APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a judgment in their favor in a personal injury action, the defendants were granted an award of discretionary costs in the amount of $3,499.81. Appellant appeals, raising several arguments in opposition to the costs awarded. Because many of Appellant’s arguments were not properly raised in the trial court, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion on the remaining issues, we affirm.

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Because the notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

J. ROSS DYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the criminal responsibility instruction in the instant matter was deficient, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the proof presented at trial is not sufficient to support a determination that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Defendant, Angela Kilgore, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated arson, and theft of property valued $2,500 or more but less than $10,000. After merging the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of life plus eighty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by overruling her motion to suppress the results of the search of her pickup truck, the evidence was insufficient to sustain her convictions for first degree murder, aggravated arson and especially aggravated robbery, her dual convictions for especially aggravated robbery and theft violate principles of double jeopardy, and the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for a corrected judgment in count six to reflect that the theft conviction merges into the conviction for especially aggravated robbery.

The issues on appeal arise from a personal injury action commenced by two tenants of an apartment complex against the owner of the complex and the property management company. The complaint alleged that one of the plaintiffs fell through an inadequately supported floor vent in the master bedroom of their apartment. The plaintiffs asserted that the management company should have discovered the defective condition while conducting maintenance and repairs on the apartment. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint after finding the undisputed facts showed the defect was concealed and the management company had no duty to test the vent’s structural integrity. Prior to entry of a final judgment, the plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint based on negligence per se against only the management company. The plaintiffs asserted that a local building code established a minimum live load for apartment floors. The court dismissed the amended complaint after finding the building code did not apply. We affirm.

A police officer appealed his termination by the Town of Greeneville to the Greeneville Civil Service Board, which upheld it. Appellant then appealed to the trial court, which also upheld the termination. Because we conclude that the record lacks information necessary to conduct appellate review, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the Board for further proceedings.

Pro-se petitioner, Tracy Lynn Harris, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shannon Bruce Foster, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2018). The Defendant was sentenced to seventeen years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that he had the duty to retreat before engaging in self-defense, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting a photograph depicting the victim with his young children. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Vincent Rodolphus Helser, pleaded guilty to one count of violation of the sexual offender registry in case number 2018-CR-129 and one count of sale of methamphetamine over 0.5 grams in case number 2018-CR-205. The Defendant received a two-year probationary sentence in case number 2018-CR-129 and an effective nine-year sentence, to be served on supervised probation after 180 days in confinement, in case number 2018-CR-205. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering the remainder of his sentence to be served in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

Defendant, Jimmy Lee Pearce, Jr., appeals the trial court’s denial of his “Petition for Pretrial Jail Credits.” On appeal, he claims that the trial court erred by failing to enter amended judgments to include credits noted in the trial court’s amended revocation order. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Justin Case Jenkins, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s imposition of an effective 16-year sentence and $9,820.35 in restitution for his guiltypleaded convictions of burglary, theft, vandalism, identity theft, felony evading arrest, and various driving offenses. We affirm the imposition of consecutive sentences but, because the trial court failed to comply with the statutory requirements in ordering restitution, we reverse the restitution orders and remand for a new restitution hearing.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Tabitha Gentry, of theft of property valued over $250,000 and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments. See State v. Tabitha Gentry, No. W2015-01745-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4264266, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 12, 2016), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2016). On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the supreme court affirmed. State v. Gentry, 538 S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. 2017). The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After multiple hearings, the post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the Petitioner had not proven that Counsel was deficient or that the Petitioner was prejudiced by Counsel’s representation. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this parental rights termination case, the trial court ruled that DCS proved five grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two children: mental incompetence, persistence of conditions, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the children. The trial court also ruled that termination of Mother’s rights was in the children’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s rulings as to the grounds of mental incompetence and abandonment by failure to support. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling that termination of Mother’s rights is in the children’s best interests.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Trial Court found the mother to be indigent and appointed counsel to represent her. The Trial Court conducted a trial and entered an order finding that two statutory grounds of abandonment existed for termination of the mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. There is no transcript or statement of the evidence included in the record to permit appellate review of the mother’s issues on appeal concerning the termination of her parental rights. As such, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights to the children and remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.    

