COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

McGinnis Oil Company, LLC v. William H. Bowling d/b/a Teague Grocery, et al.
W2021-01104-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

This is a contract dispute. The trial court dismissed Appellant's action for failure to state a claim based on the statutes of limitations prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-725 and/or Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-109(a)(3). We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Fayette Court of Appeals

Jenny Sue Taylor v. George Green Taylor, III
E2021-01281-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Bennett

George Green Taylor, III (“Father”) filed a petition to modify his permanent parenting plan in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”). Father’s ex-wife, Jenny Sue Taylor (“Mother”), responded to the petition contending, inter alia, that Father’s proposed plan was not in the children’s best interests. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that a slight change in the parties’ children’s summer schedule was warranted and ordered an upward deviation in Father’s child support for extraordinary educational expenses. Father appeals. The trial court’s ruling on Father’s child support is modified to reflect that Father’s base child support obligation is $731.00 per month, and we affirm as modified. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that an upward deviation in Father’s child support is warranted and in the children’s best interests, but we remand for entry of an order and child support worksheet reflecting the monthly amount owed for said upward deviation. Finally, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Mother is entitled to her attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).

Court of Appeals

Brian Boling v. Spireon, Inc.
E2021-00598-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Deborah C. Stevens

This appeal involves a contractual dispute related to the plaintiff’s employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

Laurel Martin Griffin v. Kevin Michael Griffin
M2021-00173-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

In a previous appeal from a divorce, this Court vacated the trial court’s award of alimony to the wife.  We remanded for reconsideration of the amount of alimony after determining the husband’s ability to pay.  On remand, the parties stipulated that the husband’s gross income was less than the amount the trial court originally relied upon in setting alimony.  But the court made no change in its alimony award.  The husband appeals.  We affirm.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Mary Causby Jackson, As Administratrix of the Estate of Samara Elizabeth Jackson v. Lenita H. Thibault, M.D., Et Al.
E2021-00988-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. McLellan, III

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude her proffered expert for failing to comply with the locality rule expressed in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011). Plaintiff also appeals the trial court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the trial court to exclude the expert. Additionally, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

In Re Autumn D. Et. Al.
E2022-00033-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. McLellan, III

This appeal arises from a common-law writ of certiorari filed in the circuit court; however, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court, which was presiding over a dependency and neglect action, retained jurisdiction to enter a custodial order after a petition to adopt the children at issue had been filed in the chancery court. The adoption petition was filed after a contested evidentiary hearing for the change of custody had concluded but prior to the juvenile court announcing its decision or entering an order. After the adoption petition was filed, the juvenile court entered an order removing the children from their grandmother’s custody and awarding custody to the mother. The grandmother challenged the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to enter the order by filing a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari. The circuit court granted the writ but held “that the Juvenile Court had the authority to enter the [post-petition custodial order] owing to the fact that proof had been heard on [the petition to change custody].” We respectfully disagree. Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-103(c) unambiguously states, “when jurisdiction has been acquired [by dependency and neglect proceedings] under this part, such jurisdiction shall continue until . . . a petition for adoption is filed regarding the child in question as set out in § 36-1-116(f).” (emphasis added). Furthermore, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1- 116(f)(2) directs that “any proceedings that may be pending seeking the custody . . . of the child . . . who is in the physical custody of the [adoption] petitioners on the date the petition is filed . . . shall be suspended pending the court’s orders in the adoption proceeding, and jurisdiction of all other pending matters concerning the child . . . shall be transferred to and assumed by the adoption court.” Here, the grandmother had legal and physical custody of the children when the adoption petition was filed. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was automatically transferred to the chancery court upon the filing of the adoption petition. For these reasons, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction to enter an order removing custody from the petitioner in the adoption case, the grandmother. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions for the circuit court to enter judgment holding that the juvenile court’s order changing custody is void for want of jurisdiction. 

Sullivan Court of Appeals

KLDW Wyocorp, Inc. v. Reginald Hall
E2022-00799-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor M. Nichole Cantrell

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Anderson Court of Appeals

E. Joseph Robinson, II et al. v. Nelle Powell Williams Mahaffey et al.
M2021-01068-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J.B. Cox

This appeal arises from a dispute between three neighbors over the nature and permissible use of an easement created through a 1983 judgment of the chancery court.  The plaintiffs own the property that is burdened by the easement and argue that the trial court correctly found that the 1983 judgment created an easement in gross in favor of the landowner directly north of their property.  We find that the trial court erred in finding an easement in gross and hold that the 1983 judgment created an express easement appurtenant creating a dominant and servient tenement; however, the easement appurtenant was not capable of being conveyed to landowners who were not purchasing the dominant estate.  Likewise, we find that there was no prescriptive or implied easement allowing the easement to be deeded from one neighbor to another.  Because the trial court’s judgment lacked findings of fact relevant to the slander of title cause of action, we remand this issue to the trial court for the entry of specific findings of fact on the elements of slander of title.  We affirm the trial court’s holding that defendants are responsible for the cost of re-installing a gate that they damaged.  The chancery court’s order is reversed in part, vacated in part, and affirmed in part.

