State vs. William Bell
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State vs. Jerry Hardin
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Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State vs. Tony Higgs
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Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
State vs. Heather Dowdy
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State vs. Will Mays
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Lake | Court of Appeals | |
02C01-9601-CR-00020
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State vs. Bobby Anderson
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Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Rudy Rogers vs. Gerald & Tony Young
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Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Fred Dean vs. Donal Campbell, et al
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Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
02A01-611-CV-00267
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Court of Appeals | ||
Reliance Insurance Co. vs. WSN Leasing, Inc.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tomlin, a minor., et. al. vs. Warren,
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Southeast Drilling & Blasting Services vs. BRS Construction Co.
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Court of Appeals | ||
Droussoitis vs. Damrron, et. al.
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Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jenkins vs. Jenkins
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Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis vs. Curtis
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State vs. Gray
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pig Improvement Co. Inc., v. Curt Reaver & Richard Alan Tracey, Jr. - Concurring
This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, Pig Improvement Co., Inc., from a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissing Pig Improvements’s complaint against defendants/appellees, Curt Reaver and Richard Alan Tracey, Jr. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Jane Bohlen Duggan v. Frederick Louis Bohlen, III
This is an appeal by petitioner/appellant, Mary Jane Bohlen Duggan, from the decision of the trial court modifying the child support obligation of respondent/appellee, Frederick Louis Bohlen, III, and interpreting the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) and a later amendment to the MDA. The court concluded Mr. Bohlen was not in contempt and required him to pay $860.00 per month for the parties’ youngest child, $250.00 per month for each child over eighteen and under twenty-two provided the child is receiving a postgraduate education, andone-half of the children’s postgraduate education expenses. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark E. Miller, v. Michael P. Schrimpf, Rita Schrimpf, and Tennessee Title and Trust Inc., et al.
The purchaser of a subdivision lot sued his agent and the sellers’ agent because the lot could not be approved for a septic tank. His complaint stated causes of action for fraud, negligence, and a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Chancery Court of Sumner County granted summary judgment to both agents. We reverse the simple negligence claim as to the purchaser’s own agent. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Diana Sue Long, v. Michael George Long
This is an appeal by the defendant, Michael George Long, from that portion of the trial court’s judgment which awarded alimony in futuro to his former wife, Diana Sue Long, who was the plaintiff below. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Diana Sue Long, v. Michael George Long
This is an appeal by the defendant, Michael George Long, from that portion of the trial court’s judgment which awarded alimony in futuro to his former wife, Diana Sue Long, who was the plaintiff below. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susanna Gillespie, A/K/A Susanna Grezegorcyk, A/K/A Susanna Kantack A/K/A Susanna Gregg, v. Stephen D. Graham and Lori G. Graham
This is an appeal from the decision of the Williamson County Chancery Court. Plaintiff/appellant, Susanna Gregg, claims the chancery court erred when it denied her claim to attorney’s fees, and defendant/appellee, Steven D. Graham, claims the chancery court erred when it failed to dismiss the claim as outside the statute of limitations. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows: Defendant and his ex-wife, Lori G. Graham, entered into an agreement with Plaintiff and her husband, Donald Kanatack, for the lease/purchase of a piece of real estate. Defendant executed a note and a deed of trust in favor of Plaintiff and her husband on 15 March 1986. In exchange for the note, Plaintiff and her husband gave Defendant and Ms. Graham $10,477.17, which they used to pay real estate commissions and to set up an escrow account for repairs. The note listed the date of maturity as “on or at closing,” and the lease/purchase agreement listed the date of closing as 17 February 1988. Both the note and the deed contained provisions allowing Plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees if Plaintiff had to file suit to recover under each agreement. At the time of execution, however, the parties modified the note by drawing an “X” over five consecutive paragraphs. One of these paragraphs included the provision allowing the note holder to recover costs and expenses under certain circumstances.1 The parties failed to pay the note on 17 February 1988. The parties extended the original lease/purchase agreement for an additional year by executing an addendum on 27 May 1988. The new closing date passed without incident and both parties continued as they had in the contract for two additional years. A fire occurred on the property in 1990 while Plaintiff still occupied it. After the insurance company paid the settlement to Defendant, he evicted Plaintiff from the property. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Mid-State Trust, IV v. Randall W. Swift
This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Randall W. Swift, from the decision of the Cheatham County Circuit Court dismissing his appeal from the general sessions court. The facts out of which this matter arose are as follows |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Jean McCracken and Alan McCracken, et. al., v. Brentwood United Methodist Church
This appeal involves a woman who broke both ankles in a fall at church. The woman and her husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Williamson County against the church and others. The trial court granted the church’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and the joint enterprise rule.The woman and her husband perfected this appeal after obtaining post-judgment relief from an inappropriate interlocutory appeal. We have determined that the trial court properly granted the post-judgment relief but erred in summarily dismissing the complaint. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |