WORKERS COMPENSATION PANEL OPINIONS
| Tennessee Roofing Corp. and Cna Insurance Co. v. Randall Lloyd 03S01-9902-CH-00016 Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Daryl R. Fansler, This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Randall Lloyd appeals an award of 25 percent to the body as a whole as inadequate. We agree and modify the award. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Scotty Bailes Builder v. Allen H. Davis 03S01-9904-CH-00046 Authoring Judge: Houston M. Goddard, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Telford E. Forgety, Jr. This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(1) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue before us is whether the Plaintiff, Scotty Bailes doing business as Scotty Bailes Builder, and Defendant, Allen Davis, agreed for Mr. Davis to have workers' compensation coverage during the roofing job in question. We think they did not and thus affirm. In November 1996, Mr. Davis, a subcontractor, heard that Mr. Bailes, a general contractor, needed a roofer. After meeting with Mr. Bailes, Mr. Davis prepared a proposal, and the parties met on November 13, 1996, although what occurred at this meeting is disputed by the parties. Mr. Davis contends that he, along with two other men, met with Mr. Bailes, but Mr. Davis asserts that he was never asked to sign a form indicating that he did not desire workers' compensation coverage until after his injury. However, Mr. Bailes argues that Mr. Davis, a subcontractor, met with him and his assistant, and Mr. Davis verbally declined workers' compensation coverage for himself, although Mr. Bailes explained that he was required to obtain workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Davis's employees. Mr. Bailes insists that he repeatedly attempted to obtain from Mr. Davis the proper paperwork |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| John J. Kobus v. Colonial Moving Company M1999-00034-WC-R3-CV Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference. |
Putnam County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Troy C. Ledbetter v. Batesville Casket Company M1998-00670-SC-WCM-CV Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference. |
Franklin County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Shirley Dale Reeves v. Wal-Mart, Inc., M1998-00879-WC-R3-CV Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference. |
Lewis County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Cecilia Nault v. Mootz, Inc., d/b/a Seasons Restaurant & Ohio Casualty Group 03S01-9903-CH-0003O Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frank Brown, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court denied the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits and dismissed the complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Cleophus Davis v. Saturn Corporation M1998-00862-WC-R3-CV Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert L. Holloway This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| James G. Spears v. Pathway Bellows, Inc. 03S01-9812-CV-00148 Authoring Judge: H. David Cate, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. James B. Scott, Jr., This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant, Pathway Bellows, Inc., appeals the trial court's award of twenty percent (2%) permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity.1 We agree with the trial court and affirm. The plaintiff, James Spears, was 56 years old in February, 1999. He dropped out of school in the 1th grade and joined the U. S. Army. While in the Army he worked in communications and received his general equivalency diploma. After being honorably discharged from the Army, he went to work as an assembler and later as a welder. While working for a small machine shop he learned to weld very thin exotic material. This type of welding requires a very steady hand and a tremendous amount of concentration. In 1969, the plaintiff went to work for the defendant. From 1969 to 1997 the plaintiff traveled all over the world welding exotic material for the defendant. On August 4, 1997, he was cutting parts that weighed around 2 pounds. He would push, catch and stand them on the ground. Later in the day his left shoulder began to bother him. He told his supervisor who sent him to Ambulatory Care where he saw Dr. Hilton. Subsequently, Dr. Hilton referred the plaintiff to Dr. Sidney Wallace, an orthopedic specialist, who first saw the plaintiff on September 17, 1997. Dr. Wallace diagnosed the plaintiff's injury as a rotator cuff syndrome on the left side. Dr. Wallace treated the plaintiff from September 17 through November 11, 1997, when Dr. Wallace released the plaintiff to return to his normal work duties. At this time Dr. Wallace felt the plaintiff should have another physician examine him because he had seen a video, showing the plaintiff doing things, which he thought impaired the doctor-patient relationship. 1T.C.A. _ 5-6-27 (3)(A)(ii)(m) denotes the upper extremity as arm. The parties agreed during oral argument that the final judgment mistakenly awarded benefits to the body as a whole and should be amended to award benefits to the arm. 