Family Trust Services LLC et al v. Green Wise Homes LLC et al
This appeal involves claims by four plaintiffs against an attorney, his business partner, and the attorney’s and partner’s limited liability company. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants fraudulently redeemed properties sold via tax sales, utilizing forged or fraudulent documents. Following a bifurcated jury trial, the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed except for the claim of one plaintiff against the attorney defendant, which resulted in a verdict for damages in the amount of $53,450. The trial court subsequently denied a motion for new trial filed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial should be reversed. However, we affirm the trial court’s pre-trial determination that judgment on the pleadings was appropriate concerning the plaintiffs’ claims of unjust enrichment and “theft” of the right of redemption. We further affirm (1) the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants concerning the plaintiffs’ claim based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-22-113 and (2) the court’s denial of the defendant company’s motion to dissolve the lien lis pendens on its property. The remaining issue raised by the defendants is pretermitted as moot. We remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estrella A. et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on five grounds, including severe child abuse. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the grounds for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
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Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Boren v. David Wade, Jr.
This case involves a post-divorce modification of the parties’ parenting plan for their minor child. The trial court suspended Appellant/Father’s visitation. Because the trial court failed to make any findings concerning the child’s best interest, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-404(b), 36-6-106(a), we vacate the trial court’s order. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Balmoral Shopping Center, LLC v. City of Memphis ET AL.
This is an appeal of a trial judge’s denial of a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B motion for the recusal of the trial judge from the case. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Trust of Katherine D. Graham
Decedent created a trust and named one of the beneficiaries and Appellee, a third-party bank, as co-trustees. The trust beneficiaries petitioned for Appellee’s removal and for the substitution of another beneficiary as co-trustee. The petitioners also sought an order directing Appellee to reimburse the trust for fees paid to Appellee as co-trustee. The trial court held that Appellee administered the trust diligently and without any malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance. As such, the trial court implicitly found that Appellee was entitled to its fees. The trial court further found that it would violate a material purpose of the trust to appoint, as co-trustee, another related beneficiary. Ultimately, the trial court declined to remove Appellee and to substitute another beneficiary as co-trustee. Appellant is the only petitioner/beneficiary to appeal. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in its material purpose finding, for reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s decision not to remove Appellee as co-trustee. Further, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ request that Appellee reimburse the trust for its fees. Appellee’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Vanessa Colley v. John S. Colley, III
Appellant/Husband voluntarily nonsuited his post-divorce lawsuit involving issues of alimony and the parties’ alleged settlement of an IRS debt. Appellee/Wife moved for an award of her attorney’s fees on alternative grounds, i.e., the abusive lawsuit statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-106; the parties’ MDA; and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5- 103(c). The trial court granted Wife’s motion and entered judgment for her attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court specifically held that Husband’s lawsuit was not abusive, and Wife does not raise this as an issue on appeal. As such, we conclude that she is not entitled to her attorney’s fees under the abusive lawsuit statute. As to her claim for attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c), both grounds require that Wife be a “prevailing party” in the underlying lawsuit. Because Husband took a voluntary nonsuit, neither party prevailed in the action, and Wife is not entitled to her attorney’s fees and costs. Reversed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Gaby v. Tony Gaby
This is the second appeal of this action concerning the father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his two children. In the first appeal, we remanded the case back to the trial court for submission of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The father now appeals the decision on remand. We vacate the order of the trial court and remand for entry of a new permanent parenting plan for the remaining minor child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Farm Credit Leasing Services Corp. v. Jeffrey Daniels
Lessee disputes the trial court’s denial of his emergency motion to continue leasing company’s summary judgment hearing. Lessee also appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for leasing company, despite not responding to discovery requests or submitting evidence in opposition to summary judgment. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin J. McNeill v. Blount Memorial Hospital Incorporated, Et Al.
The pro se plaintiff appeals the trial court’s summary judgment dismissal of his action against the defendant hospital and its Chief Executive Officer. The trial court also granted the hospital CEO’s motion for a reasonable award of attorney fees and costs in defending against the lawsuit in his personal capacity pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29- 20-113. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
First Bank F/D/B/A Northwest Georgia Bank v. Mountain Apartments, LLC Et Al.
The plaintiff bank appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of its breach of contract action against the defendants pursuant to the law in Georgia. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Lori S. Fernandez v. Tennessee Department of Revenue
Lori S. Fernandez (“Appellant”) was employed by the Tennessee Department of Revenue from 2014 until March 6, 2020, when she resigned. Following her resignation, Appellant sued the Department and several of its employees (the “Appellees”) for various causes of action including, inter alia, racial and disability discrimination. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted. Thereafter, Appellant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend the trial court’s order, as well as an amended complaint. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend and declined to address the outstanding amended complaint. Appellant timely appealed to this court. We conclude that the order appealed from is non-final. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John E. Sullivan, Jr. GST Exempt Trust, et al. v. Frank G. Sullivan, et al.
This case concerns the administration of a generation-skipping exempt trust. On review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s order is not a final judgment, so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court. Specifically, the trial court did not adjudicate: (1) the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees; (2) Appellees’ prayer to remove David M. Sullivan as trustee; (3) Appellees’ motion to disqualify David M. Sullivan from acting as legal counsel for the Trust; or (4) Trustee’s motion for sanctions against Appellees and Appellees’ legal counsel. Appeal dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Toni Barrios et al. v. Charlie Simpkins et al.
