APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In a procedurally complex case, the Petitioner, Grandon P. Day, pleaded guilty in Davidson County Criminal Court in July 2004 to two sets of offenses that occurred on April 3, 2003, and July 9, 2003. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to a total effective sentence of sixteen years of incarceration for these offenses. In December 2005, a Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the Petitioner of twenty additional offenses, all of which occurred in July 2003. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to a total effective sentence of 84 years of incarceration, to be served consecutively to his other offenses. Fourteen years later, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that the trial court erred when it ordered that his sentences run concurrently when consecutive sentences were statutorily required. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirm its judgment.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Victor Valle, of rape of a child, and he received a sentence of twenty-two years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s ruling admitting the victim’s testimony that the Defendant had abused her outside of the time period specified in the indictment. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of prior bad acts, and we affirm the judgment.

The appellee, Watauga Falls Development (“Watauga”), filed a motion to dismiss this appeal alleging that the dismissal of a prior appeal of this case bars the instant appeal. Because the previous appeal was taken from the same judgment as the instant appeal and the dismissal of the previous appeal was with prejudice, this appeal must be dismissed.

Nesreen Boutros (“Employee”) suffered a work-related injury to her right arm and neck while working for her employer, Amazon.com DEDC, LLC (“Employer”), on April 23, 2015. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (the “trial court”) held Employee suffered a compensable injury and was entitled to lifetime medical benefits and temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits, but suffered no permanent impairment. Employer appealed the award of TTD benefits and additional medical benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (the “Appeals Board”) affirmed. Employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. After careful consideration, we affirm the decision of the Appeals Board and adopt its well-reasoned opinion in its entirety as set forth in the attached Appendix.  

A public school teacher, who allegedly tested positive for alcohol on school premises during school hours, was threatened with revocation of her teaching license by the state board of education. The teacher petitioned the board for declaratory judgment, arguing that the board lacked the authority to promulgate the rule on which the threatened action was based. After a hearing, the administrative law judge concluded that the board did have the power to revoke a teacher’s license for misconduct, and the board subsequently adopted the administrative law judge’s order. The teacher then appealed to the chancery court, as permitted under the UAPA, and the chancery court affirmed the board’s findings. The teacher now appeals the chancery court’s order. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jamauri Ransom, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder, and he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his felony murder conviction, asserting that this court should apply to the present case our supreme court’s rejection of the “continuous offense theory” for robbery as discussed in State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634 (Tenn. 2000); that the aggravated robbery and felony murder were separated by intervening circumstances; and that the State failed to negate his theory of self-defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Erick Eugene Jones, Jr., was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court jury of two counts each of facilitation of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, facilitation of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, Class B felonies; aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony; one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and one count of facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403 (2018) (facilitation of a felony); 39-13-102 (2014) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault); 39-13-202 (2018) (felony murder); 39-15- 402 (2014) (subsequently amended) (aggravated child abuse and child neglect). He received an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence does not support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by allowing autopsy photographs of the victims into evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions related to the victim T.T.1 for facilitation of felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, facilitation of aggravated assault, and aggravated child neglect. We reverse the Defendant’s convictions related to K.E. for facilitation of felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, facilitation of felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, aggravated assault, and aggravated child neglect. We reverse the Defendant’s conviction related to the victim T.T. for facilitation of felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of severe abuse and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody and on the determination that termination is in the best interests of her children. Upon our review, we discern no error and affirm the termination.

This is an appeal from a contested divorce involving one minor child. The father appeals the trial court’s decision to name the mother as the primary residential parent and its decision to grant the father less than equal parenting time. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s decisions and remand.

This case concerns the termination of a condominium building. At the center of the dispute on appeal is a disagreement over whether the ordered distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the condominium real estate was proper. The Appellant, who was a unit owner in the condominium, takes specific issue with the trial court’s use of a certain appraisal as the basis for a distribution of sale proceeds. The trial court ruled against the Appellant on this issue, holding that the subject appraisal became final because it had not been timely disapproved by unit owners representing at least 25% of the votes in the unit owners’ association as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-27-318 of the Tennessee Condominium Act of 2008. In holding that the proposed allocation from the appraisal should be used, the trial court also ordered that the Appellant pay certain attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. A request for prejudgment interest against the Appellant, however, was ultimately denied. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.   

