Deborah Lacy v. Meharry General Hospital et al.
Plaintiff Deborah Lacy brought this action against Dr. Nagendra Ramanna, alleging that he committed a battery upon her by shaking her hand too forcefully during a visit in which Plaintiff was seeking medical treatment for an alleged heart condition. Following discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted after finding no evidence that the handshake caused injury to Plaintiff’s right hand. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
BB&T Financial FSB v. Maikel Hozaien
This is an appeal from a circuit court order dismissing an appeal from a general sessions court judgment. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal to this Court within thirty days after entry of the circuit court’s final order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Luna Law Group, PLLC v. Richardson M. Roberts
In this breach of contract case, Appellee law firm sued Appellant former client for unpaid attorneys’ fees. Appellant argued that the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches barred Appellee’s breach of contract claim. Alternatively, Appellant argued that the unpaid attorneys’ fees were unreasonable. The trial court held that neither the statute of limitations nor the doctrine of laches barred Appellee’s breach of contract claim, and that Appellee’s attorneys’ fees were reasonable. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Wilson v. Tawana Wilson et al.
In this appeal, we review the trial court’s dismissal of the action upon its finding that it was an “abusive civil action,” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-41-101 to -107, and res judicata. The appellee also seeks her attorney’s fees for this appeal. Discerning no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the dismissal of the suit as to the former wife and award her the attorney’s fees she incurred defending this appeal. We remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Angela Stamper (Hayes) v. Darrell Stamper
The appellant, Darrell Stamper, has appealed the December 16, 2021 order of the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). As the December 16, 2021 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Heather P. Hogrobrooks Harris v. Tijuana M. Harris (Watson), et al.
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bobby G., Jr.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support and by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Rhyder C.
This appeal arises from an unorthodox procedural history, wherein the trial court made its findings of facts and conclusions of law in an order granting summary judgment, the result of which terminated the mother/appellant’s parental rights. The court determined that the undisputed material facts clearly and convincingly established five grounds on which to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The court also found the undisputed material facts established that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother appeals, asserting that the trial court violated her due process rights by terminating her parental rights without affording her an effective opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. She contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to continue the hearing on the petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. She also contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on each of the alleged statutory grounds for termination as well as the issue of the child’s best interests. Following a careful review of the record, we have determined that the mother’s due process rights were not violated, and the trial court did not err in denying her motion for a continuance. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that Petitioners proved the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility; however, we affirm the trial court in all other respects. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Patrick Henry v. Jennifer Kay McCormack
This is an appeal from the trial court’s entry of a permanent parenting plan involving one minor child. The mother appeals the trial court’s designation of the father as the primary residential parent of the minor child. We vacate the trial court’s determination and remand for sufficient findings of fact to facilitate appellate review. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Fletcher Kidd et al. v. Bernice Lewis
This appeal concerns an alleged conversion of funds. Rebecca Durbin, Teresa Fletcher Kidd, and Ramona Lewis ("Plaintiffs," collectively), the adult children of the late Charles Lewis ("Charlie"), sued Bernice Lewis ("Defendant"), Charlie's widow, in the Chancery Court for Washington County ("the Trial Court").Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant exercised undue influence over Charlie in his later years and converted funds in a bank account that Charlie had intended for them to have. After a trial, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant appeals, arguing among other things that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs' claim had expired. Defendant also argues that the Trial Court erred by not awarding her any darnages for Plaintiffs' failure to maintain Charlie's house, which Defendant continued to live in pursuant to Charlie's will. We hold that Plaintiffs were on constructive notice of their claim against Defendant no later than October 5, 2009, and thus their lawsuit filed in October 2019 is time-barred. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Trial Court with respect to Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant. However, we affirm the Trial Court as to its declination to award Defendant any damages for Plaintiffs' failure to maintain Charlie's house as Plaintiffs owed her no duty to maintain the house; per Charlie's will, that was his Estate's responsibility. We thus affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the Trial Court's judgment. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Brady L. Daniels Et Al. v. Vince Trotter
This appeal involves the mortgagors’ petition to set aside the non-judicial foreclosure of a piece of real property, alleging that the mortgagors and owner of the property were not given proper notice of the non-judicial foreclosure sale. The mortgagee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust concerning the property at issue is the City of Chattanooga. The property was sold to Vince Trotter in a foreclosure auction. In a court order, which was certified as final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Trotter, determining that Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-106 prevented the foreclosure sale from being considered void or voidable due to lack of notice and that the mortgagors had a constitutionally adequate remedy of monetary damages. Despite the mortgagors arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-106 is unconstitutional as applied to governmental entities, the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office was not notified of the constitutional challenge to the statute, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04, Tenn. R. App. P. 32, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(b). Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Trotter and remand to the trial court to provide the required notice to the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bralynn A.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the proof was less than clear and convincing that termination was in her child’s best interest. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of three grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Deanna Lynn Akers v. Neil E. Powers
Deanna Lynn Akers (“Wife”) and Neil E. Powers (“Husband”) were divorced by the Circuit Court for Bradley County (the “trial court”) in 2016. Wife was awarded $1,100.00 per month in alimony in futuro. Following a slew of post-trial motions and proceedings, Husband filed a petition to terminate Wife’s alimony on August 6, 2019. A hearing was held after which the trial court terminated Wife’s alimony and entered a judgment against Wife for the overpaid amount. Because the trial court erred in terminating Wife’s alimony altogether, the trial court’s decision is vacated and remanded for reinstatement of Wife’s in futuro support. Because Husband established, however, a substantial and material change in his earning ability, a modification of the amount of alimony is appropriate and should be determined by the trial court on remand. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Sean Christopher Davis v. Samantha Jean (Davis) Hofer
In this divorce, one of the former spouses appeals the court’s division of certain marital debt. She claims that the division was inconsistent with the court’s final judgment and that there was no basis to revisit its previous decision absent a request for relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because we conclude that the previous decision addressing debts was not a final judgment, we affirm the court’s division of marital debt. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Tino v. Barry Walker et al.
