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	Rutherford County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/19/99
Cynthia Morrison v. Tecumseh Products Co. M1998-00246-WC-R3-CV Authoring Judge: Samuel L. Lewis, Sp. J. Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jeffrey F. This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance	Grundy County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/19/99
Shirley Clark v. Humboldt Healthcare, Inc., d/b/a Parkview Nursing and Rehabilitation Center 02S01-9903-CH-00029 Authoring Judge: J. Steven Stafford, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. George R. Ellis, This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issues presented by the defendant for our review are as follows: 1. Whether the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff interest on a judgment for benefits not yet accrued where the award was not reduced to a lump sum award; and 2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding discretionary costs for the deposition of Dr. R.J. Barnett, for obtaining medical records, and for a filing fee and service fee.	Gibson County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/15/99
John Ailworth v. Roadway Express, Inc. 01S01-9808-CV-00146 Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: Hon. Thomas Brothers, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends that the trial court erred in awarding compensation for temporary total disability and permanent partial disability and in		Workers Compensation Panel	11/10/99
William Keith Eddlemon v. Tecumseh Products Company 02S01-9811-CH-00108 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. George R. Ellis, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff received a workers' compensation lump sum award and, upon his motion, the trial court awarded post-judgment interest for a period of 32 days. He appeals and argues that he is entitled to post-judgment interest for 99 days, from the date the lump sum award was approved by the trial court until the date he received payment. The defendant contends the plaintiff is not entitled to payment on the award until 31 days after the entry of the judgment - the time period during which a Notice of Appeal could have been filed - and therefore only 32 days of post-judgment interest is due. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 entitles the plaintiff to an additional 3 days of post-judgment interest and modify the judgment of the trial court accordingly.1 On June 1, 1998, the plaintiff's workers' compensation claim was heard in the Chancery Court for Gibson County and the trial court made an award of permanent partial disability, which was to be paid in a lump sum. On July 7, 1998, the trial court's judgment was entered. On September 8, 1998, the plaintiff received payment of the judgment from the defendant. In Woodall v. Hamlett, 872 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. 1996), the Supreme Court held that judgments involving the Workers' Compensation Act are controlled by Tenn. Code Ann. 1The Supreme Court in Woodall v. Hamlett, 872 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. 1996), held the statute was applicable on this issue.	Gibson County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/29/99
Virginia Mcconnell v. The Travelers Insurance Co. 02S01-9810-CH-00098 Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Charles Mcpherson This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case arises from a back injury that plaintiff sustained on the job. The court found that plaintiff made a meaningful return to work and gave her the maximum award of six (6) times the anatomical rating (6 percent vocational disability to the body as a whole) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b), rather than limiting the award to the two and one-half (2_) times cap found in _ 5-6-241(a). The defendant appealed to this Court on three issues: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court's finding that Anderson Hickey did not return the plaintiff to her employment at wage equal to or greater than the wage plaintiff was receiving at the time of the injury as required by Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b); (2) whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that plaintiff sustained a 6 percent vocational impairment rating; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 241(c) when awarding plaintiff a vocational impairment rating of six (6) times the anatomical rating? We find that plaintiff's award is not limited by the two and one-half (2_) times cap found in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a); however, plaintiff's award is reduced to four (4) times the medical impairment rating pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b) and (c). We, therefore, modify and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Our standard of review on appeal in workers' compensation cases is de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness of the trial court's findings, unless the evidence presented preponderates otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (Supp. 1998); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard of review, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.	Lauderdale County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/29/99
Charles D. Scott v. The Travelers Insurance Co., et al 02S01-9810-CH-00097 Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Dewey C. Whitenton, This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, Charles D. Scott, brought this suit against Travelers Insurance Company, the workers' compensation insurance carrier for Kraus Model Cleaners (Kraus Cleaners), and the Second Injury Fund. After hearing the evidence, the chancellor found that the plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his back injury was caused or aggravated out of or in the course of his employment for Kraus Cleaners and entered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff has presented two issues for review: 1. Did the trial court err in finding that there is not sufficient evidence to show that plaintiff's lower back problems arose out of and were incurred in the course of his employment and that defendants are not liable under the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Law? 2. Whether plaintiff's claim is barred by wilful misrepresentation and fraud in his employment application? In considering these issues, we must be mindful of certain well established principles. Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). We are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of evidence lies. Thomas v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 812 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tenn. 1991). In making such determination, this Court must give considerable deference to the trial judges's findings regarding the weight and credibility of any oral testimony received. Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tenn. 1992); Thomas, 812 S.W.2d at 283. However, this court may draw its own conclusions about the weight, credibility, and significance of deposition testimony. Seiber v. Greenbrier Indus. Inc., 96 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff in a worker's compensation case has the burden of proving causation and permanency of his injury by the preponderance of the evidence using expert medical testimony. See Thomas, 812 S.W.2d at 283; Roark v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 793 S.W.2d 2	Scott County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/29/99
	Overton County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/22/99
