APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In a letter sent to high-ranking school officials, parents claimed that a special education teacher had denied their child an appropriate education based on the child’s needs and improperly used physical restraints on the child. The parents also claimed that the teacher had ignored them at a school event and did not communicate with them for a month afterward. The teacher sued the parents for defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the parents, reasoning primarily that the parents had not published the letter. The court also reasoned that the statements in the letter were not defamatory and that the parents did not act with actual malice. We conclude that some of the statements in the letter were not defamatory but others were capable of being understood as defamatory. For those statements capable of conveying a defamatory meaning, the record lacked evidence of actual malice. So we affirm the grant of summary judgment. 

Two children and two individuals who are neither biological nor adopted children of an intestate decedent contend that they are entitled to the decedent’s life insurance proceeds based on an alleged breach of contract between them and the decedent’s ex-girlfriend, who was the life insurance policy’s named beneficiary. The trial court found that the alleged contract failed for lack of consideration. We affirm the trial court’s decision. 

This case concerns the decision of the Rutherford County Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) to deny a property owner’s application for a special exception to operate a major home-based business on his residential property. The property owner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court, and the court upheld the BZA’s decision. Discerning no error, we affirm the Chancery Court’s decision. 

A jury convicted the Defendant, Isaiah Williams, of attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of seventeen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish his identity as the shooter. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In a previous appeal, we affirmed a trial court’s decision to hold a party in contempt, but we vacated the award of compensatory damages. Keller v. Estate of McRedmond, No. M2013-02582-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 2447041, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018). We remanded the case to the trial court for a calculation of the damages solely attributable to the contemptuous conduct. Id. On remand, the trial court entered an amended judgment. In this appeal, among other things, the contemnor argues that the amount of damages awarded lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the amount of damages awarded, we affirm.

The petitioner, Coty Shane Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his
guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Ricky Dale Breeden, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2018) (subsequently amended) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery). He was sentenced to an effective ninety-five years for the convictions. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his rape of a child convictions, (2) the State failed to make a proper election of offenses, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for expert funds, (4) the court erred by ordering consecutive service. Although we affirm the Defendant’s rape of a child convictions, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated sexual battery and remand the case for a new trial.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Sebastian A. Stevens, of three counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of eight years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that the trial court erred when it excluded the victim’s prior conviction and when it allowed the State to introduce evidence of the Defendant’s prior incarceration. The Defendant lastly contends that the trial court erred when it ordered that his effective sentence of eight years in this case be served consecutively to his sentence for a previous conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellant, a psychiatrist, was sanctioned by the Board of Medical Examiners for violation of the Tennessee Medical Practice Act. The Chancery Court for Davidson County affirmed the Board’s action, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce action between Judith Galilea Abner (“Wife”) and Steven Dale Abner (“Husband”). As part of the divorce, the Trial Court entered an order classifying certain property inherited by Husband during the divorce as his separate property after finding that this property had not been comingled or transmuted into marital property. Husband also was awarded as his separate property the value of a log cabin at the time of marriage. The parties had resided in the log cabin throughout the marriage and made substantial improvements to the log cabin during the marriage to which Wife had substantially contributed. The Trial Court, therefore, classified the appreciation of value of the log cabin as marital property, and Wife was awarded one-half of the increase in value of the property. The Trial Court classified as marital property an account in Wife’s sole name, upon its finding that the money in the account had been comingled such that the money could no longer be traced back to the original deposit. Additionally, the Trial Court granted an award of attorney’s fees to Husband for four of the five days of trial due to Wife changing her testimony and the “immense amount of time spent on these issues.” Wife timely appealed to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court’s findings concerning the classification of the parties’ property. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s fees to Husband.

