APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS | Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

Please enter some keywords to search.

COURT

COUNTY

AUTHORING JUDGE

ORIGINATING JUDGE

CASE NUMBER

DATE FILTER

SEARCH TITLE

SEARCH CASE SUMMARY

03A01-9704-CV-00111 03A01-9704-CV-00111	Hamilton County	Supreme Court	11/14/97
03A01-9704-CV-00111 03A01-9704-CV-00111	Hamilton County	Court of Appeals	11/14/97
Christopher S. Baker v. Middle Tn. Acoustics, Inc., et al. 01S01-9702-CH-00035 This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff/appellant, Christopher Steven Baker, appeals from the trial court's decision holding that he failed to prove that he sustained an injury while working for the defendant/appellee, Middle Tennessee Acoustic, Inc. The outcome of the case hinges primarily on a determination of the plaintiff's credibility. While our review is de novo, it is accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the trial court's findings. Moreover, when the trial court has made a decision that hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, it will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is in the record clear, concrete, and convincing evidence to the contrary. And, too, considerable difference is to be accorded the trial court where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved. Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tenn. 1992), Airline Construction, Inc. v. Barr, 87 S.W.2d 247, 264 (Tenn. App. 199). The record is filled with contradictory and conflicting evidence regarding whether the plaintiff injured himself as he claims. The plaintiff, at trial, testified that he injured himself on Friday, June 2, 1995. Yet he alleges in his complaint that the injury was on June 5, a Monday. Records from Nashville's General Hospital reflect that he once gave June 3 as the date of his injury and later gave June 5 as the date. The plaintiff told Dr. David Gaw it was June 5. Confusion over the exact date of an injury is not unusual and failure for a worker to recall the exact date or recalling an incorrect date is usually immaterial to the outcome of the case. But the plaintiff himself emphasizes the exact date. It is important for him to prove it happened on a Friday. Wallace Harris, owner of the employer corporation, testified that the plaintiff told him he, the plaintiff, hurt himself while moving. This, of course, directly contradicts the plaintiff's testimony. But it also sheds some light on why the June 2 date surfaced at trail. By proving that he hurt himself on a Friday, the plaintiff proves that he did not hurt himself over the weekend when he moved. Ronnie Stroud was working with the plaintiff when the plaintiff says he injured himself. The plaintiff testified he told Stroud he hurt his back and that the two of them finished the work day with Stroud doing the overhead work with the plaintiff handing Stroud the materials. Stroud testified at trial that the plaintiff never complained about being hurt and that he, Stroud, never observed the plaintiff being hurt. The plaintiff had a previous work-related back injury. He denies that it was bothering him before June 2 or June 5, 1995. Yet he was scheduled for a Social Security disability examination with Dr. Gaw before June 2 or June 5. If he had no manifestation of disability - 2 - Authoring Judge: Robe R T S. Br Andt , Senior Judge Originating Judge:Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle,	Davidson County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/14/97
Elsie Hopkins v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc. 01S01-9610-CH-00216 This Workers' Compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On May 2, 1994, the plaintiff, Elsie Hopkins, fell at work and injured her right shoulder. At trial and on appeal the defendant, San Antonio Shoe, Inc., accepted the claim as compensable. The trial court awarded thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and assessed a bad faith penalty of twenty percent (2%) of the temporary total disability benefits due in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5- 6-225(k). The defendant employer contends on appeal the evidence preponderates against a vocational disability award of thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and any finding of bad faith. The plaintiff requests an award of post judgment interest. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The scope of review of issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of evidence is otherwise. Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. 1989). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded the trial court's factual findings. Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1987). However, where the issues involve expert medical testimony which is contained in the record by deposition, as it is in this case, then all impressions of weight and credibility must be drawn from the contents of the depositions, and the reviewing court may draw its own impression as to weight and credibility from the contents of the depositions. Overman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 83 S.W.2d 672, 676-77 (Tenn. 1991). Plaintiff, Elsie Hopkins, is 48 years of age and has a tenth grade education . Her prior work history consists of repetitive work in the garment and shoe industry and she has no vocational training. She was employed by the defendant, San Antonio Shoe, Inc., for approximately 8 years when she injured her right shoulder on May 2, 1994. She reported the injury to her employer and was taken by her supervisor, Paul Darrow, to be seen by Dr. Jack Milam. Dr. Milam treated her conservatively and placed her arm in a sling for 6 to 8 weeks. 2 Authoring Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Special Judge Originating Judge:Hon. Jeffrey F. Stewart,	Franklin County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/14/97