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Kathy Mae Perry v. Tennessee Distribution, Inc. 03S01-9904-CH-00042 Authoring Judge: H. David Cate, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. G. Richard Johnson, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue for resolution is whether the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's award to the plaintiff, Kathy Mae Perry, of 5 percent permanent partial disability to the right leg. We think it does and affirm. The plaintiff was 4 years old on December 15, 1998. She dropped out of school in the eleventh grade but later received a general equivalency diploma. She had training in cosmetology and worked as a beautician for 8 months. She also had experience as a cashier. In July 1992 she was employed by the defendant, Tennessee Distribution, Inc. On August 23, 1996, she bumped her right knee while working for the defendant. At that time her job was a standup forklift driver. Subsequently the plaintiff went to see the defendant's nurse who referred her to Dr. Goulding, who then referred her to Dr. Mark Aiken, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Aiken first saw the plaintiff on September 24, 1996 and again on November 4, 1996. At the latter visit he released her to return on an as needed basis. His diagnosis of the plaintiff's injury was a mild prepatellar bursitis. The plaintiff sought additional medical treatment and was sent by the defendant to see Dr. Alan Williams, II, who treated the plaintiff from December 17, 1996 through May 12, 1998. On April 15, 1997 he performed a diagnostic arthroscopy. His diagnosis of the plaintiff's injury was chondromalacia of the patella and the femoral condyle of the right knee. The plaintiff missed work from April 4, to June 12, 1997 when she took a voluntary layoff and had the arthroscopy. Since mid June, 1997 she has worked for the defendant as a standup forklift driver, the job she was doing at the time of the accidental injury. It was Dr. Williams' opinion that the plaintiff had sustained a 5 percent impairment to her lower right extremity. He restricted her to a 4 hour work week. 2 |
Perry County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Kellie Shoun v. Southeast Industries, Inc. 03S01-9902-CH-00019 Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. G. Richard Johnson, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Southeast Industries, Inc., has appealed from the action of the trial court in awarding the employee, Kellie Shoun, 5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Several issues are being raised by the appeal. The primary question is the claim by the employer that the injury was not work-related. Other issues concern whether the trial court was in error in fixing the award of disability, in awarding temporary total disability benefits and in ruling certain questions by defense counsel were leading questions. Kellie Shoun was 25 years of age at the time of the trial (which was five years after the date in question) and was a high school graduate. She had an associate's degree from Northeast State Community College in computer programming. She was employed by Southeast as a "laminator" which she said involved heavy lifting of boxes of metal parts. On August 29, 1994, while moving boxes and placing them on a shelf, she stated she felt a strain in her low back. She said she told her supervisor, Jacqueline Dugger, that she had strained her back while lifting the boxes and Ms. Dugger told her to take some aspirin. She testified the pain continued that night and she was having muscle spasms and during the next day, she mentioned the problem to supervisor Dugger again. Later on September 1st she said as she was stepping out of the bathtub, she felt a pop in her back as she lifted her leg over the tub and the pain was so bad she could hardly walk. On the same day of the bathtub incident, she went to see Dr. Lonnie Jackson, a chiropractor who had been treating her for a number of years for migraine headaches, knee injury, etc. Dr. Jackson treated her for a period of time and then referred her to an orthopedic doctor. The record indicates she first came under the care of Dr. Mark T. McQuain and then she saw Dr. Richard Duncan who performed surgery. 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Peggy Hammond v. National Health Corp d/b/a Athens Health Care Center 03S01-9812-CH-00149 Authoring Judge: Hon. Earl Henley, Chancellor Trial Court Judge: Hon. Earl Henley This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225 (e) (3) (1998 Supp.) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Trial Court found the worker to suffer from a condition known as reflex sympathetic dystrophy, and awarded the Appellee forty-five percent vocational disability apportioned to the body as a whole. The employer appeals asserting a number of grounds for reversal. We have considered each of the issues raised on appeal, and further we have weighed the evidence ourselves, as we are required to do, with a presumption of correctness of the decision of the Trial Judge as to factual matters, and without presumption as to legal issues. We have considered the testimony presented in the record, including the depositions of a number of medical professionals, and the record of live testimony presented before the Trial Judge. We find that the award of the Trial Judge should be modified to provide for twenty-five percent vocational disability, and further modified with regard to costs of medical and psychological care, but otherwise the decision of the Trial Judge should be affirmed. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Carolyn King v. Tecumseh Products Company W1998-00699-W C-R3-CV Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J. Trial Court Judge: Hon. George R. Ellis, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court found that the employee had sustained 3 percent permanent partial disability to the right upper extremity and twenty percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for psychological injury. The employer appeals, and argues that the trial court erred by awarding excessive benefits for the scheduled member, by awarding any benefits for the mental condition, and by by ordering additional temporary total benefits. We affirm the judgment of the trial court except insofar as it provides for two awards of permanent partial disability rather than one. On that issue, we remand the case to the trial court for a finding of permanent partial disability in accordance with the limitations set forth in T.C.A. _ 5-6-27(3)(c). |
Gibson County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Craig Stephen Portman v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc. 03S01-9901-CH-00007 Authoring Judge: H. David Cate, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frank V. Williams, III, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue for resolution is whether the trial court properly concluded that the injury to the eye of the plaintiff, Craig Stephen Portman, arose out of his employment with the defendant, Camelot Care Center, Inc. We agree with the trial court and affirm.1 The plaintiff Portman was an employee of the defendant on September 4, 1996, when he was involved in an incident, where a minor child spit in his eye. Three to five days later he experienced irritation in that eye. He sought medical treatment on the seventh day following the incident. Ultimately he came under the care of Dr. Subba Rao Gollamudi, an ophthalmologist who focuses on diseases and surgery of the cornea and anterior segment of the eye. Dr. Gollamudi noted the plaintiff related to him that he had normal ocular health prior to the onset of symptoms in the eye, which occurred coincident with the incident at work, and further testified as follows: Q. Doctor, if you assume Mr. Portman worked at the Camelot Care Center which was where he worked in the capacity as a counselor with children and that on the 4th day of September, 1996, a child spit in his eye, assume that's correct, and that he is then followed with the conditions that he described to you, are you able to form an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty given the current level of scientific and medical research whether or not that episode at work was the causative factor in the development of the condition you ultimately diagnosed and treated? A. I would say that I feel reasonably certain that the time frame and episode as related to me are consistent with saliva that has herpes in it causing ocular surface herpes. The Plaintiff testified: Q. Prior to September of 1996, had you ever experienced any symptoms, problems, been treated for or been told you had the herpes simplex virus? A. No. There is no evidence the plaintiff's ocular simplex herpes condition was caused by any other occurrence. The standard of review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (1991 of Supp. 1998). "In order to be eligible for workers' compensation benefits, an employee must suffer `an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment which causes either disablement or death.' Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-12(a)(5). The phrase `arising out of' refers to causation. The causation requirement is satisfied if the injury 1W hile all th e issu es in this ca se w ere n ot co nclu ded, the p arties and the tria l cour t agre ed th at it should be treated as a final judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure No. 54. 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Jackson Manufacturing Company, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Marie Lambert 03S01-9906-CV-00057 Authoring Judge: Hon. Carroll L. Ross, Circuit Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Carroll L. Ross, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiffs, Jackson Manufacturing Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, contend the trial court was incorrect in awarding the defendant, Marie Lambert, 4% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole instead of a lesser amount to a scheduled member on the basis that the disability associated with the shoulder and neck area was not caused by the accident at work. We disagree with the plaintiffs and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The defendant Lambert was born March 15, 194. She failed to complete the ninth grade and has had no other formal education or vocational training. She went to work when she was seventeen. Her work history consists primarily of operating sewing machines in chair factories. Prior to April 21, 1995, the defendant had never experienced any pain in her shoulder or neck area. On April 21, 1995, while in the employ of Jackson Manufacturing Company, she was pulling and feeding material into an industrial computer-operated sewing machine when she injured her left ring finger at the knuckle which joins the hand. In order to pull the material she had to pull very hard with her whole arm. She described the incident as follows: ". . . as I got to the end of it (a 2 inch piece of material) my hand came off and that's when whatever popped hurt, hit - - and I hit myself so hard, you know, and my arm went backwards." She was promptly sent to Dr. Chalmer Chastain, Jr., who examined her and recommended she be referred to an orthopedic specialist or hand specialist. She returned to her place of employment and was referred that same day by her employer to Dr. Cauley Hayes, a specialist in hand surgery. Dr. Hayes treated her hand and on May 11, 1995, performed surgery on her left ring finger metacarpophalangeal joint. Dr. Hayes returned her to work three months after the accident and she was placed on light duty carrying cushions, which was too much for her condition. Thereafter she cleaned tables and bathrooms. Subsequently she was terminated for missing work and has not worked since then. While under Dr. Hayes' care the defendant and her boyfriend testified she complained at each visit to Dr. Hayes of problems with her arm, shoulder and neck. Dr. Hayes' medical records dated November 7, 1995, show her first complaint of heaviness in the arm. On that occasion the x-rays showed an abnormal cervical spine, and Dr. Hayes referred her to Dr. Adele Ackell, a neurologist. Dr. Hayes felt the defendant had sustained permanent impairment to the hand but did not assign a percentage of impairment. He did not believe