APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the termination of both parents’ rights to one of their minor children. Following a trial, the Bradley County Juvenile Court found that petitioners proved two statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence: abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Both parents appealed, arguing the abandonment was not willful. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm.

Husband appeals the trial court’s decisions regarding the classification and division of property relative to divorce. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.

Appellant appeals the circuit court’s decision to allow a law firm to intervene in an estate matter. Because we conclude that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this estate matter, we vacate the decision of the circuit court and remand with instructions to transfer this matter back to probate court.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by M.E. Buck Dougherty, III (“Petitioner” or “Father”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case involving modification of a parenting plan. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and finding that the Chancery Court for Fayette County (“the Trial Court”) properly recused but erred in entering further orders, we vacate, in part, the November 5, 2020 order and affirm the order as so modified.

A Giles County jury convicted the Petitioner, Cody D. Marks, of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public park, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to fifteen years of incarceration, twelve years of which was to be served at 100%. This court affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Cody D. Marks, No. M2018-00020-CCA-R-CD, 2018 WL 6992553, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 13, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 28, 2019). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Similarly, Appellant Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); (2) abandonment by failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1); and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Appellants also appeal the trial court’s finding that termination of their parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the record does not support grounds for termination of Appellants’ parental rights, we reverse the trial court’s order concerning same. Accordingly, the issue of whether termination is in the Child’s best interest is pretermitted.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a mother and father to their child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support two grounds for termination: persistence of conditions and severe abuse. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child. We affirm.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, David Oeser, as charged of first degree premediated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and tampering with evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), (a)(2), 39-13-403, 39-14-403, 39-16-503. The trial court imposed life sentences for the Defendant’s first degree murder convictions before merging them. It then sentenced the Defendant to twenty years at one hundred percent for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, five years at thirty percent for the aggravated burglary conviction, and five years at thirty percent for the tampering with evidence conviction, with these sentences served concurrently with one another but consecutively to the life sentence, for an effective sentence of life plus twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for first degree premediated murder; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the sentences for the especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and tampering with evidence convictions served consecutively to his life sentence. After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable law, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 3 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed

An employee sustained severe injuries when she was run over by a public transit bus on her way to work. The employer denied the employee’s workers’ compensation claim, and she filed a complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission. Both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the employee was within the course and scope of her employment when the injury occurred. The Claims Commission answered the question in the negative and determined that the case was subject to the “coming and going” rule. Therefore, the Claims Commission granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. Upon our review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.

We granted this appeal to settle a split of authority in the Court of Appeals concerning the proper interpretation of a statute that requires a person seeking termination of parental rights to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a “parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) (Supp. 2016); id. (2017 & Supp. 2020). In some decisions, the Court of Appeals has interpreted this language as requiring clear and convincing proof that a parent was both unable and unwilling to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of a child. See, e.g., In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044, *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018). In other decisions, the Court of Appeals has construed this statute as requiring clear and convincing proof that a parent was either unable or unwilling to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of a child. See, e.g., In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018). We hold that the statute is ambiguous and that the latter interpretation—the In re Amynn K. interpretation—best effectuates legislative intent. Therefore, we overrule In re Ayden S. and all other Court of Appeals’ decisions inconsistent with our holding herein. Additionally, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals herein, which applied the In re Ayden S. interpretation, and reinstate the judgment of the trial court terminating mother’s parental rights based solely on Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment remains intact and is reinstated.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration filed by the Defendant. In its order denying the motion to compel, the trial court failed to make any factual findings. Further, there is no indication that any proof was considered by the trial court. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Jamey Crowell, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2017 Chester County convictions for aggravated kidnapping, facilitation of aggravated assault, and three drug-related convictions, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The primary issue in this case involves the State’s delayed disclosure of obviously exculpatory evidence. On June 18, 2015, Lawrence Eugene Allen, Defendant, was arrested for aggravated rape and domestic assault of his wife, Kimberly Allen. The charges were based primarily on Ms. Allen’s statement to Detective Dustin Fait that Defendant struck her and penetrated her with his hand. On June 22, 2015, the day before the original setting of the preliminary hearing, Ms. Allen sent two emails to Detective Fait. In the first email, Ms. Allen stated that Defendant did not rape her. She claimed that she had a consensual sexual encounter with an unknown man in his vehicle outside a bar in Nashville during the early morning hours of June 18, 2015. After numerous continuances, a preliminary hearing was finally held on March 18, 2016. The State did not disclose the emails to Defendant before the preliminary hearing. Both Ms. Allen and Detective Fait testified at the preliminary hearing and were cross-examined by defense counsel. Neither witness mentioned Ms. Allen’s emails or her recantation of the rape allegation. A few days after the preliminary hearing, Ms. Allen was murdered. The murder was unrelated to this case or to Defendant. The emails were finally disclosed to Defendant when the State provided discovery on December 21, 2017. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to exclude Ms. Allen’s preliminary hearing testimony based on Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804 and the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. Following a hearing, the trial court declared Ms. Allen unavailable and denied Defendant’s motion, finding that Defendant had both an opportunity and a similar motive to develop Ms. Allen’s testimony at the preliminary hearing through cross-examination. At trial, the State played the audio recording of Ms. Allen’s preliminary hearing testimony for the jury and introduced the emailsas substantive evidence. The jury convicted Defendant of one count of aggravated rape and one count of domestic assault, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years to be served at one hundred percent. We hold that the State’s failure to disclose the obviously exculpatory first email before Ms. Allen testified at the preliminary hearing, coupled with her death before trial, deprived Defendant of the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Allen about the veracity of the emails, violated Brady 12/10/2020 -2 v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to due process of law. We reverse Defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

