APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

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Jacob Wyatt Allen, Defendant, appeals from the revocation of judicial diversion after subsequent arrests for driving under the influence, aggravated criminal trespass, driving on a revoked license, driving under the influence, violation of the motorcycle helmet law, and violation of an ignition interlock system.  Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the revocation of judicial diversion.

Paul L. Foutner, Defendant, was indicted for first degree murder, three counts of attempted
first degree murder, reckless endangerment, two counts of employing a firearm in the
commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm for
his role in a shooting in Knoxville. The trial court dismissed the reckless endangerment
charge before trial, and a jury convicted Defendant of second degree murder, attempted
second degree murder, two counts of reckless endangerment, employing a firearm in the
commission of a dangerous felony, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous
felony with a prior violent felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant received
an effective sentence of 54 years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his convictions for second degree murder and attempted second degree
murder. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

Defendants, Jeffrey August Tate and Steven Ogle, were indicted in separate cases for multiple counts of theft of property and home construction fraud involving separate victims. Before trial, both Defendants filed motions to dismiss the home construction fraud counts in their respective indictments, alleging that a portion of the home construction fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154(b)(1), was unconstitutionally vague on its face, and Defendant Tate also argued that the statute was vague as applied to him. Following a joint hearing on both Defendants’ motions, the trial court concluded that the home construction fraud statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The State appealed both Defendants’ cases pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), and this court consolidated the appeals. We conclude that the State does not have an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c) because the record does not reflect that the substantive effect of the trial court’s order resulted in the dismissal of the indictments. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals.

Petitioner, Roy T. Lewis, appeals from the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following a hearing, in which Petitioner alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel did not inform him of his offender classification.  Following a careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

The Defendant, Brian Tremaine Mitchell, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, one count of first degree felony murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and received a total effective sentence of two consecutive life terms plus seventeen years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements into evidence as dying declarations, (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the statements as dying declarations, (4) the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his Facebook records from evidence, (5) the trial court erred by allowing his jailhouse statements and internet searches into evidence, (6) the trial court erred by excluding evidence that one of the victims was selling drugs and might have been intoxicated at the time of the crimes, and (7) he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

in which the Plaintiff-Appellant agreed to order beverage products manufactured by the
Defendant-Appellee. The delivered products were nonconforming, and the Plaintiff-
Appellant thereafter filed suit asserting common law tort claims and alleging violation of
the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Upon motion of the Defendant-Appellee,
however, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit. As part of its order of dismissal, the trial
court held that the asserted common law tort claims were barred by the economic loss
doctrine and ruled that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of
dismissal.

Defendant, Gary E. Brown, was indicted by a Knox County Grand Jury in case number
122940 for aggravated assault by strangulation, domestic assault, false imprisonment,
interfering with an emergency call, and two counts of violating a no contact order.
Defendant was later charged by information in case number 125355 with domestic
aggravated assault. In case number 122940, Defendant pled guilty to domestic assault and
was sentenced to 179 days for which he had credit. In case number 125355, Defendant
pled guilty to aggravated assault with an agreed-upon sentence of three years suspended to
probation, with the trial court to determine after a hearing whether Defendant would
receive judicial diversion. Following the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion,
Defendant appeals arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial
diversion. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable
law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Hancock County Jury convicted the Defendant, Shoshanna Cabanting, of vandalism of
property valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-14-408(b)(1). The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months
and twenty-nine days which was suspended after service of thirty days in jail. On appeal,
the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing the thirty-day term of
confinement because it failed to consider the purposes and principles of the Sentencing
Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). Upon our review, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand for a limited resentencing hearing.

In this child support dispute, the mother filed a petition to extend child support for an adult child due to the child’s severe disability. The father filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. Following a bench trial, the court entered an order determining that the parties’ adult son was severely disabled and directing the father to pay child support “going forward” and retroactively. The father sought to amend the final judgment, again raising the issue of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and also requesting that the final order be set aside until the child could undergo a vocational evaluation. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Upon consideration, we decline the mother’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

In this divorce action, the trial court distributed the parties’ assets and liabilities, determined the amount of the husband’s child support obligation with regard to the parties’ two children, and awarded alimony in futuro to the wife. The husband timely appealed. Upon our thorough review, we vacate and remand to the trial court the issues of the husband’s child support and alimony obligations for further determination. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

This case stems from a mother’s request to relocate outside the state with the parties’ minor child. The father filed a petition opposing relocation, and a trial was held on the matter. The trial court determined that allowing relocation was not in the child’s best interests and granted the father’s petition. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Terrance Williams, of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of fifty-six years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Kevin Davidson, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary
sentence for ten drug-related convictions in two separate cases. Following our review of
the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After declaring the parties divorced, the trial court fashioned a permanent parenting plan for their minor child. The plan designated the mother as the primary residential parent and gave the father 80 days of parenting time each year. The father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting a parenting plan that failed to maximize his parenting time. We affirm.

