Harley R. Rucker v. Rockwood Electric Utilities 03S01-9511-CH-00127
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frank V. Williams,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff was injured when he fell and hit his arm on a buzz saw while cutting trees along utility lines as an employee of Woodland Tree Service, which had a contract to cut the trees for Rockwood Electric Utilities. The trial judge dismissed plaintiff's complaint, finding that Rockwood Electric Utilities was not plaintiff's statutory employer under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6- 113. However, he found plaintiff to have sustained a 45% permanent partial disability to his right hand. We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court. Plaintiff was hired by Woodland Tree Service to help fulfill Woodland's contract with Rockwood Electric Utilities. The agreement between Woodland Tree Service and Rockwood Electric Utilities was in the form of a written contract which was introduced at trial. Plaintiff reported every morning to Rockwood Electric Utilities where he met with Don White, a supervisor at Rockwood, to learn whether he should continue working on the present job or if he needed to work on some emergency project. He would also pick up a "bucket truck" owned by Rockwood to be used in cutting trees. Woodland provided all of the other equipment used by its employees. Occasionally, Rockwood supervisors would come to the site where Woodland employees were working to check on the progress of the work, occasionally telling the employees to hurry up or moving them elsewhere to a "hot spot." Woodland had absolute authority to hire and fire its own employees. Under the contract between the parties, Rockwood reserved the right to provide equipment and materials at a lower cost if those provided by Woodland were too high. Woodland paid its employees directly but according to a schedule of wages set by Rockwood. Woodland was required to notify Rockwood of changes in wage rates. Under their contract, Rockwood reserved the right to inspect Woodland's work and audit its books. The contract also provided that Woodland employees could not enter the area where power lines were located unless 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Charles Leroy Stafford v. Mid-America Corporation and Larry Brinton, Jr. 03S01-9512-CH-00132
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frederick D.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue presented by this appeal involves the extent of the claimant's permanent disability. The panel concludes thejudgment should be modified as provided below. The employee or claimant, Stafford, is forty-eight with a ninth grade education. On December 23, 1993, he suffered a compensable injury to his neck and arm, for which he received medical treatment and lost time from work. The treating physician assigned a permanent impairment rating of 3% to the whole body and released him to return to work in August of 1994 with no restrictions. From a previous injury, the claimant had received an award based on ninety-five percent to the body as a whole. The chancellor awarded permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of five percent to the body as a whole, reasoning that the claimant had not yet become rehabilitated from his previous injury. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings of the trial court, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Conclusions of law are subject to de novo review without any presumption of correctness. Presley v. Bennett, 86 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1993). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Barbara Wallace v. Cadillac Curtain Company 02S01-9510-CH-00099
Authoring Judge: Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John Hill Chisholm
This worker's compensationappeal has been referred to the special worker's compensation appeals panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Trial in this matter was conducted February 9, 1995. On May 22, 1995, the Chancellor entered a final judgment denying compensation to plaintiff and dismissing her lawsuit.
Tipton
Workers Compensation Panel
Brian Matthew Woosley v. Townsend Electric Company 02S01-9505-CH-00040
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Mo Rris
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our scope of review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-22 5(e)(2). The sole question raised on appeal is whether the evidence preponderates against the chancellor's holding that the employee's injury arose out of the course and scope of his employment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court. The plaintiff, Brian M. Woosley ("Woosley"), was employed as an electrician's he lper for To wnsend Electric. Du ring the sev eral month s of his employment with Townsend, he worked at a series of job sites. The method by which he would arrive at the site varied. For two of the jobs, he met the foreman at the Townsend "shop"on the first day of the job; thereafter he drove his own vehicle to the job site. At a third job location, he met the foreman at the Townsend shop and rode with him to the job site. While at the shop, he sometimes loaded material for use on the job. At a fourth site, the foreman drove to Woos ley's home an d transporte d him to the job. Woo sley was nev er paid until he arrived at the job site and he was never reimbursed for transportation expenses when he drove his own vehicle. On July 13, 1992, Woosley was working at a fifth job in Brownsville when he was injured en route to the job site. For the two weeks prior to his injury, he met Harold Matlock ("Matlock"), the job foreman, at the shop each day and the two went to the Brownsville job together. While working in Brownsville, Woosley was not required to pick up or load materials; he received no instructions 2
