APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, James Eggleston, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court declined to grant injunctive relief to the plaintiff, NuLife Ventures, LLC (“NuLife”), regarding its claims that the defendant, AVACEN, Inc., f/k/a AVACEN Medical, Inc. (“AVACEN”), had been competing with NuLife and soliciting NuLife’s affiliated sellers to do the same in violation of the parties’ written agreements. NuLife has appealed. Determining that NuLife demonstrated sufficient evidence of a threat of irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Christopher Aaron Hodges, of sexual battery by an authority figure, and the trial court sentenced the Appellant to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s proof pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, the trial court’s ruling as a thirteenth juror pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d), the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance, the trial court’s failure to allow defense counsel to make closing argument before instructing the jury, and the trial court’s failure to grant a motion for new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff commenced this action against Saint Thomas Health alleging negligence per se and invasion of privacy through the unauthorized access and disclosure of her confidential medical records relating to the birth of her child at Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital (“Midtown Hospital”) in violation of Tennessee’s Patient’s Privacy Protection Act. Saint Thomas Health responded by filing a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 for failure to plead facts stating a claim with particularity. Specifically, it argued the claims should be dismissed because the complaint failed to address how Saint Thomas Health could be held liable for unauthorized access and use of the plaintiff’s medical information from a separate and distinct entity, Midtown Hospital, when the complaint did not allege that an employee or agent of Saint Thomas Medical engaged in such conduct. Alternatively, relying on Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), Saint Thomas Health claimed the action was barred by the statute of limitations under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds and dismissed all claims. This appeal followed. In her appellate brief, Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court’s application of the statute of limitations but ignores the trial court’s dismissal of her claims under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 provides that the appellant’s brief shall contain “[a] statement of facts, setting forth the facts relevant to the issues presented for review with appropriate references to the record” as well as “an argument” setting forth the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented. Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(6) and (7). Additionally, Rule 6(a)(4) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals requires the appellant provide a written argument in regard to each issue on appeal that includes “[a] statement of each determinative fact relied upon with citation to the record where evidence of such fact may be found.” A party’s failure to comply with these rules “waives the issues for review.” Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with these rules by, inter alia, failing to set forth an argument or facts relevant to the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01, which was an independent basis for dismissal. As a consequence, the issue is waived. Accordingly, we affirm.

Adoptive parents filed a petition to terminate their child’s visitation with her biological grandmother on the grounds that the grandmother violated the terms of the agreed order setting visitation. The trial court terminated the grandmother’s visitation based upon its determination that continued visitation presented a risk of substantial harm to the child. Because the trial court failed to analyze the case under the legal standards applicable to a modification of visitation, we vacate the order of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order with the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law.

This appeal arises from an action regarding life insurance proceeds. As part of a permanent parenting plan, both parents were to insure their respective lives for $300,000 until the child support obligation was completed, with the children named as the sole beneficiaries to the policies and the other parent named as trustee for the benefit of the children. The Trial Court granted summary judgment finding that the children had a vested interest in the life insurance policy but that they were only entitled to the portion of the proceeds equivalent to the remaining child support obligation. With the defendant’s concession on appeal that the children had a vested interest in the life insurance proceeds, that a constructive trust was appropriate, and that the most recent permanent parenting plan was controlling, the only issues before this Court involved the amount of life insurance proceeds to which the children were entitled and attorney’s fees. We modify the amount of the Trial Court’s judgment and hold that the children are entitled to the entire $300,000 life insurance proceeds per the agreed permanent parenting plan. We affirm the Trial Court’s denial of attorney’s fees. Additionally, we deny the mother’s request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Mario Myers, of aggravated sexual battery for which he received a twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his right to self-representation and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Larry Brown, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “ensure the enforcement of a plea agreement promising concurrent service of Petitioner’s state and federal sentences.” Upon review, we conclude that the petition was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations applicable to post-conviction proceedings. However, because we are unable to determine from the record whether due process requires the tolling of the statute of limitations, we vacate the post-conviction court’s order and remand the case to the
post-conviction court for a determination of whether due process tolling applies.

Father appeals the trial court’s order establishing a permanent parenting plan on solely procedural grounds. We affirm the decision of the trial court and award Mother attorney’s fees incurred in this frivolous appeal.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of her health care liability complaint on the basis of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Because Appellant did not substantially comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), she was not entitled to an extension on the statute of limitations. The trial court’s decision that her complaint should be dismissed is affirmed.

