APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother challenges the trial court’s granting of father’s petition to modify the residential parenting schedule to give him equal residential parenting time. She argues that the father failed to establish a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s well-being in a meaningful way. We have determined that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings that there was a material change of circumstances under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) and that modification of the parenting schedule was in the best interest of the child.    

The Defendant-Appellant, Yolanda Tucker, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault,1 a Class C felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102, in Shelby County Criminal Court. Following the Defendant’s testimony at her guilty plea hearing, the trial court denied her request for judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of three years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court committed plain error in denying her statutory right to allocution and requiring her to testify under oath in order to request judicial diversion, and that (2) the trial court erred in failing to adequately explain its reasoning for denying the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from a breach of contract dispute involving the construction of two storage buildings. Among other issues is whether Appellee’s actions were “unfair or deceptive” pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court ultimately found that there was a breach of contract, but that Appellee’s actions were not deceptive and dismissed the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Appellant now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns a noncompetition agreement. The Total Garage Store, LLC (“TGS”) sued former employee Nicholas C. Moody (“Moody”) in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). TGS alleged that Moody violated his noncompetition agreement (“the Agreement”). At the end of a hearing on TGS’s motion for a temporary injunction held 35 days after suit was filed, the Trial Court invoked Tenn. R. Civ. P. 65.04(7) to declare that the hearing was on the merits of the case, not just the injunction. The Trial Court found the Agreement enforceable and entered an injunction order. Later, TGS filed a motion for contempt against Moody alleging that he violated the order. After a hearing, the Trial Court found Moody guilty of six counts of criminal contempt. The Trial Court also awarded damages to TGS. Moody appeals. Because the record does not reflect that Moody received adequate notice that the injunction hearing also would be on the merits, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment as it pertains to Moody’s alleged violation of the Agreement. However, this does not and did not entitle Moody to ignore the temporary injunction, and we affirm the Trial Court in its finding Moody guilty of criminal contempt. We therefore affirm, in part, and vacate, in part, the Trial Court’s judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

While I concur with the end result reached by the majority in this case, I write separately to note my disagreement with the the majority’s suggestion that the split of authority surrounding In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018) and In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018), has been fully resolved in favor of In re Amynn K. See, e.g., In re Allyson P., No. E2019-01606-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 3317318, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2020) (following In re Ayden S. and reversing the trial court’s decision to terminate a mother’s parental rights based upon this ground when the proof showed that mother was unable to assume custody of her child but was not unwilling). As I perceive it, this split remains clear and irreconcilable.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that multiple grounds for termination were proven and that termination is in the best interest of the children. We reverse one ground for termination but otherwise affirm and remand for further proceedings.

In this negligence action arising from the plaintiff’s injuries sustained while attempting to traverse the aisle of a moving school bus, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment following a determination that (1) the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the defendants had breached any duty of care to the plaintiff and (2) alternatively, any reasonable fact-finder could only conclude that the plaintiff was at least fifty percent (50%) at fault for her injuries. In so finding, the trial court declined to consider the plaintiff’s captioned “Declaration” in part because it failed to meet the affidavit requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.06. In filing her “Declaration” in support of her opposition to summary judgment, the plaintiff sought to amend her prior deposition testimony concerning the location of her fall. The trial court additionally denied the plaintiff’s “Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted” after the plaintiff averred that the defendants had failed to respond to the plaintiff’s initial requests for admission for over five-hundred days. The plaintiff has appealed. Having determined that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the defendants’ breach of duty of care and comparative fault, we reverse the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff’s “Declaration” should not be considered. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s “Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted.”

Appellant was injured in an accident involving a vehicle owned by Lexus of Memphis and insured under a policy issued by Appellee insurance company. The at-fault driver entered into a rental agreement with Lexus of Memphis for use of the subject vehicle. After a jury entered a verdict in favor of Appellant against the at-fault driver, Appellant sought to collect the judgment under a policy issued by Appellee. The trial court held that the at-fault driver, as a renter of the vehicle, was exempt from coverage under the policy. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this consolidated appeal, we review whether the trial court erred in holding appellants’ attorney in civil contempt and/or in assessing fees and costs after this Court, in a previous appeal, reversed the trial court’s grant of appellees’ motion for involuntary dismissal and mandated for entry of an order granting appellants’ motion for voluntary dismissal. We conclude that there was no contempt and that the fees assessed for contempt were unwarranted. Because the underlying lawsuit was voluntarily nonsuited, we pretermit appellants’ issue concerning whether the trial court erred in denying recusal.  

This appeal involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to a minor child. The trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate the father’s rights on the ground of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate the father’s parental rights and remand.