Kenneth Kerr v. Municipal Corp. 03S01-9803-CV-00032 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Rex Henry Ogle, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and fixed his recovery at 25 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The defendant says the evidence preponderates against the judgment. We agree with the defendant and reverse the judgment and dismiss this case. On July 11, 1994, the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident while in the course of his employment with the defendant. The plaintiff was treated by Dr. Archer W. Bishop, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon, whose report was submitted as medical evidence in the case. Dr. Bishop's report, in essence, shows that the plaintiff had some degenerative disc disease and that he had some temporary symptoms as a result of the accident but no permanent effects therefrom. Dr. Bishop found the plaintiff had a five percent medical impairment as a result of the degenerative disc disease but no impairment as a result of the accident. The plaintiff testified concerning pain and difficulties which he was having. This is called greatly into question by Dr. Bishop's findings concerning pain: He states that he is having severe pain in his back. He even described pain in his hair, in his neck and in his skin. He seems to have complaints that outweigh his findings. Because of the complaints of pain, Dr. Bishop had an MRI done on the plaintiff. This showed no support for the plaintiff's complaints of pain. The plaintiff sought the opinion of Dr. Wade H. Penny, III, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Penny's report is not enlightening. It is somewhat vague as to the 2	Knox County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/20/99
Carl Loving v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. 03S01-9805-CH-00050 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy J. White, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff suffered a back injury in a job-related accident on November 4, 1996. The contested issue was the extent of permanent disability, which the Chancellor found was 65 percent to the whole body. The defendant disagrees, appeals, and presents the issues of excessiveness and the allowance of discretionary costs for review, which is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff, age 48, has been married 26 years, is a high school graduate, and has worked as a car salesman most of his adult life. But on November 4, 1996, he was otherwise employed at a job which required heavy lifting. While lifting a barrel filled with liquid weighing about 6 pounds, he injured his lower back, which eventually required surgery. He was released to return to work and "just sat around answering the telephone" for two weeks before he was terminated as unable to do the required work. He testified that he has looked for work elsewhere, but that "it's hard to get a job when you can't hardly do anything." He was initially seen by Dr. Steven Sanders, a neurological surgeon, on November 11, 1996. An MRI revealed a herniated disc. Conservative treatment proved ineffective, and Dr. Sanders performed a diskectomy on November 3, 1996. Based on the AMA Guidelines, he opined that the plaintiff had a ten percent impairment, and imposed permanent lifting restrictions. 2	Knox County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/20/99
	Knox County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/13/99
Waddell Gray v. United Parcel Services, Inc., et al 02S01-9808-CV-00081 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. Kay S. Robilio, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court found that the plaintiff sustained compensable injuries in July 1996 and was entitled to vocational disability awards of 2 percent to the body as a whole and 1 percent to each arm. The defendants present the following issue on appeal: "Did the trial court err in awarding the Plaintiff 2% impairment to the body as a whole and a 1% impairment to the right arm and 1% impairment to the left arm?" We modify the case and fix the permanent vocational disability based on the total injuries to the body as a whole in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5- 6- 27(3)(C) at 3%. BACKGROUND At the time of trial, the plaintiff was 53 years of age and had been employed by UPS as a feeder driver for the past 29 years. Prior to that, he worked at Owens Illinois, a corrugated box company. He attended college for three years and served in the U.S. Marine Corps for six years. Prior to the injury in this case, he was in good health and had no pain that prevented him from performing any activities. As a feeder driver, the plaintiff was required to drive and deliver packages to various destinations. His job specifically involved coupling and uncoupling trailers. He explained that he would connect or disconnect trailers by using a dolly that weighed between 15-17 pounds. Mr. Carl McVay, the plaintiff's manager, 2	Shelby County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/12/99
	Franklin County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/11/99
	Maury County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/11/99
		Workers Compensation Panel	10/11/99
	Rutherford County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/11/99
	Grundy County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/11/99
	Montgomery County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/11/99
		Workers Compensation Panel	10/11/99
	Lewis County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/11/99
	Davidson County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/11/99
Tony Morris v. Malone Freight Line, Inc. 03S01-9808-CH-00097 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. R. Vann Owens, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff filed an action under the Workers' Compensation Act to recover for injuries he allegedly suffered while employed by the defendant. The defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment averring and showing by proper pleadings that it was a common carrier operating under a certificate of convenience and that the plaintiff was a leased-operator or owner-operator. The trial judge found the plaintiff was a leased-operator or owner-operator and that the defendant was operating under a certificate of convenience. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-16, in those parts applicable to this case, provides: "no common carrier by motor vehicle operating pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and necessity shall be deemed the `employer' of a leased-operator or owner-operator of a motor vehicle or vehicles under a contract to such a common carrier." Based upon this record, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial judge. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the plaintiff. _____________________________ John K. Byers, Senior Judge CONCUR: ________________________________ Frank F. Drowota, III, Justice ________________________________ Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge 2	Knox County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/04/99
Melanie v. Dillender 02S01-9902-CH-00013 Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. C. Creed Mcginley, This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The standard of review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1998); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.	Benton County	Workers Compensation Panel	10/04/99
Virginia Byrd v. Cookeville General Hospital 01S01-9805-CV-00097 Authoring Judge: Per Curiam Trial Court Judge: Hon. John Turnbull, Judge This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Cookeville General Hospital, insists (1) the trial judge erred in awarding permanent disability benefits for the employee's right leg injury and (2) the award of seventy percent permanent partial disability to the left foot is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Because the extent of an injured worker's permanent vocational	Putnam County	Workers Compensation Panel	09/29/99
Emma Crowe v. Diocese of Memphis Housing Corp 02S01-9807-CH-00071 Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge Trial Court Judge: Hon. J. Steven Stafford, This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff filed a complaint for workers' compensation benefits on October 7, 1996, alleging severe psychological and emotional injury, or aggravation of same, arising out of her conditions at work. The trial court found that the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's claim prior to the filing of her complaint and dismissed the complaint. The court also made findings, for the record, that the plaintiff gave proper notice and that the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proving causation of a compensable injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's complaint for the reasons herein stated.	Dyer County	Workers Compensation Panel	09/27/99