The Defendant, Cindy B. Hinton, appeals her convictions for vehicular homicide by intoxication and vehicular homicide by reckless driving. The Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient relative to the Defendant’s intoxication and that the court erred by imposing a sentence of eleven years in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Marcus Thomas, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleaded conviction to attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition and denying relief on his claims alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing and that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm in part and reverse in part the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

The Defendant previously entered guilty pleas to various drug related offenses and received an effective sentence of fourteen years’ probation. Four affidavits and arrest warrants alleging violations of his probation subsequently issued, and following a hearing conducted via Zoom video conferencing technology (“Zoom”), the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) it was plain error for the trial court to conduct the revocation hearing via Zoom because it “failed to make a specific finding, utilizing the law as articulated in Maryland v. Craig [497 U.S. 838 (1990)],” in violation of his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution; and (2) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon our review, we affirm.

Roy Evans, Defendant, admitted to violating the conditions of probation and submitted the sentencing determination to the trial court. Following a hearing on the sentence, the trial court revoked probation and suspension of the sentence and ordered Defendant to commence the execution of the judgment as originally entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Harold Holloway, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition, styled in the alternative as both a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the petitioner failed to present colorable claims for relief via either procedural vehicle, the trial court did not err by summarily dismissing the pleading.

Waynard Quartez Winbush, Petitioner, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his 2016 conviction for conspiracy to sell a Schedule I controlled substance within a thousand feet of a school. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

After a Knox County jury convicted Defendant, Michael Lynch, of all six counts of the indictment, the trial court merged each alternative count, convicting Defendant of one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more, one count of theft of property valued at $2500 or more, and one count of attempted theft of property valued at $2500 or more. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of fifteen years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) denying a motion to suppress, (2) refusing to sever offenses; and (3) determining several of Defendant’s prior convictions were admissible. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the issues and record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant appealed to circuit court following a judgment against it in general sessions court. The plaintiff filed no notice of appeal, but amended its complaint to allege an additional claim. The plaintiff later filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking an award of attorney’s fees. Eventually, the defendant dismissed its appeal and asked that the general sessions court judgment be affirmed. The trial court affirmed the previous judgment from the general sessions court, but also granted the plaintiff an additional judgment for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. The defendant appeals the award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. We reverse the trial court’s decision to award the plaintiff attorney’s fees, but affirm the award of discretionary costs.

This appeal arises from the court-ordered sale of real property to satisfy unpaid property tax owned by a living trust. After the property was sold, the trustee, acting pro se, moved to set aside the sale, asserting a violation of the trust’s due-process rights. The trial court dismissed the motion because the trustee was not a licensed attorney and was thus unqualified to represent the trust in a legal proceeding. For the reasons explained below, we have determined that the trial court correctly dismissed the motion because the
pro se trustee is not licensed to practice law in Tennessee. We also dismiss this appeal on the same ground because the trustee signed the notice of appeal on behalf of the trust, and a non-attorney may not represent a trust in our Tennessee courts. See ELM Children’s Educational Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 468 S.W.3d 529, 530 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014); see also Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 and Old Hickory Eng’g & Machine Co, Inc. v. Henry, 937 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tenn. 1996). Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

Petitioner, Alphonzo Chalmers, appeals the denial of his fourth petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenges his 1999 conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, Petitioner claims: that two pages of a “gunshot wound path report” detailing the victim’s injuries constituted newly discovered exculpatory evidence which was suppressed by the State contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); that he is actually innocent of murder because the State relied on the “knowingly false” testimony of eyewitness Alan King and Detective Miguel Aguila; that the gunshot wound path report would have refuted the testimony of Mr. King who allegedly testified that the victim had been shot in the stomach; and that the coram nobis court abused its discretion in denying his petition for the writ. Following review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court in accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.