Club v. Metropolitan Sexually Oriented Business Licensing Board
An inspector cited an entertainer and the sexually oriented business in which she worked for violating an ordinance governing certain requirements for entertainers and businesses engaging in sexually oriented entertainment. The Metropolitan Sexually Oriented Business Licensing Board upheld the citations and fined the entertainer and the business $500 each. They appealed and the chancery court affirmed. They now appeal to the Court of Appeals. We find that the board did not have authority to assess the fine. We affirm the board and the chancery court’s finding that the ordinance was violated, and since the board has authority to impose other sanctions, we remand the matter to the chancery court with instructions to return the matter to the board. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Faye Shipley, et al. v. Robin Williams, M.D.
In reliance on plaintiff’s experts, the trial court granted defendant doctor’s motion for partial summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim pertaining to defendant’s failure to admit plaintiff into the hospital. The trial court later granted the defendant doctor summary judgment on the remaining malpractice claims finding that the plaintiff’s medical expert proof previously relied upon by defendant failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. We reverse the grant of partial summary judgment on the failure to admit claim since the defendant doctor relied solely on plaintiff’s experts, whose testimony was later found inadmissable. We also reverse the summary judgment of the remaining malpractice claims since the defendant doctor never presented proof to negate an element of those claims. Consequently, the plaintiff had no duty to create issues of fact at the summary judgment phase. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Faye Black v. City of Memphis
This is a wrongful death case against a municipality. In 1987, the plaintiff’s teenage son was shot and killed by a police officer. The plaintiff sued the officer and the municipality, asserting claims under both federal and state law. Years of proceedings and delay ensued. By 2005, the only remaining claims were state law claims against the municipality. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed a motion for entry of judgment in the amount of $130,000, the maximum damage award under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Columbus Medical Services, LLC v. David Thomas and Liberty Healthcare Corporation
This appeal involves a claim of tortious inducement to breach a non-compete covenant in an employment agreement. The plaintiff staffing agency employed the defendant therapists at a State residential care facility for severely disabled persons. The plaintiff agency staffed the facility under an exclusive contract which was set to expire by its own terms in June 2003. The therapists had executed restrictive covenants in their employment agreements with the plaintiff staffing agency under which they were prohibited from working at the State facility for one year after the termination of their employment with the plaintiff. The State requested bids to staff the facility under a new contract. Through the bidding process, the defendant staffing agency was awarded the contract. The defendant agency then met with the defendant therapists (who were incumbent employees), staffed through the plaintiff agency, and offered to hire them to continue working at the facility. The defendant staffing agency was aware of the non-compete covenants and agreed to indemnify the defendant therapists if the plaintiff staffing agency tried to enforce the covenants. The defendant therapists accepted positions with the defendant agency and continued working at the facility. The plaintiff agency filed this lawsuit against the individual defendant therapists and the defendant agency. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the non-compete covenants were enforceable, that the defendant therapists had breached their covenants, and that the defendant staffing agency had tortiously induced the individual defendant therapists to breach their employment contracts. The defendants now appeal. We reverse, concluding that, while the plaintiff agency had a legitimate protectable business interest, the non-compete covenants are not enforceable in light of the hardship to the defendant therapists and the adverse impact on the public interest. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John C. Blair v. Robert Sullivan, Jr., et al.
This appeal involves the plaintiff’s negligence claim which arose from a motor vehicle accident with the defendant. Plaintiff first asserts that the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff’s positive drug test to be admitted as evidence. Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court’s jury instructions were improper and that the jury’s verdict is not supported by the evidence. Reviewing plaintiff’s first assertion, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug test as evidence. Likewise, we find that the jury instructions were proper and that there is material evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anne S. Wilson v. Scott Bowman
I write separately to state that I believe the issue is controlled by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24, particularly subsections (c), (e) and (f), wherein the respective rights and responsibilities of the appellant, the appellee and the trial court are stated. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anne S. Wilson vs Scott Bowman
This application for a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal concerns how an appealing party may use a trial court’s recording of a hearing. We grant the appellant’s Rule 10 application.1 Furthermore, we reverse the chancellor’s June 5, 2009 order and remand the matter for the chancellor to rule on appellee’s objections and resolve the parties’ differences as to the content of the transcript or statement of the evidence. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Wendell P. Baugh, III v. Herman Novak - Dissenting
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Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Adoption of : J.B.H.
Respondent/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights based on abandonment. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Corine Broadnax, Individually and as heir and on behalf of the Estate Of Mary Alice Johnson v. Quince Nursing And Rehabilitation Center, L.L.C., et al.
The parties to a nursing home Admission Agreement dispute the enforceability of its arbitration provision. The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration provision. The nursing home appealed. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Sams Tuetken v. Lance Edward Tuetken
This appeal involves the trial court’s decision to modify an arbitrator’s award in a dispute concerning the parties’ parenting plan and their child support obligations. Appellant contends that the trial court erred because modification of the arbitrator’s award was not permissible under the Uniform Arbitration Act. We have reviewed the trial court’s order referring this dispute to the arbitrator and concluded that the Uniform Arbitration Act is inapplicable. Instead, we find that this was a nonbinding dispute resolution proceeding governed by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to modify the arbitrator’s award. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney Marra v. Bank of New York
This appeal involves a court clerk’s fee for facilitating a foreclosure sale. The defendant bank held a foreclosure sale of the plaintiff’s home without giving the plaintiff proper notice. The plaintiff then filed this action and the sale was set aside. The trial court ordered that the property be re-auctioned and appointed the clerk and master of the chancery court as a special commissioner to facilitate the sale. At the second sale, the plaintiff purchased the property. The trial court ordered that the clerk be awarded 5% of the purchase price as his fee for services rendered in connection with the sale. The bank objected, arguing that the clerk’s fee was excessive. The trial court conducted a hearing and held that the fee to the clerk was reasonable. The bank appealed, naming the court clerk as an appellee in the notice of appeal, but failing to file a motion to add him as a party. The appeal was dismissed for lack of a final order. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Anderson Bonner, Jr., v. Johnnie Dobyns Miller Bonner
In this divorce action, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and awarded the wife $1,000.00 per month alimony. The husband appealed the award of alimony. We hold the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
City of Franklin, Tennessee v. Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corporation
The City of Franklin, a member of the nonprofit Middle Tennessee Electric Membership Corporation, sued the corporation to obtain access to its records in order to determine whether it would be in the City’s interest to acquire those assets which lay within the City boundaries. The trial court dismissed the suit agreeing with the corporation that the City’s request was not in conformance with the statutory requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-66-102(c) that it be made “in good faith or for a proper purpose.” We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Harry Skipper, et ux v. State of Tennessee
Mr. Skipper filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission, alleging that Tennessee Department of Transportation snow plow operator Dennis Burns crossed the center line, striking him. Mr. Burns became ill with cancer, and his deposition was scheduled three times before it was successfully taken. Following Mr. Burns’ deposition, Mr. Skipper failed to advance his claim for a period of one year, and the Claims Commission dismissed his claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(b). Mr. Skipper sought relief from the dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 6.02, 59, and 60.02. Mr. Skipper’s counsel claimed that he failed to act in order to allow Mr. Burns time to recover, so that he could testify live at trial. He further stated that it was his understanding that the State would contact him once such recovery was made. The Claims Commission denied Mr. Skipper relief from the order of dismissal, and Mr. Skipper appealed to this Court. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals |
