SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

State v. Timothy McKinney
W1999-00844-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey

In Re Estate of Fannie Barnhill
W2000-00289-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Fayette County Chancery Court had jurisdiction to hear the issue of devisavit vel non in this case, and whether the law in Tennessee permits a voluntary dismissal without prejudice in a will contest. We conclude that the chancery court had jurisdiction to hear the will contest in this case, but that the appellant's voluntary dismissal was with prejudice, barring the filing of a second will contest. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are affirmed.

Terry Lynn, et al. v. City of Jackson
W1999-01695-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Roy Morgan
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' wrongful death claim after concluding that the one-year statute of limitations was not tolled during the minority of the decedent's children or during the time the action was pending in federal district court before it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In so holding, we reaffirm Jones v. Black, 539 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. 1976), in which this Court held that the statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim is not tolled during the minority of the decedent's children. We also reaffirm the well-established rule of Tennessee law that general saving statutes do not apply to extend the time for filing an action under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.

Connie Givens v. Ed Mullikin, Admin. ad litem for Larry McElwaney
W1999-01783-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The principal issue in this case is whether an insurance carrier and an insured may be held vicariously liable for the alleged tortious actions of an attorney hired to defend the insured. The trial court held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim of vicarious liability against the defendant insured and his insurance carrier for abuse of process, inducement to breach express and implied contracts of confidentiality, inducement to breach a confidential relationship, and invasion of privacy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling with respect to the vicarious liability issue, though it dismissed the claims for inducement to breach a confidential relationship and invasion of privacy. The defendants then appealed to this Court, and we now hold that an insurer and an insured may be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts or omissions of an attorney hired to defend the insured, if the attorney's tortious actions were directed, commanded, or knowingly authorized by the insurer or by the insured. We further hold that the complaint in this case states a claim of vicarious liability against the insurer alone for abuse of process. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Planters Gin v. Federal Compress & Warehouse
W1999-02460-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
This appeal from a denial of summary judgment arises from a contract dispute between Planters Gin Company and Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. leased warehouse space to Planters Gin Company. At issue is whether an indemnity clause holding Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. harmless for "any liability or loss" arising out of the "use of the premises" and requiring Planters Gin Company to carry insurance on the contents stored in the warehouse bars recovery against Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. for damages caused by negligence occurring in an adjacent storage compartment. We find the contract unambiguous and valid. Accordingly, we hold that the indemnity provision limiting Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc.'s liability is enforceable and bars recovery under the facts of this case. The Court of Appeals's judgment against Federal Compress & Warehouse Company, Inc. is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.

Trau-Med of America, Inc. d/b/a Bellevue Clinic v. AllState Ins. Co.
W1999-01524-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
The plaintiff, a medical clinic, filed an action against the defendants alleging, among other things, tortious interference with business relationships and civil conspiracy. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of these claims, finding that the facts alleged in the complaint were sufficient to state claims upon which relief could be granted. This case is now before us to determine whether the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. We hold that the complaint in this case alleges sufficient facts to state a cause of action for tortious interference with business relationships. However, we dismiss the plaintiff's claim of civil conspiracy for failure to satisfy the plurality requirement necessary to establish an actionable conspiracy claim. Consequently, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Richard Bogan v. Doris Bogan
E1998-00060-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John S. McLellan, III

The sole question in this appeal is whether an obligor’s retirement constitutes a substantial and material change in circumstances so as to permit modification of a spousal support obligation. The trial court held that the obligor’s retirement did constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that because the retirement was voluntary and foreseeable, the obligor could not seek modification of the original alimony award. We granted permission to appeal and hold that a bona fide retirement need only be objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances to constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances. In so holding, we reject, in the retirement context, the traditional test requiring an involuntary and unforeseeable change in circumstances to modify a support award. We further hold that the retirement in this case was objectively reasonable and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the support award. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s modification of the support award. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Application for Permission to Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed

Richard Thomas Bogan v. Doris Mae Bogan - Concurring/Dissenting
E1998-00060-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John S. McLellan, III

I write separately in this case to address a single issue of paramount significance here: the decision to retire and just how much scrutiny it should receive in the factual context of the case under submission. Assuredly, I concur in the result reached by the majority, which reinstates the trial court’s reduction of Bogan’s support obligation. I disagree, however, with the breadth of the reasoning used to reach that result. In my view, the decision to retire, particularly among workers nearing the ends of their careers, is personal, private, and nearly sacrosanct. Thus, I am compelled to clarify that I would limit the majority analysis to those cases involving obligors who have not yet reached the age for Social Security eligibility, presently age 62. In cases involving obligors who decide to retire after age 62, I would not subject the retirement decision to  analysis embraced by the majority

Richard Thomas Bogan v. Doris Mae Bogan - Dissenting
E1998-00060-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. HOlder
Trial Court Judge: Judge John S. Mclellan, III

The majority holds that Mr. Bogan’s ability to provide support has been significantly reduced based solely upon a unilateral, voluntary decision to retire. If Mr. Bogan currently is unable to pay Ms. Bogan the alimony she was awarded at the time of the divorce, it is only because Mr. Bogan became dissatisfied with his job and voluntarily decided to leave. His employment was not terminated or in danger of termination. Mr. Bogan decided to retire despite his existing obligation to his former wife. I therefore cannot agree with the majority’s decision to reduce Ms. Bogan’s alimony and must respectfully dissent.

Fred Dean a/k/a Omawali Ashanti Shabazz vs. State
E1998-00135-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
We granted this appeal to determine whether the petitioner properly raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding when it was based upon the failure of defense counsel to object to or appeal the trial court's erroneous range of punishment instruction to the jury on the offense of attempted second degree murder. We conclude (1) that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly raised in the post-conviction proceeding and (2) that defense counsel's failure to object to or appeal the erroneous jury instruction fell below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and was prejudicial to the petitioner. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Southern Constructors, Inc. vs. Loudon Co. Bd. of Education
E2000-02577-SC-S09-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
The issue in this case is whether a county board of education has the authority to arbitrate a dispute arising out of a school construction contract. After the parties completed arbitration, the plaintiff filed suit to vacate the award, arguing that the defendant, a county board of education, lacked the statutory authority to agree to arbitration. The defendant unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, and it sought interlocutory appeal with the trial court's permission. The intermediate court, however, denied the interlocutory appeal, finding that the trial court's decision was consistent with prior cases from the Eastern Section Court of Appeals. We granted permission to appeal and hold that the rule of strict construction of local governmental powers should be retained. We also hold, though, that the power to arbitrate construction contract disputes is fairly implied from the express authority to enter into construction contracts. We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of summary judgment and dismiss the case.

State of Tennessee vs. Clifford Peele
E1999-00907-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Arden L. Hill
We granted appeal to determine (1) if Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b) permits the appeal of a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea; and (2) whether a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f) motion to set aside a guilty plea filed prior to the time the judgment becomes final tolls the time for filing an appeal to permit the trial court to rule on the motion. We hold (1) that a denial of a motion to set aside a guilty plea may be appealed pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); and (2) that a trial court retains jurisdiction to rule on a motion to set aside a guilty plea if the motion is filed prior to the date the judgment becomes final. Accordingly, the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the intermediate appellate court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

William Andrew Dixon v. Flora J. Holland, Warden and William Andrew Dixon v. Donal Campbell, Commissioner of TDOC
M1999-02494-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth Norman