Bedford Court of Appeals

Raymond Sines v. Regina Tinnin
E2021-01434-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Howard L. Upchurch

This post-divorce appeal arises from the trial court’s designation of the primary residential parent of two minor children. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must affirm.

Bledsoe Court of Appeals

Alexandrea Parker Ex Rel. Orrin Arlo Parker v. Jeanie D. Dassow, M.D.
E2021-01402-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney, C.J.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle E. Hedrick

This appeal involves a healthcare liability action. The plaintiff sued a physician who had interpreted the results of her fetal ultrasound. The physician was employed by a Tennessee state university as a professor. Her job duties included both educational responsibilities and clinical care to patients in the residency clinics. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that she had received no personal gain by her act of interpreting the ultrasound. Therefore, the physician possessed absolute immunity under the Tennessee Claims Commission Act for her actions within the scope of her state employment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

In Re Brayleigh C.
W2021-00910-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Andrew T. Cook

This appeal involves a dispute between unwed parents, in which the mother filed a petition to modify a parenting plan and the father filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan and to modify custody. The juvenile court dismissed both the petition and counterpetition finding that modification was not in the child’s best interests. The father appeals. We affirm.

Lake Court of Appeals

In Re Kendall K.
M2021-01463-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ted A. Crozier Jr.

A father and stepmother sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her child.  The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned her child by willful failure to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition.  But the court found the evidence less than clear and convincing that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.  We affirm. 

Robertson Court of Appeals

Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
E2022-01387-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Lauderback

The appellant, Agness McCurry, has appealed the September 29, 2022 order of the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”). Because the September 29, 2022 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Washington Court of Appeals

In Re Kailyn B.
E2021-00809-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Elizabeth C. Asbury

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. In addition to disputing the grounds for termination and best interest, Mother argues that the petition was fatally flawed, and Petitioners should not have been allowed to amend after the close of their proof. We conclude that the trial court did not err in deciding the case on its merits because the amendments were not prejudicial to Mother and remedied the petition’s deficiencies. We further conclude that clear and convincing evidence was presented of both the grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. As such, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Campbell Court of Appeals

Mark Leedy v. Hickory Ridge, LLC
E2022-00035-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge E.G. Moody

This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim. Mark Leedy (“Plaintiff”) and Hickory Ridge, LLC (“Defendant”) executed the Real Estate Land Installment Contract (“the Contract”) under which Plaintiff would purchase real estate from Defendant located at 195 Derby Drive, Kingsport, Tennessee (“the Property”). Although Defendant accepted money from Plaintiff to be applied toward insurance, Defendant opted to “self-insure.” Sometime later, severe storms damaged the Property. Defendant failed to properly assess or repair the damage. Plaintiff spent another 18 months living on the Property all the while making payments before he left. Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County (“the Trial Court”) for breach of contract. Defendant filed a counterclaim. After a bench trial, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appeals, arguing, among other things, that Plaintiff assumed the risk of loss. We hold, inter alia, that Defendant was obliged to insure the Property pursuant to the Contract and associated documents. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees and expenses as there is no provision in the Contract for such an award to Plaintiff. Otherwise, we affirm.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

Emily Daily Fuller v. Christopher Mark Fuller
E2022-00701-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marie Williams
Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

In Re Travionna W., et al.
W2021-01349-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dan H. Michael

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to four of her children. The trial court found that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination of her rights was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the mother contends that the trial court erred when it terminated her rights because the evidence is insufficient to prove any ground for termination or that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We have determined that DCS proved grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

Shelby Court of Appeals

In Re Nash M.
E2021-01126-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because of the lack of a sufficiently complete record on appeal, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Knox Court of Appeals

Anthony Herron, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
W2020-01731-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner James A. Hamilton, III

This is a consolidated appeal involving two breach of contract actions filed against the Tennessee Department of Human Services in the Tennessee Claims Commission. Following the presentation of the claimant’s proof, the Commissioner dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the dismissal.