the shoulder and 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Mary Alice Maupin v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge 03S01-9901-CC-00009 Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. James B. Scott, Jr. This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge, has appealed from the trial court's ruling awarding the employee, Mary Alice Maupin, certain travel expenses pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-24. All other issues were settled and approved by the trial court. The sole issue is whether the employee is entitled to a mileage allowance under subsection (a)(6)(A) of the statute which provides; "When an injured worker is required by the worker's employer to travel to an authorized medical provider or facility located outside a radius of fifteen (15) miles from such insured worker's residence or workplace, then, upon request, such employee shall be reimbursed for reasonable travel expenses. The injured employee's travel reimbursement shall be calculated based on a per mile reimbursement rate, as defined in subdivision (a)(6)(B), times the total round trip mileage as measured from the employee's residence or workplace to the location of the medical provider's facility. . . . . . . ." The trial court made findings that the employee "was not able to work at the time these medical expenses were incurred, and that the plaintiff's residence was more than fifteen miles from the location of the requested medical treatment and as the plaintiff had to travel in excess of fifteen miles from her home to the location for medical treatment, the Court finds that these expenses should be reimbursed." The order also recited that plaintiff had not been released to return to work at the time her travel expenses were incurred and that the medical treatment was authorized. The employer contends the trial court misconstrued the statute and that the mileage allowance should not have been allowed as the authorized medical treatment was within fifteen miles of the workplace and that the statute measured the right to mileage reimbursement by determining whether the travel was fifteen miles from the worker's residence or workplace. The employee insists the statutory language does not give the option to the employer to measure mileage from the location it may choose but the statute must be examined in light of actual distance traveled. It is also argued that the statute does not say mileage is to be determined and measured "from the employee's residence or workplace, to be determined by the employer" or it does not state measurement shall be "from the employee's residence or workplace, whichever is less." The case is to be reviewed de novo accompanied by a presumption of the findings of fact unless we find the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). However, in reviewing a question of law, there is no presumption in favor of the ruling. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Tenn. 1993). There is no issue concerning the factual findings of the trial court. In construing a statute, proper interpretations should give effect to the entire statute by giving its words their natural and ordinary meaning. Pryor Oldsmobile v. 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Pamela F. Jones v. Middle Tennessee Publishing Co., et al M1999-00697-SC-WCM-CV Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: Hon. Tom E. Gray, Chancellor This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference |
Sumner County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Flora Richardson v. Saturn Corporation M1998-00080-WC-R3-CV Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert L. Holloway, This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference; Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the motion for review is not well taken and should be denied; and It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court. |
Maury County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Lawrence Taylor v. Pya/Monarch, Inc., et al M1999-01766-SC-WCM-CV Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: Hon. Robert E. Corlew, III, Chancellor This case is before the Court upon motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference; |
Lawrence County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Barry L. Blackwell v. Madison County Sheriff's Dept. W1998-00280-SC-WCM-CV Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker's Compensation Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e) for a hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case arises out of heart problems suffered by a sheriff's deputy. The trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the statutory presumption in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 7-5-21(a)(1) allowing the court to presume that a law enforcement officer's heart problems are work-related. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered a 3 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole from this injury. Further, the trial court found that a bomb scare on June 3, 1996, was a precipitating factor that caused the plaintiff's problems. The defendant appeals the decision of the trial court, alleging that the court erred in finding that the plaintiff was entitled to the statutory presumption of causation. The plaintiff argues that the trial court correctly found that the presumption applies. He further argues that, even without the presumption, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). However, considerable deference must be given the trial court, who has seen and heard the witnesses, especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved. Jones v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 811 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn. 1991). After a review of the entire record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we REVERSE the trial court's judgment. |
