APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights to his two minor children. Thomas Miller (“Petitioner”), guardian ad litem, filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hickman County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Desia E. (“Father”) to Anari E. and Chrifayni O. (“the Children,” collectively). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on six grounds and finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest, all by clear and convincing evidence. Father appeals, arguing Petitioner failed to meet his burden as to any of the grounds and as to best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court.

The Appellant, the Estate of Sedley Alley (“the Estate”), appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of its petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. The 2019 petition sought DNA testing of items from the Defendant’s trial despite the fact that the Defendant, who had received the death penalty, was executed in 2006. The Estate argued that the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act (“the DNA Act”) permitted the Estate to petition for DNA testing because the civil right of survivorship statute applied. The Estate additionally argued that United States and Tennessee Constitutions require that the Estate be allowed to petition for DNA testing under the DNA Act, citing to principles of due process and a “reputational guarantee.” Following our review of the applicable authorities, we hold that the Estate is not a “person” within the purview of the DNA Act and that neither due process nor any reputational guarantee require a remedy under these facts. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first-degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. As a result of his convictions, the defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-six years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the shooter and insufficient to support a finding of premeditation. Upon our thorough review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs, we affirm the jury’s verdict.

The petitioner, Ronald Curry, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a thorough review of the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner failed to state a colorable claim and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Marterious O’Neal, of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range II offender. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for imposition of sentences as a Range I, standard offender.

After being indicted for one count of sexual battery, Mannan Mehdi, Defendant, entered a best interest guilty plea with no agreement as to the sentence. The trial court denied judicial diversion, ordering Defendant to a one-year sentence, suspended to probation. The trial court also ordered Defendant to serve periodic confinement of “6 weekends in jail over the course of the probation.” Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly denied judicial diversion. After a review, we determine that the trial court considered irrelevant factors in denying diversion. As a result, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Frankie Joe Alfred Benton, appeals from the Hawkins County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions upon his guilty pleas to nine drug offenses, for which he received an effective nine-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Vanassa Hurst, was convicted by a Claiborne County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and second degree murder. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2019) (subsequently amended), 39-13-210(a)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended). The trial court imposed a life sentence for first degree murder, ordered a sentence of nineteen years for second degree murder, and merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her pretrial statements and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this second appeal, Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis that the ruling is not the product of the trial court’s independent judgment. Appellee argues that the trial court’s ruling can be affirmed on a different basis, as the trial court erred in denying its motion to alter or amend the judgment to include this additional basis for the judgment in its favor. We agree that the trial court’s order does not comply with Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, 439 S.W.3d 303 (Tenn. 2014), and so we once again vacate the grant of summary judgment. We decline, however, to reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellee’s motion to alter or amend.

In 2011, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Lizandro Guevara, of eight counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to sixty-nine years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed, and our court affirmed the convictions. State v. Lizandro Guevara, No. M2015-01719-CCA-R3- CD, 2016 WL 5266552 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 21, 2016), perm. app. denied. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appealed, and, after review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

Appellant filed a civil warrant in general sessions court seeking a refund of her payment to Appellee, a bondsman, because the bondee was never released from public custody. The general sessions court granted judgment in Appellee’s favor, and Appellant appealed to circuit court. Eventually, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Appellant was not entitled to a refund. In response, Appellant filed a motion to amend her civil warrant to clarify her theories. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and denied Appellant’s motion to amend her civil warrant. Because Appellee’s failure to comply with Rule 56.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure prevents meaningful review of its motion for summary judgment, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We vacate the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to amend.

This case is about the requisite mental capacity to execute a power of attorney. After the death of Pagiel Hall Czoka (“Decedent”), Decedent’s estate initiated a lawsuit against several defendants affiliated with the Life Care Center of Gray (“Defendants”) in January of 2018. The estate’s claims arose from an alleged assault on Decedent while she resided in Defendants’ residential health-care facility in Gray, Tennessee. In response, Defendants sought to compel arbitration of all issues and claims based upon an arbitration agreement entered into by Defendants and Decedent’s power of attorney when Decedent was admitted to Defendants’ facility in 2015. The estate responded by asserting that Decedent lacked sufficient mental capacity to execute the power of attorney on the day it was signed and that the power of attorney and the arbitration agreement were therefore void. As such, the estate argued that Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration should be denied and that the case should proceed to trial. The Circuit Court for Washington County (the “trial court”) granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and the estate sought and was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. Because the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Decedent had the requisite capacity to enter into the power of attorney on the date in question, we affirm.

The Appellant, Jamie Lee Blankenship, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to violating a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO) order and driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, and received an effective sentence of one year, six months to be served at thirty percent release eligibility. The Appellant served some time in confinement and was released on probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the Appellant’s probation and ordered that he serve the remainder of his effective sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant acknowledges that he violated probation but contends that the trial court should have ordered a sentence of split confinement followed by reinstatement of probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an action filed by heirs of a deceased debtor seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale and their claims for damages against multiple defendants involved with the sale. The trial court granted summary judgment to the substitute trustee who conducted the sale, granted motions to dismiss filed by five other defendants, and dismissed the two remaining defendants sua sponte. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Corey Anderson, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of the two-year sentence imposed for his conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Charvaris Donte Newsom, was convicted of felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction and imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of evidence of his other criminal acts; (3) the admission of hearsay evidence from a police report; (4) the prosecutor’s questioning of a detective and the Defendant regarding whether they believed witnesses were truthful; (5) the prosecutor’s questioning the Defendant regarding his invocation of his right to remain silent and his failure to produce evidence and witnesses at trial; and (6) the prosecutor’s comments during opening statements and closing arguments. The Defendant also seeks relief based upon cumulative error. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Garrick Graham, Petitioner, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

