APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Maliq Asadi Muhammad, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of probation for his Range I,
eight-year sentence for possession with the intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2018). The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Allen Hill, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2018 conviction for possession with the intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of cocaine, for which he is serving a twenty-year sentence as a Range II offender. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his guilty plea involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The defendant, Michael William Shavers, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of the 10-year effective sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of attempted second degree murder in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Steve M. Jarman (“defendant”) was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his girlfriend, Shelly Heath (“victim”). At trial, the State was permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant allegedly assaulted the victim two years prior to her death, an act for which he was tried and acquitted. The defendant appealed his conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed based, in part, on the acquitted-act evidence being used at trial. We accepted the State’s appeal to consider two issues: (1) whether the rule announced in State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981), which prohibits the use of acquitted-act evidence against a defendant at a subsequent trial, should be overruled, and (2) if so, whether the trial court properly admitted the acquitted-act evidence as a prior bad act under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a thorough review of the case law in this area and the record before us on appeal, we expressly overrule our decision in Holman to the extent that it prohibits the use of acquitted-act evidence against a defendant in a subsequent trial under all circumstances. Additionally, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the acquitted-act evidence, pursuant to Rule 404(b), under the theory that it was relevant to show the defendant’s intent. We also hold that additional errors in admitting threats made by the defendant against the victim or the victim’s sister, not at issue in this appeal, were harmless. For reasons stated herein, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision and reinstate the defendant’s conviction.

Petitioner, Quinton A. Cage, appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief in which he argues that he was deprived of a fair trial. Because we determine that Petitioner has failed to file a timely notice of appeal or provide a reason as to why the timely filing of the notice of appeal should be waived, the appeal is dismissed.

A father appeals the trial court’s decision terminating his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support both grounds and that termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted Petitioner, Leonel Lopez, for first degree murder. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. Petitioner received a twenty-year sentence. This Court upheld Petitioner’s conviction on appeal. State v. Lopez, 440 S.W.3d 601 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2014). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and that the trial court made various errors. After two hearings, the post-conviction court denied relief. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Bryan James Cooke, challenges his effective sentence of two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole resulting from his convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated burglary, and a theft offense. Both the Defendant’s motion for a new trial and his notice of appeal were filed over one year after the entry of the judgment forms, and the Defendant has given no explanation of the untimely filings. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Miguel Saenz, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition as time-barred. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Dwight Michael Alston, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify and for failing to investigate and raise issues regarding the competence of the Petitioner’s son. Additionally, the Petitioner asserts that the postconviction court erred in finding that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues on appeal that were included in the motion for new trial. The Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court erred in not allowing a continuance or bifurcated hearing so that appellate counsel could be present to testify. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Kenneth Darrin Fisher, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Specifically, the petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly prepare the petitioner to testify at trial; failing to object to the State’s assertion that the gun found in the petitioner’s vehicle was an “assault rifle;” failing to object to the admission of the unredacted video of the petitioner’s police interview; and failing to appeal the trial court’s admission of Ms. Burchett’s recorded preliminary hearing testimony. The petitioner also asserts he was deprived due process when the post-conviction court sustained the State’s objection regarding Ms. Green’s testimony. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The mother of an eight-year-old child petitioned to have the primary residential parent designation changed from the father to herself. The juvenile court found she failed to show that a material change of circumstance warranted such a change, and she appealed. We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Carlton Smith, of three counts of burglary and one count each of assault and theft. As a result of his convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 12 years’ confinement for each count of burglary and 11 months and 29 days for assault and theft. The trial court merged the three burglary convictions into one count and ordered the defendant’s sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges the application of the burglary statute, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and claims his misdemeanor convictions for theft and assault should merge into his conviction for burglary. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we conclude the defendant’s convictions for assault and theft should be merged with his conviction for burglary and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of amended judgments in accordance with this opinion.

This consolidated appeal concerns a father’s action, filed pro se, to be granted custody of his child, or, in the alternative, reasonable visitation without the requirement of paying child support. Following a series of hearings in juvenile court, the father was named the primary residential parent, a permanent parenting plan was adopted, and the child support proceedings were assigned a separate docket number to be handled by Maximus/Child Support Services. Because the action was originally yet mistakenly filed as a dependency and neglect action by the father, the mother appealed the juvenile court’s decision to circuit court. On the father’s motion to alter or amend, the juvenile court struck the dependency and neglect language from its order, and the circuit court then dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision in decreeing this matter a paternity and visitation action, and we find that the circuit court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal.