The Defendant, Marquis Rashum McReynolds, was convicted by a Roane County Criminal
Court jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony; aggravated
robbery, a Class B felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; reckless
endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and employing a firearm during the
commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-
102(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); 39-13-402
(2018) (aggravated robbery); 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery); 39-13-
103 (2018) (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment); 39-17-1324(b) (2018)
(subsequently amended) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous
felony). The trial court dismissed the firearm charge and imposed an effective sentence of
twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1)
denying his request to admit the video recording of the victims’ interviews with police; (2)
denying his request to sever his trial from his codefendant’s trial; and (3) failing to grant a
new trial based upon newly discovered evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. We
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Amy Upton, pleaded guilty to four counts of drug-related offenses after
the trial court denied her motion to dismiss the charges or, alternatively, to suppress
evidence seized on the day of her arrest. The motion pertained to the circumstances of her
arrest, which occurred in Claiborne County but was effectuated by Union County deputies.
As part of her plea agreement, she sought to reserve a certified question of law challenging
the trial court’s decision to deny the motion. Following our review, we conclude that the
certified question does not clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved
as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Accordingly, we are
without jurisdiction to consider the question. The appeal is dismissed.

Petitioner, Gary Lee Bragg, Jr., claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to request that the jury be instructed on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated
burglary. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel “was deficient for not
requesting applicable lesser-included jury instructions” but found that “Petitioner was not
prejudiced as a result” and denied relief. We determine that trial counsel’s decision not to
request an instruction on lesser-included offenses was an “informed choice based upon
adequate preparation,” Moore v. State, 485 S.W.3d 411, 420 (Tenn. 2016), and that
Petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that counsel provided adequate assistance
and used reasonable professional judgment to make the strategic decision to employ an
“all-or-nothing” defense strategy. We agree with the post-conviction court’s ruling that
Petitioner failed to prove the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The assignee of a contract for the sale of real property appeals the dismissal of its claims against a third party for civil conspiracy to commit breach of contract, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and statutory inducement of breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant third party based on its conclusion that the third party had no notice of the contract at issue and did not act maliciously. We vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant appeals the chancery court’s decision to affirm the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s determination that he was overpaid unemployment benefits. Because we have determined that the appellant failed to comply with the applicable rules regarding appellate briefing, we dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Rodzell Lamont Mason, appeals the summary dismissal as time-barred of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (2022), did not establish a new constitutional right applicable to his case that would allow his claim, filed more than thirteen years after his judgment became final, to be considered. Based on our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

In a joint trial, a Davidson County jury convicted Phillip Jerome Gardner, III, and Latonia Maria Gardner of felony murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect and three counts of aggravated child neglect. Additionally, Latonia Gardner was convicted of felony murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child abuse. Each was sentenced to life plus seventeen years. On appeal, the Defendants raise separate issues. Ms. Gardner argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. She also alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to sever offenses; improperly admitted expert testimony and video evidence; gave a misleading supplemental jury instruction; and imposed consecutive sentencing. Mr. Gardner similarly challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. He also argues that the trial court erred when it took under advisement his motion for a judgment of acquittal; failed to sever the Defendants; failed to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior injuries; failed to instruct the jury on his alibi defense; and gave the same misleading supplemental jury instruction. Upon review, the court affirms Ms. Gardner’s conviction and life sentence for felony murder in perpetration of aggravated child abuse. However, the court agrees with the parties that the jury was improperly instructed on one aggravated child neglect count, and we remand that count and its associated felony murder count for a new trial as to both Defendants. With the parties’ agreement, we also reverse the order for consecutive sentences in Ms. Gardner’s cases and remand for the trial court to consider the factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). Finally, we remand both cases for entry of corrected judgments of conviction. In all other respects, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this post-divorce matter, the parties dispute the interpretation of a provision of their marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) concerning one of Husband’s retirement plans. On the parties’ cross petitions to enforce the MDA, the trial court found the MDA to be unambiguous and agreed with Wife’s interpretation of the disputed provision. Discerning no error, we affirm. Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees and costs is granted pursuant to the terms of the MDA; her request for frivolous appeal damages is denied.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Petitioner, Aaron Ostine, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence, and this court affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. Ostine, No. M2013-00467-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2442988 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 28, 2014), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2014). The Petitioner filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Our supreme court granted the application and remanded the case for our reconsideration in light of its holding in State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554 (Tenn. 2014). After considering the facts and circumstances of the case as compared to those in Jackson, this court again affirmed the trial court’s judgment. State v. Ostine, No. M2013-00467- CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 7009058, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 23, 2016). The Petitioner timely filed for post-conviction relief based upon claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and asserts that the cumulative effect of his trial counsel’s errors entitle him to relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Defendant, Dustin William Russell, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation, and three counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon.  Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of thirty years.  On appeal, Defendant claims the trial court gave an improper instruction for second degree murder, the evidence was insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction, and the trial court abused its discretion in its application of an enhancement factor and in its failure to make findings to support partial consecutive sentencing on the dangerous offender factor.  Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.