This case involves a petition to modify a father’s parenting time. The mother filed the petition against the father, alleging that the father sexually abused their minor child during an unsupervised visitation. After a two-day hearing, the trial court denied the mother’s petition, finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the father sexually abused the minor child. The mother appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand.

This case involves a breach of contract claim brought against the Tennessee Department of Human Services pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(L). The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the parties never entered into a written agreement. The Tennessee Claims Commission granted the motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the Commission’s decision and remand.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Quantavious Williams, of first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, carjacking, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping. In this appeal, the defendant challenges those convictions on grounds that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony regarding the defendant’s mental state at the time of the alleged offenses and that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This consolidated appeal arises from a dispute among various children and grandchildren of B. Ray Thompson, Jr. (“B. Ray Jr.”) and Juanne Jennings Thompson (“Juanne” or together, “Decedents”),1 over the estates of both B. Ray Jr. and Juanne. When three of the Decedents’ children obtained a court order sealing the records for both estates, a different faction of the family filed petitions to intervene in the estate actions and to unseal the records. The Chancery Court for Knox County (the “trial court”) denied the petitions for intervention and left several documents under seal. This appeal followed. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

This consolidated appeal arises from a dispute among various children and grandchildren of B. Ray Thompson, Jr. (“B. Ray Jr.”) and Juanne Jennings Thompson (“Juanne” or together, “Decedents”),1 over the estates of both B. Ray Jr. and Juanne. When three of the Decedents’ children obtained a court order sealing the records for both estates, a different faction of the family filed petitions to intervene in the estate actions and to unseal the records. The Chancery Court for Knox County (the “trial court”) denied the petitions for intervention and left several documents under seal. This appeal followed. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

This case involves an intra-family dispute over a parcel of real property. Because of the profound deficiencies with Appellant’s brief, we decline to reach the merits of this appeal and instead find that Appellant has waived his argument. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and award Appellee damages, including attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

The petitioner, Larry Michael Berkley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his multiple convictions of rape, aggravated statutory rape, sexual battery by an authority figure, and statutory rape by an authority figure, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner claims an interest in the estate of the second wife of her uncle, who was originally married to the petitioner’s aunt. Because the property at issue was held by the petitioner’s aunt and uncle as a tenancy by the entireties, the uncle owned the property in fee simple upon the aunt’s death. We conclude that the petitioner’s claim is without merit, and we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Larry Thomas Cochran, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, resisting arrest, and criminal impersonation, for which he is serving an eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that his petition for relief was untimely and by denying relief on his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. Although we conclude that the post-conviction court erred by determining that the petition for relief was untimely, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a challenge to the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in finding that his complaint was deficient per the signature requirements in Rule 11.01(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and conclude it is in compliance with the requirements of Rule 11.01.

This appeal concerns the interplay between the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“HCLA”) and the common law on vicarious liability with respect to pre-suit notice in a health care liability claim against the principal only.  We have determined that the provisions of the HCLA take precedence over the common law and that the plaintiff’s claims in this case were timely filed.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

On behalf of the estate of his mother, one son, as substitute personal representative, filed suit against his brother, the previous personal representative, seeking return of funds alleged to be missing from the decedent’s accounts. Upon summary judgment, the trial court found in favor of the defendant, the initial administrator of the estate. We reverse and remand for trial.

A patient filed a health care liability claim against a hospital, asserting the hospital was vicariously liable for injuries she suffered as a result of the anesthesia providers’ conduct.  The hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing that the anesthesia providers were not employed by the hospital and the hospital was, therefore, not liable for the anesthetists’ actions as a matter of law because the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff’s direct claims against the anesthesia providers by the time the plaintiff filed her complaint against the hospital.  The trial court granted the hospital’s motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, relying on the common law set forth in Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals, 325 S.W.3d 98 (Tenn. 2010).  Acknowledging the conflict between provisions of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act and the common law, we hold that the statute prevails.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from a boundary dispute in a residential neighborhood in Nashville. After a bench trial, the court determined the boundary between the plaintiff’s and the defendants’ properties was depicted on a survey prepared by the plaintiff’s surveyor. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining the location of the boundary. Having concluded that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s decision, we affirm. Additionally, we have determined that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary expenses and attorney’s fees incurred as the result of a frivolous appeal in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. Therefore, we remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.

The Petitioner, Juan LaSean Perry, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He asserts on appeal, as he did in his petition, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment for second degree murder. He also asserts for the first time that the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors during sentencing. Following careful review, we affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition.