APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff instituted this action to recover payments allegedly due under an agreement to sell his membership interest in a corporation. Following a bench trial, the trial court agreed with the defendant corporation’s contention that the “additional consideration” provision of the agreement was void and unenforceable because it was not supported by consideration. The trial court determined that the corporation received no consideration in exchange for its promise to make annual payments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that sufficient consideration supported the agreement, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment in that regard. The balance of the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Elvis Louis Marsh, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights based on abandonment by failure to support; abandonment by failure to visit; abandonment by wanton disregard; substantial noncompliance with permanency plans; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court granted the petition, finding that the Department proved the alleged grounds by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. The father appeals the trial court’s conclusion that terminating his parental rights is in the best interests of the child. We affirm. 

The Defendant, Brandon Luke Baron, appeals from the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for judicial diversion following his guilty plea to child abuse, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-15-401 (2014) (subsequently amended). The court imposed the agreed-upon two-year sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve it in the Department of Correction. The Defendant contends that the court erred in denying judicial diversion. We conclude that the trial court failed to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors in accord with State v. Electroplating, 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998), and State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996), but upon de novo review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying judicial diversion.

Following a public reprimand of the trial judge presiding over her divorce, Wife filed a motion to recuse the trial judge pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. The trial court denied the motion, and Wife appealed to this Court. Thereafter, the presiding judge of the Thirteenth Judicial District entered an order transferring the case to another judge in order to “equitably distribute the case load[.]” Wife then filed a notice in this Court seeking direction as to whether the appeal is moot. Following our review, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

The Defendant, Martell Smith, was convicted of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine and of the delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, both occurring in a drug-free school zone, and he received a sentence of thirty years in prison. On appeal, he asserts that his convictions should be reversed because the State did not prove that the transaction occurred within the requisite distance of the school or that the educational establishment at issue was a school under statute, because the prosecutor committed misconduct in his opening statements, and because the trial court refused to deliver his requested special instructions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Appellant, Glyn Terrance Dale, Sr., appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court's summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by increasing the Appellant' s sentence at the resentencing hearing; (2) counsel abandoned him during his resentencing hearing; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal arising out of the parties’ divorce, the Husband raises issues pertaining to the court’s classification, valuation, and division of the marital estate, as well as the court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife. Upon our review, we vacate those parts of the judgment that awarded a lien on real property belonging to LLCs in which Husband had 100 percent ownership interest as well as an award to Wife of an interest in a contingent contractual claim against the United States Government that is an asset of an LLC in which Husband had 100 percent ownership interest. Additionally, in light of this Court’s determination that the contractual claim is an asset of an LLC owned 100 percent by Husband, we conclude that the record requires the court to reconsider the valuation of the parties’ business interests in the LLC that has the contractual claim. Although the trial court must necessarily consider the impact that the contractual claim has on the parties’ net marital business interests, we note that the court’s current calculations, which are divorced from a proper consideration of the impact of the contractual claim, overvalued the net marital business interests based upon its own findings. In light of the fact that the case is being remanded for further consideration of the valuation of the parties’ net marital business interests, we also vacate the trial court’s equitable division of the estate and its award of attorney’s fees to Wife and remand for further consideration. We also decline to award Wife her attorney’s fees on appeal. The balance of the judgment is affirmed.

This appeal arises from the summary dismissal of an inmate’s petition for declaratory judgment on the calculation of his sentence expiration date. The inmate contended that each of his consecutive sentences should have begun automatically upon the expiration of the prior sentence’s period of ineligibility for release. The trial court found the material facts were undisputed and concluded that the Tennessee Department of Correction correctly calculated the sentences. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

This appeal concerns the dismissal of a health care liability action against a long-term care facility.  The trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice because the plaintiff did not provide the long-term care facility with pre-suit notice of her claim as required by statute.  The plaintiff argues that the notice she mailed to the facility’s administrator at the facility’s business address satisfied the statutory requirement.  Because her letter was not directed to the facility, we affirm the dismissal of her complaint. 

