State of Tennessee v. Gerald Robert Stevens, Laurie Ann Williams, and James Darren Brothers Stevens, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether a conclusory allegation in an affidavit that information was provided by a “concerned citizen source” is sufficient to establish the presumptive reliability of the information for the issuance of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.1 There is a distinction in Tennessee law between “citizen informants” and “criminal informants” or those from the criminal milieu. Information provided by an unnamed ordinary citizen is presumed to be reliable, and the affidavit need not establish that the source is credible or that the information is reliable. State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 354 (Tenn. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S. Ct. 770, 74 L. Ed. 2d 983 (1983). On the other hand, where information is provided by an anonymous criminal informant, the affidavit must establish (1) the basis of the informant’s knowledge, and (2) the reliability of the informant or the information. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989). |
Henry | Supreme Court | |
Edmund George Zagorski v. State of Tennessee
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING |
Robertson | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Pettus
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Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Anderson vs. Moran Foods
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Jordan vs. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital
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Supreme Court | ||
Helms vs. Dept. of Safety
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Supreme Court | ||
State vs. Vaughn Mixon
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Supreme Court | ||
Wilson vs. Wilson
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Supreme Court | ||
Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
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Supreme Court | ||
Seals vs. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg Co., Inc. and 2nd Injury Fund
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Claiborne | Supreme Court | |
Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr., Director of the Division of Workers Compensation, Tennessee Dept of Labor - Concurring
I concur in the majority's holding that this case falls within the purview of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a). I, however, continue to adhere to my dissent in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., 970 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1998), in which I concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a) is applicable when there is a subsequent injury and the employee is rendered permanently and totally disabled. Subsection (b), however, should apply only when the employee is still able to earn a wage or be gainfully employed but has received compensable vocational disabilities that exceed 100 percent or 400 weeks of compensation |
Supreme Court | ||
Wayne Eldred Hill v. CNA Insurance and Larry Brinton, Jr. Director Chancellor of the Division of Worker's Compensation Fund, Tennessee Department of Labor
In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court determined that Wayne Eldred Hill, the employee, was permanently and totally disabled. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a), the court apportioned 10 percent of the award to the employer and 90 percent of the award to the Second Injury Fund. The case was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e). The Appeals Panel modified the award by apportioning 65 percent to the employer and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Bobby Blackmon
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Sumner | Supreme Court | |
State vs. Bobby Blackmon
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Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Wilson vs. Wilson
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Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Sanjines vs. Ortwein & Assoc.
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Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Sanjines vs. Ortwein & Assoc.
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Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Alcazar vs. Hayes
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Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
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Supreme Court | ||
Walker vs. Saturn Corp.
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Supreme Court | ||
Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
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Supreme Court | ||
Est. of Ruth Garrett vs. St. Thomas Hospital
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Supreme Court | ||
Wilson vs. Wilson
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Supreme Court | ||
Robert L. DeLaney v. Brook Thompson, et al.
In this case, we are invited to decide whether the Tennessee Plan for election of appellate judges, codified as Title 17, Chapter 4 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons, but most particularly because it contemplates “retention elections” for incumbent appellate judges. In general, the Tennessee Plan provides that an incumbent appellate judge may run for reelection unopposed on the ballot, provided the incumbent’s retention has been recommended by the judicial evaluation commission; the judge will be retained in office if a majority of those voting in the election for that judge’s seat vote for such retention. Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4- 115(d)(1)(1994). It is the duty of all courts, including the Supreme Court, to pass on a constitutional question only when it is absolutely necessary for the determination of thecase and of the rights of parties to the litigation. Glasgow v. Fox, 214 Tenn. 656, 666-667, 383 S.W. 2d 9, 13-14 (1964). See also, Jackson v. Davis, 530 F. Supp. 2, 4 n. 1 (E.D. Tenn.), aff’d, 667 F. 2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1981). We hold that it is not necessary to address the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan in this case, because it is not applicable to the facts of this case. For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred in holding the Tennessee Plan constitutional, just as the trial judge erred in holding the Plan unconstitutional. We reach this conclusion because the express provisions of the Tennessee Plan render it inapplicable to the election for which defendant Brook Thompson, State Coordinator of Elections, refused to accept a qualifying petition submitted by the plaintiff, Robert L. DeLaney. |
Supreme Court | ||
Fay Thomas Nutt v. Champion International Corporation
We granted this appeal to determine whether an employer is entitled to an offset of long-term disability payments against a workers’ compensation award for permanent total disability. A 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 permits offsets against workers’ compensation benefits for payments made to an employee under an employer-funded disability plan. The plaintiff’s injury pre-dated the effective date of the statute. We hold that the amendment is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset in this case. |
Davidson | Supreme Court |