In a direct appeal from the Environmental Court for Davidson County, Tennessee (“general sessions court”), the Davidson County Circuit Court (“trial court”) granted the plaintiff agency’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court’s determination that the defendant, Farokh Fani, had untimely filed his motion for Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 relief in the general sessions court, rendering his appeal to the trial court untimely. Mr. Fani has appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred by determining that Mr. Fani’s Rule 60 motion and his appeal were untimely. Having further determined that a factual dispute exists concerning whether the plaintiff agency properly served process on Mr. Fani, we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the development of a record concerning service of process.

In this case arising from a divorce, the father of the parties’ minor child petitioned to modify the existing parenting plan which he and the mother had agreed to in mediation approximately eight months earlier. Finding that the petition’s allegations were unsubstantiated and that the father had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there had been a material change of circumstances that affected the child’s best interest, the trial court dismissed the father’s petition. The trial court awarded the mother attorney fees. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Petitioner, Jack Louis Janes, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea or, in the alternative, petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael E. Stewart, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Polk County Criminal Court, claiming that newly discovered evidence revealed the investigating officer in his case participated in the bystander jury selection process used at his trial and that the statute of limitations should be tolled. After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that our supreme court’s rules prevented him from receiving a fair coram nobis hearing by depriving him of an investigator; that the coram nobis court erred by inquiring into the Petitioner’s relationship with his “main” witness at the hearing; and that the coram nobis court should have granted his petition. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Donald Hollon Runions, was convicted of two counts of violation of the Child Protection Act, Class A felonies; four counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies; and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies, and he was sentenced to an effective term of fifty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the Child Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-518,is unconstitutional; and (3) case law applied in his case to allow certain credibility evidence should be overturned. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s award of attorney fees. The ex-husband appeals. Upon a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Nicholas Brooks, of first degree felony murder in perpetration of a robbery, first degree felony murder in perpetration of a burglary, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted the Defendant’s mother’s statement into evidence; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and (3) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Arlene T. Pugh aka Arlene McFadden, of disorderly conduct, assault, and resisting arrest, and the trial court imposed an elevenmonth, twenty-nine day probation sentence, with a seven-day jail sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions because of conflicting testimony of the witnesses. Because credibility determinations regarding witness testimony are within the province of the jury, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Dedrick Wiggins, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for two counts of second degree murder and three counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition as filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert A. Doll, III, of two counts of suborning aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation, and the trial court sentenced him to two years of probation. The Defendant filed a motion for new trial, alleging that the indictment against him was untimely. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the indictment as time-barred. After review, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Following a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Knox County (“trial court”) granted the divorce of Louise Helen Pack Dover (“Wife”) from Norris L. Dover (“Husband”) on the basis of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court classified several real properties, largely purchased by Husband before the marriage, as Husband’s separate assets and concluded that no transmutation occurred during the marriage. The trial court also classified Husband’s 401(k), which was established before the marriage, as a marital asset and ordered the parties to divide it equally. The trial court then awarded Wife alimony in solido in the amount of $5,000.00 per month for thirty-six months. We conclude that the trial court erred in the classification of the real properties at issue as well as its classification of Husband’s 401(k). Because the division of marital property will change substantially as a result of this opinion, we vacate the trial court’s division of the parties’ marital estate and the alimony award. We therefore reverse in part, affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

A Hardin County firefighter and Appellant’s husband died after their vehicles collided. Appellant alleged that the firefighter had negligently caused the accident, and thus filed tort claims against Hardin County under a theory of vicarious liability and Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. She filed her claims more than one year after the accident, so the trial court dismissed them as barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations. She appeals, and we affirm.