In this boundary line dispute in which the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment concerning the boundary between the parties’ adjoining parcels of real property, the trial court, following a bench trial, entered declaratory judgment adopting the boundary line of a survey presented by the plaintiffs over other competing surveys. The court, however, did not adopt a boundary line alternatively propounded by the plaintiffs claiming adverse possession of a disputed portion of land. The court dismissed all other claims with prejudice, including, inter alia, competing trespass claims and the plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault. The plaintiffs have appealed, raising issues regarding the trial court’s denial of their adverse possession and trespass claims and requests for damages and injunctive relief. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ adverse possession claim and the court’s declaration of the parties’ boundary line. However, determining that the trial court erred in applying an intent to trespass as a necessary element of civil trespass, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ trespass claim. We remand for the trial court to (1) apply the proper intent standard for trespass to determine, with the boundary line as declared by the trial court, whether the defendants trespassed on the plaintiffs’ property; (2) if trespass occurred, determine the type(s) of damages to be awarded; and (3) if trespass occurred, set the amount of damages to be awarded with discretionary costs as appropriate. Discerning that the trial court made no findings regarding the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, we also remand for consideration of that request based on relevant factors and entry of an order granting or denying injunctive relief with appropriate findings of fact. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. We deem the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal to be waived. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kelyahna T.
The trial court clerk notified this Court that a final judgment has not been entered. This Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed. Appellant failed to respond to our show cause order. As no final judgment has been entered, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Joseph D.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination existed as to the mother: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (3) persistent conditions; (4) severe child abuse; (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; and (6) mental incompetence. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elijah F.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the Davidson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that three of the statutory grounds were not supported by sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support, abandonment by exhibiting wanton disregard for the child’s welfare prior to incarceration, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Isaiah D.
A mother and stepfather filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights. The trial court dismissed the petition after finding that the mother and stepfather failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of any ground for termination. Because the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact in its order dismissing the petition, we vacate the order and remand for the trial court to enter an order making sufficient findings of fact. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Mark Mangum v. Laney Celeste Mangum
This appeal concerns a divorce. Larry Mark Mangum (“Husband”) sued Laney Celeste Mangum (“Wife”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment, which Wife appealed. In Mangum v. Mangum, No. E2018-00024-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1787328 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 24, 2019) (“Mangum I”), we vacated the Trial Court’s judgment except as to the divorce itself. We remanded with instructions for the Trial Court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that consider all of the relevant and applicable statutory factors guiding child custody and property division matters, respectively. On remand, the Trial Court entered a new final judgment in light of our Opinion in Mangum I. Wife appeals, arguing that the Trial Court erred in fashioning the permanent parenting plan concerning the parties’ two minor sons (“the Children”) as well as in its classification, valuation, and division of the parties’ property. Husband raises the separate issue of whether this appeal is frivolous. We find that the Trial Court, in considering all of the relevant statutory factors, complied with our instructions on remand. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings with respect to its application of the statutory factors. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Alyona Forrest v. Oluseyi Kunnu
A father appeals the modification of a parenting plan. Because the order appealed does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Gayle Arlene Green Matlock v. Mark Steven Matlock
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Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Daysparkles Oliver v. Tennessee Department of Safter and Homeland Security
Narcotics officers seized two vehicles and approximately $23,000 in U.S. currency while executing a search warrant at a residence. An administrative law judge ordered the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security to return the seized property to the purported owner. The judge determined that the search warrant was issued without probable cause, resulting in an illegal seizure. And, if not, the Department failed to prove that it strictly complied with the forfeiture statutes. The Department petitioned for judicial review. After reviewing the administrative record, the chancery court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the administrative decision for further proceedings. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Troy Love v. Andre McDowell Et Al.
This appeal involves a challenge to a chancery court’s granting of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement related to litigation over the partition of family-owned property. The appellant is incarcerated, which caused complications for all parties in efficiently resolving their dispute. The chancellor concluded the appellant was bound by the settlement reached by his agent, who was acting with both actual and apparent authority. On appeal, the appellant contends the chancellor erred in finding his agent had actual and apparent authority to agree to a settlement on his behalf. We conclude that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the chancellor erred in finding the appellant conferred actual authority upon his agent; accordingly, we affirm the chancery court’s granting of the appellees’ motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brylan S.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support and by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(a)(iv); and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g)(3)(A). Father also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee Department of Children’s Services does not defend the ground of persistence of conditions, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. We affirm the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on all remaining grounds, and on its finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Casey Phillips v. Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund
Appellant filed for disability benefits with the Appellee, Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund (“CFPPF”). The CFPPF board denied Appellant’s application by letter dated October 27, 2020. On June 28, 2021, Appellant filed a request for rehearing with the board; the board denied rehearing by letter dated August 19, 2021. On September 10, 2021, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review in the trial court, and the CFPPF moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02. The trial court held that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) applied and further held that the board’s October 27, 2020 was not compliant with the UAPA requirements for final orders. Nonetheless, the trial court held that the October 27, 2020 letter was a final order so as to trigger the sixty-day time for filing for review in the trial court and dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice. Because the October 27, 2020 order was not UAPA-compliant, it did not constitute a final order so as to trigger the running of the sixty-day statute of limitations. As such, the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s petition with prejudice. Reversed and remanded. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kamyiah H.
A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by wanton disregard, (2) persistence of conditions, (3) sentenced to two or more years’ imprisonment for conduct against a child, (4) incarcerated under a sentence of ten or more years, and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Finding that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact for the failure to manifest an ability and willingness ground, we vacate that termination ground. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all other respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |
