APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pro se litigant sought to receive part of the proceeds of a delinquent tax sale. The trial court found that she failed to prove her case. She appealed. We dismiss the appeal due to her failure to follow Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.

This appeal concerns the statute of limitations for a will contest. David Estes (“Petitioner”) filed a will contest in the Probate Court for Wilson County (“the Probate Court”) seeking to set aside the will of Petitioner’s father, Joe Richard Estes (“Decedent”). Jennifer Brooke Estes Little, Executrix of the Estate of Joe Richard Estes (“Respondent”), Petitioner’s sibling, filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the applicable two-year statute of limitations had expired by the time of day that Petitioner filed his will contest. The Probate Court granted Respondent’s motion. Petitioner appeals to this Court. Petitioner’s will contest was filed two years from the date that Decedent’s will was admitted to probate; thus, it was timely filed. The exact hour and minute of the day the will contest was filed is immaterial. We, therefore, vacate the judgment of the Probate Court, and remand for this case to proceed.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order granting the motions of Defendant, Larry McKay, (“Defendant”) and Shelby County District Attorney General, Steven J. Mulroy, (“DA Mulroy”) to disqualify the Office of Attorney General and Reporter (“Attorney General”) from representing the State during Defendant’s capital error coram nobis proceeding. The trial court concluded that a recently enacted statute, which gave the Attorney General “exclusive control over the [S]tate’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases, see 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“Public Chapter 182”), violated Article VI, § 5 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Attorney General obtained permission from the trial court and this court to file an interlocutory appeal on behalf of the State to address this constitutional issue of first impression. After thoroughly considering the briefs and arguments of the parties and amici curiae, this court concludes that the trial court erred in finding that Public Chapter 182 was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Johnathan James Gilley, of aggravated
assault for which he received a fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment. In this direct appeal,
the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
element of serious bodily injury to sustain an aggravated assault conviction. We affirm.

Defendant, Anthony Cornelius Baylis, appeals his Monroe County Circuit Court jury conviction of trafficking a person for a commercial sex act, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; that the trial court erred in affirming his conviction as the thirteenth juror; that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of the grand jury foreperson’s signature attesting that witnesses were sworn; that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony; that the State wrongfully commented on Defendant’s election to not testify; and that the trial court erred by imposing a fully-incarcerative sentence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Defendant, Antwan Jacques Whitehead, was convicted by a Wilson County jury for second degree murder by unlawful distribution of fentanyl, for which he received a twenty-three year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain text messages and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knew the substance was fentanyl. After review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

The Defendant, Triston Robert Milke, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C
felony, in the Cumberland County Criminal Court and was placed on judicial diversion
with a probationary period of three years. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (Supp. 2023)
(aggravated assault). The trial court revoked the Defendant’s diversion and entered a
judgment of conviction imposing an effective sentence of three years to be served in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his
judicial diversion and ordering confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce criminal contempt case. The trial court found Appellant guilty of four counts of criminal contempt based on Appellant’s violations of the trial court’s order. Discerning no error, we affirm

A property owner filed suit against a contractor, asserting that a driveway built by the contractor was defective. The contractor filed a counterclaim against the property owner, seeking compensation for the balance owed for the driveway and additional work the contractor had done on the property. Prior to trial, the contractor made a motion to enforce a purported settlement agreement between the parties. The trial court denied the motion. After a trial on the merits, the court awarded the property owner the cost of repairing the driveway and dismissed the contractor’s counterclaim. The contractor appealed the court’s order. Because we conclude that the trial court should have granted the contractor’s motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement, we reverse.

In this divorce action, the wife appeals the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate, the duration of the transitional alimony awarded to her, and the denial of her request for attorney’s fees and expenses as alimony in solido. The husband challenges the trial court’s decision to award any transitional alimony to the wife. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We deny the parties’ respective requests for attorney’s fees on appeal.

The majority opinion adopts Extreme Excavation’s position on appeal that the email exchanges between the parties’ attorneys contained all the material terms of the settlement, making the correspondence an enforceable contract. I must respectfully disagree. I believe that the parties here made an agreement to agree. Agreements to agree are unenforceable in Tennessee because their terms lack the definiteness required for performance. Four Eights, LLC v. Salem, 194 S.W.3d 484, 486-87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Contracts must have terms of sufficient definiteness to allow courts to give them exact meanings. United Am. Bank of Memphis v. Walker, 1986 WL 11250, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1986).