Defendant, Derrian Hill, was indicted with Co-Defendant, Miranda Barley, for aggravated kidnapping in count one and aggravated robbery in count two. Defendant then filed a Motion to Suppress the victim’s pretrial identification of Defendant, and the trial court denied the motion. Following a trial, the jury convicted Defendant as charged on both counts, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of eight years’ incarceration with a one hundred percent release eligibility for count one and twelve years’ incarceration with an eighty-five percent release eligibility for count two. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress the victim’s pretrial identification of Defendant. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Melvin Jackson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his McNairy County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated robbery and unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a consolidated appeal from judgments entered upon two post-divorce petitions filed by the mother, seeking to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan to require the father to pay an upward deviation in child support to fund private school tuition at Baylor School in Chattanooga (“Baylor”), first for the parties’ eldest of three children in one petition and then for the parties’ middle child in the second petition. The father filed an answer objecting to the expense of Baylor tuition given the parties’ respective financial situations. He also filed a counter-petition alleging that the mother had violated the joint decision-making provision in the permanent parenting plan by unilaterally enrolling the eldest child at Baylor. Although both parties sought essentially equal coparenting time, the father also requested modification of the permanent parenting plan to designate him as the primary residential parent. Each party requested sole educational decision-making authority. Following a bench trial as to the first petition, the trial court, inter alia, approved the parties’ stipulation that a material change in circumstance had occurred since entry of the prior order; maintained the mother as the primary residential parent; maintained joint decision-making authority; found that although the mother had unilaterally enrolled the eldest child at Baylor, it was in the child’s best interest to remain at the school; and found that an upward deviation in the father’s child support obligation was appropriate to fund sixty percent of the Baylor tuition for the eldest child. During a subsequent bench trial on the mother’s second petition, the Baylor financial aid director, who had testified during the first trial concerning typical financial aid awards, testified that neither of the children at issue had been awarded financial aid for the upcoming year. The trial court sua sponte amended its prior order to reduce the upward deviation in the father’s child support obligation to fifty percent of the Baylor tuition for the eldest child and to eliminate the father’s responsibility for any extracurricular expenses at Baylor. The trial court entered a separate judgment dismissing the mother’s petition as to the middle child but including a provision that the mother would be allowed to enroll the middle child at Baylor or another private school provided that the father was not 1 Upon the appellant’s motions, this Court entered an order on August 18, 2020, consolidating the appellant’s appeal in case number E2020-00712-COA-R3-CV with this appeal. 04/30/2021 - 2 - responsible for any portion of the tuition. The trial court incorporated its rulings into a modified permanent parenting plan that included a prohibition against enrollment of the third child in private school absent agreement of the parties or a subsequent court order. The father has appealed both judgments. Having determined that the upward deviation in child support for the eldest child should be capped at no more than fifty percent of the 2020-2021 Baylor tuition amount testified to at the time of trial, we modify the deviation to equal the lesser of (a) $13,200.00 annually or (b) fifty percent of the current annual Baylor tuition each year for the eldest child after deduction of proceeds from scholarships, grants, stipends, or other cost-reducing programs received by or on behalf of the child. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects and deny the father’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.

This case involves a post-divorce action, in which the father filed a petition for contempt against the mother, alleging that the mother failed to pay her portion of the child’s medical expenses pursuant to the permanent parenting plan. The Trial Court denied the father’s request that the mother be held in contempt but awarded the father a judgment for the mother’s portion of the child’s medical expenses. The Trial Court declined to award attorney’s fees to the father and ordered that the mother be permitted to make installment payments to the father. We vacate the Trial Court’s order permitting the installment payments as being premature. We further modify the judgment against Mother to $38,759.11 upon our determination that the amount paid by the father to Mountain Management and Denials Management was only $1,781.76. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all other aspects.

The Defendant, Desiree Petty, pleaded guilty to burning personal property or land, facilitation to commit felony arson, and multiple misdemeanor offenses. The trial court sentenced her to four years of incarceration, suspended in lieu of service of twelve years of probation, and $150 monthly restitution payments. In 2010, the trial court found that she had violated her probation and extended her probation for two years. In October 2019, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant based on allegations that she had failed to appear, failed a drug screen, and missed monthly restitution payments. At a hearing, the Defendant conceded that she failed the drug test. The trial court then, sua sponte, revisited the Defendant’s restitution and ordered her to pay an increased amount of monthly restitution. It also revoked her probation, required her to serve ninety days in jail, and returned her to probation, adding an additional year. The Defendant appeals. After review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Charles D. Johnson, filed for habeas corpus relief from his convictions of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and the accompanying total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. The Petitioner alleges that the judgments are void because he was never indicted for the offenses of which he was convicted and that the trial court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to try him or enter any judgment in his case. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Appellant, Tharcisse John Nkurunziza, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to vehicular assault, a Class D felony, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to four years to be served as ten months in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant claims that his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied enhancement factors and that the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation. The State acknowledges that the trial court misapplied two of the three enhancement factors but contends that the record justifies the sentence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Melvin Hopkins, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.