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX		Court of Appeals	11/13/97
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX	Jefferson County	Court of Appeals	11/13/97
Willie M. Nutt v. Angelica Uniform Group 01S01-9609-CH-00195 This Workers' Compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, Willie M. Nutt, appeals the judgment of the trial court in dismissing her complaint as being barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Willie M. Nutt worked for the defendant, Angelica Uniform Group, from 1982 to 1989 when she quit due to pain in her shoulders and back. She then worked for Tennessee River for several months, but again had to quit due to the physical inability to do her job. In November 1989, she was advised by Dr. Howard Fuchs that her shoulder problems were work- related. With the encouragement of the plant manager, and the assurance of light duty, Ms. Nutt returned to work for Angelica Uniform in July, 199. She was able to handle small parts for a few days, but her shoulder symptoms returned when she was assigned to heavier work. She was terminated because she was unable to perform her job. Plaintiff filed suit on January 28, 1991, and alleged on or about July 31, 199, she became aware she had suffered an injury to her shoulders. The defendant answered and pled the statute of limitations as a defense. After a trial on October 2, 1994, the trial court took the matter under advisement and entered judgment on December 16, 1994, dismissing plaintiff's cause of action. The trial court found: The shoulder problems suffered by Ms. Nutt, however, were long standing problems and were not caused by a work-related injury during her brief period of employment at Angelica's plant in July of 199. The Court further finds that Ms. Nutt was aware of her shoulder problems and aware that those shoulder problems were work related several years before the complaint in this action filed. The statute of limitations applicable to her claims, therefore, expired prior to the filing of this action on January 28, 1991, and Ms. Nutt's action was untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. The scope of review of issues of fact is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of evidence is otherwise. Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. 1989). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved, considerable deference 2 Authoring Judge: W. Michael Maloan, Special Judge Originating Judge:Hon. William B. Cain	Wayne County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/13/97
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX	Morgan County	Court of Appeals	11/13/97
Stat e vs. Michael Moore 02C01-9705-CR-00180 Originating Judge:Bernie Weinman	Shelby County	Court of Criminal Appeals	11/13/97
State vs. Clifton Epps 02C01-9601-CR-00022	Shelby County	Court of Criminal Appeals	11/13/97
State vs. David Hassell 02C01-9611-CR-00396 Originating Judge:W. Fred Axley	Shelby County	Court of Criminal Appeals	11/13/97
State vs. Nassel Brown 02C01-9606-CR-00187 Originating Judge:Bernie Weinman	Shelby County	Court of Criminal Appeals	11/13/97
Jewell Maness vs. Estate of Acie Maness 02A01-9611-CH-00270 Originating Judge:Joe C. Morris	Henderson County	Court of Appeals	11/12/97
Lasalle Dudley vs. Raye Dudley 02A01-9705-CH-00104	Shelby County	Court of Appeals	11/12/97
Terry Phelps vs. State 01C01-9610-CC-00451 Originating Judge:W. Charles Lee	Lincoln County	Court of Criminal Appeals	11/12/97
State vs. Michael Walton 01C01-9509-CR-00290 Originating Judge:Seth W. Norman	Davidson County	Court of Criminal Appeals	11/12/97
Raymond Morris vs. Voil Morris 02A01-9610-CH-00236 Originating Judge:George R. Ellis	Gibson County	Court of Appeals	11/12/97
Shirley Shelburne v. Frontier Health E2000-02551-SC-R11-CV Plaintiff, both individually and as next friend of her minor son, brought suit against Carter County, Frontier Health, and Woodridge Hospital for the wrongful death of her husband. The trial court granted summary judgment to Frontier and Woodridge. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Frontier and Woodridge could not be held vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of their employee because he was entitled to immunity as a state employee. We granted review to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted in light of our decision in Johnson v. LeBonheur Children's Medical Center, 74 S.W.3d 338 (Tenn. 2002). We hold that Johnson governs the present case and that Frontier and Woodridge are not immune from liability for the acts or omissions of their immune employee. Accordingly, summary judgment was not appropriate. Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder Originating Judge:Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.	Carter County	Supreme Court	11/12/97
