APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this premises liability case, the plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her claims against a hotel based on her failure to satisfy the notice requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03 for amending her complaint to add a new party. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Micah Ross Johnson, challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he attacked his jury convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner raises numerous grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel; in addition, he raises an allegation of cumulative error based upon counsel’s ineffectiveness. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we are constrained to agree with the Petitioner that the post-conviction court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable appellate review of all his claims. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A review of the record on appeal reveals that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The defendant, Anthony Lee Smith, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the 10-year sentence imposed for his theft conviction in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In her proposed final accounting, the administrator of an intestate estate sought court approval for, inter alia, the decedent’s funeral expenses and routine administrative expenses, including her attorney’s fees. She also sought to recover the costs she incurred to repair and sell the decedent’s house pursuant to an agreed order. The administrator is the decedent’s widow, and the remaining heirs, who are the decedent’s children from a prior marriage, opposed her request for reimbursement. The court denied her claims for post-death expenses finding “they were not timely filed because any request for reimbursement was required to be filed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307.” The court also denied the administrator’s request to recover her attorney’s fees upon the finding that the legal services did not benefit the estate. We affirm the denial of the administrator’s request to recover her attorney’s fees. However, we have determined that the other “claims” for reimbursement of post-death expenses are not subject to the limitation provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307. This is because the statute pertains to debts and liabilities incurred by or on behalf of the decedent prior to his death. All of the expenses at issue were incurred after the decedent’s death; therefore, we reverse the trial court’s ruling that the administrator’s post-death “claims” were time-barred pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307. Because the court has supervisory authority to determine the reasonableness and necessity of expenses incurred for the benefit of and in the administration of the decedent’s estate, we remand with instructions for the trial court to determine whether each post-death expense was reasonable and necessary in light of all the relevant circumstances and to enter judgment accordingly.

The Appellant, Nathan Lamar Swanson, Jr., pled guilty to attempted possession of a firearm by a felon, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance with the intent to sell. The Appellant was given a total effective sentence of fourteen years as a Range I offender. The Appellant subsequently filed a pro se motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon being appointed counsel, the Appellant filed an amended motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the charges and to advise the Appellant as to a viable defense, resulting in an unknowing, involuntary plea. The trial court denied relief, and the Appellant appeals. Following our review, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) wanton disregard for the child’s welfare; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (3) severe child abuse; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court.

This is an action to set aside a quitclaim deed. In the Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment, the attorney-in-fact for the plaintiff alleges that the plaintiff was not competent to execute the quitclaim deed, that she did not intend to convey title to the property, and she did not receive consideration for the conveyance. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief and upon the motion of the defendant, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. The court found, inter alia, there was no competent evidence to support the allegations that the plaintiff was not competent to execute the quitclaim deed, that fraud occurred, or that a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff was breached, and there was no proof presented that the parties lacked a meeting of the minds. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Patrick Bumpus, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts various allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, challenges the knowing and voluntary nature of his pleas, and alleges that the State “breached the contract of [his] involuntary plea[s.]” After review, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Steven King, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion because his sentence of life plus twenty-five years was illegal pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), which held that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile defendant violates the Eighth Amendment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Trista S. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of (1) persistence of conditions; (2) failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the child; and (3) mental incompetence. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence supporting the grounds for termination and the best interests determination, we affirm.

The defendant, Terry William Smith, appeals his 2019 Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of speeding, failure to obey a traffic control signal, reckless endangerment, evading arrest, violating the open container law, and driving under the influence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support some of his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of split confinement. We affirm the defendant’s convictions, the imposition of a two-year effective sentence, and the trial court’s decision to order split confinement. Because the confinement term of the split confinement sentence exceeds that allowed under the terms of Code section 40-35-501(a)(3), we modify the term of confinement and remand the case for the entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting the modified sentence and the proper place of confinement.

Defendant, Tareaun Griffin, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the production of the audio recordings from his post-conviction proceeding pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the recordings were exempt from disclosure. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.  

David Charles Gambrell, Defendant, was indicted for five counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure based on allegations made by his fifteen-year-old stepdaughter. Defendant pled guilty to amended charges of four counts of aggravated statutory rape with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. The remaining counts were nolle prossed. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, ordering him to serve four years in incarceration for each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of sixteen years. Defendant appeals his sentences. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher M. Ferrell, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 conviction for second degree murder. Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of the petition.

As part of a guilty plea to driving under the influence (“DUI”), Defendant, Janice A. Campbell, reserved a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). She asks this Court to determine whether her arrest for DUI in a private home without a warrant violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-103 when Defendant was arrested without being seen by an officer operating the vehicle in question and no vehicle accident was involved. After a review, we determine that the certified question is not dispositive. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

Defendant, Quantorius Rankins, entered a best interest plea pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997) to statutory rape. The agreement provided that the trial court would conduct a sentencing hearing to determine if Defendant would be granted judicial diversion and to determine if Defendant would be required to register as a sex offender. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion, ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender, and imposed an out-of-range sentence of six years’ probation pursuant to the plea agreement. Defendant appeals the trial court’s decision. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andre Cabrere, appeals the trial court’s entry of corrected judgment forms removing pretrial jail credits from two of the defendant’s consecutive sentences without providing the defendant notice prior to doing the same. The defendant claims the pretrial credits were part of his negotiated plea agreement. However, based on our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, it is unclear whether the awarding of pretrial credits was part of the defendant’s negotiated plea or a clerical error such that the trial court had the authority to amend the judgments under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case to allow the defendant the opportunity to respond and present proof of his claim.

The Defendant, Robert Thomas, entered guilty pleas to facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery and possession of marijuana with intent to sell. The Defendant requested probation and judicial diversion. The trial court held a hearing and sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of six years of probation for the facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and “one year and time served” for the drug conviction. The trial court denied judicial diversion, and the Defendant appeals. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying diversion, and we affirm the judgments and remand for correction of the various judgment forms.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Tommy Charles Simpson, Jr., Defendant, pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor reserving a certified question for appeal in which he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Defendant argues that a state-licensed private security guard’s seizure of Defendant’s cell phone constituted “state action,” violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s rulings changing the surname of the child, denying awards of retroactive child support and uncovered medical expenses, and allowing Father to seek modification of the residential schedule without showing a material change in circumstances. We vacate the trial court’s award of a deviation of child support because the trial court did not make the required findings under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-311 and the Child Support Guidelines. As to the remaining issues, we reverse.

In October of 2015, Defendant, Edward Walsh, was indicted by the Clay County Grand Jury for first degree murder, abuse of a corpse, tampering with evidence, and theft of property. The theft of property charge was severed, and the tampering with evidence charge was nolled before trial. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and a concurrent two-year sentence for the abuse of a corpse conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not severing the offenses of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay, that the trial court was not impartial, that the State’s closing argument was based on inferences from facts not in evidence, and that evidence was insufficient to prove first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellants, Husband and Wife, filed a complaint for damages, including Wife’s loss of consortium claim, with the Tennessee Claims Commission.  The State filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss Wife’s loss of consortium claim because she did not file notice of her claim with the Division of Claims Administration within the applicable statute of limitations.  The Claims Commission dismissed Wife’s claim for failure to comply with the notice requirement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(b).  Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Macon County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of James H. (“Father”) to his minor daughter Trinity H. (“the Child”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on the grounds of wanton disregard, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The Juvenile Court found also that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. With respect to wanton disregard, the Juvenile Court found only that Father committed criminal acts resulting in his incarceration, which by itself is insufficient to establish the ground. We, therefore, vacate the ground of wanton disregard. However, we find that the other two grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence and, by the same standard, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We vacate, in part, and affirm, as modified.