The Petitioner, Travis L. Lindsey, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions for the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, and his effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully advise him of the deadline by which he could enter into a plea agreement with the State in order to avoid a trial. We conclude that the Petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendants, Humberto Morales, Mario Garcia Flores, and Keyona Martina Newell, (collectively “the Defendants”) were convicted of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Mr. Flores also was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After merging various convictions, the trial court ordered Mr. Morales to serve an effective sentence of forty-eight years, Mr. Flores to serve an effective sentence of thirty years, and Ms. Newell to serve an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendants, either collectively or individually, challenge: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions; (2) the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress based upon the constitutionality of the stop of the vehicle in which some of the perpetrators fled the scene; (3) the trial court’s denial of a continuance based upon the State’s late disclosure of discovery materials; (4) the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony of evidence extracted from the perpetrators’ cell phones; (5) the trial court’s denial of Mr. Morales’s motion for mistrial after Ms. Newell’s counsel questioned a witness about evidence that the trial court previously ruled to be inadmissible; (6) the trial court’s failure to issue an accomplice instruction; and (7) the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a nursing home resident died, her daughter filed a wrongful death action against the facility. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by the daughter when her mother was admitted to the facility. The daughter claimed that she lacked authority to sign the arbitration agreement for her mother. The trial court agreed and denied the motion to compel. On appeal, we conclude that the Federal Arbitration Act required the trial court to resolve the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate had been formed. Because the nursing home failed to establish an agreement to arbitrate had been formed with the patient, we affirm.

This is the second appeal of this action concerning the construction of the last will and testament of the decedent. In the first appeal, we reversed the trial court’s finding that the property at issue vested in her designated heir at the time of the decedent’s passing. Upon remand, the trial court held that the property vested when the personal representative executed warranty deeds for the property at issue, despite the fact that the deeds were never recorded. We now uphold the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings necessary for the distribution of the estate.

Divorcing parents of a minor child agreed to all terms of the divorce other than the permanent parenting plan. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court designated the father as the primary residential parent. The mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an appeal from a divorce proceeding. The parties were married for around thirty years, during which time the husband built a successful business and the wife was a homemaker and stay-at-home mother to the parties’ two children. After five days of trial, the trial court classified, valued, and divided the parties’ sizeable marital estate; awarded the wife alimony in futuro; and ordered the husband to pay a portion of the wife’s attorney’s fees. Both parties raise various issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

This suit was brought under the Tennessee Human Rights Act by two African-American employees against their employer and their union to recover for alleged discrimination that created a hostile work environment. At issue in this appeal is the grant of summary judgment to the union on the basis that it did not cause or attempt to cause the employer to discriminate. Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the evidence presented at the summary judgment stage negated an essential element of the Plaintiffs’ claim and thus summary judgment was warranted. Judgment affirmed.

This appeal arises from the second jury trial of the Defendant-Appellant, Randall Kenneth Reed, for which he was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and theft of property, and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), (a)(2), 39-13-402, 39-14-103. In this appeal, Reed argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his right to self-representation; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, which it construed as a motion for reconsideration; (3) the evidence is insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; (4) the guilty pleas he made in front of the jury should have been assessed and a new jury empaneled to ensure that he had a fair and unbiased trial; and (5) the trial court erred in admitting life and death photographs of the victim at trial. After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable law, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant, Urshawn Eric Miller, was convicted by a Madison County jury of premeditated first degree murder, felony first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, evading arrest, and resisting arrest. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction and the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted second degree murder conviction. The jury sentenced Defendant to death for the first degree murder conviction. For the remaining convictions, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years, to be served concurrently with his death sentence. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues, as renumbered and reorganized by this Court: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in ruling on various challenges during jury selection; (3) the trial court erred in admitting a video of his prior aggravated robbery during the penalty phase; (4) the death penalty is unconstitutional; (5) the aggravating factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; and (6) the death penalty is disproportionate in this case. Having carefully reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for the correction of a clerical error.

The Defendant, Charlie Evans, was convicted after a jury trial of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he caused serious bodily injury to the victim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kadarick Lucas, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery, and he received an eight-year effective sentence. The Petitioner then filed a petition for postconviction relief, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not plead guilty freely and voluntarily. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2010, the Petitioner, Darrell Carpenter, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to serve twenty years in prison. The Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal. After his conviction was affirmed, the Petitioner again sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel and that the State withheld or destroyed exculpatory evidence. The postconviction court held a hearing and denied the post-conviction claims, and the Petitioner appeals, listing in his reply brief twenty-five grounds for relief. The thrust of the Petitioner’s claims is that a 911 chronology report allegedly contradicts the proof at trial, that trial counsel was deficient in not challenging the proof on this basis, and that the State failed in its duty to preserve or produce related evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has not demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his rights were otherwise violated, and we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Mark Ethan Felices, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, James Currie, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary of a motor vehicle (5 counts), fraudulent use of a credit card for a value more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 (2 counts), attempt to fraudulently use a credit card, and theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Timothy D. Carter, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In it, he repeats the same issue he raised on direct appeal and his post-conviction petition, namely that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for his vehicle. Because the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition.