APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted of the premeditated first degree murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this appeal the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ned Jackson,¹ was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that insufficient evidence of the Defendant’s identity as the culprit was presented to convict the Defendant of aggravated robbery and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of theft and aggravated assault. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt of aggravated robbery, I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses.
Currently, members of this court are divided concerning the correct interpretation of the two-step process set forth by our supreme court in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 469 (Tenn. 1999), for determining if the evidence adduced at trial justifies jury instructions on lesser-included offenses. See, e.g., State v. Linnell Richmond, No. E2000-01545-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1222247 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, October 15, 2001). I am largely in agreement with the position expressed by Judge Smith in his opinion in Richmond, No. E2000-01545-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1222247, at *21 (concurring in part and dissenting in part)(footnote omitted), that [a] reading of the recent cases of [State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 80 (Tenn. 2001), and State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 724-725 (Tenn. 2001),] leads one to the inescapable conclusion that our high court has mandated that lesser-included offense instructions be given anytime the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for these offenses. This means that anytime the proof is sufficient for a conviction of the indicted offense, the proof will a fortiori be sufficient for a conviction of the lesser-included offenses. . . . As a practical matter, this in turn means that it will almost always be error to fail to instruct the jury as to all lesser-included offenses of the indicted offense. Thus, the only real inquiry, in my opinion, in virtually all of the cases raising the lesser-included offense issue is whether the error in failing to instruct on the lesser offenses can be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

A jury convicted the defendant of aggravated robbery, and the trial judge sentenced him to 12 years incarceration as a Range I standard offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) his custodial statement should have been suppressed; (3) a juror failed to respond to a voir dire question concerning prior involvement in the legal system, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair and impartial jury; (4) the trial court erroneously disallowed admission of a crime scene report; and (5) his sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants James Whitelow and Robert Robertson appeal their convictions for possession of cocaine in an amount over 26 grams with intent to deliver. Both argue the evidence was not sufficient to support their convictions. Whitelow also argues the forensic report was erroneously admitted into evidence, and the jury's verdict was the result of passion and prejudice caused by the prosecutor's statements regarding Whitelow's alias nickname. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff counter-defendant, ShoLodge Franchise Systems, Inc. (hereafter "Sholodge") has appealed from a jury verdict of $327,272 in favor of the defendant counterplaintiff McKibbon Brothers, Inc. (hereafter McKibbon) for damages for breach of a franchise contract.

This is an appeal by defendant, Michael Kingston Stevenson (Husband), from the trial court's award of alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, the amount of child support award, and the award of additional alimony in solido of $9,700.00 for plaintiff, Shelly Sue Douglas Stevenson's (Wife), attorney's fee.

This is an appeal by plaintiffs/appellants, Richard and Kimberly King, from the trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendants/appellees, W. D. Schock, Co. ("Schock"), South Central Bell Telephone Co. a/k/a Bell South Telecommunications, Inc. ("Bell South"), and Charles LaRue.

This appeal involves a dispute between Warren County, Tennessee and the Town of Morrison, a municipality located within Warren County, regarding the disposition of the revenue generated by the county local option sales tax. On March 21, 1988, plaintiff, Town of Morrison (hereinafter Morrison), filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant, Warren County. The
complaint alleges that under T.C.A. § 67-6-712 (Supp. 1995), a justiciable controversy exists between the parties concerning their respective rights to distribution of the county local option sales tax revenue. The complaint avers that the Warren County local option sales tax was adopted in 1969 and increased in 1976 and 1985. Morrison alleges that since 1969 the tax revenues
have been collected by the Tennessee Department of Revenue and distributed to Warren County, but Warren County has refused to pay Morrison its share of the taxes as required by T.C.A. § 67-6-712 (2)(B). The complaint seeks a declaration of the rights of the parties to the sales tax revenues, and an accounting of, and a judgment for, Morrison's share of the local option sales tax.

In this case, we are presented with the issue of whether a private act is invalid as being in conflict with the general law addressing the same subject.Kentucky-Tennessee Clay Company, v. Joe H

This is an appeal by petitioner, Johnny W. Raines, from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for certiorari from a decision of the Tennessee Board of Paroles (Board).

The Shelby County Grand Jury returned two indictments against the defendant, one for aggravated burglary and one for misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court consolidated the indictments prior to trial pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(b). The defendant was found guilty of both charges by a Shelby County jury. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court improperly consolidated the indictments. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on December 11, 2000, in which he attacked convictions entered in September 1990 and upon which final appellate action was taken in 1992. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing, because it was filed outside the
statute of limitations. Concluding that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing, we reverse and remand to the post-conviction court for such a hearing.

I respectfully dissent. Based upon the record before us, I believe that the trial court was justified in dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing. I do not believe that our supreme court intended in Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Tenn. 2001), to provide a hearing for people in the petitioner’s situation. In Williams, the record indicated that Williams’ attorney’s actions may have led Williams to believe that supreme court review was timely sought, thereby potentially misleading him about when the statute of limitations would run.

The defendant, Clifton Shelton, pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 months and 29 days, requiring him to spend four months in a halfway house and the balance of his sentence on probation. The defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to suspend his entire sentence. Because the trial court relied on the defendant's prior grant of judicial diversion in denying full probation, the judgment is modified and the cause is remanded to the trial court.

The defendant, Joe Scott, was convicted of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range II sentence of 19 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Mario A. Johnson, was convicted of facilitation to commit first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 20 years for facilitation of first degree murder and a concurrent sentence of 23 years for especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Darrin Fleming, was convicted of aggravated burglary, assault, and criminal responsibility for facilitation of robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated burglary and assault and that the trial court erred by refusing to give a special instruction on criminal responsibility. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Appellant, Carlos Haywood, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Haywood was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court Jury of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery, and was sentenced to life imprisonment plus ten years. On appeal, Haywood argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

Following transfer to circuit court for trial as an adult, the juvenile defendant, Waldo Wiggins, Jr., was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal, Defendant challenges (1) whether the denial of bail by the juvenile court and subsequent bond of $ 250,000 set by the circuit court violated his right to due process of law, and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. After a review of the record, we affirm.

In 1995, the Defendant pled guilty to four felony drug charges for which he received three concurrent eight-year sentences and one concurrent five-year sentence, to be served on Community Corrections. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the Defendant's Community Corrections sentences and ordered him to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to re-sentence the Defendant and that the twelve year sentence was improperly imposed. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Charles David Vanderford, appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Hardin County revoking the community corrections sentences that he received following his convictions by a jury of two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. The appellant challenges the trial court's reliance upon his commission of crimes during the pendency of his appeal from his convictions of felony drug possession and prior to the commencement of his community corrections sentences. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Glen Alcorn, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, petitioned the Chancery Court of Davidson County for an order that he be furnished with copies of certain documents that he believed would be helpful in the appeal of his conviction. Mr. Alcorn asked the chancery court to compel the State of Tennessee to provide him with the transcript of jury voir dire in his trial, and to compel the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department to provide him with a copy of the investigative file in his case. The court dismissed Mr. Alcorn's petition on the ground of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm the dismissal.