In this premises liability case, the plaintiff appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by determining that the divot in the brick step that caused her to trip and fall amounted to a minor aberration and that, as a result, the defendants did not owe her a duty of care. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse Clay King v. Brittany Bourgeois Jones
Unwed parents filed competing petitions to modify a permanent parenting plan. The parents agreed that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a modification. But they disagreed over the parenting schedule and who should be the primary residential parent. After a hearing, the trial court changed the primary residential parent and, based on proof of domestic abuse, limited the mother’s parenting time. We conclude that neither decision was an abuse of discretion. So we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
The Villages of Cool Springs Homeowners Association, Inc. v. William Goetz
In this dispute between Appellant, homeowner, and Appellee, homeowners’ association, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant’s property is bound by a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions. Appellant painted his home’s trim without first seeking approval from the homeowners’ association in violation of the declaration. Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof to show a dispute of material fact regarding his affirmative defenses. As such, the trial court did not err in granting the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, nor in awarding attorney’s fees to Appellee under the declaration. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kylie H. ET AL.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother as to two of her minor children on various grounds. The trial court ultimately concluded that grounds existed for termination and that termination was in the best interests of the children. The mother now appeals. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Stevonski Buntyn v. Jeanette Buntyn
Husband appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to hold Wife in contempt. Because Husband’s brief is not compliant with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss this appeal. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Todd Andreacchio et al. v. Joseph Hamilton et al.
This appeal involves a claim of intentional or, alternatively, negligent infliction of emotional distress. Christian Andreacchio, son of Todd and Rae Andreacchio (“Plaintiffs”), died in Meridian, Mississippi. The Meridian Police Department ruled Christian Andreacchio’s death a suicide. Plaintiffs contend that, contrary to the official conclusion, their son was murdered. Joseph (aka Joel) Hamilton (“Defendant”) created a Facebook page to express his own opinions on the matter. Defendant has argued publicly in favor of the Meridian Police Department’s conclusion. Plaintiffs sued Defendant and John Does 1-100 in the Circuit Court for Dickson County (“the Trial Court”) for distributing Christian Andreacchio’s autopsy photographs online. The photographs were public records released by the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant exceeded the bounds of constitutionally protected speech by distributing their son’s autopsy photographs online. The undisputed material facts show that the information Defendant is alleged to have shared is truthful information, public records, concerning a matter of public significance. We hold, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claims. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Hyatt v. Adenus Group, LLC et al.
The trial court reformed an agreement between an employer and employee regarding the employee’s right to a profit share upon termination of his employment. We affirm the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Lori Albers et al. v. Richard Powers
This appeal requires us to consider the defense of res judicata in the context of two separate lawsuits filed by parties who were in a car accident. Following the car accident, the first lawsuit was filed and settled by agreement of the parties. An agreed judgment was entered dismissing the first lawsuit. Subsequently, the defendant from the initial lawsuit and her husband filed suit against the former plaintiff, alleging various causes of action sounding in tort. The trial court dismissed the second case, finding that all of the claims were barred by res judicata. The defendant in the initial suit and her husband—the plaintiffs in the second suit—appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit. We find that the tort claims alleged in the second suit were not compulsory counterclaims under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 13.01, and were not claims that would nullify the initial action or impair rights established in the initial action; therefore, we hold that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar those claims. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the case is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Michael J. Boeh et al. v. Arthur M. Dial et al.
This case pertains to the purchase of real property in a residential subdivision. The dispute arises from the fact that, at the time of sale, the lot was incorrectly listed as not being in a flood plain. Upon learning of the flood plain issue, the seller filled and graded the lot and abutting property, after which the regulatory authorities removed the lot from the flood plain zone. Despite the fact the lot was removed from the flood plain, the buyers commenced this action against the seller and its engineering firm, asserting claims for negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). Following discovery, the defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment, and the motions were set for hearing on the same day. When the buyers did not file a response in opposition to either of the motions and did not appear at the summary judgment hearing, the seller voluntarily continued the hearing on its motion. The engineering defendants, however, proceeded with the hearing, and the trial court granted summary judgment in their favor. The buyers, claiming they did not receive proper notice of the hearing, filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion to set aside the order granting summary judgment to the engineering defendants. Following a hearing on the remaining motions, the trial court denied the buyers’ Rule 59 motion on the finding the buyers had constructive notice of the hearing. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the seller on the claims of breach of contract and the TCPA. The trial court determined that the contract permitted the defendants to “grade” the land and rectify the flood plain issue even after closing. As such, the trial court found that the buyers did not have a claim for breach of contract. As to the claim that the seller violated the TCPA, the trial court explained that the TCPA requires some degree of fault, which was not present. Having determined that the buyers had constructive notice of the hearing on the engineering defendants’ motion for summary judgment, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the buyers’ Rule 59.04 motion. We also affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the seller concerning the claims for breach of contract and TCPA. Thus, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Tapp, et al. v. Fayette County, Tennessee, et al.
The trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss. Appellants appealed. Due to the deficiencies in Appellants’ brief, we do not reach the substantive issue and dismiss the appeal. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ellie G. et al.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellants, the children’s biological mother and father, appeal the trial court’s termination of their respective parental rights to the two children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the additional ground of persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A). Appellants also appeal the trial court’s determination that termination of their respective parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