In this wrongful death action, the plaintiff, the decedent’s spouse, asserted claims against multiple defendants. The plaintiff settled with all but one of the defendants prior to trial, and the settling defendants were dismissed from the case. At trial, the sole remaining defendant asserted the comparative fault of the decedent and the settling defendants. The jury assigned percentages of fault to the decedent, the defendant, and the settling defendants but returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The jury found noneconomic damages that, when reduced by the percentage of the decedent’s fault, exceeded the statutory cap. So the trial court entered a judgment against the defendant based on its percentage fault as applied to the statutory cap. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the statutory cap was incorrectly applied. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Donquise Tremonte Alexander, entered a guilty plea to second-degree murder and was sentenced to thirty years in confinement. Following a motion to correct an illegal sentence and an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition to correct a clerical error on his judgment form, alleging that the form was not stamped “filed.” The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Following our review, we affirm.

The defendant, William Johnson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Eddie Smith, appeals his conviction for second degree murder and his twentyone-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in (1) excluding proof of the victim’s prior bad acts as corroborative evidence that the victim was the initial aggressor and (2) instructing the jury that Defendant had a duty to retreat before using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury in selfdefense. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Anthony Thompson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his conviction of first degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This is a negligence case arising out of an injury suffered by a middle school student when a chair fell on his finger in his school’s lunchroom. The trial court determined that summary judgment was warranted as a matter of law because there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that a dangerous condition existed and because the incident was not foreseeable.  We conclude that there is no dispute of material fact and that summary judgment in favor of the school district was properly granted; accordingly, we affirm.

Petitioner, Joseph S. McNair, Jr., appeals from the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal and in his pro se petition, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court permitted the State to improperly amend the original indictment. After review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Defendants Calvin Smith and Hayden Bowen for attempted first degree murder in counts one and three and for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in counts two and four. Each Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the failure of the State to name a specific victim in counts one and three violated their right against double jeopardy. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed all counts of the indictment. The State appeals as of right from the trial court’s dismissal of Defendants’ indictment, arguing that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictment based on the weight of the evidence and that the indictment provided sufficient protection against double jeopardy. After a thorough review, the judgments of the criminal court are reversed, the indictment is reinstated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s decision to change the non-marital children’s surname from that of the mother to the father. We vacate the trial court’s decision and remand for findings of fact to facilitate appellate review.

The Petitioner, Marquette Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

A general sessions court entered a one-year order of protection prohibiting the plaintiff from having contact with the defendants, who are the plaintiff’s ex-wife and the couple’s minor child. The plaintiff failed to appeal the order within ten days as required by statute. Forty-two days later, he filed a document in the chancery court titled “Petition to Enroll and Certify A Foreign Judgment and Appeal in Nature of Writ of Error.” The plaintiff attached to his pleading an incomplete copy of the couple’s 2008 Texas divorce decree that granted him parenting time with the minor child and asked the chancery court to hold a new hearing and determine whether the general sessions court erred by issuing the order of protection. The plaintiff later filed a motion asking for interim parenting time with the child. The defendants filed a notice of limited appearance, and among other things, asked the chancery court to dismiss the action for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. They also requested attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending the action, relying on statutes to support these requests. The chancery court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the appeal untimely and the method of appeal obsolete, and also determining that the petition for enrollment was defective on its face because the defendant had attached an incomplete copy of the Texas decree. The chancery court initially denied the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs but granted their motion to alter or amend and ultimately awarded attorney’s fees and costs totaling $25,398.21. The plaintiff appealed, challenging only the award of attorney’s fees. The defendants asked for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. Before reaching these issues, however, the Court of Appeals sua sponte held that the chancery court erred by dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the “writ of error remains an avenue for review of judgments of general sessions courts.” Rather than remanding the matter to the chancery court for consideration of the merits of the plaintiff’s writ of error appeal, however, the Court of Appeals also addressed the defendants’ challenge to the award of attorney’s fees. The intermediate appellate court ruled that a statute authorized the chancery court to award the defendants’ attorney’s fees for defending against the plaintiff’s writ of error appeal but not for fees incurred defending against the plaintiff’s petition to enroll the Texas divorce decree. As a result, the Court of Appeals vacated the award of attorney’s fees and remanded to the chancery court for a hearing and a determination of the fees incurred solely in defense of the plaintiff’s writ of error appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal. This Court granted the defendants’ application for permission to appeal. We hold that the chancery court correctly concluded that the writ of error is no longer a viable method of appeal in this State and dismissed the untimely appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold that the chancery court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s request to enroll the Texas decree because he provided an incomplete copy of the decree. Finally, we hold that the chancery court correctly awarded the defendants’ attorney’s fees for defending against the plaintiff’s pleading and did not err by failing to limit the award to the writ of error appeal. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the judgment of the chancery court in its entirety, and remand to the chancery court for a determination of the reasonable attorney’s fees the defendants have incurred and should be awarded for this appeal.