The defendant, Diann Marie Hicks, appeals the order of the trial court revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the remainder of her ten-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the revocation and disposition of the defendant’s probation.

Petitioner, William McDaniel, appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal
sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our
review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 25, 2024. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until September 3, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Steven Lawrence Sabo, appeals from the Claiborne County Criminal
Court’s probation revocation of the eight-year sentence he received for his felony theft
conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
(1) revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in
confinement and (2) ordering consecutive service of the revoked sentence with the sentence
for a subsequent attempted aggravated assault conviction. We affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

This suit was filed pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The plaintiff was a home improvement contractor replacing a door at a client’s home. He discarded the old door, which was placed in a garbage truck allegedly owned and operated by the defendant. The truck’s compacting mechanism was engaged, causing the door to rise and strike the plaintiff in the head. The plaintiff filed suit and was awarded damages based on injuries he suffered. The defendant filed this appeal raising several issues. Because we have determined that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, we affirm.

This appeal is before this court on a remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court to address issues that had been previously pretermitted related to a punitive damages award. Upon consideration of the pretermitted issues in the present case, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Johnny Wilkerson, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed twenty-year sentences for each conviction and ordered them to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of forty years. The Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, and this court affirmed the judgments. State v. Wilkerson, No. W2016-00078-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 6596103, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2016), no perm. app. filed. The Defendant sought post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied, and this court affirmed on appeal. Wilkerson v. State, No. W2019-00459-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 506781, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2020), no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, challenging the imposition of consecutive sentencing. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion on the grounds that consecutive sentencing was authorized pursuant to statute and therefore the Defendant’s sentence was not illegal. On review, having determined that the Petitioner has failed to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Husband appeals aspects of the trial court’s classification, valuation, and division of property in its order of absolute divorce. The trial court’s decision is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further consideration.

This appeal concerns premises liability. Michael Darren Franz (“Mr. Franz”) and his wife Pamela Franz (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) sued Oscar Funes (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) for injuries Mr. Franz sustained from falling down the stairs at a residential rental property built and owned by Defendant. The stairs, which led from the first floor to the second floor, lacked a code-compliant handrail going the length of the stairs. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We conclude that the reasonably foreseeable probability and gravity of harm to Plaintiffs, namely serious injury or death from falling down the stairs, outweighed the burden on Defendant to engage in alternative conduct which would have prevented a risk of harm, such as extending the railing to the top of the stairs. Under common law principles of negligence, as well as negligence per se from the code violation, Defendant owed a duty of care. In addition, genuine issues of material fact exist in this case regarding causation and comparative fault. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

A husband and his wife found their rental boat unsatisfactory.  So they sued the rental company, alleging a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.  The rental company moved to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause in the rental agreement that required all disputes to be brought in a different county.  The husband and wife responded that the venue provision of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act controlled over the forum-selection clause.  The trial court agreed with the rental company and dismissed the suit without prejudice.  We vacate the judgment.

In 2015, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Cordell Ash, of especially aggravated robbery, attempt to commit first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a delayed appeal, and this court affirmed the trial court on appeal. Ash v. State, No. W2019-01172-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 4919798, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2020), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate possible defenses such as a third-party perpetrator. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is a breach of contract case involving a purchase and sale agreement for real property.  Because the parties’ mutual mistake of law concerning ownership of the subject property negates the prima facie element of mutual assent, there is no enforceable contract.  Reversed and remanded.

Pro se appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this dispute about real property. Due to the deficiencies in the appellant’s brief, we dismiss the appeal. We also conclude the appeal is frivolous and remand for an assessment of damages.

A Loudon County jury convicted the Defendant, Ronald Matthew Lacy, of theft of property over $60,000. The Defendant, a Kentucky resident, entered into a transaction for the sale of a car with a Tennessee resident, but with the intent not to perform as promised and to misappropriate the money instead. The trial court sentenced him to ten years, which was suspended after service of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction. He also asserts that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction and that the case should be addressed as a civil matter. Alternatively, the Defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.