Knoxville TVA Employees Credit Union v. Greg Hill et al.
This case involves two creditors, each claiming a superior interest in the same motor vehicle, which was pledged as collateral for two separate loans by its owner. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the creditor that had perfected its title lien on the vehicle. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Josie G.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.1 The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Josie G.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.1 The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Josie G.
In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.1 The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy J. Pagliara v. Marlene Moses, et al.
This is a consolidated appeal from the trial court’s attorney fee award pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c), which concerns awards of the costs and reasonable and necessary attorney fees to parties who prevail on a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging various claims against the defendants. Upon the defendants’ motion, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal on December 3, 2018. The plaintiff took a timely appeal, and we affirmed the judgment of dismissal in full. We remanded the case for collection of the costs below. After the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review, the defendants, for the first time, moved for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c) in the trial court. The trial court granted that motion and awarded the statutory maximum amount of fees to the defendants. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Paige Wininger v. Jarred Wininger
The appellant challenges the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for order of protection against her husband. Following a hearing where both parties testified, the trial court did not find appellant’s testimony credible and dismissed her petition. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Ann Baker v. Jonathan Garrett Grace
This appeal arises from a post-divorce petition to modify a parenting plan, specifically the parenting schedule, and a counter-petition to modify child support. The parties were divorced in Kentucky shortly after the father was diagnosed with a mental illness in 2012. The separation agreement gave the father visitation “as agreed upon by the parties to be supervised at all times by [the father]’s parents.” Over the next four years, the father enjoyed frequent and liberal visitation with the child. This arrangement continued until the grandparents took the father to the child’s school performance. The mother believed the father’s presence was “wildly inappropriate” due to his mental health issues. She subsequently refused the grandparents’ requests to see the child, effectively depriving the father of any parenting time with the child. The father then commenced this action by petitioning to modify the parenting plan so that he would have regularly scheduled parenting time that was not subject to the mother’s unilateral approval. The mother opposed the father’s petition and filed a counter-petition to modify his child support obligation and to award an arrearage judgment for unpaid child support. After a trial, the court found that the mother’s unilateral termination of the father’s visitation was a material change in circumstance and that scheduled, supervised visitation with the father was in the child’s best interest. The trial court also retroactively modified the father’s child support obligation and awarded an arrearage judgment of $7,000 in favor of the mother for unpaid child support. The court denied the mother’s request for pre- and postjudgment interest because the mother’s “own actions . . . caused a lengthy delay to the conclusion of the[] proceedings.” The mother raises several issues on appeal. She contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there was no evidence that the mother, the child, and the father lived in Tennessee for six months before the father’s petition. She also contends that her refusal to allow the grandparents to see the child was not a material change in circumstance. Further, she contends the trial court erred in its calculation of the father’s child support obligation and in failing to award pre- and post-judgment interest under Kentucky law. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court in all regards except its denial of interest and the effective date of the modified support order. Therefore, the judgment of the trial is affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Rufus C.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Wilson County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Christina C. (“Mother”) to her minor child Rufus C. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the grounds of severe child abuse and persistent conditions were proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. However, due to ambiguity in the Juvenile Court’s order, we vacate the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. We further find, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment, as modified, terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Grayson M.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated mother’s parental rights to her child on multiple grounds. Specifically, the trial court determined that mother had abandoned her child and failed to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the child or assume physical or legal custody of the child. In addition to finding that grounds existed for termination, the trial court concluded termination was in the child’s best interests. The mother now appeals the trial court’s termination. Although we vacate one ground for termination relied upon by the trial court, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s order terminating mother’s parental rights. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
David Lynch, Sr. et al. v. Bradley E. Poe et al.
This is a multi-party premises liability and general negligence action among a roofer who fell from the homeowner’s roof, the homeowner who erected the scaffolding at issue, and the scaffolding company that rented the scaffolding to the homeowner, but did not erect the scaffolding. The complaint alleged that the roofer slipped and fell on the roof and then bounced over to the scaffolding before falling to the ground. The complaint also alleged that had a safety rail been installed on the scaffolding it could have prevented the roofer’s fall. The homeowner filed an answer denying liability and alleging comparative fault against the scaffolding company. Consequently, the roofer filed an amended complaint adding the scaffolding company as a codefendant. After discovery, the scaffolding company filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it owed no duty to the roofer or the homeowner because it had no control over the premises nor actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the premises. The roofer and homeowner opposed the motion contending, inter alia, that this is a case of general negligence against the scaffolding company because the homeowner relied on the scaffolding company for guidance during the installation process and the scaffolding company assumed the duty of care to ensure the scaffold was installed safely. They also contend that summary judgment was not appropriate because material facts are in dispute. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the scaffolding company, and this appeal followed. We find that the material facts are not in dispute and that the scaffolding company was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on claims sounding in premises liability and general negligence. Thus, we affirm the summary dismissal of all claims against the scaffolding company. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
TMS Contracting, LLC v. SmithGroup JJR, INC. et al.
The general contractor on a park and marina project brought a professional negligence action against the engineering firm that designed the project and administered the construction contract. The jury returned a verdict for the general contractor. And the trial court approved the verdict. On appeal, the engineering firm argues that it is entitled to a new trial. It contends that: (1) the jury verdict must be set aside because it is irreconcilably inconsistent; (2) the general contractor’s expert witness was not qualified to testify on the engineering standard of care; (3) and there is no material evidence to support the jury’s findings as to liability or delay damages. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Andre Anthony v. Tony Parker et al.
