APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This divorce action involves dissolution of the 25 year marriage between Appellant, Cheryl Ann Cupples ("Wife"), and Appellee, Luther Wayne Cupples ("Husband"). Wife filed for divorce in September 1992, citing irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. Husband counterclaimed for divorce alleging inappropriate marital conduct. Both parties sought custody of their minor son, Jonathan, age 10 at the time of trial.1 On appeal, Wife cites as error the trial court's award of an absolute divorce and custody of the child to Husband, its failure to award her alimony and its division of the marital estate. For reasons hereinafter expressed, we affirm.

This is a divorce action wherein the appellant, Pamela Dawn Varley (Wife), appeals from the final decree which awarded a divorce and sole custody of the parties’ three minor children to Appellee, William Patrick Varley, Jr. (Husband). The children are Bridget Marie, born December 14, 1988, William Patrick Varley, III, born January 23, 1991 and Sadie Ellen Varley, whose date of birth is June 30, 1992. The decree also fails to award Wife alimony.

Plaintiff, People's Bank of Elk Valley ("People's Bank"), appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendant, American Banker's Financial Services, Inc. ("American") and dismissing People's Bank's complaint.

This appeal involved judicial review of an administrative decision regarding the denial of petitioner’s application for benefits for care at a nursing home facility. The chancellor granted the motion to dismiss of the Department of Health, Bureau of Medicaid (?respondents” or by name) on the ground that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction due to the failure of petitioner¹ to cause a summons to be properly issued and served on the Department within the sixty (60) day time limit specified in T.C.A. § 4-5-322(b)(1). The sole issue presented for review by this court is whether the chancellor erred in dismissing petitioner’s suit for judicial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We find no error and affirm.

The defendant, Jared M. Barnes, was convicted upon his guilty plea for vehicular homicide by recklessness, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years, with ten months, day for day, to be served in the county jail and the remainder of the sentence to be served on probation. In addition, the trial court suspended the defendant's driving privileges for five years and ordered that he complete five hundred hours of community service. The defendant appeals his sentence, contending that the trial court erred in denying him judicial diversion or full probation. We affirm the trial court's denial of judicial diversion and full probation, but hold that the order that the defendant serve his ten-month incarceration day for day does not preclude use of applicable conduct credits.

The defendant, Timothy L. Robertson, was indicted on two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell; one count of felony possession of a weapon; and one count of driving on a revoked or suspended license. Following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, he pled guilty to one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to resell, a Class B felony, and one count of felony possession of a weapon, a Class E felony. In accordance with the terms of his plea bargain agreement, the remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant reserved the right to appeal as a dispositive question of law the issue of whether his custodial arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, and Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-7-118(b)(1)(c). We conclude that the officers were required to make a custodial arrest of the defendant to prevent his continued violation of the driver's license law, and that the subsequent search of his vehicle was valid as incident to that arrest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Corey L. Milliken, pled guilty to two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of aggravated robbery. His agreed sentence was two concurrent life sentences for the murders and a consecutive twelve year term for the aggravated robbery, for an effective sentence of life plus twelve years. The Defendant timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. After a hearing the trial court denied relief and the Defendant appealed as of right. Finding no error in the trial court's ruling on the Defendant's petition, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Thomas Page, appeals as of right from the Chester County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and received the agreed, forty-year sentence as a 100% violent offender. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not understand what was happening at the guilty plea hearing. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The defendant, Chauncey E. Gray, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Chester County Circuit Court of forgery, a Class E felony, and theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to a four-year sentence for the forgery to be served in the Department of Correction, imposed a $1,500 fine, and ordered $400 in restitution. It imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent for the theft to be served concurrently and a $1,250 fine. The defendant contends that his effective four-year sentence is excessive and that he should have received a sentencing alternative to confinement. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

This appeal involves the custody of a four-year-old girl. After slightly more than two years of marriage, the mother filed a divorce petition in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County requesting custody of the parties’ only child. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and awarded custody to the mother. The husband asserts on this appeal that he is comparatively more fit than the mother to have custody. We agree and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s award of custody to the mother.

The Defendant appeals a judgment entered by the Blount County Circuit Court awarding the Plaintiffs discretionary costs including attorney fees. This appeal arises from an earlier action (second lawsuit) seeking specific performance of a settlement agreement resolving the original lawsuit filed by the Defendant.

This is a Rule 9 appeal from a judgment denying the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The issue is whether an insurance agent has the apparent authority to waive the conditions for issuance of a policy and the limitations on his authority as contained in the application for the policy. We hold that the agent has no such authority and therefore grant the motions for summary judgment.