Madison County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| David Coleman v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. W1998-00948-SC-WCM-CV Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers Trial Court Judge: Hon. Neal Small, Chancellor This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The standard of review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). This Court now determines where the preponderance of the evidence lies. |
Shelby County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Jacqueline Lindbloom v. Metro 8 Sheet Metal, Inc. 03S01-9810-CH-00115 Authoring Judge: Special Judge Robert E. Corlew, III Trial Court Judge: Hon. W. Frank Brown, III This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated _50-6-225 (e) (3) (1998 Supp.) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appellant raises two issues for consideration by the Court: 1) whether the Trial Court's award of permanent partial disability payments of forty percent to the leg is supported by the facts and the evidence, and 2) whether an award for temporary partial disability benefits is justified by the evidence. After consideration of all of the evidence and the applicable law, we find that the judgment of the Trial Court should be modified with respect to both issues, and otherwise affirmed and remanded. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Charles Pendleton v. Knoxville Community Development Corporation 03S01-9812-CH-00147 Authoring Judge: Special Judge Howell N. Peoples Trial Court Judge: Hon. John F. Weaver, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Knoxville Community Development Corporation 3S1-9812-CH-147 1 Pendleton v KCDC (hereafter "KCDC") appeals an award of 2 percent disability to the body. We affirm. |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Albert J. Shell v. Abb Combustion Engineering, Inc. 03S01-9902-CH-00018 Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Howell N. Peoples, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Albert J. Shell, has appealed from the action of the trial court in dismissing his claim for benefits. The court concluded his condition and/or injury was not work-related. On appeal two questions are presented for review. First, it is contended the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding on the causation issue and second, it is insisted the court was in error at the close of all proof to require counsel to submit a hypothetical question to one of the expert medical witnesses. We have carefully reviewed the record with these issues in mind and are of the opinion the judgment of dismissal should be affirmed. Plaintiff was 54 years of age and is a high school graduate. He has been employed by defendant, ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc ., for a long period of time. In 199 he was involved in a work-related accident which was diagnosed as a disc injury causing back and leg pain. He did not undergo surgery and conservative treatment seemed to heal the injury as he returned to work after a short period of time. He continued to work without any significant problems until March 1995. On March 21, 1995, he testified he was using a hammer to attempt to disconnect metal that had been previously welded when the blow of the hammer caused a piece of the metal to break free and strike the top of his foot; that he immediately had pain in his foot and felt he had bruised it; several days later he began having pain in his leg calf and foot and some numbness; he saw his wife's family doctor whose medical records were filed in evidence and indicated the examination revealed "Left foot numbness and weakness since Thurs. No cause. . . . . . ." On March 29, 1995 he saw Dr. George Z. Seiters, an orthopedic surgeon, who testified by deposition and stated his examination revealed a foot drop condition; that the patient had indicated he had awakened with the symptoms and that he could not recall any precipitating event other than the hammer incident. Dr. Seiters referred the patient to a neurosurgeon for further evaluation. Dr. Seiters testified he was of the opinion there was no casual connection between the hammer incident and the foot drop condition and later diagnosed disc condition. He felt the disc condition which the neurosurgeon found was probably related to the 199 work-related accident. He also stated plaintiff never described any twisting movement during the hammer incident nor did he ever complain of having back pain. The neurosurgeon, Dr. Thomas D. Fulbright, first saw plaintiff on May 1, 1995 and he performed disc surgery on May 1th. He testified by deposition and was also of the opinion the hammer incident did not cause the foot drop condition or the disc condition. He said a bulging disc caused compression of the nerve root which caused the foot drop. In describing the hammer incident at work on March 21st to the company nurse, an insurance adjuster, his wife's family doctor, Dr. Seiters and Dr. Fulbright, 2 |
Knox County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Brenda King v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. & Calsonic Yorozu Corp., Inc. M1998-00145-SC-WCM-CV Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: Hon. Barry Medley, Judge This case is before the Court upon defendants' motion for review pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(5)(B), the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference; |
Warren County | Workers Compensation Panel | ||
| Rumsey v. County of Humphreys and Humphreys County Sheriff's Dept. M1999-00026-WC-R3-CV Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: Hon. Allen W. Wallace This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference |
Wayne County | Workers Compensation Panel |