APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I agree with the majority that, to acquire legal title or a defensive possessory right to real property through adverse possession, the Plaintiffs must show Mr. Eads had “exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious” possession of the property for the requisite time. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Eads’s possession of the property was not “adverse.” ¹ I would hold Mr. Eads has met the requirements to show a hostile or adverse possession for common-law and statutory adverse possession.²

The Defendant, Steven Mitchel Ambrose, appeals his jury convictions for four counts of rape of a child and his resulting effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements made to law enforcement; (2) the State provided an insufficient election of offenses which deprived him of a verdict by a unanimous jury; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (4) his sentence is excessive; and (5) the multiple “procedural errors and constitutional violations” that occurred in the trial court violated his right to due process and entitle him to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Stephen Charles Johnson (“Husband”) filed for divorce against Elizabeth Kay Johnson (“Wife”) in the Chancery
Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”).2 Former Chancellor Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr., presided at trial.
However, he was defeated for re-election midtrial. Richard B. Armstrong, Jr. succeeded Pridemore as Chancellor.
Shortly before his statutory authority expired, Chancellor Pridemore entered a one-page order adopting Wife’s
59-page proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in full. Husband appeals. We conclude that Chancellor
Pridemore’s order does not reflect his own deliberations and decision-making. We, therefore, vacate the Trial
Court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.

Greywood Crossing Owners Association, Inc. (“Greywood”) commenced this action to enforce the
development’s Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions (“the Declaration”) against one of its homeowners,
Barbara Holleman, who had failed to pay assessments for more than three years.1 Specifically, the complaint
asserted claims against Ms. Holleman on a sworn account to collect unpaid assessments plus attorney’s fees
and costs of collection as well “an Order of Sale of the Property to satisfy [Greywood’s] assessment lien and
judgment.” Ms. Holleman, acting pro se in the trial court, filed an answer in which she denied the debt. Upon
Greywood’s motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court found that Ms. Holleman owed the
assessments, awarded fees and costs to Greywood, and ordered Ms. Holleman to list her property for sale to
satisfy the debt. When Ms. Holleman failed to list her property for sale as ordered by the trial court, Greywood
filed a Rule 70 motion for specific performance, which the court granted, directing the clerk and master to sell
Ms. Holleman’s property. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

Appellant, Raven Cobins, appealed a February 16, 2023 order of the Shelby County Circuit Court. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The appeal is dismissed.

The appellants sued the appellee, a law firm, alleging that the law firm committed legal malpractice when it gave the appellants legal advice with regard to the tax implications of a stock sale. The law firm filed two motions for summary judgment arguing that the legal malpractice case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Both motions were denied when the trial court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found that the legal malpractice case was timely filed but that the law firm had not committed legal malpractice. Upon our diligent review of the record, we affirm.

The Defendant, Andrew James Skaalerud, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s probation revocation of the three-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded conviction for possession with intent to sell or to deliver alprazolam. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found multiple counts of criminal contempt stemming from Husband’s failure to submit to court-ordered drug and alcohol testing. It fined him $7,100.00 and sentenced him to fifty days in jail. On appeal, Husband contends that the court’s order holding him in contempt lacked sufficient factual findings. He also contends that the orders requiring testing were ambiguous and unclear and that there was insufficient proof that his failure to submit to testing was willful. Finally, he challenges the punishment because of its impact on his parenting time. We affirm the finding of criminal contempt in part as modified and vacate the sentence.