The defendant, Nicholas Grassia, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, to withdraw his guilty pleas to charges of aggravated kidnapping and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, arguing that the pleas were the product of the ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the defendant failed to establish manifest injustice requiring that he be allowed to withdraw his pleas, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a trial, a Madison County jury found Defendant, Deandre Montavis Outlaw, guilty of theft of property valued under $1,000. The trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for theft of property valued under $1,000. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Tandy Tomlin, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury of eight counts of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of solicitation to commit rape of a child, and one count of solicitation to commit aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged two of the rape of a child convictions and sentenced the Appellant to consecutive sentences of thirty years for each rape of a child conviction, ten years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, ten years for the solicitation of rape of a child conviction, and five years for the solicitation of aggravated sexual battery conviction, for a total effective sentence of 245 years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the trial court erred in sentencing, and that his right to a fair trial was violated when he was escorted into the courtroom through a security door by a uniformed officer in view of the jury pool. Upon review, we conclude that the State adduced insufficient evidence to sustain the Appellant’s conviction of rape of a child in count 7 and reduce the conviction to aggravated sexual battery with an accompanying sentence of ten years to be served consecutively to the remaining sentences. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects.

The petitioner, Antonio Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2016 Knox County Criminal Court Jury convictions of the sale of heroin in a school zone, the possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin in a school zone, possession of marijuana, and the possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. He argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, Andre Bowen, and his co-defendant, Anthony Olivo, for two counts of first-degree, felony murder (Counts 1 and 2) and attempted especially aggravated robbery (Count 3). The grand jury also indicted the defendant for two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm  by a convicted felon (Counts 4 and 5). After a joint trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on Count 1 but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first-degree, felony murder in Count 2, attempted especially aggravated robbery in Count 3, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Counts 4 and 5, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of seventy-two years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in sentencing. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kevin Caprice Smith, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of premeditated first-degree murder; attempted first-degree murder, a Class A felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of heroin with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of a firearm by a felon with a prior felony drug conviction, a Class D felony; and possession of oxycodone, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment plus ten years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce case, Wife takes issue with how the trial court distributed the possessory interest in the marital home and Husband’s Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System (“TCRS”) benefits. Because the trial court did not assign values to all of the relevant property subject to division, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for additional findings.

Following an automobile accident involving Appellant and Appellee, Appellant filed a civil warrant against Appellee’s automobile insurance carrier in the general sessions court. Later, after the statute of limitations had run, Appellant filed an amended civil warrant adding Appellee as a defendant. Together, Appellee and the insurance carrier filed a joint motion to dismiss, alleging that: (1) the statute of limitations barred Appellant’s claims against Appellee; and (2) the automobile insurance carrier was not a proper party to the lawsuit. The general sessions court granted the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Appellant appealed the dismissal but did not file a new complaint in the trial court. Appellee and his insurance carrier moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant-Appellant, Crystal Renae McCroskey, was indicted by a Knox County grand jury for one count of especially aggravated assault, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of domestic assault in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-305, 39-13-304, 39-13-102, and 39-13-111. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault as a Range II, Multiple Offender for an agreed sentence of eight years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. As part of the agreement, the State dismissed the five remaining counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant’s sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Andrew Weidekamp, appeals the summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that due process considerations should toll the statute of limitations. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition as time-barred.

Petitioner, William Henry Smith Jr., was convicted of conspiracy to sell and deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine and received a fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment. The Petitioner filed a Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, which was summarily dismissed by the trial court. Petitioner raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether Petitioner’s allegation that he was erroneously classified as a career offender fails to state a colorable claim that his sentence is illegal; and (2) whether Petitioner’s right to due process of law was violated by the imposition of a sentence longer than what is required for a persistent offender. Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal by the trial court.

The Defendant, Johnvya T. Smith, appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting him partial relief based on his 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw the guilty plea that resulted in the illegal sentence rather than merely amending the sentence. The State disagrees, arguing that the trial court appropriately denied the Defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea because the illegal aspect of his sentence was not a material component of the Defendant’s plea agreement. We agree with the State. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joshua Hurt, was convicted by a Knox County jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter (Count 1), in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 13-211, as a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree murder, employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony (Count 2), possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony (Count 3), in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery (Counts 4 and 5), in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-403. The trial court merged Counts 4 and 5 and sentenced the Defendant to seventeen years’ imprisonment for these counts, merged Count 3 into Count 1 and sentenced the Defendant to four years’ imprisonment for these counts to run concurrently to Count 4, and six years’ imprisonment for Count 2 to run consecutively to Count 1, for a total effective sentence of seventeen years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated robbery, and (2) whether the trial court erred in (a) not giving the appropriate definition of serious bodily injury and (b) instructing the jury on flight. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, McKinnley McGee, was indicted by an Anderson County grand jury of attempted second degree murder in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 13-210 and 39-12-101, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102, a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, Multiple Offender to an effective sentence of twenty-years’ imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for attempted second degree murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, David Sanders, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction of rape, for which he received a ten-year sentence of imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-503. In his appeal, the Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered based on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.