Court of Appeals

Columbia Housing & Redevelopment Corp. v. Kinsley Braden
M2021-00329-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr., Presiding Judge
Trial Court Judge: Judge David L. Allen

This is a detainer action brought by a landlord to evict its tenant for possessing a firearm in his apartment in contravention of the lease agreement. The landlord, Columbia Housing & Redevelopment Corporation (“Columbia Housing”), provides subsidized housing for the City of Columbia pursuant to the Housing Authorities Law, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-20-101 to -709, and operates Creekside Acres, a multifamily, low-income public housing complex in Columbia, Tennessee. The tenant voluntarily entered into a lease agreement with Columbia Housing that contained a prohibition against firearms on the premises; nevertheless, the tenant defended the detainer action, contending that the lease agreement violated his rights under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. The circuit court ruled in favor of the landlord on the ground that the lease agreement was a valid and enforceable contract, and the tenant voluntarily waived any rights he may have had to possess a firearm on the leased premises. This appeal followed. Significantly, the landlord is a governmental entity “acting as a landlord of property that it owns.” See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 135 (2002). As such, its actions must comply with the Constitution, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982), and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine “prevent[s] the government from coercing people into giving” up constitutional rights. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013). Although laws “forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” do not violate the Second Amendment, see D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), not “all places of public congregation” are “sensitive places.” See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2134 (2022). Moreover, although public housing is government-owned, the leased premises at issue is the tenant’s private home, which is not the kind of “sensitive place” where the government may categorically ban firearm possession. See id. at 2128. Further, complete prohibitions on possession of handguns in the home for self-defense are “historically unprecedented.” See id. Therefore, we hold that Columbia Housing’s prohibition against handguns in the tenant’s “home” is an unconstitutional lease condition. As a consequence, the tenant’s possession of a handgun in his apartment, his home, did not constitute a breach of the lease agreement. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Maury Court of Appeals

Jason C. Johnson v. Tennessee Department of Corrections et al.
M2022-01265-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: PER CURIAM
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Buddy Davis v. Tennessee Board of Appeals
M2020-01255-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

A preferred service employee appealed the termination of his employment. After failing
to obtain relief at the Step I and Step II reviews, the employee requested a Step III hearing
before the Tennessee Board of Appeals. The Board determined that the employee engaged
in conduct unbecoming of an employee in state service but termination was too harsh a
punishment. So it modified the employee’s discipline to a one-step demotion and
recommended that he be transferred. The employee sought judicial review of the Board’s
decision. The chancery court reversed, finding that the decision to demote the employee
was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the chancery court
and affirm the decision of the Board.

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re Kansas B., et al.
M2021-00827-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a dependency and neglect petition with respect to four children, two of whom are the eldest children of the mother and her first husband and two of whom are the youngest children of the mother and her current husband. DCS filed the petition upon receiving a referral that the mother’s sevenyear- old daughter from her first marriage had been sexually abused by her stepfather, the mother’s current husband. The stepfather sought to call the seven-year-old child as a witness during the trial, but the trial court denied his request upon balancing the probative value of the child’s testimony with the potential emotional and psychological harm the child could suffer from testifying. The mother and stepfather have appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the trial court erred in utilizing this balancing test and precluding the stepfather from calling the child as a witness. We therefore vacate the trial court’s final judgment adjudicating the children dependent and neglected and remand the case so that the trial court may hear the child’s testimony, provided that the child is competent to testify and that the court does not exclude the testimony pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. If the child is allowed to testify, the trial court should consider utilizing the accommodations set forth in Tennessee Rule of Juvenile Practice and Procedure 306 to ameliorate any potential harm that testifying may cause the child.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Friendship Water Co. v. City of Friendship, Tennessee
W2021-00659-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn Peeples

This is an interlocutory appeal considered pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically at issue is the trial court’s ruling that a contract entered into between the parties is valid and enforceable. The City of Friendship insists that the contract at issue, which involves its purchase of a water distribution system, is void due to the operation of the Municipal Purchasing Law of 1983, Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-56-301 et seq. For the specific reasons stated herein, we respectfully reject the City’s argument and affirm the trial court’s holding that the contract at issue is enforceable.

Crockett Court of Appeals

Matthew Reyes Camacho v. Jessica Lynne Camacho
M2021-00994-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell Parkes

Mother appeals the trial court’s order naming Father primary residential parent. Because the trial court’s findings of fact are at times vague, inconsistent, and appear to improperly rely on the trial judge’s recollection of testimony from a prior hearing rather than appropriate proof, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and award Mother her reasonable attorney’s fees.

Maury Court of Appeals