Hunter vs. Brown 03S01-9607-CV-00070		Supreme Court	11/10/97
Evans & Arnold vs. Board of Paroles, et. al. 01S01-9610-CH-00210	Davidson County	Supreme Court	11/10/97
01C01-9510-CR-00347 01C01-9510-CR-00347 Originating Judge:Jerry Scott		Court of Criminal Appeals	11/10/97
State vs. Orlando Hobson 01C01-9612-CC-00527 Originating Judge:Jim T. Hamilton	Maury County	Court of Criminal Appeals	11/10/97
Patrick v. Kelfalla, 01C01-9608-CR-00357 Originating Judge:Seth W. Norman	Davidson County	Court of Criminal Appeals	11/10/97
John Shultz v. City of Lawrenceburg, et al . 01S01-9701-CV-00017 This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, City of Lawrenceburg, contends (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, (2) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the employee's compensation rate is $38.8, (3) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of temporary total disability benefits from August 5, 1994 through October of 1995 and (4) the trial court erred in commuting permanent partial disability benefits to a lump sum. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The employee or claimant, John Schultz, was forty-nine years old at the time of the injury. He has an eighth grade education and a GED. He has worked as a heavy equipment operator since 1968. On January 21, 1994, while working for the employer, he injured his neck and back while operating a backhoe as a jackhammer on frozen ground. He injured his left shoulder again on August 5, 1994 while working for the employer and running out of a hole filling with water. He attempted to work the next day before going to a doctor's appointment, then was totally disabled until October 18, 1995, when he reached maximum medical improvement. The claimant was treated or evaluated by a number of physicians and assigned permanent impairment ratings of from six to ten percent from the injuries which the physicians related to the work he was performing. He continues to have neck and shoulder problems. The record contains conflicting documentary evidence as to the employee's average weekly wage, but the employer had actually paid benefits of $38.8 from the August injury until the date of maximum medical improvement, for his temporary total disability. The trial court awarded no additional temporary total disability benefits, but did award the claimant's reasonable and necessary medical expenses and permanent partial disability benefits based on thirty-two percent to the body as a whole, payable in a lump sum. The claim against the Second Injury Fund was dismissed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). 2 Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge Originating Judge:Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,	Lawrence County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/10/97
Mary A. Clark v. Micropore, Inc. & Berwind Industries Management 01S01-9703-CH-00062 This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This complaint was filed April 17, 1995, alleging that the plaintiff had been employed at Porelon since 1974 and that in 1993 she began to develop pain in her right shoulder and arm which was evidence of a gradually developing compensable injury. Micropore, Inc. (formerly Porelon) filed its answer on June 7, 1995, alleging that it was sold on May 6, 1994 with a resulting change in workers' compensation insurers. It denied having notice of any claimed injury and affirmatively alleged that it is not liable for "any benefits due plaintiff which accrued on or after May 6, 1994." The plaintiff amended her complaint on June 21, 1995 and joined Berwind Industries Management Company as a defendant. She alleged that in 1993 and until May 1994 the manufacturing plant known as Porelon, where she worked and developed the gradual injury, was owned by Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. ["JWA"], which sold the plant to Berwind in May 1994. The plant continued to operate under the name of Micropore, Inc., allegedly a subsidiary of Berwind. Micropore, Inc. answered the amended complaint, acknowledging the sale of the plant by JWA to Berwind in May 1994. It again denied that, although the plaintiff was regularly employed by Porelon for 2 years and was so employed May 1994, when the change in ownership occurred, the plaintiff had developed a gradually occurring injury as alleged. It admitted that on November 3, 1993, the plaintiff reported to management that she had been diagnosed with fibromyosis, but that she did not relate that the condition was work related. Berwind answered the amended complaint on July 26, 1995, asserting that the plaintiff was last employed on March 6, 1995, and that it was not liable for benefits under the gradual occurring rule. The Chancellor ruled that the plaintiff's injuries were gradual "and manifested themselves in May 1993, but they did not progress to the point of making the plaintiff unable to work until March 3, 1995, and therefore March 3, 1995, under Tennessee 2 Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge Originating Judge:Hon. Vernon Neal,	Putnam County	Workers Compensation Panel	11/10/97