Andre Anthony (“Petitioner”) appeals the ruling of the Chancery Court for Davidson County (the “trial court”), dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). We conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tyler H. et al
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Ida Steinberg v. Renea Steinberg, et al.
Appellant personal representative appeals two forms of attorney’s fees awarded against her: (1) attorney’s fees incurred by the appellees in opposing the appellant’s motion for sanctions; and (2) attorney’s fees incurred by appellees in enforcing a confidential settlement agreement. We affirm the attorney’s fees awarded relative to the motion for sanctions and vacate the award of attorney’s fees relative to enforcement of the settlement. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ralph M. Et Al.
This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children upon the juvenile court’s finding of the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The juvenile court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We vacate the statutory ground of persistent conditions due to insufficient findings of fact. However, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Heather Anne (Coats) Emch v. Edward Glen Emch, III
This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his five-year-old daughter. The father filed his petition after the child’s mother decided to move from Wilson County—where the father lived and the child attended preschool—to Williamson County, where the mother’s fiancé lived. The mother was the primary residential parent and wanted the child to attend school in Williamson County, but the permanent parenting plan gave the parties joint authority over educational decisions, and the father wanted the child to attend school in Wilson County. In his petition, the father contended that the mother’s move constituted a material change in circumstance, and he asked the court to name him as the primary residential parent, implement a 50/50 residential parenting schedule, and give him authority over where the child would attend school. After a three-day trial, the court ordered the parties to send the child to school in Williamson County. The court also found the mother’s move was a material change in circumstance for the purpose of modifying the residential parenting schedule but not for the purpose of changing the primary residential parent or reallocating decision-making authority. The court concluded that a 50/50 residential schedule was in the child’s best interests. This appeal followed.We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all regards. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
David A. Avery v. Cheryl A. Blackburn et al.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12, determining that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Following the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for post-judgment relief, the plaintiff appealed to this Court. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jamarcus K. et al.
The parental rights of Taleada K. (“Mother”) and Lashaun K. (“Father”) were terminated by the Juvenile Court for Dickson County on September 8, 2021. Both parents appeal. We affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights to all four of the children for severe abuse, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. We reverse the juvenile court’s ruling that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated for abandonment by failure to support. We vacate the juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are terminated for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. We affirm the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination is in the children’s best interests and, accordingly, affirm the overall ruling that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are terminated. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Lavergne v. Abass I. Gure
A circuit court found that a motorist violated the city’s ordinance prohibiting speeding. On appeal, the motorist argues that the circuit court should have granted his motion to dismiss. He also argues that the court improperly excluded evidence from Google Maps showing his speed and that the evidence preponderates against the finding that he was speeding. Although the court erred in excluding the Google Maps evidence, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Campbell v. Klil, Inc. et al.
Homeowner appeals the trial court’s decision to not award attorney’s fees after an action to enforce a construction contract. Trial court found the provision to be unenforceable based on its undefined “where applicable” language. Applying the rules of contract construction, we conclude that this provision is enforceable and entitles the homeowner to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with this action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings to determine reasonable attorney’s fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
William Runion, Jr. v. Dianna Lynn Mashburn Runion
William Lee Runion, Jr. (“Husband”) filed for divorce from his wife of many years, Dianna Lynn Mashburn Runion (“Wife”), in 2019. Throughout the parties’ marriage they lived on a farm owned by Husband’s father. When dividing the parties’ marital estate, the trial court determined that Wife had no interest in the farm land, the real estate thereon, or the profits generated by the farm. The trial court found that these were neither separate nor marital assets, as they belonged solely to Husband’s father. Wife appeals, arguing that Husband and Grandfather were engaged in an implied partnership. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Eugene Moxley v. AMISUB SFH, Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital, et al.
In this interlocutory appeal of a health care liability action, the only issue for review is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss based on its finding that “extraordinary cause” existed to excuse the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Claude Ellis v. Melisa Jane Godfrey Ellis
In this divorce case, Claude Ellis (“Husband”) challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate, the award of spousal support and attorney’s fees to Melisa1 Jane Godfrey Ellis (“Wife”), and the trial court’s finding that Husband dissipated marital assets. We hold that the trial court misclassified some of the assets in contention as marital, and we remand for a reconsideration of the division of the marital estate in light of this holding. Because the issue of attorney’s fees as alimony in solido is only properly considered after the issues of estate valuation and distribution are settled, we vacate the award of alimony in solido, so that the trial court has the opportunity to reconsider the award if the court finds it necessary. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Boesch v. Jay R. Holeman, Et Al.
This appeal concerns valuation of a business after a partner was disaffiliated. The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking permanent injunctive relief and damages from the defendants for wrongful disaffiliation from their flavored moonshine business. The trial court entered a judgment of $23,000 and interest, which included discounts for marketability and lack of control against the defendants and Crystal Falls Spirits, LLC, jointly and severally, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 61-1-701(b). The plaintiff appealed. We reversed and remanded the trial court’s valuation of the plaintiff’s interest because it included a discount for lack of control in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 61-1-701. The trial court revaluated the plaintiff’s damages without the discount for lack of control and awarded him $35,000 and 2.5% interest from December 15, 2015. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Jean Schanzenbach v. Rowan Skeen
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |
