APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Lincoln County jury convicted Defendant, Michael Domonic Sales, of first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a life sentence. After filing a notice of appeal, Defendant filed a motion with this court requesting that the court stay his direct appeal so that he might seek relief through a petition for writ of error coram nobis. This court granted Defendant’s motion to stay his direct appeal, and Defendant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to act as the thirteenth juror and grant a judgment of acquittal based on Defendant’s claim of self-defense; (2) he is entitled to a new trial based on improper prosecutorial argument, including the prosecutor’s assertion that Defendant was a Crips gang member and that Defendant’s possession of a weapon as a convicted felon prevented his claim of self-defense; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

After a bench trial, the Robertson County Circuit Court convicted the Appellant, Jenniffer Danine Harper, of driving under the influence (DUI) and sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-eight hours in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, seventeen-year-old Devonta Kevon Curry, was transferred from juvenile court and convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated burglary (count one); aggravated robbery (counts two, five, and six); especially aggravated kidnapping (counts three and four); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count seven). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-403, -13-402, -13-305; 39-17-1324(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a five-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated burglary; a concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment for each count of aggravated robbery; a concurrent twenty-year term of imprisonment for each count of especially aggravated kidnapping; and a three-year term of imprisonment for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, to be served consecutively to the aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(e)(1). The concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated robbery convictions was ordered to be served consecutively to the concurrent twenty-year term of imprisonment for the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, for an effective sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding each of his convictions arguing that (1) the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offense; and (2) the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions were merely incidental to the aggravated robberies in violation of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). The Defendant also appeals the order of consecutive sentencing, arguing that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact in classifying him as a dangerous offender and that the trial court failed to apply certain mitigating factors. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Roger Terrell, was convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated sexual battery, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-504, (count one) and seven counts of rape of a child, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-522, (counts two through five and counts eight through ten). Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received an effective sentence of fifty-eight-years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain each of his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other crimes not charged in the indictment; (3) whether the trial court erred in restricting defense counsel from questioning the victim on cross-examination concerning the origin of a urinary tract infection after the State “opened the door” on direct examination; (4) whether the trial court erred in prohibiting the Defendant from viewing the victim’s Department of Children’s Services (DCS) records; (5) whether the trial court erred in finding the State’s comments during rebuttal closing argument were not improper; and (6) whether the trial court’s order of partial consecutive sentencing was proper. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Defendant, Titus Avery Brittain, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for pretrial jail credits. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Djuan Manning, was convicted of aggravated assault and tampering with evidence for his involvement with a shooting, and he received an effective four-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that the State did not negate his theory of self-defense and that the State did not establish that he destroyed or concealed the weapon. The Defendant also maintains that the State failed to provide him adequate notice of the charges. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A citizen filed a petition of remonstrance with the Tennessee General Assembly and then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in chancery court requesting that the legislative chambers be ordered to hear and consider his petition of remonstrance. The trial court dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus on the basis that the petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief. We affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to award the parties equal parenting time and to allow the parties to make major educational decisions jointly. We reverse the trial court’s decision to order alternating weekly parenting time and vacate the trial court’s decision regarding major educational decisions. 