We granted review in these consolidated cases to determine (1) whether William Andrew Dixon’s sentence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2603 (1975) is void and thus subject to habeas corpus relief; and (2) whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236(c) (1997) applies to Dixon’s sentence. We hold that Dixon’s sentence is void and grant habeas corpus relief. We further hold that Dixon is entitled to any sentence reduction credits earned from 1988 until 1998. Our grant of habeas corpus relief pretermits the remaining issues raised by Dixon.1 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the criminal court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2Both convictions stem from the abduction of Jodie Gaines in 1978. Dixon originally pled guilty to both counts in exchange for consecutive sentences of thirty-five ye ars for the kidnapping for ransom and five years for the commission of a felony by use of a firearm. Dixon’s guilty pleas were vacated during post-conviction relief proceedings, and he was then tried by a jury. 3Dixon received a sentence of five years for the commission of a felony by use of a firearm. This sentence, however, is not at issue in the present appeal. 4The Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) originally calculated Dixon’s sentence without parole. When the TDOC later computerized inmate records, Dixon’s sentence was inadvertently classified as life with possibility of parole. Section 41-21-236(c)(3) of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that “[a]ny person who committed a felony . . . prior to December 11, 1985, may become eligible for the sentence reduction credits . . . by signing a written waiver waiving the right to serve the sentence under the law in effect at the time the crime was committed.” (1985). Because of the computer error, Dixon was perm itted to receive sentence reduction credits. -2- Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed; Case Remanded.
 

State vs. Michael Honeycutt
M1998-00245-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
Michael Shane Honeycutt was convicted of aggravated child abuse; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Honeycutt contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to employ a theory of defense seeking to establish the child's mother as the perpetrator. We hold that trial counsel's performance was deficient in this regard and that this deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the case. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

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Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc., et al vs. Concord EFS, Inc., et al
M1999-02560-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Cornelia A. Clark
The plaintiffs, who are or independent truck drivers and their representatives, claim they are intended third-party beneficiaries of certain contracts between Flying J, Inc., Pilot Corporation, and EFS National Bank, Inc. The plaintiffs contend that Flying J, Inc. and Pilot Corporation breached their contracts with EFS National Bank, Inc. by improperly imposing surcharges on diesel fuel purchased with certain credit cards. For the alleged breaches, the plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief. After thorough consideration and due deliberation, we conclude that the plaintiffs are not intended third-party beneficiaries of the contracts and thus have no standing to sue. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

State vs. Larry Allen Hicks
E1999-00957-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

State vs. Larry Allen Hicks
E1999-00957-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

State of Tennessee v. Larry Allen Hicks
E1999-00957-SC-R11-CV
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

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Cutler-Hammer, a Division of Eaton Corp. v. Timothy L. Crabtree
E1998-00845-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Steven Bebb

We granted review in this cause to determine whether the trial court erred in finding Timothy L. Crabtree permanently and totally disabled as a result of mental and physical injuries sustained while working for Cutler-Hammer. Crabtree injured his back while working on a production line; then, during treatment for the back injury, he developed severe depression. The trial court found that Crabtree was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combined effect of his mental and physical injuries. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel rejected this finding, concluding instead that Crabtree's mental disorder was not compensable because it was not connected to his back injury, which was compensable. On review, we conclude that Crabtree's mental disorder resulted from his physical injury. We hold, therefore, that Crabtree's mental disorder is compensable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Kermit Maurice Cozart
W1999-00022-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
We granted review of this case to decide whether a trial court must instruct the jury based upon this Court's holding in State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). We hold that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury that it should determine whether the confinement, movement, or detention inherent in the kidnapping was essentially incidental to the accompanying robbery. Applying the principles first enunciated in Anthony, we further hold that the dual convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping in this case do not violate due process. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

State vs. Edward Coffee
M1998-00472-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond
Edward D. Coffee was indicted for possession of certain controlled substances with intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. Because the judicial commissioner failed to make and retain an exact copy of the original search warrant as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), the trial court suppressed the evidence recovered in the search and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, and we now also affirm.

Margaret Tobitt vs. Bridgestone/Fireston, Inc.
M2000-00279-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.

Margaret Tobitt vs. Bridgestone/Fireston, Inc.
M2000-00279-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.