Derrick Lee Johnson, Defendant, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s judgment revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his probationary sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by improperly considering Defendant’s indicted charges instead of the ones for which he was ultimately convicted, and by failing to consider whether alternative sentencing would serve the ends of justice. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned his child by failure to visit. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

The parties to this appeal separated in 2019 and executed a separation agreement requiring
the husband to pay child support for the parties’ three children. When the husband filed
for divorce in 2021, he requested that the child support be modified pursuant to a provision
in the separation agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the
husband’s child support obligation should be modified due to a substantial change in the
parties’ circumstances. Following a motion to alter or amend filed by the wife, however,
the trial court reversed its initial ruling, holding that the husband’s child support obligation
was non-modifiable. The husband appealed to this Court. Because the trial court erred in
granting the wife’s motion to alter or amend, we reverse and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Eric L. Hoosier, Sr., was found guilty by a Montgomery County jury of criminal attempt to commit first-degree murder, criminal attempt to commit second-degree murder, employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, and reckless endangerment firing a deadly weapon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seventy years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding character evidence of a victim, in denying the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial, and in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentence within the range. The defendant also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm.

The pro se Defendant, Dedrick Wiggins, appeals the summary denial of his Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the Defendant has not raised a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gregory Cornielus Thompson, pled guilty to two counts of robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years and placed the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant was arrested and convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant and felony evading arrest. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked his suspended sentences in full and ordered the original sentences into execution. On appeal, the Defendant argues that a complete revocation of his sentences was an abuse of discretion. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After remand by the Tennessee Supreme Court, we reconsider Petitioner’s, Marshall G. Tate’s, appeal from the Franklin County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (DUI per se). Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. Michelle Miller, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

A mother appeals a juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights to two of her children based on three statutory grounds. She also challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The Majority Opinion concludes that the trial court erred in finding clear and
convincing evidence that Father abandoned the Child by failing to either visit or support
him in the four months prior to the filing of the termination petition. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(g)(1) (stating that “abandonment” by the parent is a ground for termination of
parental rights); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A) (offering several definitions of the
term “abandonment,” including failure to visit or support the child in the four consecutive
months preceding the filing of the termination petition, as alleged in this case). Because I
conclude that Tennessee law compels the opposite conclusions, I must respectfully dissent
from the Majority Opinion.

This appeal concerns a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination existed: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) incarceration under a ten-year sentence; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We reverse the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. However, we affirm its findings that the remaining grounds were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child.

The Appellant, Jermaine Mitchell Gray, appeals his conviction of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine for which he received a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.  He argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the State failed to reveal the existence and identity of a second confidential informant in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (3) the trial court denied his right of allocution before sentencing.  We additionally deny appointed counsel’s July 18 motion to withdraw as counsel in this case.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a termination of parental rights and adoption case. Appellant/Father appeals the
trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to
provide more than token support and failure to exercise more than token visitation. Father
also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the
child’s best interest. Because Father met his burden to show that his failure to provide
support and to visit was not willful, we reverse the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights and granting Appellees’ petition for adoption.

The Tennessee Department of Transportation terminated a preferred service employee. Following the Step I and Step II appeals, the Board of Appeals upheld the termination. The employee petitioned for judicial review in the trial court. The trial court initially affirmed the Board of Appeals’ decision. The trial court then granted the employee’s motion to alter or amend and reversed the decision of the Board of Appeals. We reverse the trial court’s order.

The Plaintiff suffered significant injuries after falling through a plastic, debris-covered skylight embedded in the roof of the Defendant’s shop building. The Plaintiff sued the Defendant homeowner, alleging that the debris-covered skylight constituted a dangerous condition and that the Defendant failed to warn of its existence prior to the accident. After the Plaintiff did not call the Defendant as a witness and rested his case in chief, the Defendant sought a directed verdict, arguing that the Plaintiff could not establish that the Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition. The trial court agreed and granted the Defendant’s motion. Viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as required at this stage of the proceeding, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict. We remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Noah Rashad Lyles, pleaded guilty to theft of property between $1,000 and $2,500, and the trial court imposed a sentence of three years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamblen County jury convicted the Defendant, Randy Scott Bible, of aggravated
statutory rape and soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, and the trial court sentenced
him to a fourteen-year sentence, with one year of confinement and the remainder to be
suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence
is insufficient to support his convictions and that he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.