Defendant, Marvin Glynn Allen, appeals his conviction for DUI, fourth offense, arguing that, based on the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-405(a), his charge should have been DUI, third offense. After a thorough review of the record, applicable case law, and the legislative history, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rodriccus Funzie, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder. Over a year after this court affirmed his conviction, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court subsequently denied the petition on its merits. Following our review of the record and relevant law, we conclude the petition was untimely, and, therefore, this court is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Wilson, of first degree felony murder, criminal attempt to commit second degree murder, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Robert T. McLeod, Defendant, entered a best interest guilty plea to five counts of violating the sex offender registry, one count of violating community supervision, and one count of tampering with evidence with an effective sentence of three years. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered Defendant to serve his sentence in incarceration. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The trial court revoked the community corrections sentence of the Defendant, Jeffrey Brian Gwaltney, and ordered that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that, while he did violate his alternative sentence, the trial court’s full revocation of his fifteen-year sentence was excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Father living in California had his parental rights terminated by default judgment. Father appealed, and we vacate the termination because the trial court failed to conduct a best interest analysis.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Amy B. (“Mother”) is the mother of the minor child Arianna B. (“the Child”). At Mother’s request, Kayla A. (“Petitioner”), the Child’s paternal aunt, assumed temporary custody of the Child. Petitioner later filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After trial, the Trial Court entered an order finding that Petitioner had proven the ground of failure to support and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals, arguing among other things that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1), as amended in 2018, is unconstitutional for shifting the burden of proof on willfulness to parents. As Mother failed to raise this issue below and the statute is not obviously unconstitutional on its face, we decline to consider Mother’s tardy constitutional challenge. We find the ground of failure to support was proven by clear and convincing evidence, and, by the same standard, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm.

This action involves a tragic accident resulting in the death of Tommy Smith (“Decedent”), who was working as a plumber connecting a sewer line when the trench he was in collapsed and crushed him. Decedent’s children (“Plaintiffs”) sued, among others, Focus Design Builders, LLC, general contractors for the building project, alleging negligence. The trial court granted Focus Design’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court held that Focus Design did not owe a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances because Decedent’s death was unforeseeable. We hold the complaint states a cause of action for negligence and consequently reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband is a resident of Connecticut with no ties to Tennessee. Wife and minor child, also former residents of Connecticut, have resided in Tennessee since December of 2018. Wife filed for divorce in Tennessee in May of 2019 and personally served Husband in Connecticut. Husband moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court thereafter entered a final decree of divorce in favor of Wife. Because we find that Wife was not a resident of Tennessee for six months preceding the filing of the complaint for divorce, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant the divorce. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and dismissed.

This action involves the termination of both parents’ rights to a minor child. Following a trial, the Loudon County Juvenile Court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support five statutory grounds for termination of both parents’ rights: (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent; (3) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and a willingness to assume custody. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Both parents appealed. We vacate in part and affirm in part.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination had been proven and that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on two grounds for termination but otherwise affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Although I concur with the end result reached by the majority in this case, I write separately to address two issues. First, while the majority correctly concludes that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated based upon the persistent conditions ground, more analysis is warranted in light of the sparseness of DCS’s case. Second, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to conclude, based on In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COAR3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018), that DCS satisfied its burden of proving that Mother failed to manifest a willingness and ability to assume legal or physical custody of her children.  

An internecine conflict led to a suit asserting breach of contract and a variety of torts. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court deferred ruling on the motion. Instead, the court granted the plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction and ordered the parties to mediate their dispute. When the defendants refused to participate in mediation, the court held them in contempt. We granted the application of the defendants for an extraordinary appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in not proceeding summarily to the determination of whether there was an agreement to arbitrate. Upon review, we vacate the three orders issued after the motion to compel arbitration was filed and remand for the court to determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.

On the day of trial, the parties to this action, through counsel, settled the case amongst themselves and testified in open court as to the specific terms of the settlement and their consent thereto. One party filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, seeking to repudiate the settlement agreement before the trial court entered an order adopting the settlement and ordering judgment. We affirm the trial court’s decision. We also conclude the appeal is frivolous and remand for an assessment of damages.

The plaintiff, Daphne Saunders, filed a complaint against Y-12 Federal Credit Union (“Y-12”), alleging breach of the parties’ banking contract. Ms. Saunders asserted that Y- 12 had charged excessive fees for items presented for payment from Ms. Saunders’s account that were returned due to insufficient funds. Ms. Saunders also alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and asserted that Y-12 had been unjustly enriched by charging excessive fees. The trial court dismissed Ms. Saunders’s claims with prejudice, finding that Ms. Saunders had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Ms. Saunders has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.