A Shelby County jury convicted Petitioner, Antonio Wicks, of second degree murder in the death of the victim, Donald Miller, and the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 25 years’ incarceration as a Range I violent offender. This court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Antonio Wicks, No. W2011-00964-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1424717, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2012). Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and four amended petitions following the appointment of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner now appeals, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to (1) move for a mistrial due to only having eleven jurors; (2) file a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 915-16 (Tenn. 1999); (3) cross-examine the State’s witness regarding the loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence; (4) object to improper prosecutorial argument; and (5) raise in the motion for new trial and on direct appeal the failure to cross-examine a witness and improper prosecutorial argument. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Patrick Phillips, of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial based on the State’s failure to answer the defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Devin Rogers, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective elevenyear sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, arguing that his co-defendant’s testimony was “wildly contradictory” to that of the victim. Following our review, we affirm.

The Appellant, Earl Jerome Lee, Jr., appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. He contends that he is entitled to relief because his conviction for attempted felony escape was erroneously ordered to be served concurrently with his other sentences. Although we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that this issue had been previously litigated, we nevertheless conclude that the Appellant fails to state a colorable claim for relief. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jashun Yance Robertson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for judicial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on Defendant’s prior delinquent acts to deny diversion, when there was no proof regarding these acts in the record, and by failing to consider the “judicially recognized differences between juveniles and adults” in reaching its decision. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant and her son were driver and passenger, respectively, in a motor vehicle when they were struck in the rear by a vehicle driven by one of the Appellees. Appellant’s son later died from medical causes not related to the accident. Appellant then filed suit for injuries in her own name and as next of kin of her deceased son. Following arguments by the Appellees that Appellant had no authority to prosecute the case on behalf of her son, the trial court dismissed the claim corresponding to the injuries allegedly sustained by the son. Appellant then took a nonsuit of her remaining claim. This appeal concerns initially whether or not the judgment on appeal is a final judgment and, if so, the application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102 to this case. Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102, which provides for the survival of actions despite the death of the person wronged, specifies that the right of action shall pass “in like manner as the right of action described in § 20-5-106.” By way of that referenced authority, it is clear that a next of kin is one of the persons authorized to bring an action that survives under section 20-5-102. For the reasons set out herein, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal and reverse the trial court’s dismissal.

In this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal, we address whether the trial court erred in applying Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) 1.7 in determining whether Appellants’ law firm had a concurrent conflict of interest. Because a law firm may not cure a concurrent conflict by withdrawing from representing a client to avoid a conflict of interest with another client, we conclude that the trial court properly applied RPC 1.7. We also conclude that the trial court properly considered alternatives to disqualification.

The defendant, John Edward Wilson, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated burglary and indecent exposure for which he received an effective sentence of five years’ confinement. The defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of diversion and other forms of alternative sentencing, claiming the trial court erred in failing to properly analyze the diversion factors and failing to apply the correct legal standard when ordering confinement rather than probation. The State contends the defendant failed to show he was a favorable candidate for diversion, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering confinement. Upon our review of the applicable law, the record, and the arguments of the parties, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Justin W. Walkington, appeals his Giles County Circuit Court jury conviction of child abuse of a child under the age of eight, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that child abuse was a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery, that the trial court’s child abuse instruction actually charged the elements of child neglect, and that the trial court erred by denying the defendant any form of alternative sentencing. We hold that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that child abuse was a lesser included offense in this case because the evidence was legally insufficient to support that charge. Additionally, the trial court’s instruction on the offense of child abuse erroneously included the elements of child neglect, which charge was also unsupported by the evidence. Because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of either child abuse or child neglect but was sufficient to support a conviction of simple assault by offensive touching, we reverse and vacate the defendant’s conviction of child abuse and remand the case to the trial court for a sentencing hearing on the offense of Class B misdemeanor assault and the entry of an amended judgment reflecting the new conviction offense and sentence.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Ricky Boyd, of attempted second degree murder, aggravated rape, and rape. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the aggravated rape and rape convictions and imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to quash the Appellant’s subpoena duces tecum seeking “the District Attorney’s records concerning the time that [the Appellant’s] case was presented” to the grand jury; (3) the trial court erred by denying the Appellant’s request to review the victim’s mental health records; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to cross-examine the victim regarding her history of audio and visual hallucinations and her refusal to take medication to treat her condition; (5) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the case or give a Ferguson instruction based upon the State’s failure to preserve evidence that might play a significant role in the defense; (6) the State’s evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions; and (7) “the trial court erred by considering a prior charged offense during its deliberations as to sentencing even though the [Appellant] [pled] guilty to a lesser charge of aggravated assault and no factual basis surrounding the negotiated plea [was] entered into evidence.” Upon review, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Christopher W. Gadsden, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 24 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction with 100 percent release eligibility. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; 2) the trial court erred by admitting certain autopsy photographs into evidence; 3) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of a prior bad act by the victim; and 4) his sentence is excessive. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this case, a sister contests the sale of her deceased brother’s interest in real estate they inherited from their mother to satisfy an outstanding judgment lien against the brother. Because the sister waives her right to appellate review of most of her arguments and we discern no error in the circuit court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm the circuit court.

This action involves a maternal grandmother’s objection to the denial of her petition for custody of her minor grandchild and his adoption by his foster parents. We affirm.

A husband sought relief from a final decree of divorce nine years after its entry. He argued that the decree was void because the trial court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the husband’s motion. We affirm.