The Defendant, Leonard B. Casteel, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, and he received a six-year sentence on each count. The Defendant was sentenced to serve one year for each count and to complete supervised probation for the remaining time. The Defendant was released on probation, a revocation warrant was issued, and the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Frederick Perry (“Employee”) worked for Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corporation (“Employer”) at a variety of jobs beginning in 1988. On February 22, 2013, Employee was working on a cutting machine cutting steel elevator panels. While attempting to move a large steel panel from the work table to a pallet with a jib crane, Employee slipped and fell. Employee was determined to have suffered a torn labrum in his right hip and a torn meniscus in his right knee, which were surgically repaired. Employee’s treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Adam Smith, placed Employee at maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) on June 13, 2014. He assigned Employee anatomical impairment ratings of 3% to the lower right extremity for the right hip injury and 3% to the lower right extremity for the right knee injury, for a combined anatomical impairment rating of 6% to the lower right extremity or 2% to the body as a whole. Dr. Smith placed certain restrictions on Employee. Employer returned Employee to work at another job accommodating his restrictions and providing a higher rate of pay. On March 3, 2015, Employee underwent an independent medical examination by physical medicine and rehab physician, Dr. Samuel Jae Jin Chung, on referral from his attorney. Dr. Chung diagnosed Employee as suffering “[r]esidual from right knee injury requiring extensive surgical intervention with ongoing symptoms of right patellofemoral arthritis” and “[r]esidual from right hip injury secondary to fall with status post surgical intervention with ongoing symptomatology.” Dr. Chung assigned Employee anatomical impairment ratings of 15% to the right lower extremity for the right knee injury and 22% to the right lower extremity for the right hip injury, for a combined anatomical impairment rating of 34% to the lower right extremity or 13% to the body as a whole. Dr. Chung placed certain restrictions on Employee and suggested the possibility of need for a future right knee replacement. A Benefit Review Conference was held on December 2, 2015, resulting in an impasse. The parties were unable to resolve the extent of Employee’s anatomical impairment or his vocational impairment. Employee brought suit. The parties stipulated or agreed that Employee had received all the temporary total disability benefits to which he was entitled, Employer had paid all authorized medical expenses, and the 1.5 multiplier cap applied. The trial court rejected the anatomical impairment ratings of both Dr. Smith and Dr. Chung and adopted its own modified anatomical impairment ratings of 18% to the lower right extremity for the right hip injury and 14% to the lower right extremity for the right knee injury, for a combined anatomical impairment rating of 29% to the lower right extremity or 12% to the body as a whole. The trial court awarded Employee permanent partial disability benefits based upon a vocational impairment of 18% to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Agness McCurry, stated that the appellant was appealing the judgment entered on August 17, 2020. As the August 17, 2020 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In this health care liability action, the defendant moved to compel arbitration based upon an agreement entered into between the parties that provided for binding arbitration. The plaintiff opposed the defendant’s motion, taking specific umbrage at a provision in the parties’ agreement that indicated the expenses of arbitration would, by default, be subject to a 50/50 split. Contending that he was unable to pay for arbitration expenses, the plaintiff opposed enforcement of the arbitration agreement by advancing a cost-based unconscionability defense. Although the defendant acted to relieve the plaintiff of this asserted burden by offering to pay for the costs of arbitration, the trial court held that the subject fee-splitting provision in the agreement was unconscionable and denied the motion to enforce the agreement and compel arbitration. For the reasons stated herein, while we agree with the trial court that, under the facts of this case, the fee-splitting provision was unconscionable, we hold that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

Defendant, L. Clay Shuler, II, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, tampering with evidence, and setting fire to personal property or land. The trial court imposed a sentence of life for first degree murder, six years for tampering with evidence, to be served consecutively to the life sentence, and a concurrent two-year sentence for setting fire to personal property. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a disassociated partner’s buyout. Stephen Boesch (“Boesch”), Jay Holeman (“Holeman”), and Richard Fraser (“Fraser”) formed a partnership to start a flavored-moonshine and whiskey business, Tennessee Legend. Boesch contributed technical know-how and labor. Early on, Boesch was disassociated from the partnership. Boesch sued Holeman and Fraser (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) alleging, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets. Later, Crystal Falls Spirits, LLC, an entity created by Holeman, intervened to sue Boesch. At trial, the parties put on competing proof as to the value of Boesch’s interest. Ultimately, the Trial Court adopted Defendants’ value and rejected Boesch’s trade secrets claim. Boesch appeals. Because the experts failed to contend with Tenn. Code Ann. § 61- 1-701, which governs the determination of a disassociated partner’s buyout price when a partnership is not dissolved, we reverse and remand for a new determination in keeping with the statute’s requirements. Otherwise, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment. We, therefore, affirm in part, and reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In this termination of parental rights action, the father has appealed the trial court’s final order terminating his parental rights to the minor child, Brayla T. (“the Child”) based on several statutory grounds. The mother and the stepfather filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and to allow the stepfather to adopt the Child after the juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected as to the father. The trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the father’s parental rights upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that the father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit the Child and had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds applicable solely to putative fathers. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate the father’s parental rights. The father has appealed. Having determined that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the father was a putative father, we reverse as to those two statutory grounds applicable only to putative fathers. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the father’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Kimberly Reed, pled guilty to forgery, a Class E felony; identity theft, a Class D felony; theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $2,500, a Class E felony; theft of property valued at less than $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor; attempted misdemeanor theft, a Class B misdemeanor; fraudulent use of a credit card, a Class A misdemeanor; criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; and criminal trespass, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -14-103, -14-114, -14-118, - 14-150, -14-405, -16-301. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Scott A. Brown, pled guilty to one count of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and one count of possession of more than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years in the Department of Correction. Following a hearing to determine whether the Defendant should be placed on the sex offender registry, the trial court ordered that the Defendant be placed on the registry, which decision the Defendant now appeals. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, David Von Brown, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony by a person having a prior felony conviction, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the effective seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment that arises from an alleged breach of confidentiality during a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) process. The RFP contained a confidentiality provision stating that the defendant would “maintain strict confidentiality of all information provided in response to this RFP.” The plaintiff submitted the lowest bid, but after two requests for revised proposals, which the plaintiff declined to provide, the defendant awarded the contract to another business. In its complaint, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant revealed information about the plaintiff’s proposal to the other bidders in violation of the confidentiality provision to encourage them to lower their bids and, as a consequence, the plaintiff sustained damages. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged the defendant disclosed to the other bidders that they were not the lowest bidder and the percentage by which their bids exceeded the average bid. Following discovery, the trial court summarily dismissed all claims. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim on the ground that there was a valid contract. We also affirm the dismissal of the breach of contract claim on the ground that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant breached the agreement or that the alleged breach caused the plaintiff to sustain damages.

Father appeals the trial court’s decision to allow grandparent visitation. We vacate and remand the trial court’s order because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact for us to review its decision regarding its subject matter jurisdiction.

This case involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother and father. The petitioners alleged four grounds for termination against both parents: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) persistence of conditions; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court found all four grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also found that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate both of the parents’ rights. The mother and father appealed separately. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

This is a dependency and neglect case. Appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services received a referral of possible child abuse. Following Appellee’s investigation, the children were placed in foster care. Both parents were arrested on child abuse charges. Thereafter, Appellee initiated a dependency and neglect action in the juvenile court. In her criminal case, Appellant/Mother entered a best interest/Alford plea to the charge of child endangerment. Subsequently, the juvenile court found the children dependent and neglected. On de novo review, the trial court found that: (1) Mother’s Alford plea was dispositive of her guilt on the child endangerment charge; (2) Mother committed severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102 (b)(27)(C); and (3) the children were dependent and neglected. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this case, the trial court ruled, and the majority affirms, that Mother’s conviction for child endangerment is preclusive evidence that she committed severe abuse in this dependency and neglect action. Because I believe that the majority opinion fails to consider the effect of the diversion that Mother received, I must respectfully dissent.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, of two counts of rape of a child, and the trial court ordered consecutive thirty-year sentences for each conviction, for an effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgments. State v. William Rolandus Keel, No. M2016-00354-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 111312 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 11, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 13, 2017). The Petitioner timely filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition through appointed counsel. After hearings on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court failed to provide him a full and fair post-conviction hearing. He further maintains that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court on the Petitioner’s various motions, but conclude that the post-conviction court improperly limited the Petitioner’s right to testify at the third part of the post-conviction hearing. Accordingly, we remand the case for a hearing to allow the Petitioner the opportunity to provide testimony concerning the allegations in his petition.

This is an appeal of a case involving a contract dispute. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.