APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. He appealed the aggravated robbery convictions, arguing that the proof was insufficient to sustain the convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for resentencing as to the conviction for attempted aggravated robbery.

The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, later amended by appointed counsel, claiming that his 1999 pleas of guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court were involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner timely appealed, raising the same two issues. We affirm the judgments of the trial court dismissing the petition.

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Pittman, was convicted of aggravated robbery. He was subsequently sentenced to twenty years incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that his prior convictions for robbery and theft were admissible to impeach his credibility should he elect to testify. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the Defendant's prior convictions were admissible. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In his original trial, the Petitioner, Richard Lee Franklin, was convicted of first degree murder by a Cumberland County jury for the death of David Kirkland. Due to procedural errors at Petitioner's first trial, the trial court granted Petitioner's motion for a new trial. Petitioner was retried and the jury convicted him of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-two years of incarceration. State v. Richard Lee Franklin, No. 03C01-9706-CR-00219, 1998 WL 458580, at *1, Cumberland County (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, August 10, 1998), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1999). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was denied. In this appeal as of right, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred in finding his trial counsel's performance to be effective. Specifically, the appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and present witnesses that would support a defense of self-defense; (2) for failing to discuss trial strategies and defenses with the Petitioner; and (3) for failing to request an instruction on self-defense. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William R. Stevens, was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery, arising out of the deaths of his wife and mother-in-law. For each of his murder convictions, he was sentenced to death. He now appeals as of right, raising the following eleven issues for our review: (1) whether it was error to limit the testimony of crime-scene expert Gregg McCrary; (2) whether it was error to exclude evidence which tended to show that Corey Milliken had an independent motive to commit the murders; (3) whether it was error to admit a redacted version of Sandi Stevens' diary; (4) whether the trial court failed to apply the hearsay and other evidentiary rules in an evenhanded manner; (5) whether the hearsay statements of Corey Milliken to Sarah Suttle should have been excluded as not being "in furtherance of the conspiracy"; (6) whether the cumulative effect of all errors at trial violated the Defendant's right to due process of law; (7) whether instructing the jury that it must agree unanimously in order to impose a life sentence and prohibiting it from being told the effect of a non-unanimous verdict violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (8) whether the Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(4) aggravating circumstance fails to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (9) whether the failure to articulate meaningful standards for proportionality review mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206 violates the Defendant's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (10) whether the unlimited discretion vested in the prosecutor as to whether or not to seek the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (11) whether the death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant legal authorities, we find no reversible error on the part of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant's convictions and his sentences of death.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal trespass, attempted aggravated assault, and two counts of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for aggravated criminal trespass, two years for attempted aggravated assault, and one year each for both counts of felony reckless endangerment. The defendant was granted probation after service of 120 days. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of full probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner was sentenced to an effective ten-year sentence on December 13, 1990, and on December 20, 1991, he received an additional two-year sentence for felony escape, to be served consecutively to his original sentences. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was being illegally restrained because, by his calculations, his sentence had expired. The post-conviction court denied the petition, as well as a subsequent petition to rehear, and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the petition.

The defendant appealed the trial court's loss of jurisdiction when he was transferred into the custody of the Department of Correction. The issue is now moot. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

Both Petitioners appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of their post-conviction relief petitions. The Petitioners claim ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal for failing to object to an erroneous jury instruction and failing to raise the erroneous jury instruction in their direct appeal. The post-conviction court found the jury instruction to be erroneous; however, it denied relief. After a thorough review, we conclude that the jury instruction was erroneous and prejudicial to the Petitioners and find that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the erroneous jury instruction at trial and for failing to raise it on direct appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court's denial of relief and remand the Petitioners' cases to the trial court for new trials on the issues of aggravated arson.

Ricky A. Burks was convicted by a Davidson County jury of the first-degree murder of his wife. The trial court granted Burks' motion for judgment of acquittal and entered a judgment for second-degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Burks, as a range II offender, to forty years confinement in the Department of Correction. Burks now appeals both the judgment of conviction and the sentence entered by the Davidson County Criminal Court, challenging the trial court's (1) denial of his motions to suppress; (2) admission of prior bad acts of the defendant; (3) jury instructions regarding prior bad acts; (4) admission of autopsy photographs of the victim; (5) refusal to instruct on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide; (6) finding that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of second-degree murder; and (7) imposition of the maximum sentence of forty years. The State cross-appeals challenging the trial court's ruling in reducing the jury's verdict of first-degree murder to that of second-degree murder. Finding no error, we affirm.

Indicted for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated sexual battery, two counts of aggravated rape, and especially aggravated kidnapping, the defendant entered negotiated pleas of guilt to aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, and especially aggravated kidnapping.  The remaining charges were dismissed. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to 12 years for the robbery, 25 years for each of the rapes, and 25 years for the kidnapping. The rape sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to one another and to the robbery sentence, for an effective sentence of 62 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that one of the aggravated rape convictions and the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction violate due process. He asserts that his sentences are excessive and should not have been ordered to be served consecutively. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner was indicted for three counts of aggravated robbery and convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of seventeen years, and on direct appeal, this Court modified his sentence to an effective sentence of fifteen years. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorneys failed to challenge two of his indictments prior to trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Petitioner now appeals the trial court's denial of relief. We hold that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gregory Hatton, sought post-conviction relief on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective, that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary, and that his sentence is illegal. The trial court concluded that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. Insofar as an illegal sentence is subject to correction at any time, the trial court's dismissal of the petitioner's illegal sentence claim was erroneous. Because, however, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on that claim, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant appeals his conviction for murder in the first degree and the sentence of death imposed by the jury.1 This opinion is delivered in two parts, with a separate opinion addressing Part II.
In Part I of this opinion we address the following issues:

(1) Admission of evidence regarding his escape attempts;
(2) Shackling of his feet and hands;
(3) Prohibition of mitigation evidence at sentencing;
(4) Admission of his statement to police;
(5) Propriety of the prosecutor’s closing argument;
(6) Unconstitutionality of the death penalty; and
(7) Proportionality of sentence of death.

After careful review, we affirm the conviction for murder in the first degree.  In Part II of this opinion, Judge Williams sets forth his minority position on the following issues:

(1) Application of the (i)(2) aggravating factor in the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) Cumulative effect of errors.

The position of the majority on the issues addressed in Part II is set forth in the separate opinion filed by Judge Witt, in which Judge Hayes has joined. The majority concludes that the verdict is enigmatic and uncertain, requiring reversal of the sentence of death and re-sentencing.

This separate opinion addresses issues relative to the sentencing phase of the trial, as well as the defendant’s cumulative error issue. Expressed herein are the views of the majority, consisting of Judge Hayes and Judge Witt. The minority view of Judge Williams is expressed in his lead opinion.